By any means necessary : an interpretive phenomenological analysis study of post 9/11 American abusive violence in Iraq by Tsukayama, John K.
BY ANY MEANS NECESSARY : AN INTERPRETIVE
PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS STUDY OF POST 9/11
AMERICAN ABUSIVE VIOLENCE IN IRAQ
John K. Tsukayama
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews
2014
Full metadata for this item is available in
Research@StAndrews:FullText
at:
http://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/4510
This item is protected by original copyright
  i 
 
By Any Means Necessary: An Interpretive 
Phenomenological Analysis Study of Post 9/11 
American Abusive Violence in Iraq 
 
John K. Tsukayama 
 
This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment for the degree of  
PhD  
at the  
University of St Andrews 
 
 
 
July 10, 2013 
   ii 
 
 
Abstract 
This study examines the phenomenon of abusive violence (AV) in the context 
of the American Post-9/11 Counter-terrorism and Counter-insurgency campaigns.  
Previous research into atrocities by states and their agents has largely come from 
examinations of totalitarian regimes with well-developed torture and assassination 
institutions.  The mechanisms influencing willingness to do harm have been examined 
in experimental studies of obedience to authority and the influences of 
deindividuation, dehumanization, context and system.  This study used Interpretive 
Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) to examine the lived experience of AV reported by 
fourteen American military and intelligence veterans.  Participants were AV observers, 
objectors, or abusers.   
Subjects described why AV appeared sensible at the time, how methods of 
violence were selected, and what sense they made of their experiences after the fact.  
Accounts revealed the roles that frustration, fear, anger and mission pressure played 
to prompt acts of AV that ranged from the petty to heinous.  Much of the AV was tied 
to a shift in mission view from macro strategic aims of CT and COIN to individual and 
small group survival. 
Routine hazing punishment soldiers received involving forced exercise and 
stress positions made similar acts inflicted on detainees unrecognizable as abusive.  
Overt and implied permissiveness from military superiors enabled AV extending to 
torture, and extra-judicial killings.  Attempting to overcome feelings of vulnerability, 
powerlessness and rage, subjects enacted communal punishment through 
indiscriminate beatings and shooting.  Participants committed AV to amuse 
themselves and humiliate their enemies; some killed detainees to force confessions 
from others, conceal misdeeds, and avoid routine paperwork. Participants realized 
that AV practices were unnecessary, counter-productive, and self-damaging.  Several 
reduced or halted their AV as a result.  The lived experience of AV left most 
respondents feeling guilt, shame, and inadequacy, whether they committed abuse or 
failed to stop it. 
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Chapter I: Understanding the move 
from contemplation to vicious action 
In the spring of 2004 the world learned the name Abu Ghraib.  I remember 
being disgusted at the pictures of military police exulting over pyramids of nude 
detainees and the stories of humiliation, threats, and other abuse taking place there.  
These outrageous images documented violations of stated American norms of 
prisoner of war treatment first established by George Washington in 17751.  As an 
investigator with more than twenty years’ experience of conducting interviews and 
interrogations,  I was mystified that  anyone would think this kind of behavior would 
achieve the rapport I knew was crucial to getting reluctant people to tell you their 
most intimate secrets.  In subsequent weeks, I was further disturbed to read 
comments made by my fellow citizens arguing that these “terrorists” deserved what 
they got, and that the soldiers were merely protecting Americans from the next 9/11.  
These attitudes seemed to hint at why engaging in abuse and torture seems to be a 
regular companion to war as practiced by the country that proudly claims the title of 
world standard bearer of truth and justice.  The “American Way” apparently included 
a willingness to contemplate psychological and physical torture of helpless captives 
                                                     
1
 The American army has long understood the importance of properly treating captured prisoners and 
the civilian population during incursion into or occupation of foreign territory.  George Washington 
issued clear instructions to Benedict Arnold in his September 14, 1775 Order regarding the invasion of 
Canada, some of which were quite detailed in regard to the treatment of prisoners, Canadian civilians 
and their religion: 
Any other Prisoners who may fall into your Hands, you will treat with as much Humanity and 
kindness, as may be consistent with your own Safety and the publick Interest. Be very 
particular in restraining not only your own Troops, but the Indians from all Acts of Cruelty and 
Insult, which will disgrace the American Arms, and irritate our Fellow Subjects against us….As 
the Contempt of the Religion of a Country by ridiculing any of its Ceremonies or affronting its 
Ministers or Votaries has ever been deeply resented, you are to be particularly careful to 
restrain every Officer and Soldier from such Imprudence and Folly and to punish every 
Instance of it. (Washington, 1775a) 
Washington’s accompanying letter to Arnold of the same date directs strong action in the case of 
transgressions: 
Should any American Soldier be so base and infamous as to injure any Canadian or Indian, in 
his Person or Property, I do most earnestly enjoin you to bring him to such severe and 
exemplary Punishment as the Enormity of the Crime may require. Should it extend to Death 
itself it will not be disproportional to its Guilt at such a Time and in such a Cause… 
(Washington, 1775b) 
Washington’s practical reasoning for elevated concern for the good conduct of his troops is made plain 
when, referring to the Canadians and Natives in the Order; he writes, “you must carefully inculcate 
upon the Officers and Soldiers under your Command that not only the Good of their Country and their 
Honour, but their Safety depends upon the Treatment of these People” (Washington, 177a, emphasis 
mine).  Washington spells out the compelling reasons for any army in any age to discourage its soldiers 
from committing abusive violence.    
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while at the same time decrying the barbaric nature of extremists.  What Abu Ghraib 
made undeniable is that Americans can and did move beyond contemplation to 
vicious action. 
This study seeks to understand the lived experiences of American military and 
intelligence operatives who were presented with the choice to abuse captured 
enemies in the Counter-Terrorism (CT) and Counter Insurgency (COIN) campaigns 
following September 11, 2001.  Specifically, I have tried to find and interview veterans 
of military and civilian US forces who had first-hand experience with captured 
insurgents and terrorists in the so-called Global War on Terrorism.  Thirteen military 
veterans and one civilian intelligence operative agreed to provide their individual 
stories after being promised anonymity. Most did not engage in the perverse behavior 
depicted in the photographs from Abu Ghraib.  That being said, the study documents 
that some of the fourteen abused detainees in ways far more atrocious than did the 
Abu Ghraib military police guards.  All were confronted with the choice to commit, 
eschew or oppose abusive violence (AV).  The military personnel all served in Iraq, and 
it was there that the majority of their experience with abusive violence was gained. 
They all had opportunities to see abusive violence against both detainees and the 
general populace.2   
In this study I have used the following definition for abusive violence: violence 
directed at people not necessary for immediate self-defense.  This definition was 
meant to include violence and the threat of violence against non-combatants 
including both detainees and members of the public; it was not intended to include 
normal combat operations.  The definition did not appear to prompt confusion among 
the study participants, some of whom did participate in traditional combat during the 
invasion of Iraq or while under attack in convoys, patrols, or raids.  It should be 
understood that the definition contemplates unnecessary force against people who 
are unarmed at the time of the violence.  This appears reasonable as none of the 
study participants chose to include armed persons when describing abusive violence 
they observed or committed. 
This study uses three primary questions as means of approaching the 
experience of Americans who elected to commit abusive violence.  First, why did using 
abusive violence makes sense at the time to participants?  Second, how did AV 
abusers choose the method of abuse employed, with a corollary as to how they 
learned of possible methods from which to choose.  Finally, how do veterans now 
view the abusive violence they observed or perpetrated?   
                                                     
2
 The civilian intelligence operative only worked with a single high-value detainee outside the United 
States. 
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This study is situated in the discipline of Terrorism Studies, specifically that 
branch of Terrorism Studies that considers counter-terrorist measures and responses.  
For more than thirty years Paul Wilkinson wrote about his views of the correct 
approaches democracies should use in response to terrorism.  A key element of what 
he termed “the hard-line approach and the rule of law,” was his third principle: “the 
government and security forces must at all times act within the law.  If they fail to do 
this, they will undermine their democratic legitimacy and public confidence in, and 
respect for, the police and the criminal justice system (Wilkinson 2006, 62).”  
Wilkinson addressed the US war-framing of post-9/11 counter-terrorism, the 
abandonment of criminal justice systems, and the rise of a view that “in some 
circumstances inhuman and degrading treatment of suspects and even torture may be 
justified in the name of the ‘War on Terror’ (2006, 63).”  Wilkinson describes the 
problems at the heart of polices countenancing such abusive treatment: 
By abandoning the due process under the rule of law and by violations of 
human rights of suspects, we betray the very values and principles are the 
foundation of the democracies we seek to defend.  We are also corrupting our 
democracies and those public officials, members of the military and others 
who are ordered to carry out such policies. (ibid.) 
Wilkinson also noted the value of such violations in the propaganda and 
recruitment campaigns of al Qaeda arousing potential recruits by reminding them of 
abuses against Muslims at Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib.  
Part of what Terrorism Studies should do is to identify which measures are 
effective in combatting terrorism.  In doing so, efforts should be made to examine 
those counter-terrorism measures that may have unintended or adverse 
consequences, a segment of what perhaps may be called “what doesn’t work.”  
Inasmuch as this study is occasioned by American military and intelligence services 
which have failed to control, or intentionally allowed, abusive violence in CT and COIN 
campaigns, it may be looked at as studying, at the individual level, what Wilkinson 
described as the corruption of public officials and military service members carrying 
out policies that allow abuse and torture. 
Some of the information revealed in this study may also address certain of the 
research desiderata that were first developed by Alex Schmid while he was with the 
United Nations’ Terrorism Prevention Branch.  Berto Jongman’s 2007 update of 
Schmid’s list includes a number of topics related to the present study.  Their 
consolidated list included some 490 topics organized within 25 categories.  Under the 
category titled “Counterterrorist measures and responses” are the following topics: 
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 Interrogating terrorists: licit and illicit practices. 
 Torturing terrorists for purposes of intelligence gathering: how widespread is 
the practice? 
 The ‘export’ of terrorist suspects to regimes known for torture practices. 
 The justification and effectiveness of a policy of ‘terrorizing the terrorists’ (do 
to the terrorists what they do to innocents). (Jongman 2007) 
While this study is anchored squarely in the lived experiences of fourteen 
individuals presented with potential abusive violence while part of large CT and COIN 
campaigns, their accounts can help us understand something of the “corrupting” 
effects of a liberal democracy overwhelmingly employing a war model, with forces 
that were poorly prepared to resist the pressures to be abusive. 
Since the Abu Ghraib abuse was publicly revealed, much has been written 
about the steps taken by the American government to create a regime in Iraq, 
Guantanamo Bay, and at foreign detention centers operated by the Central 
Intelligence Agency that permitted the interrogation of detainees using physically and 
psychologically coercive methods (Siems 2011, Jaffer and Singh 2007, Mayer 2009, 
Sands 2009).  While I will touch upon some of the history where it intersects with the 
actions of trained military intelligence interrogators in Iraq, this study considers little 
of the state-level decision-making relative detainee combatant status and legalistic 
opinions of what constitutes torture.  As indicated in the research questions, I look 
much more closely at the thoughts and experiences of those individuals who were 
tasked with carrying out America’s CT and COIN initiatives, paying particular attention 
to the moments when abusive violence was presented as a viable option.  Others 
before me have asked similar questions, mostly with respect to government-organized 
torture and killing campaigns.  The answers drawn from social psychology and history 
provide potential ways of understanding the individual experiences related by my 
study’s participants. 
Obedience to Authority 
When Stanley Milgram began his years-long exploration of obedience to orders 
to inflict harm on others he was addressing the question of whether Americans in the 
late twentieth-century could be functionaries in a repeat of the kind of genocide 
carried out by Nazi Germany (Zimbardo 2009).  His series of experiments revealed 
how ordinary people tend to obey authority when it directs them to harm others.  The 
experiments, although by now famous to many students of human behavior, bear 
some description.   
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In each experiment a research subject, dubbed the “teacher,” was directed to 
administer an electric shock to a confederate of the researchers who was dubbed the 
“learner.”  The shock was to be given in progressively higher voltages after any failure 
of the “learner” to properly recite a short word list.  The “teacher” was seated at an 
apparatus with 30 switches used to deliver the shocks that were labeled with voltage 
levels ranging from 15 volts (marked as “slight shock”) through 375 volts (marked as 
“danger: severe shock”) up to two values, 435 volts and 450 volts (marked simply “X X 
X”).  The “teachers” were instructed by an authority figure, a researcher dressed in a 
lab coat, in the procedure to be followed (Milgram 2009).   
At certain points in the proceedings the “teachers” heard the “learner” 
reacting to the shocks, at first in apparent discomfort, then with progressively 
vehement expressions of pain, followed by demands to be released from the 
experiment and later by a declaration that his heart condition was being aggravated.  
At the higher voltage ranges the “learner” was silent when the “teachers” actuated 
the shock switches.  If “teachers” expressed doubt or reluctance to continue shocking 
the “learner,” the research experimenter would tell them that the experiment 
required that they continue.  Unknown to the “teacher” subjects of the experiments, 
the “learner” was a middle-aged volunteer who had been trained to utter the 
graduated expressions of pain and fear, and that the apparatus did not deliver any 
shocks at all to him (Milgram 2009).   
Milgram found that more than 60% of the subjects in his initial two 
experimental designs remained obedient to the lab-coated researchers’ admonition to 
carry on with the experiment until the highest voltage shock was delivered (2009, 35).  
Milgram ran a number of variations in the experiment including, among others, 
changing the distance between the “teacher” to the “learner;” having confederate 
“teachers” provide examples of disobedience; and changing the proximity of the 
authority “researcher.”  He was able to demonstrate conditions that would affect the 
number of “teachers” willing to inflict the top-level shock.  In the design where the 
subject’s involvement was distanced from actually pressing the punishment switch (by 
being assigned the role of helpful accomplice to the person doing the shocking) the 
level of obedience rose to 92.5%  (Milgram 2009, 119).  As Milgram explained, “Any 
force or event that is placed between the subject and the consequences of shocking 
the victim, any factor that will create distance between the subject and the victim, will 
lead to a reduction of the strain on the participant and thus lessen disobedience 
(2009, 121).” 
The linchpin concept for Milgram (2009) was the “agentic state” in which the 
individual internalizes an identity as the agent for carrying out the orders of another, 
the other having an acknowledged authority over the individual.  To the extent that 
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the individual accepts the role as agent for the authority figure, and at the same time 
denies personal responsibility for the acts imposed upon others and the consequences 
of those acts, he will accede to the directives to inflict harm.   
Before reaching the agentic state, there are a number of preconditions 
Milgram theorized which facilitate the submission of the individual to the mandates of 
authority, especially authority in a hierarchy.  These include the experience of being 
raised within the original hierarchy where obedience is learned (the family), which 
experience is followed by similar hierarchical structures such as school and 
employment.  In each situation the individual is conditioned to follow the directions of 
the authority figure (parent, teacher, or boss) through a series of personal experiences 
and observations which reinforce obedience via rewards and punishments.  
Eventually, the individual also learns that authority does not only derive from the 
person of the authority figure (as with a parent), but that authority can derive from 
the acknowledged relative social position the other occupies (as with a higher-ranking 
soldier) (Milgram 2009, 138-139). 
With specific regard to the ability of individuals to accept morally 
reprehensible dictates from authority figures, Milgram (2009) describes the 
importance of the authority’s ideological framing of the situation and the actions and 
the individual’s acceptance of both the legitimacy of the authority defining the frame 
and the consequent acceptance of the situational definition.  The importance of the 
individual holding this perspective is of signal importance to Milgram as he explains, 
“it is this ideological abrogation to the authority that constitutes the principal basis of 
obedience.  If, after all, the world of the situation is as the authority defines it, a 
certain set of actions follows logically (2009, 145).”  Presumably, soldiers, no less than 
experimental subjects, can be expected to carry out the logical corollaries flowing 
from the situational definitions laid down by their legitimate superiors. 
Once the individual has accepted the legitimacy of the authority figure to issue 
orders and the framing of the situation as handed down by that authority, the 
individual is within the agentic state that promotes obedience.  That the orders so 
issued may be contrary to the normal desires and actions of the individual little 
influences this obedience since the individual is able to shift the responsibility for the 
actions to the authority.  Indeed, at this point the individual measures his own 
morality based upon how effectively he carries out the dictates of authority.  The 
individual carries out these orders with a clear conscience since as Milgram states, 
“for a man to feel responsible for his actions, he must sense the behavior has flowed 
from ‘the self’ (2009, 146).”  With the actions flowing from the authority, and his 
obedience simply a consequence of providing socially demanded obedience, the 
individual can administer the injurious actions with little self-censure. 
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Milgram (2009) describes what he calls “binding” factors that prevent the 
individual from breaking from the agentic state and obedience to authority.  Among 
them is the repetitive nature of the task.  With each recurrent infliction of harm the 
individual builds a growing commitment to the correctness of his participation since it 
becomes more difficult to repudiate the sheer number of times the individual has 
obeyed the harmful order.  Milgram also notes that the social agreement made by the 
subject to carry out the experimenter’s instructions creates a situation from which it is 
very difficult for the subject to break.  Keeping one’s promises, being obedient to 
authority, and avoiding the appearance of rudeness or arrogance are all social 
conventions the subject would have to breach in order to refuse to carry on with the 
conduct demanded by the authority.  Finally, the prospect of disobeying engenders 
nebulous emotions of dread in the individual, what Milgram calls “anxiety.”  This 
anxiety steers the individual away from disobedience.  Accordingly, recurrence, 
obligation, and dread bind the individual to continued obedience in carrying out harm  
(Milgram 2009, 148-153). 
Given that the Milgram experiments were conducted in the 1960s and 1970s, 
it is a reasonable question to ask whether contemporary Americans would still be as 
obedient to authority.  In 2006 Santa Clara University researcher James Berger (2009) 
conducted a modified replication of the Milgram experiment.  The timing of his study I 
consider to be useful with respect to my research since it falls in the midst of Post-
9/11 American CT and COIN campaigns around the world, and well into the 
deployments of American military and intelligence personnel to Iraq and Afghanistan.   
Burger’s experiment was modified to take into account ethical questions that were 
leveled at the Milgram research relating to the potential harm to participants who 
were duped into believing that they had administered maximal electric charges to 
another human being.  Noting that nearly 80% of Milgram’s subjects who crossed the 
150 volt threshold in the most familiar of the experimental variants progressed 
through to the 450 volt level, Burger designed his study to halt the progression once 
subjects had indicated their choice at the 150 volt decision point.  Burger, describing 
the 70% of subjects in his base experiment who were willing to proceed beyond 150 
volts, wrote that, “this rate is slightly lower than the percentage who continued 
beyond this point in Milgram’s comparable condition (82.5%), although the difference 
fell short of statistical significance (2009, 8).”  Burger’s research does not 
fundamentally question Milgram’s findings or theories.  Indeed, as he states, “my 
partial replication of Milgram’s procedure suggests that average Americans react to 
this laboratory situation today much the way they did 45 years ago (2009, 9).” 
Burger selected the 150 volt level as the cut-off for his experiment since it was 
to the Milgram results, in his words, “something of a point of no return (2009, 2).”  In 
Contemplation to Vicious Action  8 
 
 
Milgram’s experiment, of the 82.5% of participants who went beyond 150 volts, about 
four in five (79%) actually went to the fullest extent allowed, or 450 volts. In 
examining Milgram’s reported levels of compliance over the fourteen experimental 
variants where any subjects exceeded 360 volts, one detects an even stronger “point 
of no return" than that reported by Burger. 
The machine used in the experiment was marked with a variety of word 
descriptors for various ranges of shocks.  The first six descriptors were Slight, 
Moderate, Strong, Very Strong, Intense, and Extreme.  At the 375 volt level the 
labeling changed.  Here Milgram’s machine used a specifically cautionary shock 
descriptor of Danger: Severe (Milgram 2009, 28).  This seems inconsistent with the 
scripted reply meant to prod subjects concerned with the “learner’s” exposure to 
harm: “Although the shocks may be painful, there is no permanent tissue damage, so 
please go on (Milgram 2009, 21).”  As such, the shocks delivered at levels above 360 
volts were done under more dire3 labeling than the lesser levels. 
The level of continued compliance by those who proceeded to the Danger: 
Severe levels and continued to the full 450 volt switch was even more pronounced 
than the 150 volt threshold.   Of the 261 subjects in these 14 experiments who went 
to 370 volts, 97% went all the way to the upper limit (Milgram 2009, 29,60-61,94-
95,118).  While Burger’s analysis relating to 150 volts as a predictor of likely 
persistence in obedience to higher levels of pain infliction was applied to his 
experimental design, it seems a reasonable expectation that this logic may translate to 
real-world situations where engaging in serious  levels of abusive violence might signal 
enduring obedience.  In other words, one might reasonably expect that troops who 
commit heinous acts in CT and COIN operations will continue to do so when so 
ordered. 
                                                     
3
 The next and last level of descriptor was X X X, covering the final two switches of 435 volts and 450 
volts.  
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Table 1: Obedience at Upper Range: % of Milgram participant exceeding 360 volts continuing to maximum 
voltage 
Milgram 
Experiment #
No. to 
375 volts
No. to  
450 volts
% to full 
450 volts
1 27 26 96%
2 25 25 100%
3 17 16 94%
4 12 12 100%
5 27 26 96%
6 20 20 100%
7 11 9 82%
8 26 26 100%
9 18 16 89%
10 19 19 100%
13 4 4 100%
16 13 13 100%
17 5 4 80%
18 37 37 100%
Aggregate 261 253 97%  
While Milgram’s experiments provide keys to understanding why many, 
perhaps most, people will obey orders to inflict pain, other sources of atrocious 
behavior exist that may well also  govern how abusive violence is carried out in CT and 
COIN. 
Dehumanization 
The subjects in Milgram’s experiments each met the actor posing as the 
learner and shared an initial identity as “volunteer” until separated into their 
“teacher” role through a sham lottery.  In some variants of the experiment the actor 
mentioned some trepidation over receiving shocks when mentioning a fictional heart 
condition.  As such, the subjects were given ample opportunity to meet the actor as a 
human being, even as one deserving sympathy.  What might have happened if the 
humanity of the “learner” had been called into question, if he had been 
dehumanized? 4  
Placing other humans into an outgroup is associated with both neurological 
responses of arousal and disgust as well as prejudicial thinking and assignment of 
negative attributes to the outgroup members (Bandura, Underwood and Fromson 
1975; Fiske, Harris, and Cuddy 2004).  One might consider the dehumanized other as 
                                                     
4
 The OED defines dehumanize as “To deprive of human character or attributes (Oxford University Press 
2013).” 
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the ultimate outgroup.  Stanford University professor Philip Zimbardo contends that 
“dehumanization is the central construct in our understanding of ‘man’s inhumanity 
to man.’  Dehumanization occurs whenever some human beings consider other 
human beings to be excluded from the moral order of being a human person. . . . 
Dehumanization is a central process in prejudice, racism, and discrimination. . . . 
Under such conditions, it becomes possible for normal, morally upright, and even 
usually idealistic people to perform acts of destructive cruelty (Zimbardo 2008, 307).”  
How this process operated in one important study provides additional insight to the 
lessons from Milgram’s study. 
In 1975 Albert Bandura, Bill Underwood, and Michael Fromson reported on 
their study of processes that contribute to the lessening of self-restraint in aggression. 
They posited that such lessened self-restraint, or “disinhibition,” of aggression stems 
in part from a process by which individuals apply standards of conduct to themselves 
and are hesitant to violate those self-standards since,  “they do things that give them 
self-satisfaction and a sense of self-worth but refrain from conduct that produces self-
devaluative consequences (Bandura, Underwood, and Fromson 1975, 254).”  
Assuming that avoiding committing cruelty and aggression toward others is part of the 
individual’s standards of conduct, such practices are expected to be inhibited. 
In their study the authors describe why dehumanization helps in disinhibition 
of aggression.  They write that, “inflicting harm upon individuals who are regarded as 
subhuman or debased is less apt to arouse self-reproof than if they are seen as human 
beings with dignifying qualities.  The reason for this is that people who are reduced to 
base creatures are likely to be viewed as insensitive to maltreatment and 
influenceable only through more primitive methods (Bandura, Underwood, and 
Fromson 1975, 255).” The study designed a means of observing the effects of 
dehumanization in a laboratory setting. 
Study subjects, recruited from junior colleges5, were, as with Milgram’s 
subjects, assigned the task of activating a shock generator in response to correct or 
incorrect solutions supposedly proposed by a group of decision makers.  The subjects 
were alone in a booth with the shock generator and were signaled by amber or red 
lights to withhold or inflict shocks.  Subjects were allowed to choose from among ten 
levels of shock to administer, so were free to act with more or less punitiveness.  
There were no actual decision makers, and the machines generated no shocks. 
                                                     
5
 In the United States, junior colleges refer to two-year institutions of higher learning, which do not 
award bachelors degrees, and commonly enroll persons directly out of high-school.  This study may 
offer particularly useful information for my project as eight of the fourteen DIS participants entered 
military service while in the seventeen to nineteen year age bracket. 
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Prior to commencing the exercise, the study subjects were duped into 
believing that they had overheard a candid conversation between two researchers in 
which the fictional decision makers were described in one of three ways, “for subjects 
in the humanized condition, the decision makers were characterized as a perceptive, 
understanding and otherwise humanized group.  By contrast, in the dehumanized 
condition, the decision makers were described as an animalistic, rotten bunch.  In the 
neutral condition, no evaluative references were made as to the characteristics of the 
group (Bandura, Underwood, and Fromson 1975, 258).”   In addition to being divided 
into groups exposed to differing descriptions of the decision makers, the subjects 
were divided into other groupings: those who believed that they alone determined 
the level of shock inflicted and those who were under the impression that the shock 
delivered was an average of three subjects’ independent inputs.  This created the 
impression that the subjects either were solely responsible or were punishing the 
decision-makers under diffuse responsibility. 
Bandura found that individuals who believed that they were not solely 
responsible for choosing shock levels elected higher levels than those with purely 
individual responsibility, regardless of the labeled humanity of the decision-makers 
(1975, 258-259).  In other words, when believing that they were acting as part of a 
team selecting punishment levels, individuals were more punitive, and when fully 
responsible for the choice of pain infliction, were more lenient.   
The labeling was found to be, as Bandura reported, “highly effective in creating 
differential evaluations of the group members. . . . All three conditions differed 
significantly from one another . . . with the dehumanizing, neutral, and humanizing 
characterizations inducing degrading, neutral, and favorable evaluations, respectively 
(1975, 258).”  The level of perceived personal responsibility also caused differences in 
aggression.  Once subjects administered a shock in the first trial, the shared-
responsibility cohort turned to escalating levels of intensity which were significantly 
higher than the individual-responsibility subjects.   Also, when punishment failed to 
produce desired improvement in performance, the shared-responsibility group 
persisted in applying punishment while the individualized responsibility cohort tended 
to abandon higher levels of aggression.  Put simply, if at first aggression does not 
succeed; group actors will try and try again. 
In the same study Bandura examined the thought processes of the subjects in 
justifying the punitive sanctions they selected.  Their acceptance of such justifications 
varied according to the decision makers’ labels.  As Bandura explained, “when 
performers were humanized, subjects strongly disapproved of physical punishment 
and rarely excused its use.  By contrast, when performers were divested of 
humanness, subjects seldom condemned punitive techniques but often voiced self-
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absolving justifications.  The neutral condition, in turn, produced an intermediate 
diversity of responses.  Essentially the same pattern of results is replicated under both 
individualized and collective responsibility (1975, 262).”  The willingness to allow 
oneself to commit aggression is therefore apparently even more dependent upon the 
labeling applied to victims than the individualized or shared responsibility for that 
aggression.  Of course, one expects that a combination of diffuse responsibility and 
negative victim labeling will be worse than either condition operating alone. 
While this study demonstrated some of the effects of the briefest of exposure 
to dehumanizing labeling, disinhibition of aggression can also be achieved in other 
ways.  The study report lists a number of additional effective practices: “one method 
is to make reprehensible behavior personally and socially acceptable by construing it 
in terms of high moral principle.  Euphemistic labeling provides a convenient linguistic 
device for masking reprehensible activities or according them a respectable status.  
Self-deplored acts can also be made benign by contrasting them with more flagrant 
inhumanities.  Moral justifications and palliative comparisons can serve as effective 
disinhibitors of aggression because they not only eliminate self-generated deterrents 
but also engage self-reward in the service of inhumane conduct.  What was morally 
unacceptable becomes, through cognitive restructuring, a source of self-pride 
(Bandura, Underwood, and Fromson 1975, 254).”  In these studies, Milgram, Berger 
and Bandura looked primarily at the roles of authority, diffusion of responsibility, and 
labeling for clues to explain infliction of harm, but other factors have also been 
identified as working to bring out the worst in people. 
Deindividuation and Situation 
Researcher Philip Zimbardo (2008)conducted the Stanford Prison Experiment 
(SPE) in 1971, a ground-breaking study which sought to determine the relative power 
of individual disposition and situation to create or resist change in the individual 
thrust into the context of an immersive prison simulation.  Zimbardo uncovered 
evidence relating to the power of role adoption and situational context in creating 
behavior, both atrocious and submissive.  The SPE utilized an artificial prison setting in 
which university-age men were randomly assigned the roles of either prison guard or 
prisoner.  The participants had been screened by the research team to ensure a 
largely homogeneous group which Zimbardo described: “the prisoners are not more 
violent, hostile, or rebellious than the guards, and the guards aren’t more power-
seeking authoritarians (2008, 33).”  Zimbardo observed the powerful forces exerted 
upon the participants as they assumed their roles.  The “guards” enforced the rules of 
the “prison” as they set about to maintain routine and order, cementing the situation 
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as virtually real for the prisoners, the guards, and even Zimbardo himself who was the 
self-designated warden in the experiment.   
The effects of the experiment were so rapid and profound that Zimbardo failed 
to recognize the harm being perpetrated upon the participants until castigated by a 
visiting colleague.  The authoritative domineering change in one of the guards as he 
went “on duty,” alerted the colleague that much was amiss, and prompted objection 
to Zimbardo’s glee at the demeaning march to the toilets of hooded prisoners who 
were leg-hackled together.  Shortly after deciding to halt the experiment, but before 
announcing the termination, Zimbardo observed one of the most disturbing episodes 
of prisoner treatment as guards forced prisoners to simulate sodomy on one another.  
Of the transformation in the two groups of participants, Zimbardo wrote, “It is hard to 
imagine that such sexual humiliation could happen in only five days, when the young 
men all knew that this is a simulated prison experiment . . . . Yet, some guards have 
transformed into perpetrators of evil, and other guards have become passive 
contributors to the evil through their inaction.  Still other normal, healthy young men 
as prisoners have broken down under the situational pressures, while the remaining 
surviving prisoners have become zombie-like followers (2008, 172).”  Given the even 
greater level of power that Americans exercised over detainees in CT and COIN 
contexts, for periods often far longer than the SPE’s five day duration in which that 
power is exercised, and some superficial similarities between the SPE and Abu Ghraib, 
it is useful to examine Zimbardo’s explanation for the transformation. 
Writing his fullest account of the SPE decades after it was conducted, and after 
having served as an expert consultant to the legal team defending one of the Abu 
Ghraib guards, Zimbardo incorporates into his explanation of the cruel behavior at the 
SPE and Abu Ghraib the obedience to authority dynamics described by Milgram and 
the effects of victim dehumanization and diffusion of responsibility on aggression 
disinhibition studied by Bandura.  He places greater emphasis, however on the 
situation in which the actors were placed and the system which maintains such 
situations (Zimbardo 2008). 
Zimbardo (2008) also describes the role of deindividuation6 in creating 
situations in which abuse will flourish.  Deindividuation can be achieved by altering 
the individual’s appearance so that she is disguised, takes on an anonymous 
appearance, or is not distinguishable from others in a group or crowd.  In a study 
involving women who were either individually identified or deindividuated through 
the study protocols, the duration of electric shocks supposedly delivered to research 
                                                     
6
 The OED Online defines individuation as “the condition of being an individual; separate and 
continuous existence as a single indivisible object; individuality, personal identity (Oxford University 
Press 2013).” 
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confederates posing as creativity test takers was measured.  The bogus test-
takers/shock-victims were also ascribed by the subjects in either unfavorable or 
favorable terms based information also provided by the test procedures.  Under the 
experiment protocols the subjects could choose to press the electric shock button for 
any length of time or not at all.  All chose to administer some duration of shock to the 
victims, although those in the deindividuated state delivered shocks for twice as long 
as the individualized subjects, increased the level of shock over the series of trials, and 
did so without regard to their previous perception of the victims (Zimbardo 2008, 299-
300). 
Zimbardo interpreted the psychological effect of deindivduation on the 
women: “the escalation of shock, with repeated opportunities to administer its painful 
consequences appears to be an upward-spiraling effect of the emotional arousal that 
is being experienced. The agitated behavior becomes self-reinforcing, each action 
stimulating a stronger, less controlled next reaction.  Experientially, it comes not from 
some sadistic motives of wanting to harm others but rather from the energizing sense 
of one’s domination and control over others at that moment in time (2008, 300).”  The 
forces described by Zimbardo, especially when considered in the light of the SPE and 
the Abu Ghraib scandal appear to further explain the behavior of the guards in each 
situation. 
Zimbardo describes the strong influence of deindividuation and exposure to 
state of consciousness altering factors.  Zimbardo writes that the latter can include, 
“using alcohol or drugs, arousing strong emotions, engaging in hyper-intense actions, 
getting into an expanded present-time orientation where there is no concern for past 
or future, and projecting responsibility outward onto others rather than inward 
toward oneself (2008, 305).”  These factors will reduce the individual’s ability to 
evaluate his own actions as he is subsumed by the situation.  Instead, as Zimbardo 
explains: 
Deindividuation creates a unique psychological state in which behavior comes 
under the control of immediate situational demands and biological, hormonal 
urges. . . . A state of arousal is often both a precursor to and a consequence of 
deindividuation.  Its effects are amplified in novel or unstructured situations 
where typical response habits and character traits are nullified. . . . In the 
extreme, there is no sense of right and wrong, no thoughts of culpability for 
illegal acts or Hell for immoral ones. . . . What is possible and available 
dominates what is right and just.  The moral compass of individuals and groups 
has then lost its polarity. (2008, 305-306) 
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If one looks at the results of the SPE, the outcomes are well explained by the 
processes Zimbardo describes.  The guards were given uniforms and mirrored 
sunglasses by which their deindividuation was accomplished.  In addition, they were 
thrust into a novel situation dealing with persons whose dehumanization was 
accomplished by labeling them as “prisoners,” a nomenclature denoting moral 
transgression.  Their humanness was also reduced by only allowing them to be 
addressed, or to refer to themselves, by a prisoner number.  Further removal from 
normal society was achieved by clothing the prisoners only in hospital gowns tied 
(only partially) at the back, sans underwear.  The guards were addressed by title and 
last name, denoting their elevated status as both authority figure and full human 
being.    
In the briefing of the guards, the authority (in the person of Zimbardo as 
“Warden”) clearly defined the roles they were to inhabit for themselves and to create 
for the prisoners: the powerful and the powerless.  He did so through this situation-
setting address: 
We cannot physically abuse or torture them. . . . We can create boredom.  We 
can create a sense of frustration.  We can create fear in them, to some degree.  
We can create a notion of the arbitrariness that governs their lives, which are 
totally controlled by the system, by you, me. . . . They’ll have no privacy at all, 
there will be constant surveillance—nothing they do will be go unobserved.  
They will have no freedom of action.  They will be able to do nothing and say 
nothing we don’t permit. . . .In general, what all this should create in them is a 
sense of powerlessness.  We have total power in the situation.  They have 
none. (Zimbardo 2008, 55) 
If Milgram’s agentic state can be achieved with experimental subjects during a 
situation of short duration with one lab-coated authority figure giving neutral prompts 
such as “the experiment requires that you continue”  (Milgram 2009, 21), how much 
more dedication to carrying out Zimbardo’s regime can one expect when the situation 
and desired outcomes are  explicitly described by the authority both in verbal 
exhortation and the accoutrements of domination including locked cells, shackles, and 
rules conferring the guards with nearly absolute power over the prisoners? 
The form of probable aggression does not depend upon more explicit orders 
from the authority.  Rather, it would rely on the ability of the guards in the SPE, and 
indeed Abu Ghraib, to interpret or imagine how best to execute the desirable 
outcomes as defined by the authority.  As Milgram explains, “if, after all, the world or 
the situation is as the authority defines it, a certain set of actions follows logically. . . . 
The relationship between authority and subject, therefore, cannot be viewed as one in 
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which a coercive figure forces action from an unwilling subordinate.  Because the 
subject accepts authority’s definition of the situation, action follows willingly (2009, 
145).”  The dedicated agent in the SPE, Abu Ghraib, and elsewhere, will willingly carry 
out the actions that “follow logically.”  
Having considered the ways in which individuals can be brought to obey orders 
to commit abuse, it is useful to next consider the contexts and situations under which 
those orders have been given outside the confines of social sciences laboratories, and 
how some men have acted when placed under such orders. 
Real World Atrocity 
The studies by Milgram, Bandura, and Zimbardo viewed the propensity to 
commit harm in short term laboratory circumstances.  Other research has examined 
harm infliction carried out in the real world and over longer periods.  Milgram’s 
experiments were intended to examine possible underlying factors leading to the 
Jewish Holocaust by the Nazi regime in Germany.  One remarkable study of actual 
events from the war years tends to dovetail strongly with his findings. 
World War Two 
Historian Christopher Browning examined the personal experiences of 
perpetrators of the Holocaust by examining transcripts of investigative interviews of 
former members of German Special Order Police Battalion 101, which unit was 
involved in roundups, deportations to concentration camps, and mass killings in 
territories occupied by the Nazis  (Browning 1998).  He found wide variation in the 
willingness among the officers and men in the unit to participate in operations 
involving clearing villages and city neighborhoods of Jews and other regime targets.  
Many of those operations consummated with the victims being marched into nearby 
woods to be killed by the police.  
Browning described some officers, especially the battalion commander, as very 
reluctant overseers of mass murder.  He found that the majority of men accepted the 
orders to kill during the first field extermination operations, even though they were 
given the opportunity to withdraw.  In his estimation, only ten to twenty per cent of 
the police officers either initially refused to participate or withdrew after first shooting 
some Jews.  Browning noted that even among the willing participants, morale after 
the first operation was dismal.  Later operations were structured in ways that relieved 
the men from their distress.  Distancing from the actual killing became a feature of the 
battalion’s participation.  The men were assigned largely to clearing Jewish districts 
and sending victims to the concentration camps where the actual killing occurred. In 
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addition, the Germans imported killing troops recruited from ethnic minorities within 
prisoner of war camps holding captured Soviet soldiers.    
One of Browning’s findings was that the Special Order Police officers who 
shunned killing were for the most part still bound by loyalty to their comrades.  Rather 
than denouncing the massacres as evils they refused to commit, the non-shooters 
characterized their unwillingness as a disability or weakness on their part, saying that 
they “could not” carry out the killings (Browning, 1988, 185).  This approach kept 
them from openly criticizing their fellows.  In some cases the police officers who 
refused to directly kill allowed themselves to contribute by manning cordons in the 
woods to prevent escape by the victims. Even among those who did sometimes shoot, 
their behavior would sometimes waver from the atrocious.  When they were not 
under direct supervision of others, some of the police would aim to miss, not shoot, or 
would abandon their posts.   
Perhaps one of the more remarkable findings that Browning’s study reveals is that 
even in the atmosphere of official commands to conduct extermination operations, 
men were allowed to refuse to participate.  There were no serious threats to join the 
victims or receive any other punishment for refusals.  Browning found that the 
complicit police officers claimed to their interrogators that they were forced to kill 
because they were under orders to do so, and felt that they would be themselves at 
grave risk, but that while this thinking might have been an actual motivator, the threat 
was not based on actual consequences within their unit or indeed elsewhere in the 
Third Reich.  Browning wrote that, “no defense attorney or defendant in any of the 
hundreds of postwar trials has been able to document a single case in which refusal to 
obey an order to kill unarmed civilians resulted in the allegedly inevitable dire 
punishment (Browning 1998, 170).”  Recalling the results of Milgram’s experiments, 
one can easily see that the complicit shooters at the time acted just as Milgram 
described those in the “agentic state” would after receiving orders to commit harm. 
Browning accepts many of the conclusions of the above-referenced social 
psychologists and others as he summed up the factors at work with the Special Order 
Police: 
There are many societies afflicted by traditions of racism and caught in the 
siege mentality of war.  Everywhere society conditions people to respect and 
defer to authority, and indeed could scarcely function otherwise.  Everywhere 
people seek career advancement.  In every modern society, the complexity of 
life and the resulting bureaucratization and specialization attenuate the sense 
of personal responsibility of those implementing official policy.  Within virtually 
every social collective, the peer group exerts tremendous pressures on 
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behavior and sets moral norms.  If the men of Reserve Police Battalion 101 
could become killers under such circumstances, what group of men cannot?” 
(1998, 188-189) 
This view is not universally accepted, however.  Another researcher of 
Battalion 101, Daniel Goldhagen, differs in his analysis (Goldhagen 1997).  He calls into 
question the underlying premise that mechanisms were necessary to overcome a 
reluctance to kill in the Holocaust.  He instead believes that the Holocaust was 
perpetrated largely by willing and deliberate Germans who were motivated by a 
particularly virulent anti-Semitism that pervaded German life for decades before Hitler 
rose to power.  In his view, Germans, including the killers of Battalion 101 were far 
from naively acted upon by social-psychological mechanisms that prompt obedience 
and aggression.  He wrote that “simply put, the perpetrators, having consulted their 
own convictions and morality and having judged the mass annihilation of Jews to be 
right, did not want to say ‘no’ (1997, 14).”  Although Goldhagen and Browning have 
publicly disagreed with one another, I do not find that their separate explanations are 
necessarily mutually exclusive.  Some of the perpetrators were willing, but many were 
clearly reluctant and had to become inured to their atrocious tasks.  Furthermore, 
others, subject to the same cultural influences working on the enthusiastic 
perpetrators, refused to participate at all, or changed their minds after committing 
some murders.   Goldhagen concentrates his scrutiny on the individual as fully 
responsible actor, and while dismissive of more conventional explanations for the 
Holocaust, offers an additional means of considering actions  the of American CT and 
COIN operatives after 9/11.  Specifically, Goldhagen’s conclusions invite the 
considerations that American AV was not committed under force of orders, but might 
have been willingly and enthusiastically undertaken. 
Late Twentieth-Century Greece and Brazil 
Others have written about the use of abduction, torture and murder in post-
World War Two CT and COIN campaigns.  In particular, 1960’s-1970’s Greece, and 
1960’s-1980’s Brazil, developed institutionalized atrocity within their respective 
internal security institutions. (Haritos-Fatouros 1988; Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros and 
Zimbardo 2002).   
Haritos-Fatouros  (1988) found that in Greece a very discriminating mode of 
identifying would-be torturers was employed.  The method consisting of selecting 
recruits who espoused loyalty toward the government and strong anti-communist 
sentiments.  The recruits were then placed  into a training environment where their 
political beliefs were groomed and their hatred of communists and their sympathizers 
was inflammed.  Selection into the specific torture training was judged by a recruit’s 
“(a) ability to endure beating of all kinds and exercises to exhaustion; (b) obedience to 
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the demands of authority, even of the most illogical and degrading kind; (c) free 
selection on the part of the recruit to go through the 3-month hard training… (1988, 
1114).”  The selection was simply the beginning of a system of further selection and 
training. 
Haritos-Fatouros identified a number of methods that were used to bind 
individuals to the regime, their military police corps, and the elite torturer profession.  
Once an individual was selected for torture training, they were subjected to a 
ritualized initiation ceremony, a grueling period of initial training, constant reminding 
of their elite status and privileges over ordinary soldiers and officers in the army, and 
the use of specialized jargon.  Interestingly, the trainees did not use their true names 
during the training, instead nicknames were used to keep their identies secret, a 
method of deindividuation Zimbardo would certainly recognize (1988, 1114-1115).  
The Greek trainees were subjected to behavior modification methods to create 
an instantly and completely obedient subordinate.  The carrying out of pointless and 
illogical orders, some of which were degrading and painful, became automatic.  
Trainees were desensitized to torture by a gradual process of exposure and limited 
participation that began with observing torture and progressed through increasing 
stages of involvement with prisoners including guarding and delivering limited 
beatings.  Trainees were themselves beaten by senior soldiers who also verbally 
abused them as a means of modeling the behavior they were to mimic (Haritos-
Fatouros 1988, 1117).  The trainees were also threatened whenever they were lenient 
with a prisoner.  Distrust was sown among the trainees who were told that each of 
them would inform on the others.  Trainees were threatened to be imprisoned and 
flogged.  Threats were also made that included trainees’ families.   
In addition to this negative reinforcement, rewards were also used to motivate 
and elevate the trainees, especially the membership in their elite profession.  Haritos-
Fatouros wrote, “the fact that they belonged to a highly esteemed, highly feared, and 
all-powerful army corp was the strongest long-term positive reward of all, because 
they enjoyed many standing privileges and rights during and after completing their 
military service (Haritos-Fatouros 1988, 1117-1118).” 
In 2002 sociologist Martha Huggins with Haritos-Fatouros and Zimbardo 
published an examination of the world of Brazilian police hit-squad assassins and 
torturers of the 1964-1985 era.  Perhaps less formulized and formalized in their 
methods than the Greek military police, the Brazilian police were nonetheless 
successful in using indoctrination in national security ideology; desensitization to 
abuse through beatings of trainees and increasing exposure of trainees to abuse of 
prisoners; and other methods of creating obedience to authority previously identified 
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by Milgram, Bandura, and Zimbardo.  Huggins and her co-authors also described 
certain sociological and organizational influences that they believed contributed to the 
creation of both hit-squad assassins and interrogational torturers (Huggins, Haritos-
Fatouros and Zimbardo 2002).  
Like their Greek counter-parts, the Brazilian police were initiated into their 
work through training that encouraged obedience, adherence to the norms of the 
police and military cultures, and for some, a disregard for pain, either their own or 
that of others.  Some members of the Militarized Police were forced to undergo 
degrading, exhausting, and painful training.  This method, as with the Greeks, was 
useful in creating the future atrocity police.  As Zimbardo explains, “this general 
training model clearly prepares police to become more effective at carrying out 
atrocities.  Their own threshold for pain is raised to make them less sensitive to the 
pain they experience or that they inflict on others.  There is no room for ‘unmasculine’ 
emotions of compassion, caring, concern, or empathy with a victim’s plight or pleas. . . 
. Recognizing that people come to love what they suffer for and then go on to 
advocate its virtues7, it is clear that Militarized Police preservice training set the stage 
for atrocity, which often manifested itself as quick-fire slaughter of anyone designated 
as an enemy of the Brazilian State (Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros and Zimbardo 2002, 
248).”  This initiation into a world of violence and disregard for suffering was aided by 
other influences that created police willing to torture and murder. 
The former Brazilian police revealed an inward-looking world created by the 
kind of work they did and separation from the rest of Brazilian society.  The rigid 
secrecy necessary for preventing their work from being discovered by the public and 
the specific national security emphasis of their duties meant that the assassins and 
torturers were insulated from structures and messages that would have interfered 
with their ability to carry out their dreadful work.  Secrecy became pervasive, and the 
men generally kept their activities from their friends and family.  According to 
Zimbardo:  
This insularity spread to protect atrocity perpetrators by shielding them from 
oversight by legal and religious systems, from the public, from their families, 
and eventually from their own prior values. . . . By rarely talking about what 
they were doing, these men seem to have stopped thinking about their 
violence within any abstract or conceptual framework, either legal, moral, or 
ethical.  When that happens, the insularity reaches inside the individual’s 
being, isolating behavior, cognition, and affect from each other.  Such mental 
                                                     
7
 Zimbardo cites Aronson, E., and J. Mills, 1959.  The effect of severity of initiation on liking for a group.  
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 59, pp. 177-181. 
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defenses, when overutilized, often have dysfunctional psychological 
consequences. (Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros and Zimbardo 2002, 249). 
Huggins et al report that the Brazilian police interviewed in their study 
described a system in which a kind of hyper-masculinity was promoted. One salient 
measure of that group masculinity was violence.  Zimbardo wrote, “Atrocity was 
boosted by normal masculine competition, which was further exaggerated by its 
functioning within a competitive bureaucracy powered by a climate of war. . . . 
Ordinary masculine competitiveness is augmented when demanded by superiors in an 
elite atrocity unit that insulates actions from negative external consequences 
(Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros and Zimbardo 2002, 249).”  The war climate, masculine 
competitiveness, and protection from external consequences are factors which one 
might also expect when military units find themselves fighting a CT and COIN 
campaign while occupying a foreign country, such as in Iraq. 
The Brazilian atrocity police described aspects of their insular world which 
exposed the prominence of menace, both internal and external, in shaping their views 
and actions.  The police were forced to judge the amount they could rely on their 
fellows to hold their nerve in dangerous situations, enact violence when it was 
demanded, and to act quickly in crises.  They were also in an organization that told 
them that the hidden subversive and terrorist threatened Brazil itself and that they 
must act decisively to protect the state.  The nature of such an outlook is that it allows 
little leeway for erring on the side of mercy or leniency.  Everyone could be a 
subversive, or a hardcore terrorist, so they might be withholding vital information on 
an unfolding attack.  Within such an outlook torture has a certain logical imperative, 
and the ever-present threat of terrorist attack fueled an unrelenting urgency, as “in 
Brazil’s war against subversion and crime, victory depended on the speed with which 
security forces could make captives confess vital information about enemy plans 
(Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros and Zimbardo 2002, 247).” In CT and COIN there are 
obvious reasons that having a suspect produce information before his confederates 
can evade capture, secrete materiel, and alter plans is desirable; those reasons no-
doubt underlie the adoption of some torture carried out in Brazil. 
Zimbardo points out another aspect of the hazing suffered by the Greek and 
Brazilian recruits.  “Hazing also gave a personal reality to the kind of violence that 
would be acceptable in the recruit’s later career.  For example, in both Brazil and 
Greece, trainees had to run the gauntlet, which involved being beaten repeatedly as 
they were pushed and tugged between two lines of seniors, a technique commonly 
used by Brazilian atrocity perpetrators themselves in their post-training violence work 
(Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros and Zimbardo 2002, 237).”   
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Thus far I have examined information describing the internal psychology that 
results in obedience to authority and leads to actions for which the individual 
suspends his own moral norms and judgments.  I have also examined methods from 
outside the laboratory that have been used to deliberately create men willing to carry 
out murder and torture.  In fully developed torture regimes, these methods are 
formally incorporated into a process of habituation of abuse and killing.  One writer 
has theorized the factors and steps that may explain individual readiness to commit 
abusive violence even without the intense methods of the Greek and Brazilian 
regimes. 
Ervin Staub and the Continuum of Destruction 
Ervin Staub, like Zimbardo, Huggins, and Haritos-Fatouros, sees the creation of 
torturers as part of a process. He conceptualizes the process as a movement along 
what he labels as a “Continuum of Destruction” (Staub 1993).  He described three key 
factors that prepare the future torturer for travel along the continuum:  the 
classification of self into an in-group and the other into an outgroup (Differentiation); 
the negative discrimination and description of the other and its outgroup 
(Devaluation); and the eventual placement of possible victims beyond the class of 
beings whose treatment is governed by moral values (Moral Exclusion) (Staub 1990).  
Staub’s taxonomy provides a more greatly nuanced understanding of the factors of 
situation and system that Zimbardo and Mestrovic cite as enabling abusive violence. 
With regard to differentiation, Staub wrote, “It is a very basic human tendency 
to differentiate people into members of ingroups and outgroups, into ‘us’ and ‘them.’ 
. . . Humans tend to fear and dislike the unfamiliar, the strange, and especially what is 
discrepant from their own experience. . . . In the course of the socialization, children’s 
dispositions for us—them differentiation is enlarged:  They are taught to like some 
people and to dislike and mistrust others” (Staub 1990, 52).  He pointed out also that 
this tendency is strengthened during the further socialization into larger “us” 
groupings of school, community, and nation.  He further stated that differentiation is 
followed by devaluation of, and negative discrimination against, outgroup members.  
It appears entirely necessary that such social-identification of the self into a larger 
group of similar selves occurs in order to formulate the concept of “us.”  The “us” in 
this study was variously described by participants as either Americans in general, or 
Americans deployed to Iraq, or the much narrower grouping of small military units 
such as the squad or platoon. 
Of devaluation, Staub wrote, “devaluation makes it easier to harm people, 
given a motive or reason for doing so.  Intense devaluation may by itself generate the 
desire to harm. . . . Devaluation can include at  least two somewhat separate 
components: one is a dislike, or a negative view of the capacities, intention, and moral 
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character of a group, and the second one is a view of the other as an enemy that seeks 
to harm or destroy one’s group, oneself included, or endangers it by its very nature” 
(Staub 1990, 52-53).  Staub contends that, “one focus of the training of would-be 
[torture] perpetrators is the devaluation of the victim group.  This seems to have been 
true in all known instances and even characterizes the training of soldiers when the 
enemy or potential enemy is known” (ibid., 54).  The two facets of devaluation, dislike 
and expectation of hostile intent, are both present during many of the interviews 
conducted in the current study.  Participants described recoiling from the foreign and, 
after the start of insurgent violence, fearing attack from an enemy hiding among the 
population. 
Staub noted the effects of sharp differentiation and devaluation on the 
individual’s view of the intrinsic worth of the outgroup.  Such a combination “not only 
limits caring and empathy for members of the other group but also excludes them 
from the range of applicability of moral values. . . . People do not apply moral values 
such as justice or responsibility for the welfare of other humans equally to all people.  
Some people are excluded from the universe of moral concerns, and moral values 
become inapplicable to them” (emphasis original) (1990, 53).  Staub also contends 
that the application of “Just World” thinking, through which the victim is viewed as 
deserving of the harm done, further facilitates the ability to do harm (Staub 1989, 
Staub 1990).  It appears to me that moral exclusion is unlikely to precede devaluation, 
or will be greatly aided by prior devaluation of the outgroup in the mind of the actor.  
In addition, the creation of the dehumanized other, which in my view is an analog in 
the human/animal dichotomy for “animal,” is readily explained by extreme forms of 
differentiation and devaluation resulting in extreme aggression.  For many, animals 
are food sources, to be destroyed and consumed.  For soldiers who are exhorted by 
leaders such as Colonel Steele to become the predator on the battlefield, the enemy 
other has as little claim to morally correct treatment as does a piece of meat.   
In addition to the factors already discussed, Staub also cited devaluation that 
stemmed from “Obedience to Authority,” “Ideology and Higher Ideals,” “The Defense 
of the Physical or Psychological Self,” and “The Need for Control and Personal Power.”  
With respect to the “Defense” factor, Staub wrote that  
A substantial body of laboratory research shows that threat to or attack on 
either the physical or psychological self result in anger, hostility, and 
aggression. . . . Attack on either one’s body or one’s self-concept, values, and 
ways of life generate the motivation to defend the self.  One way to defend the 
psychological self or to deal with a diminished self is to elevate oneself over 
others” (1990, 57-58).   
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Building then on this in the context of CT and COIN operations, when the enemy other 
cannot be distinguished from the native population until he raises a weapon to strike, 
or in the case of the roadside bomb continues to be indistinguishable, the predator 
not only views the entire native population as potential threat and potential prey, but 
does so with the anger, hostility, and aggression Staub describes. 
Staub wrote also about the need to obtain a sense of power or efficacy:  
When people face persistent problems in their lives that they cannot 
effectively deal with, when they lose control over their lives and the 
circumstances surrounding them, their need for control can become intense. . . 
. I believe that it is a feeling of helplessness and lack of control over their lives, 
which comes from their inability to defend themselves from threat and attack 
or to fulfill their important goals, that makes people seek a feeling of 
invulnerability through power over others’ well-being, bodies and lives” (ibid., 
59). 
Soldiers deployed where there is an active insurgency that attacks and kills without 
warning, and who are in an alien environment that causes the suffering of extreme 
heat, cold, and deprivation of other desired material comforts, find themselves 
powerless to improve their circumstances.  Staub leads one to expect that the natural 
tendency is for soldiers to reclaim their potency by aggression of the kinds found in 
abusive violence. 
Staub wrote about the role of guards, in which power plays an important part:  
One aspect of the role of guard, especially when the victims are placed outside 
the rule of law, as torture victims usually are, is tremendous power.  Without 
clearly drawn limits and accountability, power can lead to a feeling of limitless 
right to determine the fate of victims and to unbridled excess.  Less systematic 
use of torture, especially against the lower strata of society, often occurs when 
enforcement agents such as the police are not carefully supervised and made 
accountable.  Such torture is made easier and more likely by existing 
devaluation of lower social groups.  The limitations in the rights and power of 
such groups reduces the accountability of the police and other authorities. 
(1990, 55). 
One can come to grim predictions for what the mix of Defense of the Physical Self, 
Need to Claim Power, and Guard Role would produce in situations such as Abu Ghraib 
or other CT and COIN detainee circumstances.  Nearly by definition, a soldier with a 
detainee, while in the field, during transport, or in temporary holding facilities, enjoys 
not only the tremendous power of a guard, but is often subject to drastically fewer 
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clearly drawn limits and accountability than are guards in formal detention facilities.  
Participants in this study described the most extreme abuses in just such super-
empowered situations. 
The factors that instill a readiness to commit abuse can be assisted by group 
factors. Staub wrote about the individual within a group: 
Belonging to a group makes it easier for people to act in ways that are out of 
the ordinary.  Joining a group enables people to give up a burdensome self and 
adopt a shared and valued social identity.  At the same time they can shed the 
inhibitions and limitations of individual identity. . . . Thus as group members 
they can open up emotionally. . . . Anger and hate toward outsiders can come 
to the fore, especially when the group’s beliefs promote these feelings.  And 
they no longer need to take individual responsibility for their actions; no one is 
responsible, or the group is responsible, or the group’s leader. . . . Powerful 
emotions spread through contagion. It becomes difficult to deviate from group 
perceptions or values. . . . When group norms shift, it is difficult for the 
individual not to follow. . . . People predisposed to harm-doing may find 
membership in certain groups highly satisfying.  Hostility toward outgroups 
becomes desirable; the authoritarian structure is familiar and comfortable; the 
camaraderie provides a haven in a hostile world. (1989, 77-78) 
One would expect that membership in a sub-group, such as an elite military service, or 
even a smaller sub-unit of that branch, coupled with any basic societal “us” versus 
“them” contextual signaling, would combine to make entry into aggression against the 
enemy other  a near certainty. 
The continuum of destruction that Staub describes is based upon the readily 
grasped concept that one becomes habituated to novel, and previously unattractive, 
activities through both repeated exposure and gradual increases in intensity; such 
habituation changes the individual and those changes also increase the willingness to 
commit escalating harm (Staub 1990, Staub 1989).  He described some of the 
consequences of the movement along the continuum: 
As a group engages in lesser harm doing… or engaging in torture that is limited 
in scale and level of destructiveness—psychological changes result.  As I noted 
earlier, people learn by participation; they change as a result of their own 
actions. Just-world thinking and further devaluation, and exclusion from the 
range of applicability of moral values makes it possible to harm victims more 
and to feel less responsibility for their suffering.  The self-perception of the 
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perpetrators is likely to change; they come to see themselves as willing and 
able to torture and kill, usually for a higher purpose. (1990, 64). 
Staub describes also that “mistreatment of a victim group, or a cycle of violence 
between opposing groups, results in changes that make increasingly greater levels of 
violence possible.  Almost universally, with progression along the behavioral and 
psychological continuum of destruction, both the range of victims and the intensity of 
violence against them expand” (ibid., 64-65).  Most of the soldiers in Iraq were well 
aware of their participation in the “cycle of violence between opposing groups.”  
Furthermore, study participants made clear that opportunities for abuse of detainees, 
and the Iraqi population as a whole, were present in settings as varied as street 
patrols, roadblock checkpoints, base entry control gates, as well as night-time house 
raids and interrogations carried out both in the field and in the formal interrogation 
center.  Participants described what Staub’s theory would have predicted: a 
progression of violence that started at verbal abuse while brandishing weapons and 
ran the gamut through beatings, scarring torture and ultimately to killings. 
 The further consequence of habituation to abuse allows for motives 
unsanctioned by authority to creep in to the lethal situation.  Staub wrote that “as the 
destruction process evolves, harming victims can become ‘normal’ behavior.  
Inhibitions against harming or killing diminish, and extraneous motives can enter: 
greed, the enjoyment of power, the desire for sex or excitement” (1989, 84).  With 
respect to abuse in Argentina, Staub noted that “over time it became possible to 
casually torture kidnapped people, to torture as a private whim, and to kill as a private 
whim” (1990, 65).  Hazing, beatings, and torture were reported by participants to 
satisfy whims of curiosity and amusement. 
 In addition to the above-noted factors regarding preparation for violence and 
the process that leads to the creation of torturers, Staub describes possible 
dispositional factors that aid the process: 
At times people enter situations in which the use of certain kinds of force is 
required.  The guards at Abu Ghraib chose to be soldiers and were members of 
the military police.  Individuals who join the police tend to be more 
authoritarian, which means that they find satisfaction in submitting 
themselves to higher authority and using authority over others.  Those who 
join a volunteer army are also likely to be different from the average person. . . 
. Obviously, not all soldiers are the same.  But if they enter certain groups with 
some inclination to fight, this makes learning by doing and a personal evolution 
in violence easier. (2011, 254) 
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Clearly, in an all-volunteer military force, the prospect of combat is not only accepted 
by its members but, as reported by several study participants, is also greatly 
welcomed. 
Although Staub documents what he believes are the ways in which abusers are 
created, he does make note of two factors that will cause moderation.  He wrote that, 
“people do not devalue victims whose innocence is clearly and definitely established” 
(1989, 79).  This is probably in keeping with the Just World perspective of punishment 
as deserved.  Staub also wrote that “whereas defining people as ‘them’ and devaluing 
them motivates or allows harming them, defining them as ‘us,’ as similar to or like 
oneself, generates caring for them and empathy with them.  People so seen are more 
likely to be helped and less likely to be harmed. . . . Sometimes opponents in war are 
humanized, with a change in feelings and behavior toward them” (1990, 53).  Several 
study participants report lessened aggression toward detainees who were recognized 
as non-insurgents captured in dragnet sweeps.  Similar aggression moderation was 
described when participants found themselves imagining how they themselves would 
react to the treatment they meted out to the Iraqis.  This mental role-assumption led 
some participants to conclude that the Iraqi enmity was not evil, but rather a natural 
human reaction. 
Staub’s theories brings us closer to understanding how an alignment of factors 
can bring about readiness to abuse even when the institutions in which it occurs may 
not intend to create torturer training schemes in the same ways as the Greek or 
Brazilian cases.  In democratic institutions one would expect that the oft-espoused 
respect for human rights and dignity would prevent the creation of such a system.  
Sometimes, however, democracies do decide to employ torture.  When they do, they 
have a built-in image management problem.  One historian has examined how 
democracies create openings for torture that conceal the coercive nature of their 
torture from the public, courts, and in some ways even from the agents that carry out 
the abuse. 
 
Appearance of Decency 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the United 
Nations in 1948, makes clear the reasons for the protection of human rights, including, 
“if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against 
tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law 
(United Nations 1948).”  Of specific interest here, the UDHR fifth article states plainly: 
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
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punishment (United Nations 1948).”  While this was a sentiment nobly stated by 
representatives of a world having only recently survived World War Two, it was nearly 
four decades until the sentiments were given specific legal force through the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT) (United Nations 1984).  Under the CAT, member states are obliged 
to make torture illegal in the territory under their jurisdictions, to prosecute such 
crimes, and to not expel persons from their territories to places where they are likely 
to be subjected to torture.  Societies such as the United States and the United 
Kingdom claim the moral high ground when condemning the brutality of totalitarian 
regimes for, among other things, the widespread use of torture by security forces.  As 
signatories to the CAT, they cannot retain legitimacy in this area in the international 
arena if they are seen to allow torture. 
This does not of course mean that member states have prevented all of their 
agents from committing torture from time to time since 1948.  In the democracies, 
strong pressures are exerted that result in torture.  According to leading torture 
historian Darius Rejali:  
In some cases torture occurs because a national security bureaucracy 
overwhelms the democratic institutions that were designed to control it.  But 
in other cases, the demand for torture arises out of two other factors: unsound 
judicial practices and public fear of crime or perceived breakdown in civic 
order.  Police, either on their own or with tacit consent, set about torturing to 
create safe streets.  They hand criminals over to judges with confessions 
extracted through torture. . . . Some judicial systems value confessions 
inordinately, and police have strong incentives to secure them by any means. 
(2007, 22)  
 Rejali reports from his extensive study of the history of torture, with special 
emphasis on its use within modern democracies, that in situations where confessions 
are judged legitimate only when they are voluntarily given, the state must contrive 
methods of torture which are undetectable.  Thus tortures that leave no marks, so-
called “stealth” or “clean” tortures, are preferred. 
Rejali has compiled a list of clean tortures8, combinations of which he has 
classified under such names as French modern, Slavic modern and Mediterranean 
modern; of interest here: “Anglo-Saxon modern is based around stress and duress 
                                                     
8
 Rejali’s primary method groupings: Electrotorture; Beating (Instruments); Beating (Hands); Water 
Torture; Dry Choking; Air [cold]; Exhaustion Exercises; Positional Tortures; Positional Devices; 
Restraints; Salts and Spices; Drugs and Irritants; Sleep Deprivation; Noise; and Sensory Deprivation 
(Rejali 2007, 554-556). 
Contemplation to Vicious Action  29 
 
 
techniques usually supplemented with water tortures, beatings with various 
instruments, noise, and drugs.  Electrotorture is not part of this tradition normally 
(Rejali 2007, 553-554).”  The American and British historical experiences stretching 
from Northern Ireland, to Africa, the Middle East, Iraq, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, 
and Chicago are replete with reported examples of these techniques (Harbury 2005; 
Conroy 2001; McCoy 2006; Cobain 2012).  After 9/11, American military intelligence 
personnel proposed enlisting a number of those clean techniques in CT and COIN 
campaigns in Guantanamo, Afghanistan and Iraq. 
I do not intend herein to examine the entire chronology of efforts leading to  
senior military officials’ approval for specific interrogation techniqes, largely because it 
has been well documented by others (Jaffer and Singh 2007) and exceeds the needs of 
this study.  I will, however, point out the documented methods that were employed 
by American military personnel in Iraq which seem to match the typology described by 
Rejali along with the changing and ad hoc nature of authorizations for their use. 
On September 14, 2003 US Army Lt. General Ricardo Sanchez issued a 
memorandum to Abu Ghraib intelligence units responsible for the questioning of 
detainees.  In his memorandum he authorizes the use of twenty-nine specific 
techniques with names such as “Pride and Ego Up,” “We Know All,” and “Mutt and 
Jeff.”  The list ended with descriptions for “Change of Scenery Up,” “Change of 
Scenery Down,” “Dietary Manipulation,” “Environmental Manipulation,”  “Sleep 
Adjustment,” “False Flag,” “Isolation,” “Presence of Military Working Dogs,” “Sleep 
Management,” “Yelling, Loud Music, and Light Control,” and “Stress Positions” (Jaffer 
and Singh 2007, A-232 - A-235).  While this list was superseded in another 
memorandum a month later that no longer listed the last ten items from the 
September authorization, the later document did not specifically prohibit them.  The 
October memorandum clearly contemplated that other methods might be authorized 
if requests were properly framed including a legal review, full description of the 
method and proposed safeguards  (Jaffer and Singh 2007, A-238 - A-243). 
According to US Army Lietenant General Anthony Jones, who was tasked with 
investigating the intelligence gathering function at Abu Ghraib in the aftermath of the 
detainee abuses, the guidelines in the Sanchez September and October memoranda 
were incorporated into an “Interrogation Rules of Engagement” (IROE) chart by Abu 
Ghraib interrogation section operations officer  Captain Carolyn Wood.  In reviewing 
the figure below, which the news program Frontline attributes as the Wood IROE 
chart, there are a number of significant features worth noting (Interrogation Rules of 
Engagement 2005).  First, the items no longer authorized by the October Sanchez 
memorandum appear under the heading “Require CG’s Approval,”referring  to 
Commanding General Sanchez.  The same column includes an entry which was not 
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included in either Sanchez memorandum: “Sensory Deprivation.”   Jones notes also, 
“what was particularly confusing was that nowhere on the chart did it mention a 
number of techniques that were in use at the time: removal of clothing, forced 
grooming, hooding and yelling, loud music and light control (Fay and Jones 2004, 28).”  
However confusing or incomplete the IROE chart may have been, the tactics it and the 
Sanchez memoranda countenanced, and the other techniques identified by General 
Jones, are all well within the tradition of non-scarring methods described by Rejali. 
 
Figure 1: Abu Ghraib Interrogation Rules of Engagement 
(Interrogation Rules of Engagement 2005) 
Captain Wood explained her inclusion of at least two techniques based upon 
her judgment and initiative.  She wrote: 
We began interrogation operations at AG [Abu Ghraib] using accepted Field 
Manual 34-52 norms and techniques.  We were moving from a tactical to an 
operational or insurgent environment and it incresingly felt to me like my 
experiences in Afghanistan. . . . I saw the situation moving to the “Bagram” 
model. . . .I increasingly felt the need to draw on my experience in Afghanistan.  
We had used “sleep adjustment” and “stress positions” as effective techniques 
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in Afghanistan. . . . Because we had used the techniques in Afghanistan, and I 
perceived the Iraq experience to be evolving into the same operational 
environment as Afghanistan, I used my best judgment and concluded they 
would be effective tools for interrogation operations in AG. . . . we continued 
to use FM-34-52 procedures, as well as sleep management and stress positions 
from our experiences in Afghanistan, as I believed these to be reasonable, 
given the similarity of the situations. (quoted in Jaffer and Singh 2007, A-196) 
The environment at Abu Ghraib, and elsewhere in Iraq where interrogations 
took place, was one in which rules governing permissible methods were 
impermanent, sometimes confusing, and subject to interpretation and alteration 
depending upon the judgement of sometimes very junior military leaders. Some of the 
participants in this study were military intelligence interrogators forced to operate 
within this environment, and their experiences were shaped in part by the need to 
work under rules in Iraq that went beyond those described in their formal training, 
and in some cases seemed to contradict that training. 
Abu Ghraib can hardly be looked upon simply as the result of rule confusion 
among interrogators, especially since the most infamous abuses at Abu Ghraib were 
commited by Military Police personnel who were only peripherally involved in actual 
interrogations.  It is also known that instances of abusive violence took place in the 
field during the immediate aftermath of combat.  Examinations of Abu Ghraib and a 
separate field combat encounter that led to murders, provide useful information to 
understand the factors that contribute to abusive violence against detainees by 
Americans in CT and COIN operations.   This is especially so since the case studies 
present circumstances more like those experienced by my study participants than 
those from the Brazilian, Greek or Nazi regimes thus far considered. 
Two Previous American Cases: Abu Ghraib and Operation 
Iron Triangle 
 The present study, while exploring the lived experiences of its fourteen 
participants, exists within the context of America’s wider involvement in CT and COIN 
and associated instances of abusive violence that have been widely publicized and 
where American military courts martial have been held to try the soldiers involved.  
Two case studies are considered here as they have been presented by social scientists.  
The most famous such case is the 2003 detainee mistreatment at Abu Ghraib which 
sparked my initial interest in the subject.  Psychologist Phillip Zimbardo was retained 
as a defense expert witness by one legal team and conducted a detailed analysis of 
the causes of the abuse (2008).  Sociologist Stjepan Mestrovic, was retained as an 
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expert witness in a later case.  He examined the causes contributing to the 2006 killing 
by American soldiers of three Iraqi males taken prisoner during Operation Iron 
Triangle.  In the army unit involved in the killings it was generally understood that the 
Rules of Engagement allowed for the killing of all military aged males (2009).  The 
main arguments of each analysis are presented here. 
Zimbardo and Abu Ghraib 
 Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Experiment (SPE) and subsequent experience led 
him to believe that the abuses at Abu Ghraib should be viewed by considering what he 
described as the “triadic elements” contributing to such abuse.  He sought to 
understand “the Person, the Situation, and the System that had put this person in that 
place to commit such crimes” (2008, 331).  Zimbardo gained access to specific 
information regarding Abu Ghraib as an expert witness and consultant retained by the 
attorney for, Ivan “Chip” Frederick II, one of the military police soldiers court-
martialed by the US Army for his role in detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib. Frederick was 
charged with crimes involving conspiracy, dereliction of duty, maltreatment of 
detainees, assault, and indecent acts, all of which he conceded were true as part of his 
trial (ibid., 370-371). 
The Person: Ivan Frederick 
Zimbardo’s research into Ivan Frederick’s background included a review of his 
personal family background, religious beliefs, medical and criminal histories, and 
civilian and military work, training and commendation records (2008, 337-342) as well 
as interviews with Frederick and his family members (ibid., ix).  Zimbardo also 
examined the psychological assessments of Frederick, concluding that he “shows no 
evidence at all of a psychopathic personality that would predispose him to be abusive 
without guilt in his work setting.  He also falls into the ‘normal healthy range’ with 
regard to schizophrenia, depression, hysteria, and all other major forms of 
psychological pathology” (342).   
Zimbardo specifically noted that the psychological tests results demonstrated that 
Frederick was “experiencing extreme exhaustion, which is the defining quality of 
burnout.  Specifically, the assessment indicates a person who is emotionally drained 
and chronically tired. His recovery cycles are not providing sufficient rest or relief from 
work to permit him to replenish his energy, leading to a condition of chronic 
weariness. . . . Overall, this profile indicates a person experiencing job burnout that is 
specific to the work situation in question” (2008, 344).  This is significant to Zimbardo 
who concluded that Frederick’s “ordinary level of cognitive capacities was indeed 
overwhelmed by the inordinate load imposed on him by the situational demands he 
faced nightly at [Abu Ghraib]” (ibid.). 
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Zimbardo summarized his assessment of Frederick, the Person: 
There is absolutely nothing in his record that I was able to uncover that would 
predict that Chip Frederick would engage in any form of abusive, sadistic 
behavior.  On the contrary, there is much in his record to suggest that had he 
not been forced to work and live in such an abnormal situation, he might have 
been the military’s All-American poster soldier on its recruitment ads. . . . The 
military could have used [Frederick] as a superpatriot who loved his country 
and was ready to serve it to the last drop of his blood. (ibid.) 
In short, Zimbardo considered Frederick to be an ordinary American soldier, lacking 
dispositional factors that would make one expect that he would commit the abuses he 
admitted to. 
The Situation: Abu Ghraib Tier 1A Night Shift 
 Zimbardo reported that the prisoner population that Frederick was responsible 
for rose from some four-hundred detainees to more than one thousand in the space 
of weeks.  The rise was due in part to large numbers of military-aged males swept up 
by American and allied forces responding to attacks by foreign terrorists and a home-
grown Iraqi insurgency. Frederick became the leader of more than fifty American and 
Iraqi guards assigned to guarding the Iraqi detainees.  He had never before been 
responsible for such a large operation. (2008, 345-346). 
 In addition to the burgeoning responsibilities Frederick was assigned, Zimbardo 
noted the lack of training, accountability, and procedures Frederick worked under.  
Zimbardo’s assessment of Frederick’s personality had shown that such buttresses 
were crucial.  In Zimbardo’s opinion, “there would never be any clear written 
procedures, no formal policies, and no structured guidelines.  There was none of the 
procedural support that Chip Frederick needed to follow in order to be the kind of 
leader he hoped to be in this most important mission in his life” (2008, 347).  Frederick 
also lost contact with other normal supports. 
 Zimbardo found that Frederick worked an untenable number of days without 
break; the longest stretch of twelve-hour shifts was forty days long. Frederick lived in 
a rodent-infested disused cell elsewhere in the prison.  His nutrition was compromised 
by his schedule, as were his ability to exercise and socialize with friends.  Zimbardo 
wrote that “more and more his life revolved entirely around his prison supervision and 
the MP Reservists working there under his command.  They soon became what social 
psychologists refer to as his ‘reference group,’ a new in-group that would come to 
have a big influence on him.  He was enmeshed in a ‘total situation,’ of the kind. . . 
described as facilitating mind control in cults and in the North Korean prisoner-of-war 
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camps” (2008, 347-348).  Frederick’s fatigue, diet, and immersion in the hours of the 
night shift were joined by other aspects of Tier 1A to make up the situational context 
surrounding his conduct. 
 Zimbardo reported that Abu Ghraib Tier 1A on the shift supervised by 
Frederick (the place and time-frame of the infamous abuses) was characterized by a 
number of factors that contributed to the eventual misconduct that occurred.  Among 
the factors cited by Zimbardo was a lack of in-person supervision by military officers; 
the presence of civilian interrogation contractors who gave directions (contrary to 
military regulations) to Frederick and other MPs on how to prepare the detainees for 
interrogation; the frequent visits by military and other government agency personnel 
who interrogated detainees without presenting identification or giving their names to 
the MPs responsible for prisoner custody; the detention of prisoners for whom there 
were no official records kept as required under normal prison procedures; and the 
physical abuse of detainees by the anonymous interrogators.  One such interrogation 
ended with the death of the detainee.  Zimbardo commented on the impact of this 
free-wheeling atmosphere: “the effect of the MPs on night shift witnessing these and 
other instances of grim abuse by a variety of visitors on their Tier 1A was certainly to 
establish a new social norm of abuse acceptability.  If it were possible to get away with 
murder, what harm was there in just smacking around some resistant detainees or 
embarrassing them by making them take humiliating positions? (sic) they reasoned” 
(2008, 350). 
 Zimbardo also reported on the anonymity that arose in Abu Ghraib and its 
effects on Frederick and his fellow MPs: 
Anonymity of place combined with anonymity of person, given that it became 
the norm to stop wearing their full military uniforms while on duty.  And all 
around them, most visitors and the civilian interrogators came and went un-
named.  No one in charge was readily identifiable, and the seemingly endless 
mass of prisoners, wearing orange jumpsuits or totally naked, were also 
indistinguishable from one another.  It was as extreme a setting for creating 
deindividuation as I can imagine. (2008, 351) 
Such deindividuation, according to Zimbardo, leads to “the ‘Mardis Gras effect’ of 
living for the moment behind a mask that conceals one’s identity and gives vent to 
libidinous, violent and selfish impulses that are ordinarily contained.  Behavior then 
erupts in response to immediate situational demands, without planned conspiracy or 
malicious forethought.”  Zimbardo continued, stating that in both Abu Ghraib and the 
Stanford Prison Experiment (SPE), “standard social constraints against aggression and 
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antisocial action were suspended as people experienced extended latitudes of 
behavioral freedom” (2008, 367). 
In addition to deindividuation, Zimbardo cited constant fear of assaults by 
prisoners, dehumanization and boredom as factors present within the situation at Abu 
Ghraib. He reported that staged photographs of detainees in humiliating and posed 
sexual simulations were the result of directions from interrogators; the enacting of 
status-elevating dominance by MPs over detainees; and punishment/revenge for 
attacks on MPs and others (2008, 366-67). 
Zimbardo is explicit that while the Army did not direct Frederick or the other 
Abu Ghraib MPs to enact sadistic sexual abuse on the detainees, he found that, as in 
the SPE, “a general norm of permissiveness prevailed that created a sense that the 
guards could do pretty much what they felt like doing because they were not 
personally accountable.  In that context, traditional moral reasoning is diminished, 
actions speak louder than old learned lessons . . . . Moral disengagement operated 
then to change the mental and emotional landscape of those caught up in its web” 
(2008, 368). 
The System: The War on Terror, National Leadership, and Failures to Prevent 
 For Zimbardo, the Abu Ghraib situation extant at the time of Frederick’s 
detainee abuse did not appear simply as a result of the unique mix of location and the 
breakdown of normal military discipline and procedures that made the abuse 
probable.  Situations such as that at Abu Ghraib Tier 1A exist as a result of system 
influences.  Zimbardo explains that “the System consists of the agents and agencies 
whose ideology, values, and power create situations and dictate the roles and 
expectations for approved behaviors of actors within its spheres of influence” (2008, 
446).  The system that influenced the actions at Abu Ghraib, was responsible for what 
Zimbardo characterized as: 
A new kind of modern evil, ‘administrative evil’ that constitutes the foundation 
of complicity of the chain of political and military command in these abuses 
and tortures.  Both public and private organizations, because they operate 
within a legal framework, not an ethical framework, can inflict suffering, even 
death, on people by following cold rationality for achieving the goals of their 
ideology, a master plan, a cost-benefit equation, or the bottom line of profit.  
Under those circumstances, their ends always justify efficient means. (2008, 
383-84) 
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 In Zimbardo’s view, the system that created and maintained the situation at 
Abu Ghraib was a complex one that stretched up the entire American chain of military 
and civilian command.  He is specific in his description of the system: 
We can think of the torture dungeon at Abu Ghraib . . . as having been 
designed by the senior ‘architects’ [President] Bush, [Vice President] Cheney, 
[Secretary of Defense] Rumsfeld and [CIA Director] Tenet.  Next came the 
‘justifiers,’ the lawyers who came up with new language and concepts that 
legalized ‘torture’ in new ways and means. . . . The ‘foremen’ on the torture 
construction job were the military leaders such as Generals Miller, Sanchez, 
Karpinski and their underlings.  Finally, came the technicians, the grunts in 
charge of carrying out the daily labor of coercive interrogation, abuse, and 
torture—the soldiers in military intelligence, CIA operatives, civilian contract 
and military interrogators, translators, medics, and military police, including 
Chip Frederick and his night shift buddies. (2005, 403) 
Zimbardo blames President Bush for framing the post-9/11 America as being at war 
with Terror, and that, “the central premise of this new war was that terrorism is the 
primary threat to ‘national security,’ and to the ‘homeland,’ and that it must be 
opposed by all means necessary” (2008, 430).  Zimabardo noted that such rhetoric 
had been previously used in Brazil, Greece and elsewhere to justify “aggression, as 
well as repression” (ibid.).  He further stated that Vice President Cheney’s war framing 
and an assumed catastrophic and national existential threat from terrorists served as 
justification within the American administration for taking pre-emptive and 
extraordinary measures to counter that threat.  In Zimardo’s view, the major pieces of 
the system that supported the situation that bred the abuse included the signaling of 
national-level approval for the war on terror; the coercive interrogation of terrorists; 
the widespread commission of abuses by Americans against detainees in both 
Afghanistan and Iraq, with very little punishment of officers who should have 
prevented such abuses; the removal of previous separations between civilian and 
military interrogation tactics and the traditional MPs’ custody and care mission; and 
the lack of systemic changes to prevent abuses at Abu Ghraib. 
Zimbardo found that in addition to the acts committed by those within the 
entire chain of command that set the framing of the War on Terror and specified 
harsh treatment of detainees, there were other more subtle acts of omission that also 
contributed to the abuse.  Zimbardo wrote: 
What is significant to me is the number of people who knew of abuses, 
witnessed them, even participated in them in various ways and did nothing to 
prevent, stop or report them.  They provided “social proof” to the MPs that it 
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was acceptable to continue doing whatever they wanted to do.  Their smiling, 
silent faces provided social support from the surrounding network of the 
general interrogation team that gave thumbs up to abuses that should have 
received reprimands. . . . we see the evil of inaction facilitating the evil of 
action. (2008, 396) 
Zimbardo, citing evidence from a number of military, civilian government and NGO 
reports on the Abu Ghraib scandal, stated that among those who knew about the 
abuses and did not act to stop them were military medical personnel; company 
(junior) and field grade (middle-level) officers; military interrogators; military 
intelligence analysts; and military dog handlers (2208, 396-97). 
While the abuses at Abu Ghraib were the result of the actions and omissions 
by untold individuals, including Chip Frederick and his six fellow soldiers convicted in 
the aftermath of the scandal, Zimbardo believes that the System which defined the 
universe in which those abuses occurred was the result of deliberate decisions made 
in Washington DC.  He wrote that “the seeds for the flowers of evil that blossomed in 
that dark dungeon of Abu Ghraib were planted by the Bush administration in its 
triangular framing of national security threat, citizen fear and vulnerability, and 
interrogation/torture to win the war on terror” (2008, 412).   
Zimbardo on Objecting to Evil 
 Zimbardo considered Joe Darby, the low-ranking soldier who was the 
whistleblower in the Abu Ghraib scandal, an important hero-example.  Zimbardo’s 
work includes certain prescriptions for fostering in potential “heroes” the impetus to 
object to evil.  He commented about lessons learned from the SPE that he considers 
important to the kind of active opposition that can curtail abuse. 
In telling the story of the SPE, Zimbardo recounted how he was shocked out of 
his complicity in the harm to his participants by a colleague named Christina Maslach 
who denounced what was happening and exhorted him to halt the study.   Her 
analysis of her actions included the following salient points: 
1. The most important aspect of the situation was not her sole act of protest, 
but rather the wholesale manner in which everyone else, including the 
participants and the researchers, had been pulled into an acceptance of 
the seeming reality of the “prison” and their respective roles within it. 
2. Her own ability to see matters as abusive was because, as she stated, “I 
was a late entrant into the situation, and I was an ‘outsider.’ Unlike 
everyone else, I had not been a consenting participant in the study. . . . I 
had no socially defined role within that prison context. . . . I was not there 
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every day, being carried along as the situation changed and escalated bit by 
bit.  Thus the situation I entered at the end of the week was not truly the 
‘same’ as it was for everyone else. . . . For them, the situation was 
construed as being still within the range of normalcy; for me, it was not—it 
was a madhouse” (qtd. in Zimbardo, 2008, 458). 
3. She evaluated the significance of her acts in terms of whether they were 
effective in halting the abuse.  In her view, Zimbardo was sufficiently 
influenced by her objections to stop the study, and she was spared the 
burden of making a decision to go above his head to halt the experiment.   
Zimbardo quoted Maslach’s more expansive comments about objecting to evil, which 
she couched in terms of the minority of the Milgram experiments’ participants who 
refused at some point to escalate the apparent abuse to the subject who was being 
“shocked.”  Maslach commented: 
If you disobeyed, refused to continue, got paid, and left silently, your heroic 
action would not prevent the next 999 participants from experiencing the 
same distress.  It would be an isolated event without social impact unless it 
included going to the next step of challenging the entire structure and 
assumptions of the research.  Disobedience by the individual must get 
translated into systemic disobedience that forces change in the situation or 
agency itself and not just in some operating conditions.  It is too easy for evil 
situations to co-opt the intentions of good dissidents or even heroic rebels by 
giving them medals for their deeds and a gift certificate for keeping their 
opinions to themselves. (2008, 459) 
For Zimbardo, the outsider’s view enhanced the ability to see the situation as abusive 
and to allow for effective objections which challenged the situation and system 
created in the SPE.  The next case analysis, presented by sociologist Stjepan Mestrovic, 
similarly emphasizes the outsider’s vangtage as important to forcing the system to 
scrutinize abuse. 
Mestrovic and Operation Iron Triangle 
 Stjepan Mestrovic conducted an extensive study of Operation Iron Triangle and 
the military prosecutions of low-level soldiers who were directly involved in the 
killings of three unarmed detainees and the cover-up of those killings.  A description 
of the specific day’s events is useful at this juncture as the incident may not be as well 
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known to the reader as those of Abu Ghraib9.  Thereafter, Mestrovic’s primary points 
relevant to this study relating to the causes of the killings are presented. 
In May 2006 soldiers from the US Army 101st Division, Third Brigade Combat 
Team, under the command of Colonel Michael Steele were helicoptered to a 
suspected insurgent stronghold at Objective Murray. They were operating under Rules 
of Engagement that they believed allowed and required them to shoot any military 
aged males they found at the objective and elsewhere in the surrounding vicinity.  
Finding no insurgents at Objective Murray, members of Charlie Company were 
dispatched to search other buildings.  Upon approaching one building, a squad of 
soldiers fired at and killed a seventy-year-old man.  Three other males, one adult and 
two teens, and a number of women were discovered and detained.  The capture was 
reported upward, eventually coming to the attention of the senior non-commissioned 
officer in the company.  He was reported to have demanded of the squad’s platoon 
leader, “Why do I have three fucking detainees that should have been killed?”  The 
response was filtered down to the squad.  (Khatchadourian 2009) 
After an incident in which another man was captured at another site, the 
squad returned to the house where the first man had been killed and three males 
remained detained.  The squad leader spoke to the squad members and killing the 
three detainees was discussed.  At least one soldier objected to the idea and debated 
the matter with the squad leader.  Two other soldiers exited the house, cut off the 
detainees’ wrist-restraints and directed the detainees to run away.  While the 
detainees ran, the two soldiers shot and killed them.  Afterward the two soldiers and 
the squad leader conspired to claim that the detainees had broken free, assaulted the 
soldiers, and were shot while trying to escape. To lend credence to the claim, one of 
the soldiers was struck in the face and the other was cut with a knife (Khatchadourian 
2009). 
Word of the cover-up circulated among the soldiers of Charlie Company and 
others within their battalion.  A number of snipers who had occasionally operated 
with Charlie Company later persisted in bringing the matter to the attention of Army 
investigators.  They provided formal statements regarding what they had heard about 
the detainee killings and subsequent cover-up, and other incidents in which they 
understood that soldiers from Charlie Company advocated the killing of Iraqi males 
who did not pose threats.  (Mestrovic 2009).  Four soldiers were convicted of various 
crimes including murder, aggravated assault and negligent homicide (Khatchadourian 
2009). 
                                                     
9
 The presentation of events is taken from the account provided in Raffi Khatchdourian’s article “A War 
Crime in Iraq,” in The New Yorker magazine and details supplied by Mestrovic in The "Good Soldier" on 
Trial: A Sociological Study of Misconduct by the US Military Pertaining to Operation Iron Triangle, Iraq. 
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Reference Groups 
 Mestrovic considered the concept of the “reference group” as an important 
lens through which to understand the behavior of American Soldiers.  Mestrovic, citing 
the use of the term in Stouffer’s “The American Soldier,” explains “reference group” 
by writing that “people in general and especially soldiers evaluate and judge 
everything by the particular-peer group they use as a standard of reference” (2009, 2). 
He contended that Stouffer’s findings regarding World War II soldiers’ reluctance to 
kill and the stress alleviating influences of high morale and the comforting reliability 
that accompanied relatively low turnover within units were seemingly ignored during 
the Iraq War.  Instead, “constant re-shuffling of troops prevented bonding and the 
formation of real ‘reference groups,’ and unit morale was poor.  Numerous soldiers 
suffered from various forms of combat stress and PTSD” (ibid.). 
 Metrovic reported that Colonel Steele’s soldiers were subjected to behavior 
modification methods intended to make them much more willing to hate and kill the 
enemy than were American soldiers during World War II.  A key factor was the 
explicitly stated philosophy of combat communicated to the soldiers directly by 
Steele.  Metrovic cited the speech delivered by the colonel just prior to the Iraq 
deployment, some parts of which follow: 
Over the next ten days, everyone in this room will get on a plane and we will 
fly to Southwest Asia. . . . We are going into the worst part of Iraq. . . . This is 
real, and the guy who is going to win on the battlefield is the one who gets 
violent the fastest. So that’s the context.  Here are the things I want you to 
know.  Number One, anytime you fight, anytime you fight, you will always kill 
the other son-of-a-bitch.  Always.  Do not let him live today, so he will fight you 
tomorrow.  Kill him today.  They’ll make more of them, they’re out there damn 
everywhere, there’s plenty of them.  Kill him today.  Don’t let him live. . . . I 
listen to guys talk [about capturing the enemy and treating them well] and 
after we’ve befriended them they are going to tell us all this intelligence.  Man 
that is bullshit! That is bullshit.  So I want to be very clear.  If you go out and 
somebody presents a lethal threat to you, then you shoot him.  Do not feel bad 
and think that you should have brought him back because I didn’t want to talk 
to him. . . . You send the message that I am the dominant predator on this 
street, and if you mess with me I will eat you. . . . We are not going to be 
driving around Iraq raping, bartering, pillaging, being undisciplined.  That’s not 
what I’m talking about. . . . Man, it’s time to go hunting.  And that’s exactly the 
attitude I expect you to have.  Every time you walk out that gate, you are 
hunting.  You are the hunter, you are the predator, you are looking for the 
prey, and that’s all. (qtd. in Mestrovic, 2009, 20-21) 
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In addition to their brigade commander’s fiery rhetoric, the soldiers of Charlie 
Company were subjected to specific methods intended to reinforce their aggression 
and overcome their revulsion to killing.  Colonel Steele made it a practice to reward 
individual soldiers who killed the enemy with tokens of esteem such as special coins 
and knives.  Charlie Company itself maintained a board at headquarters that showed 
the tally of enemy killed.  The company first sergeant explained that it was intended to 
help condition the men to kill. (Mestrovic, 2009). 
 Mestrovic found that Steele espoused the views of Dave Grossman, the author 
of a book about killing in combat which included advice on how to overcome soldier 
reluctance to killing through techniques of operant conditioning.  Mestrovic reported 
that Grossman’s book was distributed by Steele to members of the brigade and that 
Grossman spoke to brigade members at Steele’s request.  Mestrovic noted a 
difference in interpretation of the findings of World War II Army Historian S. L. A. 
Marshall: 
Grossman begins his book with Marshall’s central finding: American soldiers 
are extremely reluctant to kill, except in self-defense, such that only 20% of 
them will generally open fire on an average combat mission. Whereas I follow 
Marshall’s conclusions from this overall finding, namely, that soldiers are not 
machines and that long-term killing wears them down and ultimately destroys 
an army through combat stress, Grossman pursues a different line of 
reasoning. Grossman’s overall aim is to show that the reluctance to kill can be 
broken down by standard conditioning techniques. . . .  He turns to Stanley 
Milgram’s famous study of obedience to authority and draws a conclusion that 
is completely different from the lessons drawn by a preponderance of 
professors who cite Milgram. The lesson drawn by college professors is that 
blind obedience to authority is a bad thing which can lead to atrocities. The 
lesson drawn by Grossman is: "Never underestimate the power of the need to 
obey." (Mestrovic 245) 
Mestrovic found that the Army’s priority was not to protect soldiers from the 
dangers identified by Marshall, but instead was apparent in a shift to a reference 
group emphasizing other goals: 
The connections among the central message in Grossman’s book, his role in 
Steele’s pep rally, and the outcome on the tragic mission of May 9th are clear 
and disturbing. Grossman’s book is about conditioning the soldier to kill 
because of the well-established fact that the American soldier is reluctant to 
kill. Grossman’s participation in Steele’s rally may explain the use of the kill 
board, coins, and other rewards used to "condition" soldiers in the brigade to 
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kill. In his sworn statement [First Sergeant ] Geressy referred to the kill board 
as a technique intended to "desensitize" soldiers toward killing. All this 
constitutes the application of behaviorism and operant conditioning toward 
the desired goal of increased killing. On the other hand, the disconnect 
between the intellectual reference group of the army and the intellectual 
reference group of civilian university professors could scarcely be greater. And 
which approach is more valid? Marshall and scores of academics have found 
that soldiers who go on missions for more than 100 days invariably develop 
symptoms that disable their performance as soldiers, from PTSD to suicide, 
alcoholism, accidents, and aggression. The more important point is that the 
army does not seem to pay attention to the reference group of civilian 
professors and researchers, and listens to its own reference group of 
intellectuals who try to transform the American soldier into a killing machine. 
(Mestrovic 245) 
Mestrovic also found that Steele’s approach to counter-insurgency was 
consonant with the philosophy of the American national leadership: 
In no way was his order atypical, given that in the current war on terror, the 
United States established the pre-emptive strike as public policy. This policy 
came to be known as the Bush Doctrine and the US attacked Iraq even though 
Iraq showed no hostile intent and posed no danger toward the US.  The 
brigade commander’s speech and order are a microcosm of the pre-emptive 
strike doctrine: the ROE for Operation Iron Triangle basically involved a pre-
emptive strike on unsuspecting, unarmed, and non-hostile Iraqis. This is an 
unmistakable cultural pattern." (2009, 23). 
This was the underpinning of the shift from the war of self-defense viewpoint and 
reluctance to kill the enemy Mestrovic considers emblematic of US soldiers during 
World War II.  He noted that: 
The traditional American soldier did not have the concept of "predator" in his 
vocabulary as a self-descriptor. The new factor in the current war is the 
introduction of the nontraditional, predatory idea of the pre-emptive strike, at 
all levels, in conjunction with demands for rigid obedience and a highly 
stratified social system. This formula helps to explain the tragedy of Operation 
Iron Triangle, the abuse at Abu Ghraib, torture at Guantanamo, and scores of 
other events that have damaged the reputation of the United States in the 
current war. (2009, 24) 
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Mestrovic noted also the differences in attitudes toward enemy prisoners of 
war during World War II and the Iraq War.  He claimed that the United States made a 
conscious effort to treat captured Germans kindly, giving them food rations better 
than most American civilians enjoyed, allowing them beer in captivity and providing 
them ample opportunities for the staging of cultural activities in prisoner of war 
camps.  These methods were employed to keep prisoners content and unlikely to 
become unruly, to demonstrate by example the desirability of living under American 
democratic principles, and to ensure reciprocal good treatment for Americans held 
captive by the Germans  (2009). 
 Mestrovic cited difference in war aims held at the national and individual 
soldier levels in World War II that were in marked contrast to those in the post-9/11 
era.  Mestrovic stated that “in World War II, America had clear objectives for 
defeating the enemy it felt compelled to fight purely for purposes of self-defense, and 
for treating the enemy with mercy and kindness.  The government goals were in line 
with commonsense and with religious teachings . . . such that a chaplain could 
summarize government policy in a coherent manner. . . . But in the current war on 
terror, the American government’s objectives for defeating the enemy and for 
treating enemy as well as its own prisoners are not clear or coherent” (2009, 264-
265). 
Of particular import to this study are Metrovic’s conclusions regarding reference 
groups and the individuals who were able to force the situation into the light of day: 
American soldiers are extremely reluctant to kill or abuse the enemy. When 
they do commit war crimes, they always act in the context of reference groups 
that exhibit poisoned command and social climates. The soldiers who are able 
to notice and criticize the war crimes are typically affiliated with different 
reference groups with a healthier command and social climate — this is clearly 
the case with the snipers who worked with but did not belong to Charlie 
Company. Similarly, the whistleblowers at Abu Ghraib were not locked into the 
daily misery of working in the poisoned social climate in Tier 1A. (2009, 50-51) 
His views are very similar to those held by Christina Maslach as reported by Zimbardo:  
it is the outsider who has an independent perspective and is free of entanglements of 
the immediate situation who is able to take decisive action to halt abuse. 
 
Grossman on Killing 
Mestrovic takes Steele, and by extension Dave Grossman, to task for 
misapplying Marshall’s findings about World War II soldiers’ reluctance to kill the 
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enemy on the battlefield.  He decries the use of operant conditioning to maximize 
killing behavior by Steel’s soldiers in Iraq and at the crucial moments during Operation 
Iron Triangle; and he is critical of the army’s shift from the reference group of 
academics to military men such as Grossman. In doing so, Mestrovic ignores much of 
Grossman’s message about the psychological costs of killing. 
Grossman (1996) acknowledges Marshall’s findings with respect to American 
soldiers fighting against either the Japanese or Germans that, “only 15 to 20 percent 
of the American riflemen in combat during World War II would fire at the enemy.  
Those who would not fire did not run or hide [], but they simply would not fire their 
weapons at the enemy, even when faced with repeated waves of banzai charges” 
(1996, 4).  As a result of his study of the roots of this phenomenon, Grossman 
concluded that, “there is within most men an intense resistance to killing their fellow 
man.  A resistance so strong that, in many circumstances, soldiers on the battlefield 
will die before they can overcome it” (ibid.).  He goes on to state that “with the proper 
conditioning and the proper circumstances, it appears that almost anyone can and will 
kill” (ibid.,).  To this limited extent, Mestrovic provides an accurate picture of part of 
Grossman’s writing.  There is more to Grossman’s work, however, and some parts of it 
are useful for gaining an understanding of the question of American involvement in 
abusive violence. 
Grossman charts the factors that allow the soldier to overcome the reluctance 
to kill (1996, 142).  They include Demands of Authority, Group Absolution, 
Predisposition of Killer, Total Distance from Victim, and the Target Attractiveness of 
Victim.  The first factor includes much of the obedience to authority described in 
Zimbardo and Milgram; however, Grossman adds the conditions that the authority 
figure must be legitimate, both in terms of possessing the superior position granted by 
hierarchical position, and the legitimacy that comes from respect granted by the 
subordinate to courageous and prudent leaders.   
By “Predisposition of Killer,” Grossman refers to the combination of training, 
conditioning, recent experiences, and temperament. The modern soldier’s training 
includes operant conditioning to fire on human shaped targets, unlike the bulls eye 
targets of World War II.  This factor is cited as a major explanation for increased killing 
behavior by soldiers subjected to such modern training.  In addition to training, 
Grossman states that “the recent loss of friends and beloved leaders in combat can 
also enable violence on the battlefield.  The deaths of friends and comrades can stun, 
paralyze, and emotionally defeat soldiers.  But in many circumstances soldiers react 
with anger [], and then the loss of comrades can enable killing” (1996, 179). 
Temperament for Grossman can also include a willingness to kill separate from 
training-conditioned behavior.  Accepting research citing a 2 percent rate of soldiers 
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predisposed to killing, Grossman concludes that “there is 2 percent of the male 
population that, if pushed or given a legitimate reason, will kill without regret or 
remorse.  What these individuals represent—and this is a terribly important point that 
I must emphasize—is the capacity for the levelheaded participation in combat that we 
as a society glorify and that Hollywood would have us believe that all soldiers possess” 
(ibid., 180-81). 
Of specific interest in Grossman’s theory on what enables combat killing for 
the 98 percent of the population who are not what he terms “natural soldiers,” is the 
collection of mechanisms that reduce the guilt felt by the soldier.  One of the most 
important factors, in Grossman’s opinion, is the influence of the group during battle.  
He cites the ability of the group to provide surveillance on the individual to encourage 
compliance with kill orders.  The group also provides the diffusion of individual 
responsibility, and therefore lessened guilt, which allows the individual to participate 
in the killing activity.  This is especially evident in the literature which demonstrates 
that soldiers operating crew-served weapons such as machine guns and artillery 
reached a firing rate of nearly 100 percent during World War II (1996, 153).  This 
combination of reinforcement of the order to kill through certain detection of failure 
to comply, plus the reduction of responsibility afforded to those who merely carry out 
a portion of the required killing steps, bring to the fore the strength of the group in 
overcoming individual resistance to killing. 
Grossman devotes a considerable portion of his writing to atrocity.  He 
recounts his personal experience of being an enlisted soldier who rose through the 
ranks.  At frequent intervals during training he and his fellow soldiers discussed 
various ways and reasons to evade the proscriptions of the Geneva Conventions 
against killing non-combatants or using illegal weapons against combatants.  He 
described such a situation where a military chaplain tried to dissuade the soldiers 
based upon moral and legal principles from killing future prisoners (which was the 
accepted position of the group).  Grossman observed that the men were not swayed 
in the least.  He chose to address his men directly by pointing out that if the enemy 
learned of such killing, they would stiffen their resolve and fight the Americans to the 
last (thereby increasing the potential of the Americans suffering casualties).  Humane 
treatment of the enemy would encourage surrender rather than resistance.  Finally, 
he told the men, “the last thing you ought to know is that if I ever catch any of you 
heroes killing a POW, I’ll shoot you right on the spot.  Because it’s illegal, because it’s 
wrong, because it’s dumb, and it’s one of the worst things you could do to help us win 
a war” (1996, 204). 
Grossman’s research describes the ways in which the ability to overcome the 
repugnance to killing that most soldiers have can be taken to the extreme of 
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committing atrocity.  He wrote, “All of us would like to believe that we would not 
participate in atrocities.  That we would deny our friends and leaders and even turn 
our weapons on them if need be. But there are profound processes involved that 
prevent such confrontation of peers and leaders in atrocity circumstance.  The first 
involves group absolution and peer pressure. . . . Human life is profoundly cheapened 
by these acts, and the soldier realizes that one of the lives that has been cheapened is 
his own” (1996, 224-25). 
Grossman considers the most important safeguard against unrestrained killing 
is the inviolable and universal rule in American military training that soldiers only 
unleash their killing abilities upon orders from authority.  According to Grossman, “It is 
essential to understand that one of the most important aspects of this process is that 
soldiers are always under authority in combat.  No army can tolerate undisciplined or 
indiscriminate firing, and a vital—and easily overlooked—fact of the soldier’s 
conditioning revolves around having him fire only when told to by a higher authority 
and then only within his designated firing lane.  Firing a weapon at the wrong time or 
in the wrong direction is so heinous an offense that it is almost unthinkable to the 
average soldier” (1996, 260). 
Grossman has definite views on the costs to the soldier who participates in 
atrocity, even when acting under authority.  He wrote: “The psychological trauma of 
living with what one has done to one’s fellow man may represent the most significant 
toll taken by atrocity.  Those who commit atrocity have made a Faustian bargain with 
evil.  They have sold their conscience, their future, and their peace of mind for a brief, 
fleeting, self-destructive advantage. . . .The killer can be empowered by his killing, but 
ultimately, often years later, he may bear the emotional burden of guilt that he has 
buried with his acts. . . . The guilt and trauma of an average human being who is 
forced to murder innocent civilians don’t necessarily have to wait years before they 
well up into revulsion and rebellion.  Sometimes the executioner cannot resist the 
forces that cause him to kill, but the still, small voice of humanity and guilt wins out 
shortly thereafter” (1996, 222-23). Mestrovic’s characterization of Grossman’s 
position on how soldiers are enabled to kill fails to include Grossman’s strong 
opposition to atrocity by soldiers, even when those soldiers are operating under the 
perceived behest to kill. 
Of particular interest to the present study is Grossman’s contention that 
soldiers are always under authority in combat.  He wrote from his perspective of a 
soldier who was trained to face the Soviet menace on a conventional battlefield.  He 
did not address the effect of small squad-sized units of troops operating 
autonomously in the patrols characteristic of the COIN tactics in Iraq.  Those patrols 
were under the leadership of young squad leaders and existed within the insular world 
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at the bottom of the war machine, distant from officers and senior NCOs who can 
provide the prudent leadership necessary to avoid atrocity.   
Grossman similarly does not write from the perspective of a force confronting 
an enemy who has been declared devoid of the legal soldier status that serves as the 
threshold for dignified treatment by the capturing force.  His perspective is anchored 
firmly upon what he characterized as “America’s position on the role of atrocity in 
combat and this is the logic behind it,” namely, that “the American reputation for fair 
play and respect for human life had survived over generations, and the decent actions 
of American soldiers in World War I had saved the lives of many soldiers in World War 
II” (1996, 205).  The Post-9/11 era American government, as described by Zimbardo 
and Mestrovic, changed the national reputation, and the rules that soldiers perceived 
to apply to detainee treatment. 
Sources of Abusive Violence, Methods Transmission, and 
Reflections on Experiences  
This study has found a number of surprising features about abusive violence as 
reported by the participants.  These findings partially answer the basic questions of 
the research and are briefly described here.   
 First, abusive violence was most often reported as an emotional response to 
feeling frustrated, angry, or under pressure to improve intelligence gathering or 
insurgency suppression.  Second, participants describe being almost entirely 
unprepared to effectively interrogate in an insurgency campaign, or to reduce 
violence against occupation forces.  As such, participants were not engaging in abusive 
violence as part of carefully designed and controlled sets of tactics.  Instead, abusive 
violence was enacted by troops who were frustrated by encountering a population the 
Americans thought possessed key information necessary to identify terrorists and 
insurgents who appeared to be stubbornly affecting ignorance in order to aid the 
enemy.  The Americans, viewing everyone as either an active terrorist/insurgent or an 
enemy sympathizer, believed that harsh methods were justified in order to combat 
violence against US forces.   
In many other cases the viewpoint was put much more simply: participants 
acted abusively toward detainees and Iraqis in general because they could.  They 
could because they had the overwhelming force of arms, the authority to exert 
powers of detention and transportation to secluded and sometimes illicit locations, 
and therefore the ability to abuse with impunity as long as comrades remained silent.  
The participants described fear, frustration, rage and a desire to reclaim power in an 
environment where the insurgent held the power to attack Americans by bomb or 
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ambush and avoid capture by disappearing into the populace.  This classic counter-
insurgency fighter’s problem, the unseen foe, raised anxiety, frustration, and anger. 
The participants also describe the weakness of constraints against abusive 
violence, and the frequent tacit or explicit encouragement they discerned from their 
immediate and senior commanders to forgo prohibitions in favor of being effective.  
Implicit in this interpreted message was a belief signaled to the troops that abuse, 
intimidation, and fear were the best tools to obtain information or to separate the 
community from the insurgent. 
The stated respect for human rights that would represent a barrier to such 
abuse prevented the Americans from creating formal types of torture training of the 
kinds that occurred in regimes less punctilious in such matters.  As such, an informal, 
ad hoc, and improvised approach was employed by abuser participants.  They did 
what they knew.  They hazed because they had been hazed.  They punched, kicked, 
and beat because these are what angry people do.  They used abuse techniques that 
they learned from movies, fathers, other abusers, and even from detainees who 
described what had been done to them by other soldiers.  They sometimes could not 
explain why they chose to maim or disfigure; yet in recounting those incidents they 
expressed the most concern about their own enjoyment of atrocity. 
In the main, participants express disappointment with their behavior.  As 
abusers, observers, or objectors all but one regret the abusive violence they saw or 
enacted.  To varying degrees participants were marked by the experience of abusive 
violence.  Some consider the abuse they committed to be the worst experiences of 
war they carry.  Others are gnawed by regret that they did not do more to prevent the 
abuse, as much because of harm to the perpetrators as to the victims.  Only one 
participant believed that the abusive violence was necessary and tactically effective 
after the fact; however, even he described the devastation that the worst abusers in 
his unit suffered after discharge.  They became drug users, lost their families, and 
went to jail.  Other abusers regret the gratuitous brutality they committed and report 
post-service bouts with anger, violent ideation and behavior, and suicidal thoughts 
and attempts.  Abusive violence is viewed retrospectively as unnecessary and toxic to 
everyone involved. 
To this point I have described various laboratory studies that attempt to 
explain how atrocity is enabled; the examples from World War II, Brazil, and Greece 
that show how actual situations of deliberate officially-sanctioned atrocity are realized 
in extreme military and police missions; the methods in which democratic states 
choose to undertake torture in ways that do not strip them of their morally superior 
appearances; and how the commands of senior American generals in Iraq were 
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themselves poorly defined and were adulterated by subordinates issuing confusing 
guidance to interrogators, or simply disregarded as other methods were employed.  I 
have also given a précis of the general thematic findings communicated by 
participants. 
In Chapter two I describe the methods employed in this study, both in terms of 
data collection protocols and the method known as Interpretive Phenomenological 
Analysis (IPA).  In the same chapter I describe the group of study participants and 
some of the abusive violence that they reported observing and committing.  In 
Chapters three and four I commence presenting the central information provided by 
the participants, which is not the catalogue of gross and minor abuses, but rather 
what they tell us about what the experience of abusive violence means, both in terms 
of how it comes about and how it affects the individual at the time and months and 
years later when those experiences are considered in the light afforded by time and 
distance.  I bring forth certain superordinate experiential themes common to some or 
the majority of participants.  Chapter three specifically addresses aspects most salient 
among the intelligence operatives.  Chapter four is centered on those soldiers 
employed in combat patrols, raids, and convoys.   In Chapters five, six, and seven, I 
examine in detail the experiences of three individuals with personal involvement in 
small units that routinely committed abusive violence, some of it including acts of 
scarring torture and murder.  Those experiences tell us much about the descent into 
heinous atrocity and what it is like to live years later with a divided self-image of 
monster, unforgivable sinner, and patriot. 
It should be understood that IPA is a method which endeavors to report in 
detail the experiences of individuals and to identify the meaning of those experiences, 
both as described by the individual and as interpreted by the researcher.  The method 
does not attempt to describe how all individuals may react to situations where 
abusive violence is of real potential.  It does provide vivid description of what those 
experiences were like for these people.  There has been little research done resulting 
in such rich description from veterans of America’s Global War on Terror and abusive 
violence as they experienced it.  This study will add to such scant information and may 
be useful in serving as a foundation of other qualitative research of broader scope and 
wider implication. 
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Chapter 2: Method and Participants 
This research was conceived, planned, and conducted as an Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) study seeking to understand the lived experiences of 
men and women who were exposed to abusive violence as part of their involvement 
in America’s “Global War on Terror” campaigns.  IPA studies can be done in various 
ways, but the preferred method is through the analysis of transcripts of semi-
structured interviews (Smith and Osborn 2008).  I therefore sought to identify and 
recruit Americans with direct experience with abusive violence carried out in 
American CT and COIN operations after September 11, 2001.   
Once the interviews were conducted, transcripts were prepared and IPA 
methods were used to identify themes that characterized the accounts, both within 
individual accounts and in some cases across multiple accounts.  While the cross-
account themes are useful for understanding the possibility of commonality of 
experience, they are not intended to describe any further incidence of the themes 
beyond this set of individuals.  IPA does not look at a set of study participants as a 
statistical sample, but rather as discrete whole persons with individual experiences.  
Considering those experiences in detail can provide for rich descriptive empirical 
information not well suited to collection through quantitative research methods.  The 
collection of that data required planning the study to address issues of research 
ethics, effective recruitment, and rapport-building which would allow participants to 
freely share their recollections of events that included many memories which 
continue to haunt them years after they occurred. 
Data Analysis Method 
As noted above, this study endeavors to seek understanding of the 
phenomenon of abusive violence in the American Post-9/11 case.  The difficulty of 
obtaining data from a large sample of veterans in the CT and COIN campaigns willing 
to disclose their exposure to and involvement in abusive violence has meant that the 
selected approach would have to concentrate on the individual.  This reliance on the 
individual account and comparison to a small number of similarly situated willing 
study participants dictates that the insights achieved from the study are not designed 
to be generalized to the larger population of all, or even any, other intelligence and 
military veterans.  It is, therefore the objective of this study to discover what can be 
learned about abusive violence in CT and COIN from the experiences of individuals 
and the meanings emerging from those experiences.  The method for the analysis of 
the data was therefore selected based upon the limitations and aims of the study. 
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Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (IPA), first described by Jonathan A. 
Smith (1996), is a qualitative research approach aimed squarely at understanding the 
lived experiences of individuals and the meanings they ascribe to those experiences 
(Smith, Flowers and Larkin 2010).  According to Smith (1996), IPA is theoretically 
based on phenomenology and symbolic interactionism.  Being informed by 
phenomenology, IPA concentrates in part upon the “individual’s personal perception 
of an account or event as opposed to an attempt to produce an objective statement of 
the object or event itself (1996, 263).”  Symbolic interactionism guides IPA by 
asserting that “the meanings individuals ascribe to events should be of central 
concern to the social scientist but also that those meanings are only obtained through 
a process of interpretation (ibid.).”  The interpretation of meanings from the words 
used by individuals to describe significant life events is the key task of the IPA 
researcher. 
IPA then relies upon a dual-interpretive process.  At the first stage of the 
process, the individual must interpret the event in some fashion and express both an 
account of the events and the meanings she places upon them.  At the second stage, 
the researcher must attempt to interpret what the individual has said, both explicitly 
and implicitly in the account provided.  The researcher “is trying to make sense of the 
participants trying to make sense of their world (Smith and Osborn 2008, 53).”  The 
researcher cannot simply relate the words of the individual; he must approach those 
words with a critical eye while seeking to represent the individual’s point of view.  The 
researcher should be attuned to the possibility of meaning and subtext being 
communicated that perhaps the individual does not identify; the researcher is 
expected to interpret, not simply repeat. 
Using IPA, the researcher does not conduct a straight-line, single pass, analysis 
of the data presented.  The process of analysis employed in IPA takes into account, 
and indeed relies upon, the researcher’s evolving understanding of the individual’s 
lived experience.  He will look at the information, typically in the form of interview 
transcripts, multiple times and attempt to discover the meaning from the text while 
considering the individual, the specific situation described, that situation’s place 
within a larger context, the event in relation to the individual’s greater life story, and 
his own growing understanding of such situations based upon his contact with both 
the individual, and other individuals in similar situations.  As Smith et al explain, “the 
process of analysis is iterative – we may move back and forth through a range of 
different ways of thinking about the data, rather than completing each step one after 
the other. . . .  The idea is that our entry into the meaning of a text can be made at a 
number of different levels, all of which relate to one another, and many of which will 
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offer different perspectives on the part-whole coherence of the text (Smith, Flowers 
and Larkin 2010, 28).”   
Although Smith and others describe IPA as a “process,” this does not imply that 
there is a single method employed in IPA.  IPA is an approach and a sensibility more 
than a prescribed set of ordered procedures.  Smith et al note that “IPA can be 
characterized by a set of common processes (e.g. moving from the particular to the 
shared, and from the descriptive to the interpretative) and principles (e.g. a 
commitment to an understanding of the participant’s point of view, and a 
psychological focus on personal meaning-making in particular contexts) which are 
applied flexibly, according to the analytic task (Smith, Flowers and Larkin 2010, 79).”  
In addition, the analysis presented as a result of IPA is reliant upon the text, not a 
theoretical position.  Smith, in explaining his analysis of one individual’s experience 
said that it was “based on a close reading of what is already in the passage, helped by 
analysis of what the participant said elsewhere in the interview and informed by a 
general psychological interest but without being influenced by a specific pre-existing 
formal theoretical position (qtd. in Smith, Flowers and Larkin 2010, 105).”  Finally, IPA 
acknowledges the existence of the individual conducting the interpretive analysis and 
the grounding of that analysis: “even though most IPA reading is operating close to 
the text, there is still a reader doing the reading and influenced by all of his/her 
biographical presence when doing that reading.  There is a discipline, however, in 
staying grounded and attentive, checking one’s reading again against the local text 
itself, and verifying it in the light of the larger text/what is said elsewhere in the 
interview and one’s unfolding analysis (ibid.).” 
Although as noted above, IPA does not prescribe a rigid process, there are 
approaches which are recommended to facilitate the detailed analysis of the 
participant’s account.  At the beginning of the process is the data collection, typically 
using audio recordings of semi-structured interviews, which interviews aim at allowing 
the participant to lead their own account of the life-experience under study.  The 
recordings are then transcribed and reviewed closely, with individual passages being 
labeled for the apparent meaning communicated by the individual.  This first level 
review occurs more than once with each transcript.  Where the labeled meanings are 
identified as potential higher-order concepts or “themes” emerging from the multiple 
close examinations of the transcript, the researcher will encapsulate the theme in a 
written descriptor.  As the researcher continues his consideration of the text the focus 
shifts slightly, from a sole concentration on the text itself.  As Smith and Osborn 
describe it, “the next stage involves a more analytical or theoretical ordering, as the 
researcher tries to make sense of the connections between themes, and some may 
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emerge as superordinate concepts.  Imagine a magnet with some of the themes 
pulling others in and helping to make sense of them (2008, 70).” 
One recommended process is the creation of tables of themes for each person 
as a means of conceptually ordering the insight into the meanings attributed by the 
individual to the reported life experiences (Smith 1996; Smith and Osborn 2008; 
Smith, Flowers and Larkin 2010).  Attention is first paid to the individual before 
moving across cases.  Again from Smith: “IPA is strongly idiographic, starting with the 
detailed examination of one case until some degree of closure or gestalt has been 
achieved, then moving to a detailed analysis of the second case, and so on through 
the corpus of cases. Only when that has been achieved, is there an attempt to conduct 
a cross-case analysis as the tables of themes for each individual are interrogated for 
convergence and divergence (Smith 2008, 41).”  While Smith has advocated for 
studies using as few as one individual as the entire data set (Smith, 2008), IPA studies 
often use larger groups.  In those cases, the level and order of detailed analysis will 
differ: “if one has a larger corpus, then almost inevitably the analysis of each case 
cannot be so detailed.  In this case, the emphasis may shift more to assessing what 
were the key emergent themes for the whole group.  Here it may even be the case 
that identifies emergent themes at case level but holds off the search for patterns and 
connections until one is examing all the cases together. . . . what makes the analysis 
IPA is the fact that the group level themes are still illustrated with particular examples 
taken from individuals (Smith, Flowers and Larkin 2010, 106).”  This study will apply 
IPA to two groups of participants with shared experiences and duties.  It will also then 
focus on a pair of individuals whose small units often engaged in abusive violence; in 
one instance the abusive violence was almost always considered instrumental to 
achieveing mission objectives, in the other the abusive violence was very often used 
as a means of venting rage.  I will also then focus on the account of a single individual 
whose attitude toward Muslims in general, and Iraqis in particular, fueled everyday 
beatings and torure, punctuated with the occasional murder.  His story arc moves, 
along with his recognition of the humanness of the Iraqis, to more humane, and even 
protective, treatment of the populace. 
In the instance of this study, I have remained committed to the individual 
account as the source of insight into the meaning of the abusive violence events 
experienced by each participant.  Each recording was transcribed and read multiple 
times by me.  I utilized a software program, Atlas.ti, with which each transcript was 
annotated with labels (in Atlas.ti parlance, “codes”).  In many cases specific passages 
were labelled with multiple codes.  Some labels were generic so as to allow capture of 
related passages and meanings within the transcript and for possible later cross-case 
comparison.  Others were of more conceptual significance. 
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As an example of the initial processing, the following passage was from an 
interview with Harold Turner10, who had just described an incident where his superior 
had violently thrown to the ground an Iraqi civilian at a checkpoint Harold was 
guarding.  Harold had not felt threatened, and in fact had engaged in purchasing 
goods from the civilian in the days before the incident. 
Q: At the time that the team leader intervened, what were you feeling 
when you saw that happen? 
A: Confused, by—like I said immediately my assumption was I [he?] saw 
something I didn’t, because they were, you know, salty and they had 
experience, so they knew what they were doing. But no, I thought this was 
horrible and I wanted to like stop it, but it wasn’t my place and… 
This passage was labeled “AV:Reaction to” and “AVOb: Objectors feel 
powerless to object.11”  This labeling scheme allowed me to look elsewhere in the 
individual transcript text for other instances when Harold mentioned his specific 
reaction to abusive violence and his characterization of helplessness.  The software 
allowed for identifying similar recurrence across the full fifteen-hundred pages of 
transcripts.  This latter ability allowed for the consideration of “objectors feel 
powerless to object” to abusive violence at the micro-level of an Iraqi guard post in 
comparison to a desire to object to the macro-level enabling of abusive violence.  As 
an example, Wayne Watson, spoke about the problems associated with objecting in 
his circumstance as a career intelligence officer: 
Well, I think…the—it’s important to assess or no—to keep in mind,as all of 
these things played out, the just about irresistible force of programs once they 
begin that are formally approved by the entire government and by an 
institution whose job is to serve and to fulfill the mission and there’s relatively 
little open challenge of the measures that I observed, if any.  Because you were 
part of the team or you weren’t and there was a chain of command that you 
had to—that you were a part of. So that made it very difficult to—it’s not a 
college seminar where there can be endless challenges of any assumption or 
any practice, and so once the doctrine is developed and the approvals are 
given and the perceptions are developed, then it’s incredibly difficult for an 
individual to challenge all of that. 
                                                     
10
 All participant names used herein are assigned aliases. 
11
 Among the hundreds of thematic codes, I used a certain number of abbreviations/categorizations.  
AV was used as universal shorthand for “Abusive Violence,” while AVOb stood for a large category 
grouping of “Objecting to Abusive Violence”. 
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The two passages open the question of what does it mean to these men to 
believe that “it wasn’t my place,” to object?  And what does it mean to have not 
objected at the time?  Is the expression today a re-framing, a self-convincing, that the 
impetus to abuse was in fact a “just about irresistible force?”  The process of 
interviewing provided rich details of the experiences of the participants. The use of 
Atlas.ti facilitated the recognition of the events and reflections within and across 
cases, which offered me the opportunity to consider the more conceptual aspects of 
what the participants’ accounts contained. 
After weeks of reviewing and coding transcripts using the Atlas.ti program, I 
ended up with 628 codes and 1666 coded quotations.  Pretty obviously this resulted in 
a barely manageable amount of information to sift, if done manually.  On a previous 
research study I had semi-manually sifted transcripts of about the same 1500 page 
volume by cutting and pasting passages in a word processing program.  In that case, I 
had used only four major descriptors for the initial transcript reviews. With the ability 
to group codes and primary documents into categorical “families” (e.g. the seventy 
different codes belonging to “AV Reasons for” or the fourteen “Combat Arms” 
transcript) it was possible to employ some of the simpler Atlas.ti program tools to 
group participant quotations into potential thematic clusters. 
As an example, seeking to explore the idea that intelligence interrogators were 
ill-prepared for their duties, and the repercussions that resulted from that lack, I 
created a research query in Atlas.ti. The query was constructed by selecting from 
among all of the codes the sixteen codes that seemed to relate to the topic of interest.  
The resulting query report, (see figure 1) documented the date and time of the query, 
the codes used for the query, and the document filter used: “Intelligence Operatives.”  
Forty quotations were returned.  All forty were then re-read in the query report.  In 
many cases the originating transcripts were reviewed to get a better understanding of 
the immediate context from which the quotations were taken. 
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Figure 2. Example of Atlas.ti query report 
 
In order to form the initial data into a more highly processed piece of analysis, I 
created a research question memo in Atlas.ti (see figure 2).  The analysis memo states 
the specific question being considered, and incorporates the query and filter.  
Thereafter, the drafting of analysis and incorporation of selected quotations from the 
returned items in the research query report are placed in the “Answer” section of the 
memo.  The memo then can be set aside for re-drafting as other related quotations 
come to light during exploration of different themes or as part of the process of 
returning to the topic with a more developed insight as a result of reflection or new 
data.  In any case, the analysis memo and query report form a basis of documenting 
the steps taken to reach conclusions which can be an important part of demonstrating 
the rigor and reliability of the resulting writing incorporated into this thesis. 
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Figure 3. Example of Research Question memo 
 
The process of interviewing provided rich details of the experiences of the 
participants. The use of Atlas.ti facilitated the recognition of the events and reflections 
within and across cases, which offered me the opportunity to consider the more 
conceptual aspects of what the participants’ accounts contained.  Having considered 
the processes by which the data was collected and analyzed, I turn now to how the 
data was gathered for analysis. 
Data Collection Method 
Research Ethics Considerations 
In keeping with requirements related to studying human subjects, I applied for 
and obtained approval from both the School of International Relations Ethics 
Committee and the University Teaching and Research Ethics Committee (UTREC) to 
conduct research interviews of American veterans.  As part of the process of obtaining 
those approvals, I made clear in my application that I would undertake measures to 
minimize potential harm to participants as a result of aiding the study.  Provisions for 
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participant harm mitigation and confidentiality protections are detailed in Appendix 1.  
I also prepared a Risk Assessment and Safety Plan related to the field work phase of 
the study (see Appendix 1).   
Recruitment 
This study, seeking participants in what is believed to be a relatively rare 
phenomenon among a very large veteran population distributed across the entire 
United States, was not considered suitable for recruiting strategies typically 
undertaken to study university students or participants within small geographic 
boundaries.  However, since the total number of participants for an IPA-based study is 
much smaller than those required by quantitative research approaches, it was 
expected that successful recruitment of a small initial cohort of persons might result in 
additional referral participants of sufficient number to create a credible study.  In this 
case it was decided that twelve participants would be a minimum workable group.  
The primary phenomenon of interest in the study was the choice by individuals 
to participate in abusive violence, some of which violence I anticipated might have 
included activities such as the types of humiliation and assaults which had already 
resulted in criminal convictions.  I did not think that recruiting participants to a study 
called “Understanding Torturers and What Makes Them Do It,” would be very 
successful. The more neutral-sounding “Detainee Interaction Study” became the name 
put forth during recruitment.  Recruiting materials were designed to assure 
participants that their experiences would not be judged negatively, regardless of what 
those experiences included.  The study materials invited participants to share their 
experiences whether they were simply bystanders or participants in abusive violence 
directed toward detainees. 
I recruited participants in several ways.  One of the methods resulted in the 
recruitment of a single participant who, along with his “snowball”12 referrals, made up 
nine of the fourteen total participants interviewed.  In keeping with my obligation to 
keep participant identities confidential I will document the various ways in which I 
tried to recruit participants but I will not list which methods ultimately led to 
interviews.   
I attempted to make my study known through direct appeal recruitment via 
local veterans groups in North Carolina, where I was briefly based. Numerous military 
bases exist in that state and the adjacent states of Virginia and South Carolina and I 
intended to travel extensively in the region speaking to small veterans organizations 
meetings.  For reasons unrelated to the study or recruiting feasibility in that area, I 
                                                     
12
 Snowballing refers to research participant recruitment using early participants to recommend others 
to the study, and subsequent participants to do the same. 
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halted that particular initiative.  I relocated to Hawaii and undertook a similar strategy 
there. This proved entirely unproductive in that location, so I amended my 
recruitment plan.  
I then attempted contact with people who had been associated publicly with 
detainee interrogations or were directly implicated in abusive violence.  Among those 
were persons who had been mentioned in press reports or who had spoken out about 
their experiences through interviews or writings.  I sought contact through journalists, 
publishers, and co-authors.  In the case of persons who had been accused in court 
actions as perpetrators of abusive violence, I attempted contact through lawyers, a 
prisoner advocacy organization, and their family members.  In a few cases I sent 
letters directly to the homes of individuals known to have been involved in detainee 
interrogations.  I did not attempt to recruit any defendants in the Abu Ghraib courts 
martial, primarily because I felt that this group already had been intensely studied and 
that any of the defendants would have given their accounts so many times in the past 
as to create the high likelihood that semi-structured interviews would result in the 
receipt of well-sculpted and rehearsed renditions closely adhering to earlier 
testimony. 
I contacted the national leadership of a number of organizations made up of 
former members of the US armed forces and intelligence agencies seeking assistance 
with a call-for-participants effort.  I also sought participants via colleges and 
universities, in some cases through contact with various academic departments and in 
others through on-campus veterans’ organizations.  In total, inquiries were sent to 
more than 400 individuals and entities. 
To support my inquiries, I established an internet presence for the study.  A 
web-page was posted on the St Andrews School of International Studies site 
(Appendix 2), as was a biography page on me to allow interested persons to take in 
information about me and the study that would assure them of both my bona fides 
and earnest commitment to the research and their well-being.  I also established a 
website at http://unspokentruths.org (Appendix 3) that provided information about 
the study and linked to the two pages on the School web-site.  Finally, I established a 
personal Facebook site that I maintained solely for the purpose of presenting a 
communication and familiarization link for potential participants. 
Initial conversations with potential participants included discussions relating to 
the study aims, procedures, and ethical safeguards.  I also tried to pre-qualify 
participants by asking some general questions about their experience-level with 
detainees and observing abusive violence.  I made clear to each potential participant 
that agreeing to meet me did not obligate them in any way to proceeding with the 
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actual interviews.  If initial contact was received by email, I sent reply emails with links 
to the webpages I had established as well as an attachment copy of the Participant 
Information Sheet developed for the study (Appendix 4).  In most cases, the potential 
participants had received enough information in my initial solicitation or from referral 
sources to create interest and tentative willingness to participate.  I answered any 
questions that they had regarding my interest in the topic, commitment to 
confidentiality, probable time commitments, and how their information would be 
used.  I urged them to review the provided information, reflect on our conversation, 
think of any additional questions they might have, and then to contact me if they 
wished to proceed.  All agreed to do so, but most indicated a willingness to cooperate 
in the first conversation.  I still insisted that they contemplate the matter at least 
overnight before I would accept their commitment as fully considered. 
I only discussed the logistics of meeting after the potential participant made a 
clear statement of willingness to participate in the study.  I then offered to travel to 
the participants’ towns for the interviews, or to meet at some other location of their 
choosing, with their travel costs covered by me.  I also offered to cover the costs of 
the participant travel to my locale.  Participants were also told that if they did not wish 
to meet in person that a distance interview could be arranged via telephone or video-
conferencing. 
While working with the second participant, it became evident that the 
participants would probably benefit from the assistance of spouses or other 
supporters between the two interviews and immediately after the second interview.  
Also in the case of the second interviewee, allowing the participant’s significant other 
to meet me appeared to satisfy certain hesitations that she had about the 
participant’s well-being during the interviews. As a result, I concluded that the 
participants who did not remain at home for the interviews should have the 
immediate support of a friend or significant other during the time after each interview 
and during travel home.  I wanted to avoid placing participants in situations wherein 
they, after having spent a first interview remembering and disclosing events that were 
deeply troubling to them, faced an afternoon and evening in a hotel room alone, 
without having anyone nearby who knew their mood and with whom they could share 
their feelings.  I hoped that the resort atmosphere in Honolulu would provide 
sufficient diversion to allow the participants and their supporters to disengage from 
thinking solely about negative war experiences.   
Investigation of travel package expenses showed that it would be feasible to 
have the participant and a supporter-companion travel to my location for the same or 
lesser cost of my traveling to most locations elsewhere in the US.  After the interviews 
with the second study participant, each subsequent participant was offered the option 
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of having a supporter accompany them to the meeting city.  Again, this offer was not 
made until potential participants had already made a strong statement of willingness 
to be interviewed. 
Recruitment efforts resulted in the interview of five individuals attracted by 
the recruitment campaign.  The remaining nine participant interviews were the result 
of referrals stemming from the first five.    The first interview took place during early 
Spring 2011 and the final interview occurred in the Fall of 2012.  All but one interview 
was done face to face, the exception being via telephone. Of the fourteen interview 
participants, eleven travelled to Hawaii to be interviewed.  Of those eleven, two 
travelled alone. 
I made clear to participants that by covering the expense of the travel, lodging, 
and food for themselves and a supporter, I was not bargaining for their participation 
in the study.  Some participants expressed doubt that this should be true given the 
amount of funds being provided.  I explained, truthfully, that I would be no worse off 
if they met me and decided to not proceed with interview regardless of whether this 
occurred on their doorstep or in Honolulu.  Actually, there were a number of reasons 
why the latter was preferable to me.  In the first case I would have had to devote the 
effort of at least two days’ travel before and after the rejection.  I would also have had 
to undergo the effort and expense of arranging suitable interview venues that 
provided requisite privacy, but not be so secluded as to create a sense of insecurity in 
the participant or an actual security issue for myself as a lone researcher.   
In order to safeguard participant anonymity, participants were responsible for 
making their own arrangements for flights and hotels within a pre-determined budget 
limit.  I reimbursed or pre-funded the travel expenses in cash so that there would be 
no financial records connecting participants to the study. 
Researcher-Participant Interactions 
Building Rapport.  As an experienced interviewer on sensitive subjects13, I 
understood that establishing strong rapport would be a key factor in allowing 
participants to feel safe enough to describe their exposure to abusive violence and to 
divulge their own indirect and direct complicity in some of that violence.  I also 
believed that allowing participant supporters the opportunity to question me about 
my motives for the research, commitment to participant well-being, and my study’s 
aims and methods, would increase their confidence in the process on which the 
                                                     
13
 From 1982 to 2006 I had spent a career as a specialist fraud and threat management investigator.  I 
received extensive training in interview and interrogation methods used in law enforcement and 
private investigations. My professional experience included many hundreds of witness interviews and 
approximately 200 suspect interrogations, the majority of the latter resulting in voluntary confessions. 
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participants were to embark.  I therefore discussed with participants who travelled to 
meet with me the advantages to spending some informal time together before the 
actual interviews.   
I eventually developed a number of ways to enhance rapport and trust with 
participants and their supporters.  A detailed description of those methods is found in 
Appendix 5. 
I believe that the efforts to put participants at ease and to ensure that they 
were supported and diverted were effective. The amount of time spent with the 
participants who met in person ranged from four to more than ten hours.  During the 
interviews a number of the participants told me that they had been able to discuss 
some events that they had never disclosed to others before, including loved ones and 
therapists.  One participant noted that the interview sessions were far more intense 
than he had anticipated, even more so than with his psychiatrist since the fifty minute 
counseling hour tended to cut off discussion too early.  Several participants said that 
the interviews prompted recollections of events that they had not thought about in 
years.  When I expressed concern that the memories had been unpleasant and best 
forgotten, all of the participants told me that they did not feel worse for having 
recalled them and were happy that they might contribute to the understanding of the 
study phenomena.  Some of the participants expressed appreciation for being 
removed from their normal home environments while undergoing interview since 
they were not pressured by the regular household-family requirements and could 
relax with their spouses for a few days, making the overall experience a positive one.   
Interview Settings and Procedures. The Honolulu interviews took place in the 
large office suite of an international corporation that had agreed to host the study 
interviews.  Two venues were used.  The most frequently used space was a conference 
room that accommodated ten; the other was a small private office within an inner 
suite.  A stereo digital audio recorder sat on a small tripod between us.  After several 
interviews had been completed without technical issue, a single failure occurred 
during which less than thirty minutes of interview went unrecorded. From that point 
forward a backup digital recorder was also used.  Prior to the start of each first 
interview I explained to the participant that I would announce when the recorders 
would be turned on and showed them the lights on the recorders that indicated that 
they were recording.  I also informed each participant that they could request the 
recorders to be turned off if they wanted to discuss any matters off-line.  This was 
taken advantage of on a couple of occasions when participants wanted to talk about 
how best to frame their comments to preserve their own or others’ anonymity.   
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I generally tried to provide for once-hourly comfort breaks but also 
encouraged participants to say when they might want to take pauses.  Participants did 
so on several occasions.  If the interview was covering a particularly interesting or 
intense account by the participant, I would allow the narrative to continue beyond the 
regular break interval.  In some cases participants declined offers of breaks at the 
hourly point. 
After each participant’s final interview, I asked most participants to consider 
referring individuals to the study who might have study-relevant experiences.  I told 
participants that it was my practice not to acknowledge the names of any participants, 
even if they had made disclosure to third parties themselves. I asked participants to 
make contact with potential new participants and ask that they contact me if 
interested in the study and its objectives.  In order to preserve participant identities, 
each referring participant was assigned a code word or phrase that was memorable, 
and to have the referral mention the code during the initial contact.  In this way I was 
able to receive contacts from anonymous persons who claimed to have been referred, 
but I would not have to acknowledge the name of the referring individual as a 
participant.  This process worked well, although none of the eventual participants 
opted to remain anonymous to me. 
Pre-Interview and Interview Schedule.  The pre-interview was structured to 
allow for participants to enter the subject of Abusive Violence as easily as possible.  
Since form filling is a familiar activity, I decided to use this method to set ground rules 
and expectations for the interviews proper, to collect information, introduce 
definitions, and to start participants thinking in specific terms about the abusive 
violence they saw, without their being burdened at that time with the dynamics of 
conversation that could distract from their own thoughts and prompted memories.  
The participants were given a sheet of instructions and questionnaire (Appendix  6).  
The instructions were designed to emphasize the anonymous nature of the study 
(items 1,2,5,6,8 ), to remind that an audio recorder would be used (item 7), and 
underscore the ability to decline to provide information requested by the 
questionnaire, seek clarification for any questions asked, and to ask for a break at any 
time (Items 3, 4, 9, respectively).   
Item 10 on the instruction sheet introduced a tool suggested by information 
from a psychologist to assist in helping participants access their reactions to the 
interview conversation.  The Personal Calm Score was devised as a ten point scale the 
participants used to describe their level of calm or uneasiness: 
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Table 2. Personal Calm Score Ranges 
Score Descriptor Label 
1 Entirely Calm 
2-4 Mostly Calm 
5-6 Neutral 
7-9 Mostly Uneasy 
10 Entirely Uneasy 
   
It was hoped that the participants would be prompted to pay attention to their 
own reactions to the interview and would be open to my asking them about their 
feelings through the short-hand of the number scale.  Participants were normally 
asked to rate their level at the start and end of the recorded interview sessions and on 
occasion during conversation when they seemed to be uneasy.  During the pre-
interview contact with participants I often discussed that I wanted to ensure their 
well-being during the interviews, but that it was a shared responsibility since only they 
could know whether they were okay.  I also urged participants to let me know if there 
were points where they did not want to continue discussing particularly problematic 
topics. 
An untitled second sheet was given to the participants as a means of 
approaching the topics I anticipated would be more difficult for them.  The form 
(Appendix 7) began with the definition of Abusive Violence adopted by the study. The 
initial question allowed participants to first disclose that they had been present during 
abusive violence, asking them to indicate the number of times it had been observed 
by selecting from among “Zero,” “One,” “Two,” “Three to Five,” and “More than Five.”   
They were then asked to categorize their observations of Abusive Violence by 
selecting from among a list of abusive practices, placed generally in an order from the 
mild to most atrocious.  This was hoped to remind participants of behaviors that they 
observed and to introduce to them some methods that they might not have 
previously considered to fall within Abusive Violence.  It was also expected that by 
first disclosing what participants observed, a de facto disclosure of proximity to 
Abusive Violence, they would be more open to describing their own conduct.  The 
next section, as with the first, asked participants to indicate on the same frequency 
scale their own involvement in Abusive Violence.  After doing so they were asked to 
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re-mark the list of methods to indicate those techniques they had personally used.  
They were also provided space to record methods not appearing on the list. 
The two forms filled out by the participants provided me with some quick 
demographic information and self-disclosures obtained from participants through the 
comparatively safe method of circling and underlining entries from a pre-composed 
list.  Having those self-disclosures allowed me to initiate the discussion of participant’s 
personal experiences with abusive violence in the actual interviews by referring to 
information that the participants had already given.   This allowed me to bring some 
structure to the questioning regarding specific methods, and still allowed the 
narratives to be guided first by the participants own revelations. The interviews 
thereby benefitted from time-saving in exploring the entire universe of possible 
Abusive Violence methods and allowed sufficient time to be spent on each individual’s 
experiences and sense-making. 
An interview schedule was prepared (Appendix 8) to provide a semi-structured 
format which allowed for the main topics of the study to be addressed while leaving 
sufficient flexibility to allow each participant to be the primary guide to the events 
they experienced and the thoughts those experiences engendered.  The order of the 
questions was tailored generally along chronological lines.  The preliminary question 
(“can you tell me a little about where you’re from?”) seemed like a basic topic 
participants would use as an every-day starting point in introducing themselves and it 
naturally allowed for follow up questions about immediate family, education, personal 
interests and influences.  The individual was then asked to continue his “personal 
story” by describing the decision to enlist, the crucial entry to the circumstances that 
would eventually place them in proximity to Abusive Violence.  Again, this allowed for 
the follow-up questions about their naive expectations for military or intelligence 
agency service, training and pre-deployment service experiences, and expectations 
regarding interaction with detainees.  The discussion also allowed for participants to 
describe the motivations for joining and some of the underlying attitudes they had 
about Muslims, Arabs and Iraqis prior to deployment.  These initial thoughts, motives, 
and expectations in most cases were profoundly altered by the experiences of actual 
CT and COIN operations. 
The interview narratives then moved to operational deployments and first 
impressions of the arrival in-country, most often in Iraq.  Participants were asked to 
describe their initial duties in general and their first encounters with the local 
populace and detainees.   
Participants were then referred to the observations of Abusive Violence they 
had disclosed in the pre-interview form and asked to describe their first such 
Method and Participants  66 
 
 
 
experience.   Participants were prompted to give an initial account of the event.  In 
order to enhance details, participants were often asked to recall and describe the 
events in terms of what they heard, saw, and felt at the time of the experience.  They 
were then asked to describe one or two similar events that may have occurred, again 
with as much detail as possible.  They were also asked to describe the immediate 
aftermath of each event and what they had thought about it at the time. 
Participants were asked to provide similar levels of detail regarding their own 
abusive violence and their related decision-making.  This provided some of the richest 
materials in the study.  Similarly rich details were received from participants as their 
stories continued with post-deployment and post-service narratives.  The interviews 
included participants sharing their present views of their conduct and generally 
concluded with an open-ended request that participants add whatever they thought 
important to say about Abusive Violence.   
Possible Issues Relating to Participant Travel and Pre-qualifying Participant History 
During the planning and execution of the data collection phase of the study, I 
was cognizant of issues of possible coercion and related matters that the bringing of 
participants to Honolulu might raise.  It was possible that potentially vulnerable 
persons being brought out of their safe environments might feel dependent on me to 
the extent that they could not freely exercise their right to withdraw consent from the 
interview.  It was also possible that participants might view their participation as a 
quid pro quo to the receipt of travel expenses to a desirable vacation location.  It 
might be even further possible that participants would shape their narratives to 
exaggerate the kinds of accounts they thought I wanted to collect.  These possibilities 
were discussed during planning the study with my supervisor and I believe without 
question that each participant was a fully informed and free participant in the study. 
The Honolulu participants’ potential vulnerability to dependence on me was 
reduced by the presence, with only two exceptions, of their supporters.  The 
supporters, either close friends or partners, offered the participants access to a third 
point of view if they wanted to discuss misgivings about continuing.  Furthermore, the 
expense money was always provided to the participant before the first interview day 
so that there could not be any question that their funds would be withheld if they did 
not consent to interview.  In most cases the funds were sent to the participants before 
they booked their travel since many did not have the ability to pre-pay the travel.  This 
also tended to address possible concerns that participants might not receive 
reimbursement upon arrival in Honolulu. 
As described above, I undertook multiple efforts to inform and remind 
participants that they could withdraw consent at any time before and during the 
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interviews.  I also took pains to point out that while they might feel that the trip to 
Honolulu was of benefit to them, that through their willingness to come to me I was 
receiving a definite benefit by being able to avoid two trans-Pacific flights, possibly 
followed by two trans-continental flights.  I reminded them that their withdrawal 
upon initially meeting me would put me no worse off than if they changed their mind 
if I had travelled to meet with them.  In these ways I tried to reduce any sense of 
obligation to proceed.  Their consent appeared genuine, and at the start of each first 
recorded session I reiterated the option to halt and obtained their verbal consent to 
begin. 
With respect to participants possibly shaping accounts to meet perceived 
researcher expectations I can provide the following perspectives.  While it would be 
inaccurate to state that participants were completely unaware of my interest in 
studying the phenomenon of abusive violence from the standpoint of perpetrators, 
much of my pre-interview interaction with participants and their supporters was spent 
making clear that the study would benefit from the accounts of those who were 
simply present during abusive violence or who actively objected to such goings on.  I 
was also very explicit in telling each participant and supporter that the study was 
intended to understand the experiences of each individual and that their accounts 
were not expected to match anyone else’s story.  In some cases the amount and 
character of personal exposure to abusive violence related by participants was 
relatively mild compared to other collected accounts, and some of those participants 
apologized for their self-perceived lack of valuable egregious anecdotes.  This 
indicates that those participants both acknowledged my interest in understanding the 
worst-case abuse situations, but were not compelled to embellish.  I was also allowed 
in those interviews that were not crowded with stories of routine abusive violence, to 
explore issues that proved to be quite valuable to the study.  An example is the role of 
harsh military hazing in one unit.  This was mentioned by a participant with little direct 
experience with abusive violence, yet it offered a guide to a topic I was able to bring 
up with later participants.  Some more serious abusers had not previously thought 
about how hazing seemed to make invisible the abuse of detainees subjected to 
treatment that outwardly mimicked their own military training experiences.   
In initial emails and conversations with potential participants I did try to pre-
qualify their experiences to ensure that they did include observations of or 
participation in abusive violence. In at least one situation my understanding was 
imperfect, as subsequent interview tended to show.  This interview was useful not 
simply because of the introduction of topics which had not been obviously important 
at the start of the study, such as hazing, but also because the participant was able to 
refer other individuals whose direct abusive history was more significant.  Those 
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follow-on participants ended up being the pathways to third and fourth level referrals 
that eventually represented the majority of recruited participants. 
The planning for recruitment, researcher safety, and rapport-building, followed 
by the actual recruitment and subsequent interviews spanned more than two years.  
This resulted in fourteen two-session interviews.  The elapsed interview durations 
ranged from three hours to more than five hours, with an average time of four hours 
and twenty-five minutes per participant.  The sixty-one plus hours of recordings 
resulted in the preparation of nearly sixteen-hundred pages of interview transcripts, 
which represented the mass to be passed through the refining screen of Interpretive 
Phenomenological Analysis. 
The Participants 
Information was collected from the participants regarding their age and 
education level at the time of enlistment.  They also provided information relating to 
their age, rank, and general duties at the time of detainee interaction, as well as their 
total time in government service.  For all but one participant, Iraq was the country 
where detainee interactions took place.  Some of this information is sumarized in the 
tables below.  The participants were prompted during the interviews to describe why 
they enlisted.  The information provided in this chapter is intended to provide the final 
backdrop information to allow the deeper entry into the lived experiences of the 
participants as individuals in the next chapters. 
Eight of the particpants entered government service between the ages of 
seventeen and nineteen.  Two were aged 22-23 years, two were aged 24-25 years, and 
one was aged 26-27 years at enlistment.  At the time of interaction with detainees, 
eight of the participants had only high-school educations, two had college degrees 
(one of whom had a master’s degree), and four had some college, but no degree.  
Several of the participants have continued their education since leaving military 
service. 
With the exception of the civilian intelligence officer, the participants were 
mostly lower-ranking enlisted personnel at the time of the deployments that put them 
in contact with detainees and the Iraqi populace.  The military ranks ranged from E-1, 
private, to E-6, a staff Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO).  The number of reported 
ranks reflect individual participants whose multiple deployments spanned their rise in 
the ranks.  The majority of reported ranks are E-4 or higher, which represent the 
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positions occuppied by soldiers14 who have supervisory duties over others, usually at 
the lower organizational levels such as within a single vehicle or squad. 
 
Table 3. Ranks during Interactions 
Rank at time of interactions No.  
E-1 1 
E-2 1 
E-3 1 
E-4 8 
E-5 3 
E-6 1 
 
The participants also responded to questionnaire inquiry regarding their 
detainee-related duties. Their answers regarding the pre-defined categories are 
compiled in the following table. 
Table 4. Detainee-related Tasks 
Detainee-related tasks No.  
capture 9 
transport from point of capture 10 
guard in field 7 
question in field 9 
guard in holding facility 6 
question in holding facility 6 
in-process at holding facility 8 
provide medical services 3 
language translation 6 
out-process from holding facility 3 
 
                                                     
14
 Throughout this work I use the term “soldier” to mean all uniformed members of the US armed 
forces.  I do so in order to further preserve the confidentiality and anonymity of all participants.  This 
would otherwise potentially offend participants who have earned the right to be called by more exalted 
or elite titles such as Marine, Paratrooper, Ranger, Recon Marine, HUMINTer, etc.; however, the 
participants certainly understand that this is not my intent. 
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The variety of tasks reflect the diversity of general position types held by the 
participants.  Some were assigned to units such as infantry, mechanized infantry, 
special operations, paratroopers, and rangers. Their units would have been engaged in 
direct combat, raids, patrolling, checkpoints, and guard duty where the interactions 
with detainees and the general population would have afforded exposure to abusive 
violence.  Others were involved in intelligence gathering, including interrogation of 
detainees in the field and at holding facilities of varying permanence, which afforded 
other kinds of situations with potential for abusive violence.  Again, the total number 
of responses reflects the the multiple duties carried out by the participants at 
different times and places. 
The age at which participants had direct interactions with detainees was also 
reported.  Most of the participants were younger than twenty-five at the time of their 
first detainee interactions. 
Table 5. Age during Interactions 
Age during detainee Interaction No. 
18-19 4 
20-21 6 
22-23 2 
24-25 1 
26-27 3 
28-29 2 
30-31 1 
32-33 0 
34-35 1 
36-37 0 
38-39 0 
40+ 1 
 
The seeming excess number of reported ages is a function of participants 
whose individual deployments may have occurred during a time period in which the 
participants’ ages fell into two of the pre-defined age ranges on the questionnaires.  
For example, a single soldier may have been in Iraq on a single deployment during 
which he turned twenty;  he would have reported interactions in both the 18-19 and 
20-21 age brackets. 
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Why Participants Joined Up 
The participants were asked to describe why they enlisted in government 
service.  This was used as a means of opening them up to discussing the overall 
context which resulted in their deployments and exposure to abusive violence, and 
was expectedto be an easy subject with which to start them talking.  Their replies 
ranged from a need to earn money,  to a desire to do something other than simply 
continue with more education after high-school graduation, to a yearning for 
adventure, and a desire to be of service.  Charles Wilson described a combination of 
motives for enlisting: 
Um…ah, so yeah, and I was just not wanting to do anymore school at that 
point, so the [military] was kind of the complete opposite of that and I suppose 
being a Boy Scout, I was an Eagle Scout, and so there was that—I remember 
telling my dad that I felt like I needed to give something back to the United 
States for what it had provided for me.  I guess that was one of the bigger 
things was the like kind of “called to service” attitude, I had at the time. 
Some viewed military service as a means of personal growth.  Aaron Bennet 
saw the possibilities: 
It was, you know, so—a lot of it was, you know, so a lot of it was, mostly it was 
economic incentive, but some of it too was, you know, these feelings of, you 
know, help me mature and become more of, more of a man, so to speak. I 
mean, and I really wanted to get out of where I was from. So it was the 
quickest, easiest way to get out. 
Other participants had been fascinated by the subject of war as youngsters, 
and definitely saw military service, and especially combat, as a highly-desired  pinnacle 
experience. Frank Wright described his motivations: 
You join the military and a lot of it had to do with the fact that I read a lot of 
books as a child, and I was really into war books and history books, and 
ah…I’ve always considered war to be the ultimate human experience, you 
know, good, bad or otherwise. I had a saying, ‘There’s only like three things in 
life that are all they’re cracked up to be. It’s women, drugs and war.’ 
The September 11, 2001 attacks figured large for some participants.  For 
Richard Miller there was a direct connection: 
I joined the military because of September 11. I thought that it was my job, 
my…my duty to serve, uh once we were attacked, that I could no longer enjoy 
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the freedoms that were offered in this country without fighting for them or 
myself. 
 
Louis Sanders’ reaction was simple and direct: 
Q: When September 11 happened, how did you feel? 
A: I felt that my country was attacked and I needed to go eliminate the 
threat. 
Stephen Scott, who had previously done a stint in the military, receiving a 
discharge shortly after 9/11, described his feeling of having unfinished business that 
prompted his re-enlistment: 
When I got out, okay 9/11 had happened and I was kind of always on the fence 
about whether I should get out or not, because the country was going to war, 
of—I asked my family what I should do. Of course, they all said, “Get out, you 
did your time…’ whatever.  “It’s somebody else’s problem now…” and … you 
know, I thought, ‘Yeah, I’ll just get out…’ but I always kind of felt like I ran 
when the country needed me, so when they decided to go into Iraq, that was 
it, I was like, ‘Okay, my country’s at war, you know, with two countries now… 
like it needs me, I need to go back in.’ 
Antonio Hayes joined before leaving high-school with a sense of patriotism, 
fascination with war, and a general idealism.  When asked why he joined up he 
replied: 
Um, I was one of those “true believers.”  Um, I, you know,  had thought about 
joining the military since I was a young kid.  Um, you know, I liked GI Joe, I liked 
war movies and books and things like that, um and I think as a consequence of 
that of being interested in those things, I, you know,  developed a really strong 
sense of patriotism, and so, you know, when I got a little older and when I was 
in high school, um I felt that, you know, I saw my peers just aspiring to just go 
to college and party and um do whatever, but I felt that I really wanted to be a 
part of something bigger than myself. I wanted to, you know, commit myself, 
donate my life um to serving some greater cause, ah and at—at that time, I 
believed very strongly that the most noble cause was serving in the U. S. 
military.  I believed, you know, that as a soldier, my job would be to ah free the 
oppressed, to help people who were in need, bring people a better life, ah you 
know, bring freedom and democracy to people who didn’t have it, um and so 
like it was a very idealistic decision um which is why I joined as soon as I could. 
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The participants, from a wide variety of backgrounds, and with many different 
motives for enlisting, all found themselves in situations where abusive violence was a 
frequent possibility.  Many of them saw and did things which they never imagined 
when they joined up. 
A Tally of Abusive Violence 
The participants reported first-hand experience with much abusive violence.  
In this section I report a summary of the abusive violence they described.  While it is a 
summary of facts, it does not provide insight into what these events meant to the 
participants at the time, why they happened, or what meaning those atrocious actions 
have for them now.  Those understandings will be revealed in the next chapters as the 
approaches of IPA are used to tease out the important nuances of meaning. 
Prior to the start of the interviews, participants were asked to mark 
questionnaires to indicate thenumber of times they had personally observed or 
participated in any of thirty-five pre-defined types of abuse. Among the fourteen 
participants, all reported observing abusive violence, while nine reported committing 
such violence. 
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Table 6. Frequency of Abuse 
Number of times Abuse Observed Abuse Committed 
Zero 0 5 
One 2 2 
Two 0 0 
Three to Five 3 1 
More than five 9 6 
 
Abuse Types 
The types of abuse reported varied widely. The participant questionnaires 
listed some thirty-five kinds of abuse and allowed for participants to describe other 
types of abuse. Of the pre-listed abuse categories, all were observed by one or more 
participants. The participants’ responses regarding their own conduct conflicted with 
their interview contents with respect to finger-twisting; while not marked on any 
questionnaires, more than one participant did report during interview that they used 
fingertwisting to unnecessarily cause pain. Participants did not report personally 
abusing persons through the use of knee-strikes, forced sexual contact, whipping, or 
squeezing the body with bindings or heavy objects. The following table includes the 
number of participants reporting having observed or participating in the respective 
kinds of abuse. The types are listed below in the same order as presented to the 
participants. 
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Table 7. Participants Observing, Committing Abuse 
Listed Type of Abuse Observed Committed 
Threat Detainee-verbal only 11 8 
Threat Others-verbal only 9 4 
Use Weapon to threaten detainee 11 4 
Use Weapon to threaten others 5 2 
Slapping 10 4 
Punching 9 4 
Elbow Strikes 2 2 
Kicking 7 2 
Knee Strikes 1 0 
Stomping 4 2 
Choking 3 1 
Strike w/ Weapon 5 4 
Strike w/ object 4 2 
Finger-twisting 6 0 
Arm/wrist twisting 6 1 
Burning 2 1 
Stabbing/Cutting 3 2 
Whipping 1 0 
Electric Shock 2 1 
Pinching/squeezing w/ tool 2 1 
Poking/probing/pressing existing 
injury 3 2 
Withholding Medical 
Care/Medicine 7 5 
Withholding Food 8 3 
Forced Exercise 5 3 
Withholding Water 8 3 
Forced Sexual Contact 1 0 
Forced Kneeling/Standing  5 5 
Binding/Shackling in painful 
positions 7 4 
Hanging from wrists/arms/legs 1 1 
Covering mouth/nose to prevent 
breathing 2 2 
Squeezing body with bindings or 
heavy objects 1 0 
Pouring liquid over/into mouth 
and nose 1 1 
Prolonged exposure: cold or heat 8 5 
Prolonged exposure: loud noise 5 4 
Shooting 3 2 
Killing 3 2 
 
Method and Participants  76 
 
 
 
The worst forms of abuse included reports of study participants observing or 
being responsible for the mutilation of detainees with knives, the killing of detainees 
during simulated drowning, the killing of battlefield captures in lieu of transport to 
detainee collection points, the use of detainees as human shields during withdrawal 
under fire, the killing of human shields once extraction vehicles were full, stomping a 
prisoner to death after an ambush killed a comrade, and two killings of family 
members of persons during field interrogation (in one case a detainee’s younger 
brother, in the other a detainee’s pre-adolescent son). Interrogation techniques 
included cutting, finger-lopping, beating, electrocution, threats leveled against 
household members present, and threats to find absent family members and 
subject them to torture, pointing loaded weapons at detainees, and explicit promises 
to kill the detainee. One unit routinely allowed an Iraqi national who was a contract 
translator to threaten to torture and sodomize detainees in order to obtain 
information. In one case, a participant recounted a situation where an insurgent was 
caught red-handed attempting to emplace an IED. The participant’s squad debated 
the relative merits of killing the detainee on the spot or taking him back to a detention 
center where he would likely be tortured. In the end the squad members decided to 
shoot the detainee and if necessary claim he had shot at them. 
The most egregious abuse was committed by combat arms service members 
including soldiers and marines in infantry, airborne, mounted and special operations 
units. The participants who were in actual military or civilian intelligence positions did 
not report directly observing or participating inbeating, cutting, shooting, 
electrocution, or killing. 
To this point I have described the methods employed in this study, the 
theoretical underpinnings and goals of the IPA approach, the limits on generalizing 
from this kind of study, and the software tool used to facilitate the data analysis.  I 
have also provided some background information regarding the study participants and 
the kinds of abusive violence they observed and perpetrated.  Although I have 
introduced some of their voices while describing the variety of motives they had for 
enlisting, I have not thus far provided much information about the meaning of the 
experiences to the participants themselves.   
This research, committed to the principls of IPA, presents my interpretation of 
the sense-making of these fourteen prticipants.  The evidence underpinning my 
analysis is constituted by the words they spoke. For that reason alone Smith, Flowers 
and Larkin recommend that “a large porportion [of an IPA write-up] is constituted by 
transcripts extracts (2009, 109).”  That is not the only, or even the best, reason why 
the following pages are full of many quoted passages from interviews.  The raw words 
from the participants provide the experienced-reality of events significant to them in a 
more immediate, manifestly authentic, and idiographic way than my paraphasing.  
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The reader can evaluate my analysis and more fully enter the  experiences we seek to 
understand through the testimony the participants themselves offer. 
It should be made clear that the IPA is a research method and is not a 
psychological therapeutic approach.  As such, in the interviews conducted with 
participants, there was no goal of providing any kind of therapy or treatment to the 
participants.  This is especially so since I am not a qualified therapist and IPA is aimed 
at research, not healing.  Indeed, psychology is not its only area of application.  As 
Smith, Flowers and Larkin state at the very beginning of the first book-length 
treatment of IPA, “[it] is a recently developed and rapidly growing approach to 
qualitative inquiry.  It originated and is best known in psychology but is increasingly 
being picked up by those working in cognate disciplines in the human, social and 
health sciences (2010).”  A recent internet search for evidence of such method 
dispersion found masters and doctoral theses and dissertations reporting IPA as the 
primary method of research into such diverse subjects as education (Devries 2013), 
organization development (Fursman 2012), and the experiences of users of 
therapeutic footwear (Williams 2008). 
In the next chapter I will present the information related by those participants 
whose duties were primarily centered on intelligence gathering.  Following that, I will 
relate information from those who carried out the direct combat missions, patrolling, 
conducting raids, and transporting detainees.  In the two further chapters I will 
consider the experiences and meanings of three participants whose involvement in 
abusive violence was personal, egregious, and to varying degrees, scarring to their 
victims and themselves.  In this way I intend to move closer to the individual lived 
experience of this group of Americans whose motives for enlisting ranged from lofty 
ideals of service to revenge. 
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Chapter 3: The Intelligence 
Professionals 
The interview of intelligence personnel who were confronted with the 
opportunity to commit abusive violence revealed several superordinate themes that 
describe the sense of their experiences.  Those experiences included specific events of 
abusive violence and the larger context in which the experiences are situated by the 
participants.  The themes are: 
1.  We Just Came Up With That. The participants who actually conducted 
interrogations describe the training they received.  Two participants attended 
the full Army interrogation course at the Military Intelligence School at Fort 
Huachuca, Arizona.  One other soldier, tasked to head an interrogation team, 
was not “schoolhouse” trained, but received some informal training from his 
unit.  A fourth soldier was plucked from other intelligence duties to assist his 
unit’s professional intelligence officers in preparing detainees for interrogation 
by terrorizing them.  The only civilian intelligence operative, the one with the 
most experience in intelligence field operations, had no formal training beyond 
the interrogation and torture resistance techniques he had learned decades 
earlier.  All of them related that they were ill-prepared for the reality of 
interrogating.  They were forced to experiment, improvise, and generally fail 
because of an over-reliance on power and force rather than rapport. 
2. The Interrogation Assembly Line. The military interrogators lived in a world of 
detentions resulting from mass arrests, and sometimes from corrupt practices.  
In that world, trying to extract information of intelligence value became a 
mind-numbing exercise of interrogation that one participant equated to speed-
dating.  Eventually, for those who employed it, abusive violence became part 
of the routine, regardless of whether it aided intelligence gathering.  The 
absurdity of interrogating what seemed like every military-aged male became 
apparent to the interrogators and one participant began modifying his 
approach during interrogations, or avoiding them altogether. 
3. A Tempting Mix: The Cool Factor plus Frustration, Power, Isolation and the 
Helpless Deserving Enemy.  The interrogators who turned to abuse described 
frustration, anger, and revenge as motivations for using enhanced 
interrogation.  Fascination with the privileged access to the uncommon human 
experiences found in the interrogation rooms was also an admitted factor: 
doing interrogations and testing moral limits was alluring. 
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4. Bursting the Moral Bubble. Those interrogators who abused detainees 
described the process of thinking that eventually robbed the abuse of its 
attraction.  Their judgment of their own actions, and considering their actions 
from the points of view of the people back home in America, and indeed even 
the people they were abusing, bled their enthusiasm for the abuse.   
5. Mottled Reflections. Chagrin, denial, shame, and acceptance of responsibility 
characterized both of the abusive interrogators’ reflections about their 
experiences.  For those intelligence personnel who did not abuse, there is no 
sense of unadulterated satisfaction; there lingers the question of what they 
might have done better.  
We Just Came Up With That 
The various military intelligence participants whose duties included 
interrogations all describe being poorly prepared for the reality of the situations into 
which they were thrust.  Two of the participants, Roy Howard and Stephen Scott, were 
graduates of the formal Army interrogation course at Fort Huachuca, Arizona.  Wayne 
Watson, the civilian intelligence officer, had received briefings on interrogation 
methods during his initial agent training, but said that while his agency had relied on 
so-called experts, the training did not appear to be reliable.  Antonio Hayes was a 
young intelligence specialist whose training was entirely divorced from questioning 
people.  Anthony Rodriguez was a supervisory level soldier leading an interrogation 
team by virtue of possessing the rank required by the billet.  He had never been 
trained to interrogate before receiving his assignment. 
Although one would expect a wide variation in the levels of skill, expertise, and 
accomplishment from these five participants, there is a surprising similarity in some of 
their accounts.  Their common experiences included a struggle to find methods that 
would actually work.  Most of them also found that while their respective 
organizations acknowledged limits to what could legally be done, some of what they 
were taught was to exceed the legal limits.  Once actually in the field, some received 
guidance, directives, and policies that were confusing and contradictory.  Ultimately, 
each described situations in which a lack of training grounded in the reality of their 
circumstances left them mainly to their own devices to imagine and then try things 
that might work.  In short, they made it up as they went along.  Sam Bailey was an 
intelligence specialist who provided intelligence assessment briefings to a non-
intelligence battalion.  She did no interrogations. 
Interrogation Training and Abusive Violence 
Roy Howard and Stephen Scott received their interrogation training during 
different eras.  Roy was trained before 9/11 when there was little expectation that he 
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would ever conduct live interrogations.  Stephen was trained after the Abu Ghraib 
scandal had made headlines and thousands of detainees were already being held in 
Iraq.  For Roy, the described limits on what he could do were mandated by the Geneva 
Conventions.  For Stephen, Geneva was certainly part of the training, but for him, the 
main deterrent was different, and related specifically to Abu Ghraib.  Asked about 
whether the trainees talked about Abu Ghraib while trying to figure out what might 
work within a real interrogation, he answered: 
What we knew from Abu Ghraib was that real soldiers were going to real jail 
for stuff that they had done out there, and nobody enlists to go to jail, nobody 
enlists to make their life worse, so I mean…I don’t recall having any sort of 
conversations where we even discussed stuff like that.  
He had specific cause to contemplate what abuse might mean when he 
returned to Iraq: 
Q: So as somebody going to interrogation school, um…do you remember 
the treatment of the subject of the Geneva Conventions and its protocols? 
A: It figured, it ahhhh, it figured prominently, well maybe in the middle. 
We did get a talk on it, because the Geneva Conventions was all about how to 
handle prisoners of war and detainees, and then we were told that if—if there 
was like a Geneva Conventions violation and we were the human intelligence 
collector who was on site, that we would get in trouble before the commander 
or any of the soldiers, because we were the “subject knowledge experts,” so to 
speak, and that really played in to when I was deployed the second time. 
Although both interrogators received training on the Geneva Conventions, and 
in Stephen’s case that training included specific object lessons on punishment, they 
each talked about the informal learning about abusive violence they received at the 
interrogation school.  Roy, asked about whether the cautionary lessons were 
undermined, answered: 
Yeah. Um…I think—I think there was a kind of a wink and a nod as they were 
telling us these things, saying that “when you get out there, you know, it’s 
going to be different…” and in particular, ah I remember one of our instructors 
telling us about techniques used in Viet Nam where, you know, you—you 
would be interrogating two people in the helicopter and you push one guy out 
and…the other guy would then—then talk and this wasn’t said as a 
condemnation, it was said as,  you know, kind of— “This is what actually 
works.” 
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Roy’s training also included anecdotes delivered by instructors about prisoners in Viet 
Nam being electrotortured by Americans using hand-cranked field telephones. 
Comes Stephen’s account from a decade later: 
A: One of the instructors told us that you could use one of those, it’s a 
hardwired telephone where you just connect it, it’s just connected to another 
telephone with the wire, you crank it, it makes the other phone ring. [] When 
you crank it, it um…generates an electric charge and they’re saying that if you 
use the connector, instead of connecting to the wire, you can actually like zap 
somebody with it. So, um, and they were talking about like you could use that 
to like zap a prisoner, or that they would do that in the Vietnam War, I guess, 
to zap a prisoner on the testicles. You know, that’s exactly where they said, 
too, you know, not—not the tongue or anywhere like that, but, you know, on 
the—on the scrotum, um…he didn’t say, instruct us to do that, it was just kind 
of like, it can be used for that. 
Q: Do you remember the context in which that would even came up. 
A: Yeah, this was not explained to the class, you know, in front of like 
females and males, but this particular instructor was—he was former Special 
Forces, and I guess that was probably something he just learned being a part of 
a SF group somewhere down the line. Um…but no, we were never instructed 
to. [] We were in the classroom, [] I guess maybe we were on break or 
something, [] he was former Special Forces, so he always had stories to tell us. 
Some of us would kind of be enamored with the stories he would tell. 
Both future interrogators received the overt lesson of legal limits on the 
treatment of interrogation subjects, no doubt as written into the curriculum.  The 
informal lore, a subversive co-message of “what works,” was delivered sotto voce to 
students “enamored” by the hard-core warriors at the front of the class.  The 
transmission of an abusive culture submerged beneath the surface of a professional 
army intelligence corps through its formal institution continued across the span of 
time in which the Army enjoyed the comparative peace of the late 1990’s and the 
grueling two war marathon of the 2000’s.  Deployment to the battle zones of the 
Global War on Terror did little to suppress the abusive undertones. 
“Theory” and Practice in the Absence of Expertise 
Antonio Hayes was a young soldier whose intelligence specialty was entirely 
unsuited to the CT and COIN missions in Iraq.  He was brought into the interrogation 
process when the warrant officers in his intelligence unit needed extra hands to keep 
the pressure on a pair of high-value detainees.  Antonio, his section leader, and his 
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team-mate were assigned to assist in interrogations by keeping the detainees awake 
and under stress through the night, so that they would be ready to be interrogated in 
the morning. 
Later, as the number of detentions skyrocketed in the area where Antonio’s 
unit was stationed, Antonio, and his team-mates assisted in interrogation sessions.  
Antonio’s training consisting of observing the warrant officers.  Having already been 
used to terrify detainees before they were interrogated, Antonio expanded on the 
bullying techniques. Antonio describes a confused, chaotic, and menacing 
environment that he and his un-trained team created in the interrogation room: 
A: When we started, I wasn’t the one who was doing the bulk of the, [] 
questioning.  I was just the one in the room that was helping be scary.  []One of 
my main jobs was having a metal folding chair and hitting it against the wall as 
a person was in a stress position with their face against the wall or just 
standing against the wall like bound, um…my thing was, I just take this chair 
and slam it against the wall next to their head. Um… 
Q: Were you—being cued to do that at specific times or was it just…? 
A: It was just random; I mean and that’s actually something I came up 
with myself…um, it was just something that I had developed as a tactic. 
Q: What was the reaction that that garnered? 
A: Um, like extreme fear, like extreme fear. I mean, you know, these 
people were usually, whenever I was doing it, they hand sandbags on them, 
so…it was like extremely jarring; it was extremely loud and it was right next to 
their ear.  Um…so it was like every time, it was like an extremely jarring thing 
and not knowing if they’re going to get, the next time they’re actually going to 
get hit.  
Q: And what were you trying to achieve? 
A: Um, scaring the people. Ah, like…’cause we—we’d go through the—the 
shock, like scaring the hell out of ‘em and then we’d start asking them 
questions, but sometimes it would just be to just be confusing. Like one of the 
things that we would do is ask them—so we’d, so like one of the things would 
be like in Arabic to say like, “What’s your name?” It’s like “Shishmuk” or 
something and I’m pronouncing it wrong and we would pronounce it wrong in 
the cell, like, you know, they probably didn’t understand that we were saying, 
“What’s your name?” but we would just scream this question over and over 
again.  So the guy’d be against the wall, my partner would just scream 
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“Shishmuk” at this guy and as soon as he’d scream that question, I’d slam the 
chair against the wall and freak the guy out and then he’d scream the question 
again and we’d just be asking this question that wasn’t a question to this 
person, but he knew we were asking him something, he just didn’t know what, 
and then every time I’d just be smashing this chair, and so it was just like, I 
mean in a way, if there’s no information to get from this. It was just putting 
them in a psychological state that was just extremely disoriented and terrified. 
Q: Now was that something that you were coached to do? 
A: No, we just came up with that.  Um, we just knew we’d have a 
caseload, we just had to see if we could get any information out of these 
people, and then report whether or not we got any information. 
Antonio and his team, with their unschooled and inexperienced reasoning, felt 
that putting people into a “disoriented and terrified” state would produce useful 
revelations.  He explained what he had been doing:   
We were kind of thrown into it with no training and no guidance and so we 
were just trying to figure out, you know, what would—what would work, and 
so…and I think some of it too, it’s just out of the frustration of not knowing 
what we were doing and it wasn’t—in a way it wasn’t even a totally serious 
thing, you know, like when we were screaming a question over and over again.  
That was just like a stupid question that had no answer.  It was just, I think it 
kind of spoke to like—the absurdity of what our, like what are we supposed to 
be doing anyway, like it was like a detail that…I don’t know, we ended up kind 
of figuring out, just was kind of…like pointless altogether. 
Being a “schoolhouse trained” interrogator early in the Iraq war did not 
guarantee any greater expertise.  Roy Howard described the results of bad training 
meeting the real world: 
We were flying blind, to be honest with you.  Yeah, we were not very good 
interrogators.  Like we…you know, we didn’t learn these approaches in the 
schoolhouse. We spent one day on approaches in the schoolhouse.  Out of the 
three months we were there, we spent one day on how to break a prisoner 
and they were all, I mean it—I’m sure they can be effective techniques, but 
you can’t learn them in one day, but so…I don’t know, we were just going on 
what we heard worked, what other people—any ideas, like…we had nothing, 
you know.  Nobody was talking to us and we got, we had no intelligence in Iraq 
and a lot of that is because a lot of the people that they were bringing us 
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weren’t involved in the insurgency and they didn’t have intelligence to tell us, 
but a large part of it too was that we were just completely inept.   
Roy explained the use of coercion during his interrogations, even though he 
learned that softer approaches were more productive. Roy explained why this was the 
common approach: 
When I was using the, the hard power approach was, because I was 
inexperienced and…I was being told that this is what’s effective.  Um…and as I 
started to get a little bit better, I—I—I kind of was starting to use better 
methods, and I think that was true for others as well. 
Causing pain, invoking terror, creating confusion and disorientation were all 
methods that study participants who were intelligence interrogators used when they 
first began to work with detainees in Iraq.  They speak of lack of guidance or expertise 
and the frustration of blindly trying to develop effective approaches for the gathering 
of intelligence from detainees.  In the absence of better advice, they elected to use 
raw power.  None of them reported success with this approach. 
The Interrogation Assembly Line 
Several of the interrogators describe frustration over the mass arrests that 
produced large numbers of detainees to be questioned.  They refer to the pressure 
they felt while they were at the front-end of the detention process, when they were 
responsible for designating who would be detained and moved along the detention 
assembly line to higher levels of detention.  They also describe the absurdity they felt 
at being part of a machine responsible for obtaining information in the wake of such 
mass arrests.  In some instances they concluded that the system and methods 
employed were creating more enemies and dangers for US forces.  The various 
pressures and contradictions they dealt with created dilemmas that resulted in one 
team trying to ameliorate or at least lessen the resentment among detainees by 
abandoning interrogation altogether.  In one case, the pressure to produce more 
detainees led to corruption, injustice, and questioning of the mission to which the 
interrogator was devoted. 
Anthony Rodriguez supervised a mobile interrogation team.   His team would 
often be assigned to line combat units to question persons detained at that level.  This 
frequently entailed questioning large numbers of detainees with only a limited time to 
spend with each one.  He discussed what it was like to work on the front end of the 
detainee interrogation process: 
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Having a short amount of time to be able to develop information that people 
wanted, it could be effective but you really had-like you had to be lucky to run 
upon somebody that was either really disorientated or really willing to give 
information. [] The circumstances that you had or worked with, [weren’t] really 
conducive to what you were trying to do.  I mean, I almost kind of look at it like 
it was speed dating; one minute you’re talking to somebody, next minute 
you’re talking to somebody, next minute you talk to somebody and you’re 
trying to develop but a picture of, getting small snap shots and little things.... 
Just had to type up a report, information you knew, send it up, that guy’s going 
to Abu Ghraib and they’ll develop it further there.   
Rodriquez never learned whether the interrogators at Abu Ghraib obtained 
anything of use from the detainees sent there. 
The line combat units were often responsible for amassing large numbers of 
detainees.  The reason for those detentions became apparent to the interrogators.  
Antonio Hayes described his observations: 
When they would raid a house or they would raid houses, they’d get an 
intelligence where some guy would snitch, be like, you know, “There’s people 
who are in the resistance who are living in this neighborhood…” [] They’d be 
cordoned off and everyone would be searched, whatever, and everyone would 
just be brought in for questioning.  Because it was like, it was almost like a 
‘better safe than sorry’ thing. It was like, these guys may be bad guys; we don’t 
really know, but what’s the harm in bringing them in to be interrogated to find 
out for sure? 
 
At times the results were overwhelming to Hayes: 
So there’d be times where we’d have to work all through the night because 
there was a raid and they wrapped up like 200 people and we have to put all 
these 200 people through this process.   
Rodriquez described what it meant to his team when they realized the nature 
of the mass arrests: 
A big sentiment that was agreed upon with some of us is that…if you’re going 
on a mission to go collect people, I mean, go for a reason, don’t just go 
because they fit within a particular range of an age. I mean, if that’s the case, 
then…why don’t we just round up all of Iraq and we just talk, talk to every 
person individually and see what we can do [] there was some disdain for 
The Intelligence Professionals  86 
 
 
 
it....it’s kind of hard because when you see people, rounds of people just being 
brought in, just being brought in and tons of them are just there for absolutely 
no reason other than being an Iraqi between a certain age, that wears on you. 
[] The majority of the bag is like, you really arrested a lot of people for nothing, 
absolutely nothing. 
The reasons for the detentions were not always so inept or benign.  Stephen 
Scott described the corruption of a process that required more than one party to 
denounce someone in order to justify a detention.  This method, known as "dual-
source reporting" is a bona fide intelligence technique only if the multiple sources are 
independent of each other.  There was pressure to increase the numbers of 
detentions arising from this supposedly reliable method.  That pressure skewed the 
process.  Scott described the aftermath of a successful raid that was the result of 
painstaking intelligence gathering: 
A: It was, it was a-it was a success, it was just too slow for the battalion 
commander. So he’s like, “We need to do this faster…” so instead of dual 
source reporting, well we still dual source reported, but whenever we had a 
source come in, we would say, “Hey bring a friend, that way we can dual 
source right then and there. [] And nobody ever asked who our sources were 
anyway. They just wanted to detain people, you know what I mean. If we can 
give them, like, like here’s…one sworn statement, here’s one-another sworn 
statement. Yeah, they were dated at the same exact time, but that didn’t 
matter. You just had to have two people point out the same person. We would 
have them, we could triple or quadruple source one person in an afternoon 
doing it that way. 
 
Scott's team grew even more creative: 
We got even worse than that, you know. We started going on raids and 
bringing our sources with us so that we can just, you know, um, we would…we 
would stage it so we’d have like multiple rooms. We would take a picture of 
people in one room on a digital camera, go into the next room where like the 
three or four sources might be, and just start being like, just go through the 
digital camera, and if they were like, “Oh yeah, him, him, him…” and like, “Oh 
okay, we’ll detain that one...” you know. “Oh yeah, him, him too…” so we 
would just do it that way. [] We didn’t care who got detained, we just wanted 
numbers, we just wanted numbers.   
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Eventually, Scott found that the sources were making false allegations, and he 
found out that the pressure to produce detainees had led to transactional 
denunciations: 
I found out that my team leader was actually paying them [sources] per person 
that they pointed out. We did have Intelligence Collection Funds, ICF, that we 
were able to use at our own discretion. He was like giving them, you know, ten 
bucks for every person they pointed out, something like that, you know so, I 
mean we were pretty much just buying detainees at that point. He found some 
wicked people that were willing to sell out anybody for like ten bucks a pop. 
You know, at that point, you-only way to make money is to point out every 
frickin’ body, you know, and he got his friends involved, like “hey, they’re 
paying us to detain people.” 
The realization that innocent Iraqis were being detained and interrogated led 
at least one interrogator team to alter its approach.  Antonio Hayes, who had 
developed the techniques of bashing chairs against walls and shouting unanswerable 
questions during interrogations, described what happened: 
So it was just me and my squad mate who was like my-my best friend while we 
were deployed.  So it was just us doing them from then on and we started 
essentially just not doing it or faking it, where, um….you know, our normal 
routine would be get-have someone in, do the first part of freaking them out 
really bad and then getting into the actual questioning, but um…we just kind of 
stopped doing it, like…we’d-um, the person would come in, we wouldn’t scare 
them, we wouldn’t put ‘em in a stress position, we’d just sit there and just ask 
the questions, like “Did you do this?”  “Did you do that?”  “Do you know where 
Saddam Hussein is?”  “Okay, go…” and then we’d just, and it wasn’t like him 
and-him and I talked about it, but I think we both just became fatigued with 
going through these motions and being this person that we weren’t really-we 
weren’t really that person, like we were like nice guys and then our job is to be 
just this complete, like belligerent ass hole.  Um, and so we just kind of 
stopped and just not cared, just made like it’s just another stupid assignment, 
like typical Army bullshit, and so we kind of stopped, stopped doing the 
interrogations.  
Hayes described how his thinking evolved, and how he stopped his 
involvement: 
I started not liking the interrogations.[] At the point that I had been doing them 
for a little while, so I had gotten some experience, like maybe…you know, 
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several weeks or a month or something, and I had done a high volume of 
people, and, um, you know, felt, started feeling uncomfortable doing them 
because, you know, I was realizing it was extremely traumatic for the people 
who it was being done to, um, that I was kind of-felt, in a way, kind of turning 
in to this-this monster in a way.  Um…and also the main thing was, ah…that not 
one time, ever, did we ever get any information out of anyone. So there is no 
time where we did an interrogation and then someone was like, “Yes, I’m a 
part of this group; I gave money…” “Or I conducted an attack…” or whatever.  
So it was like, um, and then knowing why these people were being brought in 
for these random things, I began to realize that these people hadn’t done 
anything; that they were just civilians who, some, like infantry dude just 
suspected and then was like, “Whatever, what’s the harm?” in sending them in 
to get interrogated, and so I started feeling like, um…that these were just 
innocent people and they were being severely traumatized by their 
experience, and I was the person who was doing it, and I started not feeling 
good about that. So, I got myself tasked out to do other-other types of things. 
The interrogators describe a system that swept up large numbers of Iraqis into 
detention and delivered them to the interrogators who admitted that they knew very 
little about how to be effective.  What they did know was how to bully, intimidate, 
terrorize and abuse.  They grew frustrated and began to think that the system was 
becoming pointless.  They also thought about things far worse.   
A Tempting Mix: Frustration, Power, Isolation and the 
Helpless Deserving Enemy 
The interrogators related their frustration at being ineffective because of their 
own lack of skills, the pressure to get results, and the unworkable numbers of 
detainees to interrogate.  Clearly, gathering intelligence was becoming nearly 
impossible.  The interrogators describe the effects of frustration, power to inflict pain, 
and the urgent need to prevent the next insurgent or terrorist attack had when a 
helpless detainee was brought to them.  The motive of gaining secrets was joined by 
other impulses in the interrogation space; if intelligence could not be gained, then 
satisfying anger would suffice. 
The rising frustration and anger took two interrogators’ thoughts into dark 
areas.  Roy Howard described what he contemplated, but did not do.   
I mean, as I said, you know, there were times when I was extremely angry and 
frustrated and um…you know, you have somebody in front of you who’s 
helpless, and you’re holding all the cards and it’s the middle of the night in the 
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middle of nowhere and you can do whatever you want and…that seemed 
attractive at some time, at some points. [] Like cutting off fingers or just 
beating them or-and then, you know…there were plenty of guys, who, even if I 
didn’t have the stomach for it would have been happy to go in there and do it 
for me. Um…so I could have just, you know, turned a blind eye to that, but 
ah…and so yeah, I thought of it, I thought of those things. 
Stephen Scott wrestled with a rising hatred toward Iraqis during his 
deployment as an interrogator. While speaking of this he brought up the subject of 
waterboarding.  He described the circumstances that constrained him from using the 
technique: 
Q: When you said you wanted to water board somebody, was it an Iraqi 
detainee that you would hope to practice this on? 
A: Not a detainee, somebody that we had, um…there was a—there was a 
couple of incidents where they would hold somebody [] in the neighborhood, 
like we had stopped them, and we weren’t going to let them go home just, just 
quite yet, but they weren’t—we didn’t quite know what to do with them. 
Q: Okay. 
A: So they would sometimes drive one of us, ah…HUMINTERS [Human 
Intelligence specialists] out there to go talk to this person. Now when we 
would link up with them to go talk to them, the person, we were—we would 
be in a secluded empty field, and there were—and, you know, they would be 
like, nobody ever said, you know like, “Okay, go beat the truth out of this 
guy…” nobody ever said anything like that. But just the fact that we were in a 
secluded area, this is clearly not where he was picked up and where he was 
found; it was dark, um…and they would say like, “Okay, you know, talk to 
him…” I kind of got the impression that they wanted me to do more than just, 
you know, finger quotes, “talk to” the person. 
Q: [] Did you find yourself in that situation considering how to and if to 
water board the person in front of you? 
A: Um…not really, I—the problem with that, and I think I told you this 
yesterday, was that whenever we would talk to a detainee, we made sure that 
there was no eyes on us, and in this situation, all the eyes were on us. There 
was absolutely no way I was going to do something, because I—I didn’t trust 
every single one of those soldiers, and I knew it would only take one solder 
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writing an email home…and you know, that email getting forwarded around 
that, you know, again, real soldiers were going to real jail for stuff like this. 
Q: But if those soldiers were absent? 
A: I might have; I might have given it [waterboarding] my best shot, I 
mean, at that point. [] I would have done it just because I wanted to [do] it. 
Like I wouldn’t even ask any questions, you know, I was just kind of curious. 
As Roy Howard mentioned, and Stephen Scott certainly endorsed, isolation, 
power, and a need for answers, even to a matter of personal curiosity, could turn a 
professionally trained interrogator to thoughts of atrocious conduct.  Both men 
refrained, but as more than one combat arms soldier related, not every American in 
Iraq did under the same circumstances. 
Beyond frustration, a source of motivation for abusive violence was a sense 
that the detainees deserved the treatment because they were an enemy who caused 
harm to Americans. This sense, coupled with anger toward detainees, fueled some of 
the abuse. Roy Howard described why he allowed a mock execution: 
A: I was convinced that this guy was involved in, and particularly he was 
involved in firing mortars on us and we-like, we had just been through [a 
mortar attack with casualties] I was pissed at him, and ah, I had interrogated 
him once before and he was really recalcitrant and kind of an asshole, and so, I 
didn’t really care about how he was feeling, at that point. 
Q: Was he somehow directly involved in that particular mortaring? 
A: That’s what I believe, yeah.  [] 
Q: Do you think that you were present when the soldiers were injured 
enhanced your level of animus toward that particular detainee? 
A: Yeah, and that happened all the time. I mean…I mean there were times 
when we were interrogating them, you know and rounds would start falling [] 
and like it ramps up your adrenalin and motivation to, to ah…get to this guy, 
and it-even if it’s not to gain intelligence, you’re just mad, you’re just really 
mad, you know? 
Roy also described the reasons why he felt that another interrogator 
threatening a detainee’s family member was appropriate: 
I think part of that is because like this guy [the detainee] was actually a very 
bad man, I mean, I-I think that he had killed and tortured a lot of people, and 
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so I had-I had no moral compunction about what was going on there, and as 
far as legal problems, I didn’t think that we were um…crossing lines that 
anybody would ever have a problem with. 
Roy Howard summed up the ties between frustration, anger, and blaming the 
victims: 
I don’t know, it’s funny and I-you know what, honestly, like I think a lot of what 
we were doing over there, in terms of the enhanced interrogation or straight-
up torture was not so much about gaining intelligence or mission specific, I 
think a lot of it was simply just frustration and anger and it was just violence 
for violence sake, you know, like you have a helpless person in front of you 
that, you know, you think is part of a force that’s trying to kill you and your 
friends and…you know, just act out violently. 
  
The Intelligence Professionals  92 
 
 
 
Distanced and Routinized Pain 
For Roy, the ability to distance himself from the pain he was inflicting created a 
blind spot in his thinking at the time.  Distancing was a matter he talked about more 
than once during his interviews.  He explained the practice of stress positions and the 
distancing effect of using indirect methods to cause harm. 
Q: Ah…did the use of the stress position, in order to create discomfort and 
um…did that somehow seem to attenuate you from the direct infliction of that 
pain? 
A: Yeah, ah…yeah, it-it…for us, I think it, you know, it was psychologically 
really different than punching them or kicking them, ah…because, you know, 
you’d just tell them, “Okay, you kneel,” and they would do it themselves, and 
it’s gravity and the ground, that’s really causing them pain, not us. Even 
though, I mean that’s not quite accurate, but that uh, it seems like one level 
removed. 
Q: Was that helpful [] in terms of you’re being able to employ it? 
A: Yeah, I think so, I-I-I think I really wouldn’t have, okay…the-it was a 
clear line for me that I would never strike a detainee, and I…I…I don’t even 
think I really even had the impulse or the-but um…it was easy, yeah, it was 
easy to-to do those, that kind of, that kind of stuff. 
Q: Did you have a sense of the amount of pain that was being experienced 
was a lot by the detainee? 
A: Oh, God yeah.  I mean…I remember one guy like…we left him kneeling 
so long that he couldn’t walk for day. . . . 
Q: And how did you react to seeing that? 
A: Um…well, I guess I felt some sympathy but um…it-really, depended on 
the detainee like…you know, I’d make distinctions on who I thought was a total 
jackoff and I decided to like, which, you know, I don’t-I wouldn’t stand by 
now…reflecting on it.  I think that anybody who’s a prisoner and who’s in your 
control is under your care and you shouldn’t harm them, but at the time I felt a 
little bit differently about it. 
 
Roy, again on the distancing from the pain infliction: 
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Like if you strip somebody down and leave them in the freezing rain, you’re 
not inflicting that pain on them yourself.  You, I mean, obviously they’re 
suffering and it’s your fault, but it doesn’t feel exactly that way or if you’re 
keeping somebody awake for two days or three days.  It doesn’t feel like you’re 
torturing them whereas if you’re punching them, that seems to cross the line 
and I-I mean it’s a nonsensical distinction, but I think that’s what we were 
running off of. 
This distancing was more than merely brought about by appearances.  Roy 
spoke about the distancing afforded to him as an interrogator: 
In fact, I mean it was really quite explicit like, you know, I was working with this 
Staff Sergeant on one base and he had been in Guantanamo and he’s like, 
“Look, it’s easy…” like “You guys don’t do the torturing…” He didn’t call it 
torturing, but, you know, “You guys have to be the nice guys, and let the MP’s 
do all the dirty work.  Let them hate the MP’s and you set yourself as 
somebody who can protect them from the MP’s.”  And so…you know, his idea 
was that you commission the MP’s to do this stuff and you direct them to do it, 
and so that’s-we would do that. 
Roy explained how forced kneeling was routinely used, even when 
counterproductive from an intelligence perspective: 
A: Oh yeah, I mean… you know that kneeling is not a comfortable position, 
ah, you know, like even for five minutes, it’s painful, but you know try it for 
hours and hours and hours it was, it was clearly painful, but we were used to 
that because we, I mean stress positions, that was the most common thing we 
did, and we did it like really universally with tons and tons of prisoners. 
Q: So at some point was that really just routine? 
A: Absolutely, yeah. Ah, yeah, like, I knew one interrogator who like, that’s 
how he’d start out his interrogations.  [] That’s just what he did and we all-we 
all did that.  I-I would conduct entire interrogations sometimes for two hours 
with the-the guy, the guy just kneeling the whole time. 
Q: Do you ever get the sense that the discomfort was overriding their 
ability to grasp what you were trying to tell ‘em? 
A: I-I…that, yeah, I did come to that realization, yeah.  Um…but yeah, it-it 
took me a little, a little longer, but…you know, I think I told you, I think that a 
lot of what we were doing wasn’t really about gathering intelligence, it was 
about anger and revenge…so…I don’t think it mattered. 
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For Roy, at times the experience of conducting interrogation was a mix of 
information seeking, enacting cruelty on those he disliked, and frustration.  Abusive 
methods happened to well suit his motives and eventually became routine. 
The Uncommon Experience 
The idea of partaking in a rare experience, of a privileged opportunity, was 
how two of the interrogators viewed the allure of the task they were given.  The use 
of abusive violence only sharpened this sense.  Roy Howard described his perspective 
regarding going to war and being an interrogator: 
 Q: What were you hoping to get out of the experience [of going to war]? 
A: Um…well, I wanted to be good at my job and I…another thing I also, I 
was kind of drawn to the idea of combat, I mean it’s…um…I can’t really even 
put my finger on what that is but I still am, like…I want to go to Afghanistan 
right now, like, um…yeah, I don’t know what, and as soon as I got back from 
Iraq, I wanted to go back. I wanted to return to Iraq. Um…and I—I don’t know, 
I don’t know why that is.   
Q: What did you think that going to war was going to provide you that 
peace would—would not? [] Was it seeking the uncommon experience? 
A: Yeah, I think, I think that’s it, yeah, I just wanted to see what—what the 
limits were.  And I think that—that might have been part of um…my 
willingness to participate in the enhanced interrogations also, like to see, this is 
a like part of human experience that, yeah, nobody…experiences, you know, 
in—in peacetime or…normal life. 
Q: Did you sometimes feel a little bit privileged to be allowed the 
opportunity to participate in those things? 
A: Yeah, sure, I mean…um…yeah, I mean I…I was interrogating some really 
important people in the Iraqi government. I was in places that everyone in the 
United States was talking about, you know. Yeah, like, you know, I mean 
there’s something about being in the hottest war zone in the world at that 
moment. We’re like right in the middle of it, you know. Yeah, I really did feel a 
bit privileged.  
Q: It’s attractive? 
A: Right.  Like, I—I think my favorite heroes growing up were like the old 
gunfighter who has a thousand stories to tell or…you know, the Woody Guthrie 
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character who’s rambled around and done all these things that no one else has 
been able to do and so…I think I was trying to accomplish that.  Um…you know, 
kind of looking back, I don’t really think that’s a great thing to aspire to, but I 
think that that was part of the motivation without actually really articulating it 
to myself at the time. 
Antonio Hayes talked also about his feelings during his early interrogation 
experiences: 
Q: Did it seem like fun? 
A: Yeah.  I mean, yeah, it was like, you know, me and two people that I 
was good friends with, um, you know, getting this assignment that was a very 
unique type of assignment, um, to scare someone who, you know, we were 
told was this high-value target, so someone in my mind was like, you know, 
one of Saddam’s henchmen or something of that, somebody who’s guilty of 
really bad things, um…so, yeah, I mean it-I did, you know, I saw it as, as fun for 
a moment, because it was, and in a way too, it was like I joined the Army to be, 
to do things, um and I felt like I hadn’t really done a lot up until that point, 
um… 
Antonio Hayes’ captivation with being allowed to assist with interrogation at 
first masked what would later become deep misgivings about his participation.  He 
described his reactions to a mock execution he witnessed: 
Q: When you heard him crying, what were you feeling? 
A: I mean, I guess, I guess I kind of felt bad for him because he was, you 
know, very scared, but I felt like, and  this is like how I felt about other things.  I 
felt that it wasn’t, it wasn’t really that serious of a thing that was being done; 
not like, you know, we’re not going to really kill this guy, so whatever, if we 
make him think we’re going to. I didn’t see it as torture, abuse or anything like 
that, and so doing that, I mean that particular thing, I actually felt, it felt cool 
doing it, because, you know, it was like this…you know, it was with the 
Warrants [officers] that I respected and, you know, thought were, you know 
these like bad ass secret agents, and so it was a very, you know, some 19-year-
old kid like doing this intense interrogation tactic, was, you know, it seemed 
very cool to me that I was a part of it.  So I remember feeling like, you know, 
when the guy was crying, like feeling, you know, really, you know, bad for this 
guy that he’s going through that, but, it was really kind of superseded by me 
feeling really good and cool that I was a part of this…this really interesting like 
thing that I was doing. 
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Q: Did you feel privileged? 
A: Yeah, I did. You know, because I-and-and especially because I never 
thought I would be doing anything like that. I thought I was, I thought I had 
some stupid computer job that I hated. I really did hate my MOS [Military 
Occupational Specialty] because I didn’t realize what it was until I got to AIT 
[Advanced Individual Training], but yeah, I felt privileged, because I wanted-I 
wanted to do cool stuff, and to me that was something cool. 
Roy Howard related his thoughts as enhanced interrogation techniques were 
being planned: 
Q: Was there a point where you embraced the escalation of harshness? 
A: Yeah, like…you know when… with the strobe lights and the loud music 
and the 24-hour interrogation shifts on these guys, um…I was kind of 
interested to see if we can make that work and see if this would be effective.  
And like I said, you know, I was kind of, sort of…testing limits, you know, to see 
what was…what I was capable of and what that human interaction would be 
like. Um…but I-you know I…I certainly was still capable of putting the brakes on 
like…you know, I-I didn’t want to seriously harm somebody. Um…yeah. 
For Roy and Antonio, the uniqueness of the situation they were in was 
something that provided fascination for both conducting interrogations and exploring 
limits.  Both men were tested and the abusive violence ended when they found their 
respective internal boundaries. 
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Bursting the Moral Bubble 
Roy Howard and Antonio Hayes, the two participant interrogators who 
witnessed the most abuse, related the misgivings they experienced in Iraq.  These 
misgivings were not centered solely upon the victims of the abuse, but were 
intertwined with their self-images.  The ability to see themselves clearly was found in 
realizing how others, including their victims and their friends, might view them.  Their 
accounts relate how they found pathways out of the abusive thicket and what that 
experience was like. 
The road back to humane treatment did not turn abruptly and unwaveringly in 
a humane direction.  Roy described the forces that made his willingness to be abusive 
wax and wane. 
Q: At some point, did you just flat out become reluctant to do things? 
A: Well it’s kind of funny…like we would use these enhanced techniques 
on somebody and there were times when I would become really remorseful 
about that and just feel horrible about it and-but then, you know, the next day 
with somebody else, I would do the same thing.  So I was going back and forth 
with this and as I said, you know, with the small unit we were with, we were 
constantly talking about this and we were half reluctant and half kind 
of…enthusiastic about trying to use any techniques we could to get 
intelligence.  We wanted to do a good job, you know, like… we wanted to be 
good at our jobs and we wanted to complete this mission of, you know, 
shutting down the insurgency and preventing any deaths.  You know, we were 
getting shot at and bombed all the time, you know, and people were dying and 
so we wanted intelligence. So it was kind of a back and forth and it…it took a 
while for me to realize that it-these techniques were ineffective and that I was 
doing things that were really compromising my moral standing in what-the 
kind of person I wanted to be.  
Roy’s reluctance to carry on being abusive was undermined by distancing and 
receiving messages from superiors that abuse was permissible.  Acquiring a sense of 
how outsiders viewed such matters was a strong counter-message which forced him 
to reconsider: 
Well…like a lot of the enhanced techniques, as I said, they don’t involve like 
physical contact with the detainee.  They seem much more benign so you can 
sort of convince yourself that you’re not doing something horrible but it slowly 
became clear to me that what we were doing is really actually pretty awful [] 
At that point, they were helpless and they were in our care and just seeing the 
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way they deteriorated and just watching people suffer that it just-it got to be 
too much.  I couldn’t do it. You know you’re over there and, okay so you’re 
told these things are legal, you’re being told by your leaders to do these things 
and everybody thinks it’s okay.  Like-and so you’re kind of in this moral bubble, 
like you don’t-you don’t see what’s happening but when the [Abu Ghraib] 
scandal broke and you could see that-the outrage that people were having in 
the states about this and around the world, you kind of realize “fuck, that’s 
what we’re doing,” you know. 
Antonio Hayes remembers the event that marked the start of his doubt.  He 
described keeping an injured detainee awake through the night.  A supervising 
sergeant was dissatisfied with Hayes’ ability to force compliance and proceeded to 
beat the detainee bloody.  Hayes described his thinking after the incident: 
Um, I mean I felt really bad, I mean I felt really bad for that person.  You know, 
ah…I mean I felt it was totally unnecessary, the way he was dealt with.  Ah, you 
know, it was hard to like just see someone in pain like that and not just in pain, 
but extremely terrified and in pain, um, and I felt he was abused, like it was 
abuse, what was happening. And then it was that coupled with my thinking at 
the time being like, you know, who are, like who are these people, anyway. 
Like what did these people do to deserve this?  Um, so that’s when I had 
started kind of…just not really understanding the point of any of it. 
Hayes describes travelling a path from being an excited abuse enthusiast 
enjoying privileged access into the world of intelligence work to arriving at a state of 
being a remorseful participant in a process that had lost any feeling of 
accomplishment, glamour, or worthiness: 
Q: How did you view yourself? 
A: (Sigh) Um…you know, like I-at first, you know at first I like felt, I felt 
proud of myself, very good of myself, like I was…you know, I was at, I thought 
about my friends from high school and how I knew what all of them were 
doing. They were all at the local university, all just getting shit-faced every day, 
going to stupid, at college parties, and doing nothing, and I was like, I’m 19 and 
I’m doing this like CIA-type stuff.  And so I felt very good, feeling very good 
about myself and do what I was doing.  Um…and that evolved, the more I did 
it, and then I remembered kind of being, [] I’m this 19-year-old kid, like doing 
all this-this cool stuff, and then it became like…I’m just some 19-year-old punk 
kid who’s like shitting all over these people ah, because like, I can, because I 
have this power, like for no other reason except like…I have a gun. That’s when 
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I stopped seeing myself, in the light that I had before, and I felt like…and a lot 
of it changed with [] experiences with-with the detainees where I swear I was 
feeling like, “Okay this is, this is kind of fucked up…” um…you know, it was like, 
I’m just some kid just out of high school who now has the authority to, you 
know, traumatize these people. 
The view of the war held by people back home was significant to both Roy and 
Antonio.  For Roy, seeing the war and his actions from the vantage of an America 
largely unaffected by war led to a tarnished self-image: 
Q: So what do you think it was about being on leave that-or was there 
something about being on leave that may have prompted your crisis? 
A: Well, it’s like I said, you know, if you’re surrounded by military people, 
and you’re kind of…in this moral isolation, um, it’s-it’s easy to justify what 
you’re doing, but, you know, you get back into the real world and you feel 
more like yourself rather than just a soldier. I think it sort of opens up the-your 
moral context, so I think that’s what it was. 
Q: So…while you were back in the context of really, “peace” at home, how 
did you view the guy who’s in Iraq when you was in Iraq? 
 A: I don’t think I liked myself very much at that point, actually. 
For Antonio Hayes, the act of communicating to friends was an opportunity to 
project a burnished image.  He describes the motives behind a careful grooming of his 
homeward accounts: 
Q: When you’re writing letters to friends, um…were you talking about 
your experiences as an interrogator at all? 
A: (Heavy sigh) Um…not in detail, just that I was doing it, because I didn’t 
want, I didn’t want my friends to know that side of me.  You know, I wanted 
them, I wanted them to know, you know, like I felt very proud of going to Iraq, 
like I didn’t have to go, I like begged to get on the team that was going. . . . So 
um…you know I-I was very proud of going and so the things I wrote home 
about…um, were the things I felt people would-would see, you know, was 
what I-the impression I wanted to give that things I was doing that, you know, 
dangerous and heroic, and whatever, so…I specifically didn’t-didn’t write about 
what I did in interrogation, because it didn’t-it wasn’t in line with the image I 
wanted to give off to people; it wasn’t that person I wanted people to think I 
was. 
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Hayes described the thoughts he harbored during the time he was an 
interrogator: 
Um, I was feeling, I mean I was feeling confused.  You know, like I had this idea, 
in my head of what-what the war was about, what the U.S. military was all 
about, and it was like, you know, just this is perfect picture, and then…I started 
being involved in things that contradicted [] what I thought it should be.  
Um…and so the, you know, it was contradicting what, what I was being told we 
were supposed to be doing.  Um…so I started feeling, you know, I started 
feeling very guilty about being someone who is inflicting, you know, terror and 
pain against these people.   
Antonio’s moral dilemma came to a crisis when he was forced to question a 
critically wounded detainee, whom he realized was guilty of nothing more than trying 
to get home in the presence of a trigger-happy American officer.    He was worried 
that the man’s serious wounds were not being treated at a hospital, and that instead 
an interrogation was ordered. Antonio, bending over the bleeding middle-aged man, 
was sickened by the over-riding concern that the unit had for justifying the shooting.  
He terminated the interrogation and returned to his quarters.  He recounted at length 
the flood of thoughts that the incident unleashed: 
I went back to bed and I was feeling like very like, you know, I wasn’t—I didn’t 
sleep, I didn’t fall back to sleep; I was just thinking about this guy who was 
maybe dead by that point, um…you know and it was like, at that point, I was 
starting to, like, like thinking about my own father. I was like, ‘What if that was 
my dad…’ like what if, you know, he was trying to come home and see  us and 
he just got shot by some random dude. So I started like feeling just, I just 
kept—couldn’t stop thinking about what I had just seen, this guy on this table.  
Um…ah, you know, being denied medical attention, like no one is trying to 
save his life or whatever, and that his, you know, that he was seeing my face as 
like just coming in with a flashlight in his eyes like asking him what he did, I 
mean his position or whatever.  Um, so I was just awake, laying awake and ah, 
then we start getting rocket fire or mortars, um both, I don’t know.  Um…and 
so we started taking fire and I like didn’t move, I didn’t do anything, I didn’t, 
you know, grab my helmet, body armor, ah…I just laid there and I was just 
like…and at that, like at that point, I was just like, ‘I totally get it, like I 
understand why these mother fuckers are shooting at us…’ and I was just like, 
‘I don’t fuckin’ care if I get hit and get killed right now…’ because I was just like, 
it was a moment where I was like, felt like I was the bad guy that like, you 
know, the—the…people who were setting off the mortars like could be a guy 
just like this guy I just saw in the cell, and I was like, if that guy survived that 
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and then went and shot some mortars off at us, I would not blame him for 
doing that, and so I just remembered just, just not moving, just being like…like 
I—almost like I deserved it, like I deserve for this to be coming in. If it hits me, 
then whatever.  Ah, so that’s when I—that’s when it was like a big change 
‘cause it was, in a sense, identifying with the people that we were supposed to 
be fighting and feeling bad about what I was doing to the point where I was 
putting myself in great danger because of how bad I felt about it, by not, you 
know, getting cover or whatever, just basically being like…you know, if I—if it 
happens, it happens. 
Eventually Antonio saw the power he did have was not his ability to terrify and 
threaten, but instead was his agency to choose another course: 
Q: Early on in the deployment you were, you were…scaring folks in the 
cells and then in the interrogations, would you say you, that, as a young guy, 
you were reveling in the experience? 
A: Absolutely, yeah, for sure. 
Q: [] You were powerful? 
A: Uh-huh, yeah. 
Q: At some point did the…doing of those things, still feel like you were 
powerful or not? 
A: Yeah, no I still felt powerful, but like, but I had the power to not do it 
too. . . . You know, I understood I had the power to do whatever I wanted to 
this guy…but I also had the power to like help him too.  Um…and like when we 
stopped, when we stopped doing interrogations as we were supposed to [i.e., 
being abusive and terrifying], you know, I felt…I didn’t feel like I was being a 
rogue soldier, but I felt like I was the person in the position of authority and 
this was my-my decision to what was the best, the best way to approach this, 
this mission was to do it in such a such a way. 
Roy and Antonio had shared a common fascination with the uncommon 
experience of being powerful while confronting the dangerous enemy.  Over time they 
both realized that the detainees they faced were not deserving of abuse, and that the 
abuse was pointless.  It took looking at themselves through the eyes of others for 
them to forswear abuse and embrace different approaches.  As Antonio viewed it, he 
still possessed a great power: the choice to be humane.  The choices intelligence 
operatives made while deployed, whether they were to abuse or shield detainees, left 
them years later with clashing reflections of their actions. 
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Mottled Reflections 
Going home took each of the participants far from the scenes of the abusive 
choices they had faced.  They generously shared with me their thoughts about that 
abusive violence with the further distance of years.  Their reflections are the results of 
the events they experienced overseas and the lives they have led since coming home.  
Those reflections are part of their present-day experience of having been exposed to 
abusive violence.  For some, the sense-making is still difficult. 
When Antonio Hayes returned home his recollections of Iraq centered on his 
combat experiences.  His suppressed memories of abusive violence made themselves 
known to him through the eyes of another: 
Q: Specifically with respect to your interactions with detainees, when you 
first got back, how did you view those? 
A: I would just immediately go to the times where, you know. . . . you 
know when we’re getting fired at, and so []that’s what I was thinking about, 
and so it was kind of like I even completely overlooked the fact that I was an 
interrogator.  Ah…and…I think I—what triggered me even thinking about it, um 
was my girlfriend who [] said something about how I, um…would act, where I 
would act asha-- different or like um, you know, I’d get very, she used the word 
“ashamed” if we were walking by someone or around people who looked 
Arab. She said I would like completely withdraw and just become like, I don’t 
know, I don’t know, like very weird, and so I realized that it was, that’s what 
made me, you know, and so I was like, you know, why, I’d begin to think like 
“why would I—why would I react that way?”  Because…you know and that’s 
when it—that’s when it clicked with me that it was…because of the guilt that I 
felt for being involved in interrogations. 
Antonio remembered his reactions when he identified the source of his odd 
behavior: 
And what—what I—my thought, what the realization I had at that time, that 
was very difficult for me was that…you know, because I…um…you know like I 
remembered people, [] I remember, you know, certain individuals that we 
interrogated that had, you know, memorable reactions.  Um…so I remembered 
all of them…ah, but then it clicked in my head that all those people would 
remember me also and that um, for the rest of their lives, they would always, 
always remember my face and always remember me…being that person. [] 
You know that the guy that was shot will always remember me looking down 
at him with a flashlight, and so I couldn’t um, you know, being someone who 
The Intelligence Professionals  103 
 
 
 
wanted to go into the military for serving some greater good and for helping 
people, and who made myself go to, you know, made them send me to Iraq so 
I could go help people, and I realized that there is this hundreds of people who 
would always remember me as like the, you know, a horrible person, um…you 
know, whether or not that in my mind, I was trying to be this horrible person, 
like it didn’t matter to them because that was the perspective they had of me, 
and so knowing that…just this, all of these people would never forget who I 
was was just—I didn’t feel like the hero that I wanted to be. 
 
Antonio shared his current thoughts about his conduct: 
I mean…it’s the…least proud moments of my life really.  Um…you know, I 
didn’t…I mean I regret, I regret it. I don’t…I don’t think that there is points 
where I could have…done anything different um where I was faced with a 
decision and I made the wrong decision, I think I did…everything that I could 
have and did everything I thought I was supposed to do, you know, but…that 
doesn’t, you know, take away from the fact that, you know, that was the, um, 
you know, like I-I am ashamed of that, of that period of my life and of 
that…that role that I had; those, those interactions.  So…you know, yeah, I 
mean I hate, you know, I hate that I did that. 
While Antonio expresses remorse, it is evident that he still sees his abusive 
actions as unavoidable when he claims that he did “everything I could have and did 
everything I was supposed to do.”  This sense seems to be inconsistent with the fact 
that he later did make the choice to avoid further abuse. 
Ultimately, Antonio’s sense-making of his actions are split between a relief that 
he had not done the worst and shame for what he did do: 
I was never someone who’d let myself get carried away with emotions, and 
there was never moments that I regretted where I like just flipped out on 
someone or did something fucked up to someone.  You know, I always felt in 
control of it, but…so I felt like I did what—you know the things that I had to do 
and I was tasked to do, but um, I mean I felt, I felt ashamed of who that was, 
and I did, and I still do, um, you know that was a—I didn’t, that’s not who I 
joined the Army to be. 
Antonio expresses that he retained control, but that control fell short of what 
would have saved him from being ashamed, which is the antithesis of his desire to 
become a hero soldier. 
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Roy Howard, who eventually abandoned the use of abusive interrogation 
techniques, shared his thoughts when asked about whether his actions had been 
affected by external curbs: 
A: Uh-huh.  Well, there was certainly that too, I mean, you know, 
obviously, you know, if you’re in the military, you’re constantly worried about 
the repercussions of your actions, you know, um, externally, but I think all that 
stuff is going on and it’s—yeah, would be hard to really pinpoint or articulate 
years later why…but…I really, I mean, when it comes down to it, I honestly 
don’t think that I—I…could have the stomach, even if I were completely free to 
do it, to cause that much suffering to another person, I really don’t think I can 
do that…to, yeah, to somebody who’s helpless; I couldn’t. I mean, I—I think I 
could have shot somebody in combat, but I couldn’t…I couldn’t do something 
like that to a—a helpless person. In the end I don’t, I don’t think I could have 
gone that far. 
Q: How does realizing that…affect your general reflections on your overall 
conduct and experiences there? 
A: Well, I mean it’s nice to know I had some limits, you know? 
Um…but…yeah, I—you know, the person I would have liked to have been over 
there would have been, like, somebody  who could just say, “Fuck you!” to the 
leadership and do the right thing all the time.  That would—that would have 
been nice if I could reflect on that, but um…you know, but it’s nice to know I 
had, you know, at least some limits. 
Although Roy described an aspiration to have stood up for his convictions, he 
admitted that his convictions had not always been foremost in his thoughts: 
No, I-actually I think-I think back on it, and I could have said, “Fuck you!” from 
the beginning and not done any of that stuff. I could have…but there was a 
willingness on my part that I-I recognize. 
 
Roy summed up the effects of abusive violence on the abusers: 
Um…I think it’s-I think it’s really harmful, I-you know, like I-I think that that’s a 
tough thing for people to come home with, you know.  Ah…yeah, I mean we-
like we all share a set of moral values and if you violated them egregiously 
whether it’s in combat or not, um…I think it’s-it’s tough to reintegrate into 
society. 
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Sam Bailey, an intelligence specialist attached to a non-intelligence battalion, 
reflected upon her inability to check the abuse directed at the civilian population by 
soldiers and officers in the unit.  She had tried to change the conduct by briefing the 
battalion staff that the population needed to be treated with dignity.  In her view, the 
soldiers’ actions were fueling rising hostility toward the Americans.  Her less-than-
direct efforts failed to have the desired effect.  She reflected on this: 
A: Um…so yeah, oftentimes I wish like maybe I would have like done 
something more, you know, or gotten more extreme about it but…um…you 
know, stuff like that is hard to deal with, like…ah, because the-the actions had, 
the actions they were taking had repercussions, you know, and the whole 
situation was unnecessary and um, so, you know… 
Q: Well, what-what do you think you could have done different? 
A: [] Maybe if I went like directly to the battalion commander and was 
like…you know, there’s some crazy stuff going on and you need to like do 
something about it, you know, then he probably would have done something 
about it, but I’m not sure, you know, I’m not sure what kind of effect that that 
would have had or whether it would have made the problem worse, you know 
what I mean. 
During her interview, Bailey expressed regret that the battalion began to suffer 
attacks after she rotated home.  She believed that the abuse by the Americans was a 
cause of the attacks.  
Wayne Watson, the civilian intelligence officer, resisted pressure from 
Washington to go beyond his personal limits of behavior when dealing with a high-
value terrorism detainee.  His reflections seem worlds apart from those of the 
soldiers.  His refusal to even consider abusive violence from the moment he received 
his assignment may have a bearing on his experience.  Nonetheless, his words carry a 
note of regret, if not perhaps guilt: 
You know, I thought-it’s a-what I was involved in was…profoundly disturbing 
and really important and shocking for what it says about our institutions and 
our laws, and our checks and balances, the practices we engaged in, all of that, 
it’s really, really…  We’ve done things that betray ourselves. Of course, I could 
have done more, one always thinks one could do more, but I think I…did about 
as well as one can in the circumstances I, I confronted. And I was not duped to-
I didn’t unthinkingly accept the orders and engage in practices that I think are 
wrong.  So I-I’m patting myself on the back, I suppose, but I think that I did 
about as well as one can in those circumstances. Ultimately, I, you know, and I 
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couldn’t change the larger approach, but to the extent I had influence, I feel 
okay about what I did. I don’t mind…having to deal with hard choices 
professionally. I sought to. Some of them don’t have right answers, some of 
the answers I made, I’m sure are wrong, but overall I actually think that I was a 
distinct outlier in the whole process and got it right.  So I don’t feel-it’s a 
terrible, it’s a bad thing and that happens, and…it was all unnecessary, it was 
all insane, but I attempted to inject sanity and failed and so I feel okay actually. 
The contrast between Wayne’s self-evaluation and Roy Howard’s guilt could 
not be more pronounced: 
Q: Did you at some point have any difficulties coming to terms with what 
you had done? 
A: Yeah, I mean…yeah, I think like a huge part of my identity was changed 
for me, you know. (softly) 
Q: What was it that was changed do you think? 
A: Well…(long pause)…you know, like when you’re a kid you read, “The 
Diary of Anne Frank” or something, like you expect that you would be the 
person who would protect that family and hide them in the attic and then you 
kind of realize maybe that’s not who you are, you know. 
 
Roy talked about the balm of time: 
Um…well as I said it took a little while for me to actually take some 
responsibility for what happened over there.  But other than that, I think as 
time passes, I just—I become a little bit more distant from it, and I don’t have 
to think about it so much.  It’s not so much of a, so much of who I am anymore. 
The experiences related by the intelligence personnel reveal that the CT and 
COIN campaigns they were involved in were far from being carefully planned exacting 
exercises in intelligence gathering or surgical attacks on terrorist and insurgent 
networks.  Instead, their lived experiences were marked by frustration and anger 
brought on by the combined pressure of enemy attacks, impossible numbers of 
detainees to process, and their self-recognized ineptitude.  Responding to those 
pressures sometimes meant feeding the interrogation assembly line with bodies 
because of corruption or simply not knowing what else to do.  Working on the 
interrogation assembly line sometimes called forth an abusive routine that had no 
relation to advancing the war effort by gathering intelligence.  The dynamics of 
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isolation, helplessness in the face of power, and anger made interrogators 
contemplate torture.  The road back from abuse was found gradually and while 
employing a viewpoint of the “other.”  Even having once found the path, reverting to 
abuse was possible.   
The self-reflections on abusive violence from the intelligence operatives are 
not simple and do not reflect closure.  To varying degrees, shame, regret and a 
nagging sense that they could have done more, been better, and acted more like their 
heroes, colors their sense-making today.  Some of these same emotions tint the 
experiences as recounted by the combat arms veterans.  The focus of the next four 
chapters turns to the lived-experiences of abusive violence recounted by those 
soldiers. 
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Chapter 4: The Combat Arms 
Soldiers 
In this chapter I will examine the lived experience of abusive violence as 
expressed by soldiers whose main jobs were not intelligence gathering and 
interrogation.  These participants fought their wars in Iraq “outside the wire,” while 
running convoys or patrols past roadside bombs, conducting raids for suspected 
insurgents, and manning checkpoints where suicide bombers were definite threats.  
They experienced fear, frustration, fatigue and hate like the intelligence personnel, 
but their responses included wholesale and brutal violence directed at communities, 
not just individuals.  Their stories introduce three superordinate themes.   
In “The Invisible Haze,” the participants describe the practice of hazing as 
inflicted upon them in their own training and even while on combat deployment.  The 
routinized use of hazing against their own soldiers made the practice virtually 
unrecognizable as torture.  As one soldier put it, “if you’re doing it to the soldiers, 
then why would you not do it to your enemy?”  As one might expect, the transfer of 
this practice to detainee treatment became commonplace.  Eventually, the hazing of 
detainees, as being no more remarkable than hazing of soldiers, makes the practice in 
detainee holding facilities lose any salience, and disappears into the mental blind spot 
of habituation. 
In “Mission Shift and One Long Drive-by” the soldiers give accounts of their 
original view of the mission of US forces in Iraq.  Those views are tinted by noble 
sentiments of nation-building, liberation from tyranny, and helping a broken country.  
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Over time, the participants experience a re-calibration from the concerns of the State 
to the straightforward and visceral super-priority of staying alive long enough to get 
out of Iraq in one piece.  Accompanying this shift in focus is the adoption of tactics of 
communal punishment and intimidation, even as the justness of retaliatory attacks by 
insurgents is acknowledged. 
In “The Experience of Objecting” the attempts made by soldiers to stop 
abusive violence by their own friends and other forces are related.  The experiences 
are sometimes from those who never participated in abusive violence and always 
worked to prevent it.  In other cases, enthusiastic practitioners of the “360-degree 
fire,” display a sense of outrage over abuse of individuals at the hands of other 
soldiers.  The experiences related by the soldiers show that at times standing against 
abuse is dependent upon situation and can be as influenced by emotion as is the 
abuse itself. 
The Invisible Haze 
I was basically instructed to haze.15   
Several of the soldiers discussed hazing as initiation they experienced in their 
first military training and as punishment after being assigned to military units.   In the 
context of active line units, hazing would take the form of either physical exercise or 
the completion of unnecessary work assignments in order to make life generally 
miserable.  Harold Turner described the culture of hazing in his unit: 
                                                     
15
 The OED Online variously defines “haze” as “ 1. Trans. To affright, scare; to scold; also, to punish by 
blows. 2. Naut. To punish by keeping at disagreeable and unnecessary hard work; to harass with 
overwork. 3. To subject to cruel horseplay (as practiced by American students); to bully.” 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/84867?result=2&rskey=mfdwqE& 
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A: No we had, they had hazing.  Our unit is under investigation for hazing 
mostly the entire time I was in. It was pretty continuous and in Afghanistan 
that was my first.  I was a team leader while I was there and I was basically 
instructed to haze. 
Q: What form of hazing was expected? 
A: What was expected?  I don’t know if it was anything specific, but I 
would dare to say punishment that would not be in any manual, so [] for 
example, the hazing that um, I mean, the most common form of hazing is 
assigning the worst jobs and messing with somebody’s sleep.  That was the 
most common that pretty much everybody had to deal with. 
Turner described a nightmarish situation in which an under-strength unit fell 
under the control of a Non-Commissioned Officer who had reportedly been rejected 
by the service drill instructor course.  The methods he mandated seemed more akin to 
those used in initial training than with a unit operating in a combat theater.   
Sleep deprivation, [] assigning jobs that specifically messed with someone’s 
sleep patterns.[] We’re already working like 100-hour weeks at this point just 
in general, but you have a, I think it’s like an eight-hour, six- or eight-hour post, 
“Well, let’s punish the whole platoon by having two to three hours preparation 
for going on post…” “Two to three hours preparation for going off post…” 
“Then let’s have duties and mandatory PT [Physical Training] in between 
that…” so literally you’re living on post, basically. There’s almost no down time 
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except for minimal sleep and then that’s the standard, and then when you 
want to punish somebody it’s very easy because now you assign them hour on, 
hour off duties, so you have-they have six hours of sleep because they’ve been 
up for the last 18 hours and three of those hours every other hour, they’re 
going to be assigned to clean the shower at 2 a.m. in the morning.  So that was 
very easy; that was common.  The other hazings are more direct, so…the 
hazing we did was putting people into, first off,  trashing, trashing their living 
space and taking them into the bathrooms, putting them in a gas mask which 
add a lot of heat, a lot of moisture, very unbearable, turning on all the hot 
showers, squirting soap across the floor and having them do exercise on a slick 
environment and hot, wet environment in a gas mask, pouring crap on top of 
them, um…so it’s one form of hazing.  
 
Turner described the natural consequence of this treatment: 
Ultimately, the sleep deprivation catches onto people and people start falling 
asleep on post, so I mean those are, those are serious problems and I’m victim 
to it as well. I fell asleep on post plenty of times. Luckily there’s two people on 
my post and we took turns because we could not stay awake, but some of my 
men were by themselves in an empty post after doing all this for eight hours 
and being caught sleeping on post because they don’t respond to a radio call 
and then again more, more collective punishment, more hell to be paid for 
what’s a product of collective punishment and hell that’s being paid. 
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While this level of hazing and harassment of the soldiers was considered 
excessive, the individual actions ordered by the platoon sergeant would not have been 
deemed remarkable in other contexts.  All of the soldiers would have undergone 
similar punishments during their basic training and perhaps even in garrison.   
Why would you not do it to your enemy?  
The use of various techniques experienced by soldiers themselves migrated to 
detainee treatment. Brandon Peterson recalled that: 
I do-I do remember we captured, ah, we captured some people and they-the 
squad leaders were, were making them like do some stupid push-ups or 
something like that. Ah…in the…but I…I don’t really remember the details of 
that. 
Several soldiers were familiar with a particular form of forced exercise 
punishment that Chris Alexander mentioned while recounting what some 
interrogators on his base did to prisoners: 
A: I remember one was called “the electric chair” and that was where you 
were in a squat position with your back up against the wall with your arms out 
and they’d just start putting heavy objects on the arms and after a while it 
does hurt. 
Q: Is that something that you tried? 
A: No. Ah…I’ve seen it done but that was back when I was in [deleted 
name of training school]. [] It was kind of…hazing rituals. 
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Q: By school staff? 
A: Correct. 
Q: And were they just done to everybody or as punishment? 
A: As punishment…mostly. 
Richard Miller described an instance in which he directed a detainee to be 
forced into the same position, which in his unit was called the “iron chair:” 
He is placed in the chair, not sitting in the chair, but in a chair…ah…so it’s a 
stressful position and is where he’s leaned up against the wall with the knees 
bent and your arms forward and the entire time I told my SAW [Squad 
Automatic Weapon] gunner to ensure that he stays in that position…don’t let 
him do anything but that position. You know, down in the dungeon it’s a good 
150 degrees down there; it’s hot.  
 
Aaron Bennett was asked about stress positions used against detainees: 
A: Yeah, it was, yeah, yeah and we did them to our own soldiers. I mean 
that’s like—that’s part of like the tor—like having someone stand like this up 
against the wall, like this and not letting them, you know, down, was, was 
common practice when you, you know your soldier did something wrong, so 
obviously, people do it to detainees too. That was probably the most common 
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thing is [] having ‘em stand like that, I think that was one of the most common 
forms of abuse, really. 
 Bennett was describing the everyday use of the chairing position and its pain, 
when he suddenly came to a realization about the practice: 
Q: Did you-did you ever have that happen to you while you were a 
soldier?   
A: Yeah, oh yeah. [] Ah, it’s horrible, and it makes you think if you did 
something wrong about doing it again, like… 
Q: How long does it take for it to get…not fun at all? 
A: Well I haven’t done it in a few years, but I remember it picks up pretty 
quickly, and a lot of it was, you know, like, I never really thought about this 
comparison until right now, is a lot of stuff that we did to our own soldiers is 
probably torture, but when you make them do exercises ‘til they throw up or 
you make them drink so much water that they throw up.  
Interestingly, Bennett first introduces the technique when asked about stress 
positions, and equates it to torture against detainees, but does not at that point 
connect the same treatment of soldiers as torture.  It appears that he has to pass the 
concept of the treatment through his own definition of torture against detainees 
before he sees it as analogous to mistreatment of soldiers.  It is equally possible that 
Bennett employed the opposite filter in Iraq: the forced exercise that he observed, 
since done against soldiers, did not qualify as “torture” to which he might object when 
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used against detainees. For him, it is obvious that something done to soldiers would 
naturally be done to detainees. Bennett spoke about the habituating effect of seeing 
frequent abuse.  He was asked about the chairing position used by his soldiers against 
detainees: 
Q: What was the purpose of doing that? 
A: It was just to make it uncomfortable I think, ….like I think I’ve done that 
too, is like have them sit like that, but not for like a long time, but that-I mean 
it would happen all, you would just go into the detainee area, you would see, 
like people take away their cots and not let them stay in their cots, and have 
them sit up against the wall like that.  Like I said, that was the most common 
thing; it was just normal to walk in and see people like forcing some detainees 
to sit like that. 
Bennett acknowledged that he had probably done the same, and explained 
why: 
It was just so com-such common practice that you would see it all the time 
that it just was normal to look at like that.  Like it happened so much that it-it 
doesn’t, like when you’re there in Iraq and you’re going through all of this 
stuff, like having someone sitting in an uncomfortable position, it just doesn’t 
seem like a big deal, you know, like at all.  
Pressed to explain the objective of treating detainees in this fashion, Bennett 
replied: 
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There is none, it’s just simply cruel; it’s absolute cruelty and there is no, there 
is absolutely no purpose for it.  I think a lot of it; like I said, I-I can’t remember a 
specific time when I did that, I don’t think, but I’m, I’m probably-I would not be 
shocked if I did do that or if I-and I think that by walking in it and seeing it all 
the time and not stopping it, is I’m also kind of doing it, like by-by not stopping 
it from happening. I might as well have told the person to sit like that. 
Bennett provided his view of how hazing techniques come to be inflicted on 
detainees: 
The mentality, like if you’re doing it to the soldiers, then why would you not do 
it to your enemy? You know what I--like why would you not, if you’re capable 
of, if you’re using corrective training on a soldier than why people would not 
do that to you know, people that they perceive to be your enemy has a lot to 
do with the detainee abuse. 
 
Brandon Peterson, described soldiers using forced exercise against detainees.   
Q: Why, why were they doing it? 
A: Just because they were cruel, stupid people who wanted to exercise 
some authority. I mean that’s nothing that hadn’t been done to them a million 
times, ah…you know, and ah…this was their one chance, I guess to…exercise 
some authority over someone else. 
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Cruelty and petty tyranny were the explanations accorded to the abusive behavior by 
the soldiers; they do not mention instrumental use, such as in interrogations.   
For the soldiers the shared experience of being hazed by their own military 
made similar actions against detainees lose any improper dimension.  Its frequent use 
made it virtually disappear from view, as described by Aaron Bennett, “it was just so 
com-such common practice that you would see it all the time that it just was normal 
to look at like that.”  The haze had become invisible. 
Mission Shift and One Long Drive-by 
The Mission  
Just as study participants had very individualized reasons for enlisting, there 
was an array of views of the mission in Iraq.  Over time, for several of the participants, 
the view of the mission changed, often contracting from large strategic goals to simple 
personal and small group survival.  These shifts were sometimes directly tied to the 
abusive violence meted out to the Iraqi population by the soldiers. 
Stephen Scott described his initial views: 
Q: So in, when you were heading into Iraq, what did you think 
the…mission of American Forces was at that point? 
A: Nation building; I mean I knew from history that whenever you 
dismantle a government, there’s always like a…somebody’s got to keep control 
until a new one can be installed, so I thought we were kind of more like a law 
enforcement type deal, making sure that the place didn’t just descend into 
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chaos because they had a dictator, and we just removed him, ergo, they had 
no government to speak of.  You know, I thought we were there to like make 
sure infrastructure kept happening. You know, I didn’t know anything about 
Iraq, you know, I-making sure the plumbing still worked, make sure electricity 
still worked; I thought we were just trying to do that until um, a new 
government can be formed. 
One of the events that happened when Scott was present in Iraq were the first 
elections.  While this may have been directly related to forming a new government, 
Scott’s views were more complex than before he arrived in-country: 
Q: As an American soldier, how did you feel about facilitating the first 
elections? 
A: I felt great about it; you know, I-I kept seeing, I kept seeing these things 
as victories, but it wasn’t until a while that um these victories were what 
America was calling victories.  Like these were all like PR stunts, you know, it 
was something that CNN can report to the American people to say how good a 
job that we were doing, but I don’t really think it was necessarily what the 
Iraqis wanted. Um…I don’t think the-the government really took care of the 
Iraqi people under Saddam. [] So since government wasn’t really a big part of 
their everyday life, they didn’t really care about government over there, you 
know. It’s not like…it’s not like, you know, here in America where 
government’s everywhere. . . . They didn’t have a whole lot of that, so what 
did they care about government?  You know, it’s just a word to them. 
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Aaron Bennett was an armored vehicle mechanic.  Before leaving for Iraq, the 
unit mission was indistinct to him: 
A: I don’t-I don’t, I don’t think anyone understood it. You know, I don’t 
think, I think it was just…and I think that’s the way it is for lots of, you know, 
people was to, like the individual soldier doesn’t really know what’s going on. 
Q: So, but as a-mechanic, did you really care? 
A: Not really. 
Upon arrival in Iraq, Bennett found himself repairing vehicles that had been 
part of the initial invasion, but were unlikely to be used again in Iraq.  He hated the 
seemingly pointless job.  He describes his shift from uninformed but enthusiastic 
soldier to a demoralized mechanic: 
I mean, just like-can you imagine that, like I was sitting there like, “You know, 
I’m excited, um…I’m not really sure what we’re doing…” but like I had a set 
unit, “we’re going to go there and liberate these people and help them out…” 
and now I’m fixing a wiring harness for a vehicle that’s never going to even 
participate in any way for helping liberate these people.  So it’s just like, “what 
am I doing?” I might as well throw stuff at the wall instead; [] I’m wasting tax 
payer money. I’m not even a good mechanic. 
For Bennett, being a vehicle mechanic in a huge repair facility working on un-
needed vehicles seemed far out of step with what he felt he should have been doing 
in Iraq.  He described his feelings about seeing soldiers returning to the base: 
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I hate this. Like I would get so angry working…I would see-you know these 
people come back from patrol and it’s-you know, at the time I still believed 
that the war in Iraq was good and, you know, we’re helping the Iraqi people to 
liberate them from this brutal dictator and we’re gonna deliver them 
democracy and we’ll have all these great things and so…I still-I felt…like I 
wasn’t being used properly, [] I joined the military before the war in Iraq, and 
now being in a culture of-of the U.S. Military, I was like, ‘why would I…why am 
I going halfway with this; I should be out there in the front lines doing it too 
and helping where I can…’ so I volunteered to Abu Ghraib after about a few 
months. 
Bennett became part of the perimeter guard force at Abu Ghraib. 
Staying Alive 
The participants spoke often of the overriding priority of personal survival.  
Staying alive and keeping comrades alive was a theme shared by several soldiers. 
Louis Sanders shared his perspective: 
Q: What did you think the U.S. mission in Iraq was at the time you were 
crossing the border into Kuwait? 
A: Taking out Saddam.  You know, I really, and at the time, I did feel that 
there were weapons of mass destruction.  I knew that we sold em to em to kill 
Iranians and-and all that, but I didn’t really care…um.  I was there to just do my 
job, make sure the brothers on my left and my right got back home safe.  
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To Harold Turner, the reason for his unit’s presence was not precisely clear.  
For him, the personal was also paramount: 
Q: When you were in [city name], what was the primary mission, you 
think, of your company? 
A: To continue the occupation of [city name]. I remember there actually 
being some confusion about what the hell we were doing here. Um…because it 
didn’t really seem, it was like a circle jerk, like the only reason for us to be 
there was that we were there. [] Generally, I would say like, “Win the hearts 
and minds…” and we would go throw some teddy bears and deflated soccer 
balls at some kids that have their homes busted out and you could say that, 
that’s what they were trying to tell us our mission was, but we all knew that 
was a joke, like the only mission for us individually was to get back home.  We 
didn’t feel like there was anything for us to do there other than survive it and 
make it back home. 
Turner worked in the headquarters section of his company and was 
responsible for delivering supplies and meals to the outlying checkpoints and the 
medical evacuation of injured troops.  He described how this matched his personal 
priorities: 
There’s just like this realization that the only reason I’m there is because I’ve 
been deployed there and our mission is pretty much to just make it home 
alive, and so really earlier on that just became my mission, was like make sure 
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all the people I’m serving with make it home alive; if they’re wounded, there’s 
no way I can respond fast enough to them and get them the treatment that 
they need. But once I made that mental switch, it’s just about survival []. 
Patrols, convoys didn’t seem to serve a purpose to me anymore other than 
resupply so you should minimalize them because putting ourselves at risk, 
putting the local Iraqis at risk. 
Charles Wilson expressed his view of the mission as he prepared for a second 
deployment: 
I was still definitely more concerned with my-my-my people than I was with 
them [the Iraqi people].  I didn’t see myself as going over to protect them or to 
protect their country; I was just going over there to protect my troops and to 
make sure that everybody, you know, that they, um…weren’t going to be 
harmed. 
Chris Alexander reflecting on the mission he and his unit had served, 
commented: 
I couldn’t even tell you why I was in Iraq.  I-I really don’t know more than to 
protect the person on my left and my right.  What was my mission in Iraq or 
what was our outcome?  I-I don’t know.  It was above my pay grade. 
There was certainly logic to it   
When personal survival became the only mission, and every patrol through an 
Iraqi city became fraught with potential Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attack, 
certain modes of operating made sense.  Brandon Peterson was an armored vehicle 
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commander, in a small unit assigned to a mid-sized Iraqi city.  He described the way he 
directed the platoon’s drivers to operate, and why: 
They [insurgents] had been trying their best definitely to kill us all, but we, you 
know, whenever we moved through the city, um we moved as quickly as 
possible, um wherever we went. We drove really fast; if someone got in our 
way, we would drive over them, um…we just didn’t, we didn’t act like most 
soldiers in the area who had a tendency to drive slow, in-in slow convoys that 
were easy to hit, we were always super aggressive, we were always super 
aggressive driving, we never cared if we-if we ran-hit a car or anything like 
that.  We just didn’t give a fuck, and that, you know, that was definitely what 
was keeping us alive. 
To Peterson, the entire city represented an extreme threat, one the Americans 
were forced to overcome through intimidation: 
Q: In your questionnaire you noted that more than five times you 
witnessed but did not take part in abusive violence. Can you recall the first 
time you were present during any abusive violence for your detainee? 
[] 
A: No, I don’t; I mean it was, there were so many at that, at that time, it 
was just daily, like…(sigh)…and, you know, I hate to kind of come off as—as 
being, as defending the practice, because it—it’s atrocious, but, but I mean, we 
were maybe 175 fighting men with, you know, a compliment of probably, you 
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know, five, six hundred non-combat…soldiers on this base [].   [The city] had, I 
think over a million people in it, and ah, you know, [deleted publication name] 
estimated that they had, you know, thousands of insurgents there and—there 
in [deleted city name] and, you know, um, we were pretty brutal…about 
dealing with them just on a daily basis, and it, you know, it got to the point 
where… 
Q: When you say dealing with them, you’re talking about, um…detainees 
or…? 
A: No, when I say ‘dealing with them’ I mean the local population. We 
would just beat people up for no reason, and…you know, going—you know, 
bust into people’s houses, you know, um, you know, of course, separate the 
men from the women, beat the hell out of the men, um…and…you know 
there’s a—it’s not good, but there was certainly a logic to it, I—we would have, 
we would have died. People did die, people were dying pretty—pretty 
regularly, ah, you know… 
Peterson attributes his unit’s survival to the brutalization of the population and 
he disdained the other troops who acted differently.  He described his unit’s response 
to any attack during patrols: 
A: We would keep moving…you know, if that—if that vehicle, unless that 
vehicle was disabled, we would keep moving and we would shoot ah into the 
town, you know, in every, anyplace where we thought someone might be 
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hiding, we would shoot ‘em, that was always our response, and ah, you know, 
again, you know, I don’t want to seem like I’m defending the practice, but it—
but I mean there is a—it was a very effective, people were terrified of us. Our 
vehicles specifically, because they looked so different, you know, the—the--… 
Q: The [vehicles]? 
A: The ah…ah…the cav scouts, their [vehicles]—they get hit all the time; 
they die all the time, you know, I mean it was…it got to a point where [] we 
would make fun of like pretty much everyone who wasn’t infantry, because 
like, as they would leave the gate because we’d be like, “Have a good time 
fucking dying out there…” because they were, they didn’t act the way we did, 
and so…they were more vulnerable, ah, you know, it sounds really sick, it was 
really sick. 
 
One long drive-by   
The risk of IED strikes against patrols and convoys led to a response, the so-
called “360 degree rotational fire,” which was embraced by many. The tactic included 
opening fire in all directions if an IED exploded as they passed.   
For Stephen Scott, any response was preferable to simply driving past an 
unsuccessful attack.  He described how he felt before his unit was instructed to fire if 
an IED went off targeting their patrol or convoy: 
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Well we were told to make a statement, [by] our platoon sergeant. Um, a lot of 
the soldiers, they didn’t like the idea of, if we got fired [at] or if a bomb went 
off, of us not firing back because, I mean it…I guess it was kind of like a group-
think, you know everybody kind of thought that if we just rolled through 
without doing anything that we were running away. Um…and I-I kind of 
thought that too. I was like, “Wow, we’re just [not] going to attack, we’re just 
going to drive through?” But you know, it wasn’t until we were actually told, 
like ‘make a statement’ that…you know, the next time we got attacked, we just 
shot at everything.  
Scott welcomed the command: 
A: Our platoon sergeant[] would just be like, “Make a statement; next 
time we get shot, just make a statement…” shoot, you know, and I don’t know 
if he said, “Shoot everything up or whatever…” but he said, “Make a 
statement”, and that kind of-we knew what that meant. We knew what that 
meant and somewhere inside, that’s what we wanted to hear. So it’s not like 
he had to convince us, really, we’re like, “Oh okay, good, now we can actually 
do what we feel like doing”. 
Q: So what was it that you “felt like doing”? 
A: Well, the frustration was really kicking in. Um…because we were doing 
the same thing every other day with mind-numbing regularity. It felt like we 
were accomplishing nothing, and we didn’t know why we were there, 
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and…even though we were trying to help, they were attacking us. So…I don’t 
know when it started to happen, but my, my wanting to help turned into, real 
genuine hatred. It turned into a genuine hatred for the people, the Iraqi 
people. Like I wanted them all dead.  I-I didn’t care; I’m like, if that was, if 
that’s what it was going to take for me to go home safe and sound and be 
alive, then so be it.  
Scott described that the platoon would fire at animals and vehicles in the 
vicinity of the IED attacks, but that they did not kill any people because the inhabitants 
routinely disappeared before attacks.   
A: I don’t think we ever actually shot a human being just because they 
were, they—were—gone. 
Q: Were you wanting to? 
A: Yeah, yeah, I sure was.  I… 
Q: Was their absence making it even more frustrating? 
A: Yeah, yeah, it really was, because we weren’t a line company, so we 
never got out of our trucks and like went looking house to house or anything 
like that. We were only there to be targets, well not to be targets, we were 
there, we were doing a mission. . . .and because we were only a support 
platoon and not a line platoon, we were the last priority to get armored 
vehicles or armored anything so it’s like, you know, all of us were thinking, we 
all just felt incredibly helpless, so if there’s anything we can do to take a little 
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bit of that power back and get rid of little bit of the helpless feeling, we wanted 
to do it.  Um, yeah, I mean…I don’t know how else to put it, just frustration, 
just so much frustration. 
As with the interrogators considered in the last chapter, the dynamics of 
frustration and power fed the violence.  As Scott explained, there was also a sense of 
the entire community deserving punishment.  
Q: Who did you want to shoot? 
A: Um…at least the people who were involved, but then…I do, I’m starting 
to remember, like, whenever we would get attacked, the people, because like 
there was usually people everywhere. After a while, whenever we got 
attacked, all the people were gone. So then that made me think that they were 
all guilty by association. So then I just wanted to start shooting any of ‘em. 
Brandon Peterson’s unit, which was heavily outnumbered by the insurgents, 
was not waiting for instructions: 
We didn’t have to be told to-to be brutal, we didn’t have to be told to-to lay 
down fire or whatever, it’s just something we started doing as we were, you 
know, and in response to, you know, just constantly seeing, you know, these 
people blown up and constantly, you know, having to deal with, um, you know, 
the aftermath of these IED’s. 
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In Richard Miller’s squad, the return-fire planning was much more deliberate: 
Q: Within the squad, what was agreed would happen if you came under 
ambush? 
A: That we would kill whoever was, kill whoever we could. 
Q: Not just the opposition forces, just anybody available? 
A: Anybody that was in the area.  We were going to control our area of 
operations by out-terrorizing the terrorists. [] We were told that the only way 
that we were able to maintain control of our area of operations was to bring 
fear into the hearts of the people and…the only way to do that is to…to kill and 
maim and to out-terrorize the terrorists. Make the people more afraid of us 
than they are of the terrorists. 
 
Miller surmised where the orders orginated: 
When it comes from every squad leader, after they talk to you know-the 
platoon sergeant, the platoon sergeant would talk to the company first 
sergeant.  Then, it’s pretty much known that it’s coming down from there. 
In Miller’s unit, the campaign to terrorize the population was carried out as per 
plan: 
Q: Um…you said the first killing by your squad was a response to an IED? 
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A: Uh-huh. 
Q: How many people…do you think your squad hit that day or in that 
location? 
A: Six or seven people. 
Q: What was the location like? 
A: It was a highway, [place name deleted], and ah…we were driving in a 
northbound lane there were vehicles coming down the south bound lane and a 
IED went off and we fired our weapons…we hit people in vehicles, people-I 
know the SAW gunner who was up in my truck um…shot two teenagers out in 
the field, and…with his SAW so…from everybody, you know, everybody’s going 
to say they hit somebody, but…the truth of the matter is that not everybody 
hits somebody. 
 
Stephen Scott summed up his unit’s willingness to use indiscriminate violence 
and disputes the notion of heroic sacrifice:  
Well, I know none of us wanted to die out there; that’s the thing is-I learned 
about soldiers is, soldiers are more than willing to, you know, kill for their 
country, but do not want to die for it, so…we were going to do everything we 
could to make sure that we survive. 
Scott described what this actually meant in practice: 
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So there was a lot of ham-fisted reactions to small attacks, you know. In-in 
fact, one of my buddies, he would start shooting and which usually, because 
we had no communications, as soon as somebody saw a gunner start shooting, 
everybody would start shooting, you know, just…at nothing in particular. 
[]Then because we’re on convoys and moving, it just turns to one long drive by 
[shooting], and so I remember…but this—this soldier, you know, he was an 
older soldier.  If you were talking right next to him, he’d be like, “What?  I can’t 
hear you…” but then suddenly he was the one saying like, “Yeah, I heard a 
gunshot coming from over that way, so I started shooting.” And I remember 
asking him. I’m like, “Did you—are you hearing anything out there?”  He’s like, 
“No, I’m not hearing anything; I’m just kind of…” so I mean, it was 
ridiculous…and not funny; I don’t know why I’m laughing about it now. 
 
 
You are by definition a terrorist  
The brutality with which any possible threats were addressed, including the 
wholesale intimidation of the population, was considered necessary by some 
participants.  Even so, the likely consequences were recognized.  Brandon Peterson, 
talking about the routine beating of Iraqi’s: 
Yeah, absolutely, I consider that ah…to be torture. I mean you know, there’s 
absolutely no reason for it.  It instills terror, and if, you know, that’s what 
you’re doing, and you know, you are by definition a terrorist, and, you know, 
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and certainly we were, um…it, you know it served our purposes at a certain 
point, but I mean, you know, what we’re doing wasn’t benevolent, our 
purposes weren’t benevolent, and the people there were more than justified 
to, you know, try and kill us and liberate their country from our occupation. 
For Stephen Scott, the rising hostility between his men and the Iraqi 
population was contrary to what he had hoped to achieve when he arrived in country.  
By the time he left, he recognized why the Americans would be attacked: 
My whole thing was, I was really confused; I mean, I wanted to help them, and 
I know that they weren’t attacking me. I didn’t really take it personally when 
they would attack, because I was kind of starting to think like, “Well, you know, 
if I had—if there was a foreign military going down my street, I’d probably 
want them out too…” and the guerilla tactics they used, although we view 
them as cowards, so they would just hide and detonate a bomb. That’s 
worked, throughout history so I didn’t even think that that was, you know, 
cowardly.  I was like, “Well, that’s—that’s strategic…” Um, what they call it, 
“fourth-generation warfare.” Yeah, the same thing that we used to kick the 
British out when, you know, the Revolutionary War was going on. 
For the participants from the combat arms, feeling constantly threatened by 
an unseen enemy led to reactions and over-reactions that resulted in a wholly 
understandable hostility from the population and the likelihood of more attacks.  
Their original sense of mission to carry out the ideals of their country became 
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subordinated to a visceral desire to survive, even if that survival meant acting 
atrociously.   
Stephen Scott, trying to make sense of the spiral of aggression, came to a 
perfectly elegant solution:  
And that was another thing that kind of drove me crazy. It’s like the only thing 
we were trying to accomplish there was just living for one more day, you 
know, which, if we just left and weren’t there to begin with, both sides got 
what they wanted!  The soldiers got to live and the Iraqis got us out of their 
country. That’s all we had to do was just leave.  But since we couldn’t, you 
know, it wasn’t my decision, just the-you know, they-they weren’t going to 
stop attacking us, because they wanted us gone and we just wanted to keep 
living, you know, so…it-that kind of, ah, I don’t know, I don’t want to use the 
word like dichotomy or anything, but that kind of, um…those goals from each 
side . . . were mutually exclusive, there was no middle ground, you know.  
 
The soldiers described the original mission views they held.  When the 
missions slipped to simple personal survival, indiscriminate shooting and beatings 
made sense, even as the likely backlash was recognized.  The ability to see the conflict 
from the eyes of the occupied population was a theme also described by several 
soldiers, even as the tit-for-tat violence continued. 
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The Experience of Objecting  
What must it be like when one is in a unit that routinely fires on homes and 
shops and beats passersby?  What if one thinks that what is happening is wrong?  
What is that experience like?  The participants shared their recollections and 
reflections.  Some had quite happily enacted vicious violence early during 
deployments.  Some acknowledged their own frustration and hatred of the Iraqi 
people.  One, a woman, tried to act sanely throughout her deployment. 
In the face of commonplace violence against the population, there were some 
soldiers who objected to abuse.  In some cases the rejection of abuse was clear from 
the first instance and continued until leaving the combat zone.  However the dynamic 
of objecting to abuse in a war zone was more complex for some soldiers.  As with 
interrogator Roy Howard in the last chapter, regretting abuse on one day did not 
mean that it would not be used with vigor the next. 
This is kinda going over the line   
All abuse is not equal.  Soldiers who were brutal found circumstances where 
they intervened in abuse.  Brandon Peterson, who swears by the abuse that he 
believes kept the insurgents in one city from wiping out his unit, remembers several 
instances when he prevented abuse, especially of detainees.  He described a situation 
where he was informally participating in the questioning of a prisoner taken by 
Americans to an Iraqi police station when the Iraqi police brought in another prisoner 
and began to abuse him.  He explained his subsequent actions: 
Q: Why did you tell the Iraqis to do that, to stop? 
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A: Because it was—it was stupid. I mean, not—you know, I was, you know, 
I may sound like I’m defending a lot of these really awful practices, but at the 
time I was, I was, I was the biggest [] thorn in the side of, of everyone who was 
doing this sort of thing, [], I was very much against what we were, what we 
were doing to these people, even if they were bad, but like I said, I…I rarely 
dealt with anyone who was, you know, actively against us,  [] I stayed in the 
room as they started to interrogate this prisoner… 
Q: Do you know what they were trying to learn? 
A: They weren’t trying anything; the guy was a—it was a different ethnic 
persuasion than they were and they were.  He was in the wrong part of town, 
and . . . they captured him.  They were going to to beat the hell out of ‘im, and 
my friend, he was a police officer, [] had this guy. []  He was, I think he may 
have been trying to impress me maybe by mistreating him. I don’t know if [] he 
had been a special forces soldier in the war against Iran and [] he had some 
pretty serious mental problems, I guess. [] He starts questioning this guy, 
putting a gun to his head, and [] they just do things differently than we do, and 
then…ah, and then like, he you know, starts hitting him with a cleaning rod and 
I was like, “Well, you know, hey, this is, this is…this is kinda going over the 
line…” and then he like wanted me to help search this guy, and so I start 
searching this guy, you know, took off his shoes, and ah, then [name 
deleted]takes a power cord from a lamp, and he kind of mimes to me that like, 
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he if hooks the power cord up to his feet he’ll feel it in his genitals, and you 
know at this point, I said, “Stop, stop…” 
Peterson sought support for his intervention from his own lieutenant: 
I went to go get um…the platoon leader who could [not] have cared less about 
what the fuck I had to say.  He was just like, you know, “Get the fuck away 
from me, whatever…” I was like, “No, you know, they’re really going to do this, 
you need, you need to step in here,” he’s like, you know, “whatever; just—just 
go away.” And so I went back in there and when I got back in there there’d 
been a bunch of cops that had kind of joined in and ah, you know, they were, 
you know doing all sorts of really awful stuff. []  They were trying to shove a 
bottle up his ass, and ah...hitting him with a cleaner, well through is, through 
his robes, not ah—they hadn’t like stripped him naked. They were beating him 
with cleaning rods, punching him, I mean it was…it was, you know, a bunch of 
dudes beating up a guy. [] He was just crying…he was, you know, he was crying 
and screaming.  
Peterson described the scene further, saying that the detainee was, “on the 
ground, stomach down and they were all, they were all beating him and so I said, at 
that point, that they—I—I made them all stop and I got them all off of him and I 
started questioning him; I started questioning the police.” 
For Peterson, intervention became a frequent occurrence when his own 
platoon’s soldiers began using drugs. Certain that the illicit use was widely known in 
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the unit, he blames the specific drug involved for aggression and describes the effect it 
had on one of his former friends:   
A: They [assaults] were all happening in that incident, but I mean they 
happen just on a daily basis, um, you know, one of the—part of the problem 
was, we raided this pharmacy early on and ah, and…I had assumed that they 
were going to, you know, come out with some opiates or something, and were 
all kind of just like, you know, spend the rest of the year comatose with the 
stuff, but, but they—they come out with vials and vials of, of ah…of steroids, 
and so the whole platoon was on steroids, I wasn’t and there were—some 
guys who weren’t—a lot of them were on steroids. 
Petersen cited problems he encountered with a friend who used steroids: 
We went head-to-head quite often, ah, when we were outside the wire. I was 
an E4, you know, trying to tell an E6, you know, that he better knock it the fuck 
off…on, you know, you can imagine how effective my protests were, but 
ah…um, you know, he saw someone on the street, he would sometimes make 
up things, make up reasons to fuckin’ grab someone off the street and beat the 
fuck, out of him. That’s just, that’s just what he did. 
Peterson intervened personally with the squad leader, and then went to his 
own chain of command with a threat: 
A: I would yell at him, you know, I’d yell like, “Stop! Knock it off!”  It finally 
got to the point where I, um…myself and some of the other people in the 
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driver squad said, “We’re going to write our Congressman if they, if they didn’t 
back off with the beatings…” I mean, you know, and it made… 
Q: Who did you…? 
A: We went to the platoon sergeant, um… 
Q: What was his attitude when you guys said that? 
A: He certainly didn’t want a congressional [investigation].  
This eventually had an effect that was not completely along the lines desired; 
Petersen described what the platoon sergeant did: 
He said, he said he’d have a conversation with people, and he did, he did, ah, 
you know, he went to the squad leaders and he said, “Look, you know, 
Peterson’s going to fuckin’…fuck, um…you know,” he said, “Look, you know, 
these guys are going to go to Congress and you know, if you keep on doing 
this…” “You’ve gotta, you’ve gotta tone it down.” And so they’d do things like, 
they would look to see where I was and drag people behind walls to beat them 
or something like that, but it did-it did get toned down quite a bit. 
Aaron Bennett described one instance where he objected to conduct in the 
field that was especially troubling to him: 
A: We raided a house one day, um…and secured it; there was nothing in 
it. Um, and there was like this little kid and one of their soldiers which is an E-4, 
on numerous times. He’s like, “Come here you little fuck…” to like the kid, and I 
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was like. . . . “What the fuck’s wrong with you; it’s like a six-year-old kid…” and 
I got into a huge argument with him. And he was like, “Whatever sergeant so 
and so…” and I was like, “Come here…” like I would get really-I took like the 
situation with children very seriously. Um, and I-you know, it was like, “You’re 
a fuckin’ grown man in body armor…punking like a six-year-old kid, that’s 
pathetic. What is wrong with you?” 
Q: And…what…the E-4 that you chastised for um…berating the child, at 
the time you were doing it, at the time you were saying what you were saying, 
what did you want the outcome of your conversation to be? 
A: I wanted him to understand that, you know, like, that—that’s [a] child 
and I wanted to get it through his head that, and it wasn’t the first time I’ve 
talked to him about it, before, I pulled him on the side, I’m like, “Dude, you 
can’t do that.”  And so like, at that time, you know, we’re hot and angry, and 
like, I was just like frustrated and so he’s like, yelling at the kid, I wanted him to 
be, I wanted to shame him into not, to not doing that again. Like I wanted him 
to understand that what he was doing was wrong. 
You can’t just do that  
Sometimes the abuse directed at Iraqis happened suddenly and outside the 
context of combat patrols.  The abuse was not solely committed by the lower ranked 
soldiers. Sam Bailey described what happened on the day before her departure from 
Iraq.  Her account, and that of another incident involving Aaron Bennett, illustrates 
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reactions to incipient violence that were characterized by incredulity followed by 
intervention.   
Bailey and a captain were each being rotated out to their respective next 
assignments. Their comrades took them to a farewell lunch in a town the battalion 
occupied.  Bailey recounted that on the way back to the base they stopped and a 
teen-aged boy was abducted and loaded into her truck: 
So, of course, I—this was not part of the plan so I didn’t really understand what 
was going on, so I was like, you know, “What are you guys doing?”  He said, 
“Well we’re bringing this guy in the jail…” I don’t know, it’s like, “What?” Like 
I’ve never even heard of any of this, ah, you know, um, as long as—we hadn’t 
brought anyone else to jail, and there was no real, doesn’t seem to be any real 
reason for it, and so I kind of demanded an explanation, um, I was like, “Well, 
what are you talking about, bringing this guy to jail?” and he said, “Well when 
we first got here, he…came up and kissed your boss on both of his cheeks, so, 
you know, he’s a homo and we’re gonna go bring him to jail…” I’m like, “What? 
This doesn’t make any sense…” I was like, “You know, he’s not being gay by 
doing that, that’s just what they do when they’re happy…” you know, like Iraqi 
people, when they kiss another guy on the cheek and—and that’s just what 
they do when they’re happy and they’re, you know, he was obviously just 
really happy that we were here, he wasn’t trying to be gay on, you know, my 
boss.  “Why are we doing this?  This is stupid; we’re supposed to be going back 
to the base…” and like, you know, against my objection that they like loaded 
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this guy into the back of the Humvee that I was in and I went along obviously 
with them objecting the whole way. 
Bailey found that the vehicles did not go to either the jail or the base, but 
instead to a rock quarry where the abuse intensified to the point that the captain 
drew a knife and held it to the boy’s throat.  Bailey, worrying that matters could 
escalate further, tried to intervene: 
 And so I was yelling and, you know, at the top of my lungs and like, it was like I 
wasn’t even there, like it didn’t even matter whatever I was saying. I was like, 
you know, “This is completely illegal; this is silly, unauthorized.  Why are you 
doing this? This is stupid.”   Um, like and the entire time I was like, you know, 
they were just ah…going about their business. Like one of the, one of the guys 
was like holding the kid and then my boss was like messing, they were like, you 
know, messing with him, like terrorizing him, trying to, I guess like scare him or 
freak him out or whatever, but I didn’t know at that point, because there was 
nobody around…like, I was kind of starting to wonder if they were actually 
going to kill this kid and like do something, you know what I mean, like get rid 
of his body or something, because nobody would have really known. 
Q: Right. 
A: And so I was really kind of like…ah…like kicked into high gear like, “You 
need to stop what you’re doing…” which went completely and totally ignored.  
And then ah…finally, they like cut the guy loose and he ran off, and then I went 
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and found out like, he was from a really big family because we had like known 
that family because they helped us out when we came in this town. 
Bailey watched the incident end, but it is probably best for the Americans that 
some sanity prevailed, since moments later she noticed that the events had been 
observed: 
Like, so, I saw him go run off, and then I saw there was like an entire car load 
of people like waiting over there because they had followed us to the rock pile 
and seen everything that had happened, and they were over there like ready 
to do something about it, but they let him go, he went running off and like he 
jumped in the car with all these guys that like came to pick him up, you know, 
because they followed us, because they were like, why is that—why are these 
people snatching up our—our son or whatever, and then like they took off.  
Bailey was shocked that the captain who had held the knife to the boy’s throat 
would have done this.  He was a senior individual in the battalion, someone whose 
position made him second in importance only to the battalion commander.  After the 
incident Bailey reported it to a lieutenant, but was certain that what the captain had 
seen as a lark was never investigated or punished.  She and the captain flew out of 
Iraq without further incident. 
This instance was not Bailey’s only example of intervening during abusive 
violence while in Iraq.  In the first situation, battalion officers and enlisted ranks were 
setting up unauthorized checkpoints in a major city and at gunpoint forcing persons 
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driving former Iraqi government vehicles to surrender them.  It was called “Operation 
Carjack” and created a lot of resentment among the local populace.  Bailey persuaded 
the commander that the queues of Iraqis at their small base demanding the return of 
the vehicles represented a security threat and the practice was stopped.  Bailey tried 
to emphasize in her briefings to battalion staff that failing to treat the locals with 
dignity would result in resentment.  While the battalion commander appeared to 
agree, she did not see the conduct of the rank and file or even some officers, become 
any less arrogant and harsh toward the Iraqi population. 
Bailey gave her thoughts about why these incidents occurred among soldiers 
she had come to know very well over two combat deployments: 
They just made some, I guess they didn’t—I don’t even think they even made 
bad choices; I think they were just like, you know, like the part of their…like the 
very, I guess, base of their brain stem kicked in, so to speak, and whatever else, 
like usually would override it, was not like doing its job at that time, and they 
just like kicked into kind of like aggression mode. []I think that when people, 
you know, kick into that mode, they…they are operating on like a level of just, 
you know, domination or regaining control of the situation and  . . .  they just 
kick straight in to like, “get out of my face” mode, you know, which is really no 
different for people than it is for animals. 
Aaron Bennett related an incident in which a team had captured a detainee 
suspected of being the maker of a suicide vest which had killed one of their soldiers: 
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A:  So when we raided the house, it was a family, a large family and they 
caught the guy and they…put his face up against the wall, and one of the other 
E-5’s was like, “We should just shoot this guy…” and they have like a discussion 
whether they should just shoot him right there or not. []We were just like 
standing there, I was like, “You’re seriously talking about this?” like the guy is 
detained now, like it’s beyond that like, “You can’t just do that…” and the guys 
were like, “Yeah, we should…” and I was like, “You’re out of your mind,” and 
this guy’s like standing and like shaking like a leaf on-on a tree…um, and so I 
was, we-I was, you know, people were having a discussion whether they 
should execute someone or not.  
[] 
Q: How many people were within that discussion? 
A: Like four, four people I think, and it was, I-most people were against it, 
and the guy that was talking about doing it was just like the biggest, he’s an E-
5, but he was a fuck, he’s a fucking coward like…oh that’s-like the only people 
that I saw that did that, were all cowardice in-in action, anyway, like, and so 
we’re like, “You’re an idiot man, like this is ridiculous…” and then the platoon 
sergeant came out and nothing came of it 
Bennett expressed the opinion that other abusers, including one whom on 
another occasion he stopped from continuing to kick a prostrate detainee, were 
cowards in battle who sought opportunities to be tough against helpless victims. 
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That’s why I’m not going to do it   
Objecting to abusive violence sometimes required soldiers to spell out their 
logic for refusing.  Stephen Scott recounted a situation in which an Iraqi turned in to 
the Iraqi Police in sound condition was produced for him to interrogate hours later 
having been apparently beaten while in the police station.  Seeing that the Iraqis had 
tried to conceal injuries sustained by the prisoner by placing a ski mask on him, Scott 
terminated the session and returned to his base.  He explained to his unit leaders the 
situation from his point of view: 
A: When I saw this detainee and the condition he was in, I said, I’m not 
going to talk to him because he was clearly tortured, and… 
Q: Who’d you say that to? 
A: Ah…it must have been the lieutenant or []whoever had the, the 
decision-making authority, and I remember it caused quite a stir when we got 
back, you know. The battalion commander’s like, “What does he mean, he’s 
not going to talk to ‘em…” and I told him, like, “That’s an unlawful order; you 
can’t-you can’t use torture as a means of…or like some sort of physical 
coercion as a means of getting information,”, and I told the junior soldiers, I 
was like, “We are not going to talk to any more detainees at the Iraqi police; 
we are not going to do it,” and my team leader kind of caved. He kind of said, 
he kind of told the S-2 Captain that I was right, that it was an unlawful order, 
and so the S-2 captain’s like, “Okay, then we won’t do that anymore.” 
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Scott had spent some time on his own learning about the tradition of US Army 
soldier resistance to participation in illegal actions. He formed firm beliefs of where he 
would take a stand.   
A: I had filled my head with like a lot of stuff about Vietnam War and how 
soldiers kind of revolted in the Vietnam War, and one of the things they always 
said is, one of the things that were-was beat into our heads since basic training 
was, “Always turn down unlawful orders.” I come to find out that in other 
armies, in other countries, they tell the officers don’t issue unlawful orders, 
and it came down to the My Lai Massacre. They punished only the lowest 
ranking because it was on the lowest ranking, they’re like, “Well that’s an 
unlawful order, they should have, they should have disobeyed it…” you know, 
and then I was like, “Oh, so that’s why they do that. That way the burden’s 
always on the lowest ranking, you know, it’s okay for the commander to get to 
issue an unlawful order. The problem is when the lower ranking follows that 
unlawful order…” So, you know, I told the junior soldiers that, and we actually 
had like a-you know, that-that higher ranking, that warrant officer came to talk 
to us []. So he wanted to talk to us, and we told him that, we’re like, we’re like, 
“We’re just not going to do it sir; I mean we’re just going to err on the side of 
caution, we’re not going to do it…” It’s like, the Iraqi police are torturing these 
detainees.[] 
 
Scott’s account demonstrated that he had influenced the other soldiers: 
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I remember one of the other soldiers said the same thing that I told him. I was 
kind of poi--, I uh…filling the soldiers’ minds with stuff that they—points of 
view that they hadn’t heard before. [] And so that was enough to scare them, 
you know, and they said that to the warrant officer. They’re like, like, well the 
system is set up so that, you know, we don’t follow unlawf—er, the system is 
set up so the lowest ranking is always the one who gets in trouble. 
In some cases, objecting to abusive violence took place far from the combat 
theater.  Aaron Bennett described an incident in which he spoke up when his platoon 
leader suggested the all-direction shooting response to ambushes or IEDs as the unit 
was training for Iraq.  Bennett had already been to Iraq once on a combat 
deployment, and was a heavy machine gunner on an armored vehicle when the 
direction was given: 
So I’s like, “I won’t do that sir…” and he’s like, “Excuse me?”  I was like, “That’s 
just, it doesn’t make sense…”  He’s like, “What are you talking about?” [] The 
PL was like, “Yeah, we’re going to do this.”  And I was like, “No, say we do do 
that and say one of those rounds goes through, goes through a thin wall and 
clips a child in the head and kills that child, and now the father is angry that we 
just killed their child and rightfully so and decides to put a bomb in the road, 
and then we’re on patrol the next day, and one of our soldiers steps on a bomb 
that was in the road and he blows his legs off, and now he has to be sent home 
and has no legs because you wanted to do 360-degree fire, and now he’s put 
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out of the Army and completely depressed”, and like I went over like the whole 
thing, and I was like, “That’s why I’m not going to do it.”   
But we never tortured people   
Brandon Peterson’s stance was perhaps the most nuanced.  While he 
defended the beatings and shootings of Iraqis in the first occupied city where his unit 
believed that intimidation was the only possible survival strategy, Peterson did draw a 
line at torture: 
Q: You guys were beating people before, so… 
A: Yeah, but we never tortured anyone, I-you know, and I-and I guess we 
did some really awful things to people, but we never fuckin’ tortured anyone; 
we never tortured anyone for confessions, like I’m sure that a lot of that went 
on. I’m sure that there were intelligence people who tortured people; but we 
handed people off. We…you know, when it came to like interrogating people, 
ah, I mean, even we knew that that was a horrible idea. Ah, I mean, when 
people were mistreated it was generally, it was not so that we could extract 
information from them for us.  But I mean, I’m sure it happened all the time, 
yeah, obviously it was happening in [deleted]; I’m sure it happened in 
[deleted].  
Objecting to abusive violence was not a simple and consistent matter for 
individuals.  Peterson described a situation involving his unit and their dealings with a 
detention center which was known to send detainees to the Iraqi police to be tortured 
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before Americans questioned them.  His platoon members were appalled and were 
discussing actively thwarting the practice.  In his account, Peterson expresses his 
personal feelings of responsibility for what happened, the rationalizations he could 
have used when framing the decision he made, and the bottom line of just being too 
tired to take a stand: 
A: I-if there’s one thing I feel bad about, um, you know, we had had a long 
day, we had been out ah, and ah, they called, you know, as we were coming in, 
they called us in to go to the detention center and I was…one of the guys, 
ah…who was a vehicle commander, you know, kind of pulled us all in and said, 
“Hey look, you know obviously, we’re taking a prisoner to go and be tortured 
by the Iraqi Police. They can’t do this without us…if we walk away from our 
vehicles, they-they can’t take this guy to be tortured…” you know, I ah-I ah… 
Q: Was-was he pitching the idea of refusing? 
A: He wanted us to refuse and I…you know, I really wish I had, um…but I, 
you know, I was like, “Well, we don’t do it, someone else will…” so, um…so we 
did it, and, I mean, you know, and I-I was, I was kind of the person who made 
that decision. Ah…and like I said, I was an E-4, I probably shouldn’t have been 
in a position to make, make any kind of decisions, I don’t know…ah…but… 
Q: Why was it that you…? 
A: Because it was a long day; I really didn’t want to get court martialed.  I 
mean, because that-that-I mean, that would have been a big deal, like GI 
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resistance is ah-is a big deal for them. I mean, that’s-that’s border-lining on like 
a mutiny and I mean we would have gotten court martialed. Well, you know, 
maybe they-maybe not, they probably would have just told us that, you know, 
what assholes we were, and you know, just send us back to continue doing 
what we were doing, but…I mean they probably-you know, they could have, 
could have court martialed us, um…it would have made that really long…I 
mean that-the-the main reason, you know, I’m…I’m justifying that here, after 
the fact. The fact is, when we’re doing that, it had been a long day and I really 
wanted to just go and lay down and I did not want to deal with a bunch of 
bullshit and because I was tired and I was, I was fatigued…yeah, you know, I 
decided that we should probably just make this one real quick run to the police 
station and then be done with the day as opposed to getting, you know, 
getting fuckin’, you know, PT’d [punished by Physical Training] because we 
fuckin’ ah…ah…you know, because we disobeyed a direct order, I don’t know. 
 
Petersen shared his single lingering regret: 
A: That was the um, when we…had the opportunity to—to not, to not 
take this person to a—to the police station in [deleted] and ah…you know, I 
kind of made the decision that we should, we should just get it knocked out 
and be done with our work for the day. 
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Q: So it’s—you described it that—that…you don’t…you’re not happy with 
that decision? 
A: No, no, I really regret it. I can’t imagine what that guy went through.  
Q: While you were on the deployment, did you have that feeling about 
that decision? 
A: Yes, I had that feeling about that decision immediately after I made 
that decision. 
The participants who objected to abusive violence spoke of a number of 
reasons why they intervened to stop it.  In the case of Stephen Scott, the prohibitions 
taught at interrogator school and his own later research made clear that he and his 
fellow soldiers could best protect themselves from a system of blame that had little 
downward loyalty by refusing illegal orders.  Aaron Bennett refused to allow an extra-
judicial killing, and was especially incensed by abuse of children.  He saw abusive 
violence as likely to result in retaliatory harm to soldiers. 
Sam Bailey simply acted in the presence of men whose conduct she put down 
to a kind of dementedness.  Twice the immediacy of the possible harm called forth a 
direct intervention.  As pointed out in the last chapter, she has lingering doubts about 
whether subsequent attacks on her comrades could have been avoided if she had 
been more explicit and adamant. 
The lived experience of objecting to abusive violence seems surprisingly devoid 
of fear or hesitation.  In most instances the objections seem to come forth as 
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spontaneous expressions of the ridiculousness and stupidity of the actions being 
observed.  The objections were not framed in terms of being contrary to winning 
hearts of minds in a counter-insurgency campaign.  If persuasive arguments were 
attempted, appealing to the self-interest of the abusers was used.  While fatigue and 
frustration were enough to trigger the “long drive-by,” at least once those same 
factors led instead to a moment of unreflective complicity with torture and probably a 
lifetime of guilt. 
In the next chapter I will look more closely at the experience of abusive 
violence as lived by two soldiers whose units took part in deliberate mistreatment.  In 
one case, the soldier was junior to veteran soldiers whose atrocious approaches had 
developed in an earlier deployment.  He was influenced in part by their examples, but 
after a particularly harrowing encounter became an enthusiastic killer and torturer.  
The other soldier was part of an elite unit that used abusive violence in nuanced and 
generally controlled ways.  He exercised personal restraint and sought to influence his 
comrades toward self-restraint.  Ultimately, the viewpoints of the two men about 
their abusive violence are worlds apart, and the effects on them of having participated 
also starkly differ.
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Chapter 5.  Chris and Frank: 
Testimonies of Abuse 
This chapter and the next explore more deeply many of the themes already 
discussed and introduce others not yet covered.  The two men whose experiences are 
the foci of these chapters come from backgrounds that are in some ways similar.  
Their Iraq experiences also share some features, but in terms of wartime missions and 
personal participation in abusive violence, their experiences diverge.  The final 
reflections on each man’s war and abusive violence underlie the superordinate 
themes that their accounts produce. 
Unlike the last two chapters, individual themes will not be examined in detail 
apart from each man’s overall story arc.  Given the larger numbers of participants 
addressed in prior chapters, analysis of common elements and differences between 
accounts would have been excessively unwieldy and a theme specific ordering was 
therefore suitable.  In this examination of two men, it is possible to shift between a 
close-in “zoom” on specific episodes for the men and a more opened-out perspective 
that allows us to see thematic threads that run throughout the individual men’s 
narratives.  In this way the themes for each man can be tied both to individual 
incidents and the meaning of the larger experience of going to war and being exposed 
to abusive violence. 
The choice of these two particular men for this level of examination is based 
on the fact that they were each involved in routine abusive violence.  This makes them 
similar and of interest for the purposes of seeing whether their personal themes have 
common features worth noticing.  The men served in combat units that both saw 
heavy combat, but the nature of the engagements were quite different, and in many 
ways the nature of the resulting abusive violence were dissimilar.  This dissimilarity is 
a reason to compare the two participants’ experiences, it allows an examination of 
whether those differences created contrasting sense-making about those experiences. 
One unit was responsible for maintaining general order in specific areas and 
therefore conducted patrols and other operations which made them susceptible to 
both being ambushed and becoming part of the general strategy of an infantry 
battalion to pacify the space within geographic boundaries.  The abusive violence 
enacted by this unit often followed combat initiated by the enemy, although the rare 
capture and interrogate raid was also assigned.  These aspects of the first unit’s day to 
day entry into situations that presented opportunities for abuse appear to have 
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engendered anger-based abuse.  The unit also participated in abuse for intelligence-
gathering, amusement, and convenience. 
The other participant’s unit was a highly-trained special operations force that 
was allowed a great deal of independent initiative.  The unit relied on routine death-
threats and physical abuse in order to obtain quick information which could be 
instantly exploited.  This unit’s abuse was generally applied with adequate restraint 
and precision to elicit the desired information, and was paused when the instrumental 
purpose was fulfilled.  This is not to say that the victims of this unit’s abusive violence 
were less terrified than the first unit’s; the second unit simply did not appear to 
engage in affective violence to the extent of the first unit. 
Chris and Frank 
Chris Alexander’s introduction to abusive violence took place long before he 
enlisted in the military and continued into his assignment to a squad whose members 
would groom him to accept abusive violence as part of war.  Chris first observed and 
participated in abusive violence enacted on detainees immediately in the wake of his 
unit being attacked.  The initial angry beatings became more severe as further intense 
combat occurred, turning into nothing short of torture, mutilations and murder.  
Eventually, kidnapping, torture, and murder happened for motives as diverse as 
curiosity, intelligence gathering, amusement, and even the mere avoidance of 
paperwork.  Chris was deeply affected by his wartime conduct and his memories are 
filled with regret.  He views most of the abusive violence as having been needlessly 
brutal and ultimately pointless. 
Frank Wright was part of an elite unit that was highly trained and supremely 
confident in its ability to complete its mission of dismantling the insurgent 
organization of the enemy.  This was done through conducting precise raids based on 
sound intelligence, and immediately wringing information from anyone they captured.  
Frank and his cohorts were highly-skilled professional special operations soldiers who 
fully expected to prevail if they met with armed resistance.  They used abusive 
violence very specifically to obtain quick information about the whereabouts of arms, 
materiel, and money used by insurgents.  The unit generally engaged in physical 
torture and murder only to accomplish its mission; although, once in the wake of an 
incident where some of its number were killed or wounded, brutal detainee murder 
ensued.  Frank’s own conduct was restrained and he tried to warn his fellow soldiers 
about the self-harm they were committing as they brutalized detainees.  His view of 
abusive violence, and especially its use in intelligence gathering, is wholly unrepentant 
and he feels no guilt for what his unit did, largely because he sees the unit as having 
been successful in its mission. 
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In this chapter I will explore the two soldiers’ accounts from early interest in 
military service through the initiation into abusive violence and on to the experiences 
of abuse.  In the next chapter I will present the two participants’ recollections and 
reflections of issues collateral to abuse and of their post-deployment sense-making of 
the abusive violence. 
War Fascination and Lessons in Abusive Violence 
I was always in awe  
Chris was enamored of military life in general and war in particular.  He was 
fascinated by his family’s history of combat service and could not wait to enlist.  He 
described the reasons he wanted to join the military.  He spoke of feeling obligated, a 
need, to enlist:  
Q: When you say that you felt obligated, can you tell me more about that? 
A: Ah, I had the personal belief that all people should serve some time in 
the military, kinda like how Israel does it where when they turn 18 they do two 
years in the military. 
Q: Why did you think that? 
A: You’re given all these freedoms, and yet you don’t know why you have 
them—you—you don’t understand why other people sacrifice the way that 
they did to ensure that you still have them.  That’s why I did it. 
Chris’ reply voices his sense of seeking to understand the mystery of patriotism 
and willing self-sacrifice.  He sees the sacrifice as being the vehicle by which the gifts 
of freedom are passed between generations, creating the obligation to serve in a like 
way for all citizens.  It is a part of an American ethos that was more than merely 
symbolic to him. 
Chris comes from family which on both sides demonstrated the willingness to 
sacrifice on behalf of the nation. His biological father, mother, grandfather and step-
father were all military veterans.  Chris grew up in and around military bases as the 
family often moved due to his parents’ military assignments.  He loved being around 
the military and fervently hoped to make the military his own career.   
Chris saw himself possessing a different, privileged, view of the military and 
war from most kids.  He described his childhood self: 
A: I mean I—I grew up in the military so my understanding of war, death 
and all that was different than everybody else; I had more of a realistic view 
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about it.  Um…whereas most kids around my age, when I was even in 
kindergarten, didn’t understand it or didn’t really know too much about it.  I—I 
knew or seemed like, was more enlightened or more um…knowledgeable 
about the subject. 
Q: You said also you felt it was a bit like a family business? 
A: Uh-huh. 
That perspective was nourished by more than simply living in military base 
communities.  Chris found a powerful way to connect with his father’s Viet Nam 
experiences when he was eight years old: 
My dad was um…he served in the tail end of Viet Nam; he volunteered, he 
didn’t get drafted.  Um…he joined the Infantry, yeah, so he lied about his age 
in order to get in.  Um…I—I remember…when I was a kid, I’d dress up in his old 
cammies [camouflage uniforms] and one time I found a—his old foot locker 
which had a lot of photos and little notebooks of…that he would detail events 
that happened to him while he was over there and I was always in awe.  
Chris’ account in this one passage displays several important things about his 
imagining of war.  His father was a hero who did not evade the draft, but in fact broke 
the rules in order to join the war.  Chris donned the garments worn by his father in 
combat while accessing his father’s journals and mementos, giving him entrée to the 
thoughts and images of a young combat soldier.  Chris idealized war and idolized his 
father because of what he read in the journals and saw in the photos: “and I was 
always in awe.”   
It is little wonder, then, that Chris would want to follow in his father’s 
footsteps.  He too enlisted at the earliest possible age, even though his parents were 
discouraging him from joining during wartime.  He met with resistance from his 
grandfather, a revered family figure, and a veteran of not one, but two wars.  Chris 
discussed the effects on his desure to enlist: 
Q: So it’s fair to say you were determined to do it? 
A: Yeah, um my grandfather on my mom’s side who served in the military 
in Korea and Vietnam really was my motivation to see it all the way through, 
‘cause he told me that I couldn’t do it, that I wouldn’t survive, I wouldn’t last 
and I wanted to throw it in his face, ‘cause every time he told me that I 
couldn’t do something, I had to prove him wrong. 
Chris and Frank: Testimonies of Abuse  158 
 
 
 
Chris’ grandfather predicted that he would wash out of his initial military 
training because he was not good enough for military service.  Chris had a strong and 
lasting reaction: 
Q: How did you feel when he said that? 
A: I hated him.  I really didn’t like him after that point and our relationship 
wasn’t the best in the world after that.  (Long pause) It still isn’t. 
No other way to learn things about yourself    
Frank Wright spoke of combat as an “ultimate human experience,” in much the 
same way that others described why they wanted to go to war.  For Frank, joining 
offered a means of following the footsteps of his forebears into the opportunity to 
discover the true measure of himself and humanity. 
To Frank, as with Chris, the military was a boyhood dream stemming from a 
family heritage steeped in military service.  He describes his military connections when 
giving the reasons he joined the military: 
That all started at a very young age; it’s just kind of the way it was. Every 
member of my family joins the military; every male member of my family, 
literally, every single male member of my family joins the military. Actually, 
three weekends ago, I took my wife and family to a cemetery, our family 
cemetery that has some of the oldest graves in the area that I live, and took a 
picture with my great-great-great-grandfather’s tombstone, and he served in 
the, in the Civil War, and we took a picture with him, and you know that’s—so 
that—that—that is the culture in my family, you join the military and a lot of it 
had to do with the fact that I read a lot of books as a child, and I was really into 
war books and history books [ ] I know I read literally every book out there on 
military and operations and things like that, and when I say every book, I mean 
more like personal accounts, I don’t mean like textbooks and…you know, I was 
a young man…I wasn’t analytically looking at anything; I was looking for a cool 
story, and this story is true.  And, you know, my—my grandfather was in World 
War II, Korea and Viet Nam. My uncles was in Korea and Viet Nam; my dad was 
in Viet Nam, my other uncle was in Viet Nam, um…I mean…that’s just how it is. 
For Frank it was more than a desire to be in the military that drove him to 
enlist.  He had a desire to “see the elephant,” as US Civil War recruits anticipating their 
first combat would have put it: 
I’ve always considered war to be the ultimate human experience, you know, 
good, bad or otherwise. I had a saying, ‘There’s only like three things in life 
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that are all they’re cracked up to be. It’s women, drugs and war.’ They’re the 
only three things that you ever experience that really are everything that they 
say they are . . . . seriously, they’re all they’re cracked up to be, and that—
that’s kind of the main reason I joined the military, not just because of family 
ties, but ah…just—there’s no other way to learn things about yourself that you 
can learn in the military. 
He was asked to elaborate and replied: 
I just wanted to see how I would react to extreme stress and see if I had the 
ability to handle myself in situations, you know, that it’s just a good way to 
really find out what kind of person you really are.  See if you are the kind of 
person who may abuse someone or see if you are the kind of person who can 
place yourself in direct danger and still think intelligently, ah—I mean, I’ve read 
a lot of books, and I had attributes about people that I respected and regarded 
and now I wanted to find out if I had some of those same attributes myself. 
Um, I guess that’s what I mean by that. 
Here Frank makes clear that war was not only something to be experienced, it 
was to be a means by which he could measure himself as a person. 
That’s pretty brutal  
Contrary to his grand-father’s predictions, Chris did complete his military 
training and joined a unit that had fought its way into Iraq during an earlier 
deployment.  In this unit, Chris was further groomed to become an abusive soldier.  
The unit was preparing to return to Iraq and Chris learned about abusive violence 
from the more experienced soldiers: 
Q: Had they talked about detainees from their prior deployment before 
you went? 
A: Every now and then, yeah. 
Q: Do you remember what kinds of things you heard? 
A: They um…(long pause)…they talked about things that they would do, 
water boarding ‘em and putting cigarettes out on ‘em, cutting off fingers 
and…strapping ‘em to the side of Humvees… 
Q: When they started describing doing those things what were you 
thinking? 
A: Um…that’s pretty brutal. 
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Q: At that time, before you deployed, how did you feel when you heard 
that that’s how detainees had been treated by these guys? 
A: Um…(pause)…I felt somewhat sorry for them; they shouldn’t have been 
treated that way, but at the same time I had the feeling, “it’s combat and 
you’re gonna do what you gotta do.” 
Chris, the young inexperienced soldier, hearing about abusive violence, rationalized 
the conduct as justified by necessity: 
Q: And what were your feelings about the folks who were telling you 
about these experiences? 
A: That they’d been in the thick of it; that their actions in their minds were 
justifiable. 
Q: How did they seem, when they were telling you about it, what was 
their demeanor like? 
A: Cold…very somber, very ah—some of them were very ah…very—they 
tried to used their words as carefully as possible, and very calculated when 
they would speak, how they would say things—almost to the point where 
some of it seemed like they were forcing or sugar coating it. 
What Chris describes is not the lighthearted boasting by soldiers trying to 
impress the neophyte.  Instead, the experience he relates is that of being among 
cautious, dangerous and deliberate men.  Their caution about the topic of abusive 
violence was underscored when the Abu Ghraib scandal erupted.  Chris described the 
older soldiers’ reaction to the photos and their confirmation of involvement in similar 
abuse:  
A: Humorous reaction; they think it was funny, um comments of—“they 
were idiots to take photos, but that’s shit that we would do.” 
Q: Not taking the photos, but the actions? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Were there any of the things that came up that, um the people you 
were with say, “That’s just stupid or lame or…” 
A: Ah, some people would have said, “Yeah, that’s kinda childish,” but the 
general consensus was, “They’re fuckin’ idiots for using cameras.” 
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The publicity did give rise to an explicit pre-deployment arrangement in Chris’ 
squad.  Chris explained: 
A: Um, shortly before, well actually the day before deploying, we were up 
at the tarmac waiting, you know, just kind of a last check, make sure we got 
everything, so our…trip out there would go as smoothly as possible. Um…our 
squad leader pulled us aside and said, and brought the subject back up with 
Abu Ghraib that um…if anything were to happen like that, that no photos 
should be taken. 
Q: What comments were made when he said that? 
A: Everybody pretty much was that was…common sense. 
Q: Now when you heard that, what were you feeling? 
A: Um…I was…just ready to get in the field and I—I really didn’t…pay any 
attention.  I just wished we were deploying that day instead of the next day. 
For Chris, the prospect of the unit engaging in abusive violence was well 
established before he left for Iraq, and the agreement to do it smarter than the guards 
at Abu Ghraib was accepted out of hand by the young soldier anxious to go to war. 
They keep it real   
Frank introduced a view of humanity spanning a range of behavior that 
includes brutality and stark choices.  He saw this before going to Iraq and his sense of 
his early experiences were developed more fully by what he later saw and did. 
Frank joined the military and was accepted into an elite special operations 
group where he received far more training than did regular infantry soldiers.  He 
deployed first to a non-Middle Eastern country as a trainer/advisor to a government 
that has been fighting an active organized insurgency for many years.  His exposure to 
abusive violence began there: 
And previous deployments I had seen it too.  Literally, when I was in [deleted], 
those savages would like capture people and cut them up, and these weren’t 
military, but these were [deleted]that I had trained with and they’d like cut 
‘em up, and like stick their head on a stake, I mean, they’re old school man, 
they keep it real down there.  They ah, they really do it; it’s—you know, they 
hack ‘em up with [deleted] and…feed ‘em to pigs, and stick their head on a 
stake, and I saw that, “wow, like…a guy’s head in the stake…and I knew 
him…yesterday.” 
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Frank’s view of a raw, elemental, and primal world that is more “real” than the 
normal experiences of Americans is something he brought up several times during the 
two interviews.  For him, this reality is one to be regarded with due respect, as it 
reveals human nature as it truly exists. 
In Iraq, Frank’s unit was primarily used to target key insurgent personnel.  He 
described the kinds of individuals he expected his team to capture: 
Q: Who did you think was going to be getting themselves detained? 
A: Ah, combatants, on the field; I knew exactly who they were.  Um, even 
before I went over there, I knew who they were.  Ah…I mean…there were the 
people that the government wanted to talk to, the main people who had, you 
know, they were the top of the cells. Instead of using the bottom-up strategy 
the cops like to do. In the military, we go from the top down strategy; we cut 
the head off the snake.  We don’t develop informants and process—at 
least…not my job.  You know, we weren’t into, you know, developing 
informants and following that trail; we didn’t have that sort of time. We—we 
found out who was, I think, where we needed them to be, and then we went 
to where [they were] and got them, and that’s exactly what happened.  I was 
trained for it and we went over there, and that’s what happened. . . .    
Q: What would make them of interest? 
A: Ah, they were actively engaged in the harmful operations toward U.S. 
military personnel, be it smuggling, money raising, ah, a lot of the people we 
went after were trainers, the main trainers and the main funders of these 
operations. So that’s what made them of interest to us that, you know, we get 
rid of them and then there’s no one to train people; there’s no one to give 
them money; there’s no one to give them cars; there’s no one to supply them 
with the resources that they need to cause harm to, you know, U.S. military. 
That’s what made them of interest. 
This mission would afford Frank the opportunities he always hoped for when 
he dreamt of going to war. 
Abuse in Iraq 
Better him than me   
Chris’s first incident of abusive violence surprised him, but he was little 
affected by it.  His attitude, and what he observed, made clear that Chris had been 
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prepared to witness routine beatings of captured fighters.  At this point, however, he 
was not a participant. 
Chris had never encountered a detainee before seeing his squad beat a 
captured fighter in the wake of an attack.  He offered a succinct narrative of the 
incident from start to finish: 
It was ah…my first interaction with a detainee.  It was the first time um…we 
were in a town, we had dismounted from our Humvees and we started up our 
patrol and we took some small arms fire and we busted down the door and 
took the guy by surprise.  They dragged him out and they beat him a little bit, 
yelled at ‘im you know, and kicked ‘im and then flexi-cuffed ‘im and then threw 
him in the back of our high-back Humvee and we continued on our way and we 
took him with us and then after continuing our patrol route, we returned back 
to base.  He was left face down in the back of the high-back, and people with 
their feet on ‘im, which is considered disgraceful in Iraq to show the bottom of 
your foot or put the bottom of your foot on somebody.  He was left back there 
for about an hour, maybe, hour and a half before he was finally pulled out and 
taken to the holding facility…and there he was beaten again and then thrown 
in-in a cell.   
 
Chris was asked to describe the situation in more detail: 
Q: What happened? 
A: Um…punched, kicked…butt stroked16 a couple times, beaten with 
sticks… 
Q: And how many members of the um squad took part in that? 
A: About eight…roughly. 
Q: And when you saw that happening how were you physically reacting to 
that? 
A: I was in disbelief, but I was trying to also focus on what was going on 
around us...because they were all pretty distracted with this one guy.  There 
could have been others out there that could have taken us all out. 
Q: What sort of things did you hear? 
                                                     
16
 “butt stroked” refers to striking a person with the end or edge of a rifle butt-stock. 
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A: “Fuckin’ asshole,” “sand nigger,” um… “piece of shit,” “fuckin’ shootin’ 
at us…,” “I’m gonna fuckin’ kill you…,” things to that extent. 
Chris’ immediate thoughts after the incident were not fixated on what had 
happened.  We talked about when he returned to his quarters: 
Q: What—what was occupying your thoughts then? 
A: At the time, I thought better him than me…um, but after we left and 
we got back to our huts, my thoughts were more on what I was gonna do until 
we had to go out again, whether go to the um…the communications center 
and get on-line or make a phone call back home or watch movies, or just go to 
sleep. 
Chris related that the squad members and members of the detention facility 
guard force beat the detainee with nightsticks without much comment when he was 
turned over.  The impression one receives is that of a routinized process of brutality 
that helped Chris move from initial “disbelief” to unconcern and an untroubled ability 
to concentrate on the mundane.  It was not long before Chris began his own 
participation; before that happened, he experienced a harrowing encounter that 
changed his entire view of being in Iraq. 
I wasn’t there really to ensure their freedom   
Chris was being asked about injuries suffered by his unit when he mentioned 
cuts he received about a week after the first detainee beating.  In the space of a single 
intimate and lethal encounter, Chris switched from an idealistic young soldier to a 
pure survivor.  He described the incident while showing me the scars on his forearms: 
A: We had gotten hit pretty hard several times.  I had been [by] myself---I 
had somebody…had the jump on me where I had sustained some scars from 
hand-to-hand combat. 
Q: I’m sorry, say that again? 
A: Um…it was about a week after the fir—after my first dealing with a 
detainee. 
Q: Uh-huh. 
A: Um, we had been hit pretty hard on several occasions when we’d go 
out on patrols. 
Q: Did you take casualties? 
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A: Um…minor injuries, um concussions, um…flesh wounds but nothing 
real serious where we had to just leave or call in evac.  Um…on one occasion, 
um, as we were clearing a building [I] ended up going down a corridor or a 
hallway by myself, which wasn’t very intelligent, and I missed a door as I was 
going down and I—I don’t know where this guy was from.  He could have been 
Iraqi, could’ve been Syrian.  We dealt with a lot of mix whether they were 
Iraqis or Syrians or even from Iran and um, and we engaged in hand-to-hand 
combat where I defended myself with my arms and sustained a couple scars.  
Um…my will to live was stronger than his and ah…I killed him and after that 
point I was…not really caring anymore about them and about their well-
being…kinda came to the realization that I wasn’t there really to ensure their 
freedom but to help the person on my left and my right come home. 
Q: By “they,” you’re talking about the Iraqi people? 
A: No, well yeah.  Well, I wasn’t there fighting for their freedom.  I was 
there to make sure that the guys that I was serving with would come home 
alive…and I stopped viewing the Iraqis as people in general and more or less 
animals or basically less than human.   
Q: Were the other members of your squad feeling the same way? 
A: Uh-huh.  We all—we all felt the same way.  We all just wanted to go 
home, and we were willing to do whatever it took to go home, to make sure 
that everybody went home. 
Chris is able to identify a single point in time when his world view shrank from 
high ideals to personal survival.  Alone in a corridor he is attacked, wounded and kills 
his assailant.  He frames his new sense of resolve as ensuring the safety of his 
comrades and makes evident that he certainly intends to survive. It is as if he sees his 
survival as a matter of sheer will-power: “my will to live was stronger than his.”  He 
links the survival of himself and his comrades with the ability to see the Iraqis as 
animals.  Those animals would not deserve the sacrifice from Chris that his forebears 
had made on behalf of him and his fellow Americans. 
I wanted to kill ‘im   
Chris’ further journey toward becoming a brutal abuser of detainees gained 
impetus as his frustration and rage erupted in the wake of an ambush. Chris was asked 
to recount the first instance in which he directly took part in abusive violence.  This 
happened after his deadly hallway encounter: 
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Um…we were conducting um…what we jokingly refer to as humanitarian 
operations.  It was more of a show force than it was taking care of the people 
out there, and we were patrolling through a village that was located along the 
Euphrates and ah…there was two guys that started shooting at us and we 
returned fire and we killed one; and the other one took off where we 
dismounted in pursuit after him on foot.  He was running along the river bank 
and we caught up to him and I tackled ‘im into the river where I proceeded to 
beat him and submerge his head underwater… and I beat ‘im with my Kevlar 
helmet, with my fists.  Then intermittently dunking him into the water before a 
couple of members in my squad dragged me off of him and dragged him onto 
the bank. 
Chris was asked for more detail: 
Q: When you were holding him down under the water, what did you want 
to do to him? 
A: I wanted to kill ‘im. 
 [ ] 
Q: (Pause) Why did you want to capture him? 
A: We had received reports of people in the area that may know more 
than we let on, and ah-if possible, bring ‘em in. 
Q: So while you were-while he was running you had that thought in your 
mind? 
A: Yeah. 
Q: But when you hit the water? 
A: I was…upset, I was wet and miserable and it was hot and…  I mean our 
body armor adds 10 degrees of heat and now adding water that’s evaporating, 
that’s basically having your own humidifier strapped to your body.  It’s hot and 
miserable and wet…just-just not…just not a fun…kind of time for me. 
Chris described exercising restraint and trying to capture the shooter for 
intelligence purposes, but his self-control evaporated when they hit the water.  He 
described what he was feeling at that moment: 
A: Um…I was a little pissed off because it was just…supposed to be a drive.  
It wasn’t really supposed to be anything; we were going through towns that we 
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never really had any issues with before.  It was supposed to be a nice easy day 
and then ah…tackling him in the water wasn’t the brightest because that’s a 
nasty river.  I smelled like crap for days. 
Q: What were your emotions when you were striking him? 
A: I was angry.  I mean they wanted to shoot at us, but weren’t willing 
enough to stay and fight.  I was angry and just…I was just angry.  I was just…my 
mind was blown because that’s what all our engagements were like.  They 
would just hit us and run.  They never really give us a stand-up fight.  That’s 
what we wanted, that’s (laugh) what we were hoping for.   
Q: So how did you feel about the enemy who shot and ran? 
A: That he was a coward, he was willing to take several shots at us but 
wasn’t really willing to do anything after that. 
Chris was able to assess the damage he had done and to reflect on the 
situation afterward: 
A: Um…I fractured…his left orbital bone.  Ah…I broke his jaw, I busted his 
ear and knocked out a couple teeth when I slammed my Kevlar helmet in his 
face. 
Q: When you saw that damage, what do you think or feel? 
A: It serves him right.  He wanted to shoot at us and his buddy got killed 
and he gets to walk away with broken bones.  
Q: After you had taken a shower, did you think about the encounter?   
A: Yeah. 
Q: What did you think? 
A: That I should have killed him.  That I shouldn’t have even wasted my 
energy chasing him down, I should have just shot him. 
Q: (Pause) Was that something that you arrived at on your own or in 
discussion with others? 
A: On my own while showering.  
Q: (Pause) At some point after that, did you remember what you had in 
your mind when you were chasing him about intelligence value of detainees? 
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A: No.   
Q: (Pause) What comments did your squadmates make to you about what 
you had done? 
A: “Good job”, “wouldn’t have done it any other way”. 
Q: And what’d you say? 
A: “Doing what I was paid to do.” 
Q: Did you share with them the conclusion you had come to in the 
shower. 
A: Um, to a couple.  They said it sounded more like a reasonable choice 
than tackling him into a river.  Less paper work. 
For Chris, this encounter reveals his soldier-self’s disdain for a base and 
cowardly enemy who deprived the Americans of the head-to-head battle they 
yearned for.  He also described the unleashing of a pent-up frustration brought to a 
head by the dashed expectation of an easy day in the field.  Chris reveals that his 
attitude about the use of abusive violence had moved from an initial “disbelief” at 
witnessing a beating to a callous indifference enabling him to conclude that he should 
have saved his breath and simply killed the fleeing insurgent.  The brusque macho 
interchange with his squad mates endorsed his actions and also gave an entirely banal 
reason for killing instead of capture: “less paperwork.”  That this was absurd on 
multiple levels is appallingly evident, but fails even on the issue of relevance.  
Elsewhere in his account Chris described that a detainee had been simply dropped off 
by the patrol at the detention center, without any report being given, so there could 
not have been any less paperwork.  What is eminently clear is that Chris’ squad was 
talking itself into casual killing of detainees for simple convenience. 
Why even bother taking him in?  
It was not long before the squad put their attitudes into action.  Chris found 
the next level of the squad’s transformation into a torture and killing machine when 
the lethal logic behind a simple question went unchallenged in the face of revenge 
and callousness.   
He described a situation where the squad came across a bomb-planting 
insurgent and the deliberations that preceded a murder.  Chris was asked whether he 
had personally observed the event: 
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A: It was observed and we caught him one night, ambushed him, cuffed 
‘im, um instead of taking him back, we might as well just kill him.  Either way, 
he’s not going to be out there. 
Q: What did he have with him?  I mean, did you guys captured him? 
A:  Um…homemade explosives. 
Q: Is he by himself? 
A: Yes. 
Q: (Pause) And…at the time he was shot, was there any sort of discussion, 
did somebody say something? 
A: We were all discussing what we should do with him.  And we all came 
up with a consensus, just to shoot him, not even worry about it and say that he 
shot at us and…that was it. 
Q: At the time you guys were discussing it, what was his situation? 
A: Um, he was bound, flexi-cuffed behind his back.  He was on his knees, 
um…one member of my unit has his knee on the upper portion of his back, 
forcing him down. 
Q: And um how was it decided who was gonna shoot him? 
A: Ah…we drew straws. 
Q: During the discussion, were there arguments made for taking him in? 
A: Ah…couple people. 
Q: Do you remember what their logic was? 
A: Either way he wasn’t going to be out on--burying IEDs on the side of the 
road. 
Q: If he was detained? 
A: Even if he was detained. 
Q: And what was it-- 
A: He would be more likely tortured, so his punishment would be 
prolonged instead of quick. 
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Q: So these are the-that was the logic being offered for why you’d take 
him in? 
A: Uh-huh.   
Q: And then what was said in response to that logic? 
A: “Why even bother taking him in?” 
Q: So you drew straws and was it a single individual who pulled the straw 
to shoot or were there more than one? 
A: There were um…there was 11 long straws and one short straw… 
(pause) and we all-we grabbed a straw. 
Q: And your straw was long or short? 
A: Long. 
Q: How did you feel when you pulled a long straw? 
A: I wanted to do it. 
Q: You wanted to shoot him? 
A: Uh-huh.  Ah, he was responsible or at least in my mind he was 
responsible for the death of a buddy of mine that I went to [training] with.  
Who had died in the area…from an IED. 
Q: Was that on your mind at the time? 
A: Uh-huh. 
Here Chris introduces the theme of revenge as being a motivator for killing.  He 
also shows that the squad was operating entirely on an inward-focused logic devoid of 
outside considerations.  They saw the goal as removing a dangerous enemy from the 
battlefield and accepted equal risk/opportunity to be the one to pull the trigger.  They 
prioritized immediate convenience over any intelligence that could have been 
obtained from the bomber, any punishment that would have likely occurred at the 
detention center, and indeed any accolades they could have received for making the 
capture.  In the end, one prosaic question settled the argument: “Why even bother 
taking him in?” 
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What could happen if they messed with us   
The treatment of battlefield captures figures prominently in one incident 
recounted by Chris.  Chris describes his adoption of murder and mutilation in response 
to surviving a ferocious battle, and the desire to permanently intimidate the captured 
enemy. Chris’ squad was on a mounted patrol near a town where a squad from 
another platoon had been left to patrol on foot.  The other squad came under fire and 
began to take casualties, eventually becoming pinned down, surrounded by 
insurgents.  Chris’ squad was sent to their aid, and drove as close as they could to the 
battle.  Leaving some soldiers to guard the vehicles, the squad killed more than twenty 
fighters while fighting its way to relieve the trapped soldiers.  On the way in, Chris’ 
squad took several insurgents captive, and immobilized them before moving forward.   
During the retreat a number of acts of abusive violence occurred, started by the 
members of the other squad.  Chris described what he saw and did: 
Q: Going back to the engagement where you’re extracting with the other 
squad, some of the people in the other squad began shooting people that your 
unit had had detained or had tied up.  How did you react to that? 
A: “That’s a good idea.” 
Q: Were all of the um…individuals gathered up by that point or were you 
just moving back along your-your route? 
A: We were moving back along the same route that we had. 
Q: So…who’s the first, describe the first of the detainees that you shot on 
the way out? 
A: He was an older male…with some slight gray hair, sort of a little pepper. 
Q: Had you been present during his capture? 
A: No… 
Q: Or his neutralizing? 
A: No. 
Q: Why did you decide to shoot him at that point? 
A: (Pause) Because I didn’t wanna waste my energy dragging him. 
Chris and his partner shot the next bound insurgent they found, but they used 
others as human shields.  This did not ensure the detainee’s survival: 
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Q: And…the third person that you shot on the way out, can you describe 
that situation? 
A: We were just pretty much at the Humvees.  It was one of the people 
that we picked up and had ‘em running in front of us.  Just shot ‘im and we got 
in the Humvees and waited for everybody else to mount up and go. 
Q: Were any of the detainees taken back? 
A: Um, we had five of ‘em with us. 
Q: So the one that you shot near the Humvees, why did you decide to 
shoot him? 
A: We were pretty full…didn’t have much space. 
Again, the killing of detainees took place because of the practical 
considerations: Chris did not want to drag detainees during the retreat. The squad had 
no room for all of the human shields, and apparently did not think it was appropriate 
to abandon them unharmed.  Given the fact that these detainees were taken under 
arms while fighting, there would have been no question of their “guilt” in the minds of 
the soldiers.  As with the bomber shot after pulling straws, these victims would not be 
loose to pose future threats.  
The drive back to the base lasted ninety minutes.  Chris describes the mayhem 
that took place: 
Q: Were any of them [detainees] subjected to any abuse on the way back? 
A: Um some were urinated on, cigarettes put out on ‘em, pretty much a 
lot of beating, lotta taking our knives and cutting them,  not deeply 
but…enough to draw blood and hurt ‘em. 
Q: Between the two squads, yours and for lack of a better term, the first 
squad, um…did-one group or the other seem more into hurting the detainees 
at that point? 
A: They were…the first squad.  They were-they were pretty-pretty pissed 
and…they were…they were not happy (slight chuckle) at all for lack of any 
better phrase.  
Q: Was that the first time you used your-your knife to um abuse a 
detainee? 
A: Ah, yeah. 
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Q: Had you seen somebody else do that by that time? 
A: Hmm…no, not that I can remember.  I’ve used my knife before and it 
wasn’t on somebody that was already bound. 
Q: So what made you add that to what you were going to do? 
A: (Pause) Um…I really…had no reason except for, give them a constant 
reminder of what could happen if they messed with us.  
Q: When you say ‘constant reminder’ what-what did you mean? 
A: Um…cut em deep enough that they’d have a scar, something that they 
would see for the rest of their life if they live long enough. 
Q: And um where were you cutting on them? 
A: The chest, cheeks, arms, legs. 
Q: And…was there any…anything other than straight cuts? 
A: Um…carved initials…carved symbols… 
Q: Initials of individuals or organizations? 
A: Both. 
Q: Your own? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And your service? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And what sort of symbols? 
A: Stars and smiley faces. 
Q: Of these, how many detainees did you have access to? 
A: Um… 
Q: That you were doing this to? 
A: We had um…about seven with us. 
Q: And…where was this taking place? 
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A: In the high-back [Humvee]. 
Q: So all seven were in there? 
A: Uh-huh. 
Q: And were they on benches, standing, lying down? 
A: Sitting, standing, lying…on top of each other. 
Q: Did…how many of you were using your knives? 
A: Um…there was four of us. 
Q: From just your squad? 
A: Um, no, it was mixed, there was um…me and one other person from 
my squad and then two from the other squad. 
Q: Were all of the detainees in the vehicle…cut? 
A: Yeah, as far as I know, yes. 
Q: While you were doing it, who-well who was the first one-- 
A: Um… 
Q: --to use a blade? 
A: I don’t know; there was um, a lot of was going on, it was pretty chaotic; 
it was just…pretty…(pause)well… 
Q: What were you hearing at the time? 
A: Screams. 
Q: Just from detainees? 
A: No, screaming from other people…loud.  You hear it over the engines, 
some from our wounded, some from the detainees… 
Q: What’d it smell like? 
A: (Pause) Smelled like shit…smelled bad.  Um…smelled like diesel fumes 
and…body odor and…just…it didn’t smell good. 
Q: What were you saying while you were doing this? 
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A: I was laughing…and pointing out, “Hey look…look what I did…” 
Q: How long was the ride back to the base? 
A: It was about a-an hour and a half. 
Q: At some point did the abuse stop before you…? 
A: Um, about half an hour before we went back to the base. 
Q: Why did it stop? 
A: Lost its fun. 
Q: While you were-during the hour or so before you stopped, did um-was 
it constant? 
A: No, it wasn’t constant, you know…get an idea and just do it and-and 
after you’re done you kinda go off into…just space, and then you get another 
idea to do and do it again. 
Chris describes a scene of depraved blood-letting by vengeful soldiers who 
turn the mutilations into marks of victory on the bodies of the captured insurgents.  
Chris’ reasons for scarring the prisoners are both to humiliate and intimidate, he 
wanted to “give them a constant reminder of what could happen if they messed with 
us.”  There is also the dimension of cruel delight at the abuse they inflict.  Chris 
mentions laughing and pointing to the clever works he created and only stopping 
when the activity “lost its fun.”  Whether this action and satisfaction is a response to 
surviving a deadly encounter with superior numbers of enemy is unclear; however, in 
later instances of abusive violence, the dimension of peril is sometimes absent. 
It always seemed logical at the time   
In the aftermath of the rescue/torture incident Chris and his squad were 
relieved that they had been able to rescue the other squad and make it out 
themselves without any soldiers dying.  They also discussed the abusive violence; Chris 
and his squad mates found easy justification for killing people they captured and 
abused: 
Q: With respect to shooting the um enemy who were tied up?  Did you or 
the squad mates discuss or talk about it? 
A: Um, what we did…(heavy sigh)…um…the only discussion was “winning 
hearts and minds.” 
Q: Tell me about that. 
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A: Ah, it’s…an old saying…um, “Let me win your hearts and minds or I’ll 
burn your damn huts down”. 
Q: Was it from the Viet Nam era? 
A: Right. (Faint) 
Q: So how, how was that said in the context of what you guys are doing? 
A: “Winnin’ hearts and minds everywhere we go.” 
Chris’ squad wryly turned the COIN objective of gaining the trust and 
confidence of the populace on its head and into a hyper-macho swagger.   
I asked Chris about other incidents: 
Q: Did um…you question other people under circumstances that at the 
end you thought it was logical to shoot them? 
A: Uh-huh. (Long pause)  It always seemed logical at the time, but 
afterwards it was like…could’ve just let him go, but then again the same people 
that were friendly with us during the day were shooting us at night, so it’d just 
be another one.  I mean I remember one incident where I had gotten a shave 
and the guy had a straight razor.  He could’ve easily slit my throat that day. 
That night we got into a fire fight with a small group and he was one of the 
dead.  All I could think about was he was just holding a razor next to my throat 
that morning. (Faint)   
Q: How did that thought make you feel? 
A: Lucky. 
Chris’ words mark a conflict in his thoughts about the killing the squad did after 
torturing detainees.  By his admitting the possibility of release, we see that something 
in him regrets the murders.  In the next breath his war-zone logic asserts itself and the 
single instance of the barber/insurgent stands to justify the blanket reasoning for 
murder.  He evidences a kind of logical “blind-spot” to the alternative of turning the 
prisoners in for detention.  That he does this is in itself curious since he mentions the 
practice of having done so in reality.  The kill-release-detention question seems to be 
settled in his mind as being weighted toward killing.  It is unclear whether this is 
because his squad might have done this most often in practice or if having done the 
most serious action even once he is compelled to adopt the applied logic as 
necessarily and universally appropriate with other detainees.  He was however able to 
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articulate a clear lethal logic while recounting the first time he directly tortured a 
detainee. 
I’m not into that   
Frank described a particularly brutal kind of violence leveled at detainees by a 
translator, and the Americans’ unwillingness to be present during possible torture. 
While Frank described legal considerations, his personal distaste seems to have 
governed his actions. 
A figure of particular prominence to Frank was the translator that his unit 
“inherited” from the unit previously operating in the area.  According to Frank, the 
interpreter (“Ted”) was a Kurd who hated the local population after his family had 
been killed.  Frank was asked what the other unit said about Ted. 
A: That he produces results immediately. Ah, because this unit lost a lot 
people and my unit lost a lot of people, but....Ted was really good to have 
around. Ah, well basically [what] we wanted to know is like, “Where are you 
making the bombs at?” “Where’s it at, where’s all the materials at?”  “Take us 
to where all these materials are right now…” and he told us, and we went 
there, and we blew the whole place up. 
Q: How—what did you understand was the way Ted got people talking? 
A: He would cut their fingers off or he would show them a pornographic 
magazine and let them decide how he was going to fuck them; that’s literally 
what he would do to people, but he was a crazy person, and he was very mean 
and he did not like Insurgents, at all.  Ah…yeah…and it usually, I don’t know 
how often it came to that, um…but ah it was usually really quick. It never took 
very long at all. 
Frank explained that he and the other Americans would deliberately absent 
themselves during some of Ted’s interactions with the detainees. 
Q: Was there—you mentioned that there were times when Ted would 
have you guys leave the room. 
A: Uh-huh. 
Q: And that signaled that he was going to be doing things that you didn’t 
want to be present for? 
A: Yes. 
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Q: In your mind, what was the line that existed that divided what was okay 
for you to see and what you really didn’t want to see? 
A: Well, it was more of a legal thing, and I personally wouldn’t want to see 
that anyways. I’m not one of those people that like, watches “Faces of Death” 
or anything. I’m not—I’m not into that, I’m not into like…hurting people or like 
seeing people—it’ just is not my thing, you know. So I didn’t know that I had a 
line; I just had like a, but if I knew he was going to be ass raping somebody, I 
don’t want any part of that or cuttin’ someone’s finger off. I don’t wanna be in 
there watching someone’s finger get cut off. I don’t want to be a part, I mean, 
that’s just not something I want to, you know… 
Q: What was the legal thing? 
A: You can’t do that to people! It’s wrong (laughs)…immorally and legally. 
Q: Okay. 
A: And you go to jail for shit like that. “Did you cut that guy’s finger off?” 
“Yes I did.” “Okay, you’re going to Ft. Leavenworth [military prison].” 
Q: Um… 
A: And it’s just sick, it’s gross. 
Frank was quite capable of accepting the fruits of Ted’s atrocities as long as 
they advanced the mission.  At the same time he was happy to be absent from the 
actual torture, both for legal reasons and a fastidiousness I was surprised to find in a 
special operations warrior.  In this exchange his laughter evidences an amusement at 
the violence under discussion, something he did several times during the two 
interviews. 
Interestingly, Frank introduced Ted into the narrative of his deployment by 
describing the abusive violence attributed to him, but when questioned closely, the 
reality was more elusive: 
Q: Was it your belief that he was doing that [rape] to some of the 
detainees when you were operating with him? 
A: I don’t think so, because it was all over so quick. I don’t know that he 
ever had time to really do anything like that, and like I said, I do believe that he 
did, ah but I don’t, I don’t even—like I said, we usually left and like literally 
before we could even like get all of our stuff unloaded. I mean we usually had 
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what we needed to—to know. So I don’t know that he ever had time to 
actually do that. 
Q: And…? 
A: And I wouldn’t have witnessed it if he did. And I think he might have 
told us. He was really—I mean he probably would have been like… “Oh, I just 
did this to this dude…” he never came out and said that. 
Q: Did he ever, although he…invited you guys to absent yourselves from 
what he was about to do…? 
A: Well, that was our policy; it wasn’t really him, it was actually with us. 
Q: Oh I see, okay.  
A: Even our leadership; they’re like, “Do not go in that room…” I mean we 
would have been in there for a little bit, but…then it was like, “Okay, time to 
leave…” 
Q: Do they explain why they are giving that instruction? 
A: Ah…it was just implied, understood. 
Frank later admitted that he never saw evidence of Ted cutting prisoners, and 
said he definitely would have heard prisoners having fingers removed.  While the level 
of Ted’s actual viciousness may have been cloudy, his reputation was enough to 
prompt the Americans to withdraw and allow him to prise information from detainees 
in private. 
Oh my God, these people really will kill me  
A continual theme of Frank’s narrative was the effectiveness of certain tactics 
for getting information from detainees.  As long as the detainee was convinced that he 
was in mortal danger, according to Frank, human nature always produced the desired 
results. 
Ted, the interpreter, was eventually killed by insurgents.  Once Ted’s services 
were no longer available, members of the unit took over field questioning.  Frank was 
asked whether Ted’s absence made the unit’s work harder: 
A: Ah, yes, yes…and no.  Yes and no, because we—we ourselves got 
better, you know.  I said yesterday, you know, the job will always get done, 
doesn’t matter if you’re there or not, and Ted was awesome to have around, 
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you know, but when he was gone, other people played to their strengths and 
developed the ability to, you know, be better interrogators. 
Q: Okay. 
A: More efficient interrogators. 
Q: So…of the things that Ted did, what did his successors employ? 
A: Nothing like what Ted did, just more ah bullish, American style, typical 
schoolyard bully tactics. Nothing, you know, not ah…not anything too sadistic, 
just more…common that you would think of. 
Q: Okay, so…give me… 
A: Like slappin’ em around, throwin’ ‘em into stuff, telling ‘em what’s 
going to happen to them if they don’t tell you what you want to know and 
what…what we always found is like once they understand how serious you 
really are, and I said this yesterday, they believed us. They really did believe us 
and we would tell em, and they would believe us and then they would tell us 
what we wanted to know because we would make it perfectly clear from the 
very, very beginning that, you know, we weren’t…I mean they just understood 
how serious of a situation they were in, and even if they did comply with us, 
you know, they were under the belief that they may die anyways.  So, I mean, 
they were—literally, people were afraid of us and they told us what we wanted 
to know. 
Frank personally used force on prisoners during field questioning.  He gave an 
example of a typical encounter: 
A: Um, I was trying to get into this—this door, it was locked. Had like a big 
lock on it, like a big dead bolt, and I was like, “Hey man, open this up…” and so 
I don’t know how serious you take that, but ah yeah, so I—I talked him into 
opening that door for me. 
Q: And how did you talk him to him? 
A: I grabbed him by his hair and smashed his face into the door and 
pointed at the lock, and then he looked at me funny and I did it again and then 
he opened the lock. 
Q: He had a key where? 
A: It was a combination lock. 
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Q: Oh, I see…I see.  And were there other times that you were…? 
A: Ah yeah, kind of—and it was always real similar that, there was always 
like, “Hey, do this…” and they’d say, “No!” and I would make them do it…just—
just a little smack in the head or just whatever, you know, nothing too crazy, 
but just, you know… “do it.” 
Q: Um… 
A: And people are universal man, they…they will tell you; if they’re afraid 
of you, they will tell you or they will do what you want them to do if they don’t 
wanna die. I mean that’s how people are; they don’t wanna die. 
Frank would sometimes use light strikes with a tomahawk to gain compliance from 
detainees.  He explained why he would resort to this method: 
A: Ah…really, I had a problem with people acting like kind of indignant 
and, you know, these are kind of like a proud people and things like that and a 
lot of times pointing a gun at them wouldn’t work and…I really didn’t just feel 
like sitting the person, sitting next to ‘em or whatever and, I mean, I really like 
my tomahawk, and they’re afraid of tomahawks, and it really cured their 
attitude really quick. I mean it’s a very intimate experience, ah…and by 
intimate, I mean very close. I mean there’s nothing, you know, it’s a lot more 
personal than pointing a gun at someone. 
Q: Uh-huh. 
A: And so I think that was probably why it worked so well.  I just really 
needed to be in control of the entire situation, and by the entire situation I 
mean, I need to be in control of their thought process.  I need to be in control 
of every aspect of every single thing of this whole area, everything about it. 
Here Frank discusses both the sheer menace he employed in the “intimate” 
use of the tomahawk, his intense need to exert control over situations, and his 
immediate reaction to defiance or indignation.  There is no question in his mind that 
these measures are justified because they are necessary for mission completion. 
Frank had definite thoughts about certain tactics used for information-seeking 
and his general evaluation of methods used by regular military interrogators: 
A: Yeah, these tactics are extremely effective, and I know…or I don’t 
know, but I know some people think they’re not…they really work, it’s just like 
human nature and that’s why interrogators suck in interrogating people 
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because they don’t use human nature against humans. All people speak fear. If 
you scare them and convince them that they will die, they will do what you 
want them to do, and these tactics work, and a lot of times you don’t have to 
go all the—you just have to, you know, produce the illusion that they are 
under, you know, a life-threatening circumstance, and it works. Always. Every 
time. At least in my experience, and we were talking to some hard core dudes, 
like the main people that we wanted in Iraq. The main dudes, like the top 10 
people that we wanted to find, and we found them. I mean…it’s like the main 
dudes, you know, supposedly hard core, highly disciplined, intelligent; it didn’t 
matter. If you scare someone, they’ll do what you want, especially if they 
know, you know, … “these people really will hurt me…” 
Q: So the… 
A: Very, very, very effective…and produced a lot of good, a lot of good 
results…that you can’t do in a clinical environment and in clinical, I mean like 
an interrogation; that’s a clinical environment, you know, it’s like a sterile 
atmosphere, you can’t, you can’t, you know, your hands are tied and they 
know that, and they’re not scared of you, and they’re not going to tell you 
anything. That’s why you got to get a hold of ‘em before they get processed. I 
guess that’s it. 
Frank mentioned that on some missions the unit would move beyond threats 
to gain information.  He described one such situation: 
Q: Okay.  Now, what can you tell me about one of those? 
A: Um…well, we went to this guy’s house and he was like trying to be a 
tough guy, so we shot his brother and then he told us everything we wanted to 
know. 
Q: You mean, in that case, what were you after? 
A: Ah, his network; he was another finance guy.  He had a lot of money in 
his house; he was a trainer who was from another country. He…was like, I 
don’t know what his deal was; he—like I don’t know if it was IED’s or maybe it 
was just-- maybe he was more like, more just like a money guy. 
Q: And what was the brother like? 
A: Well, a lot like him, I think. Skinnier. 
Q: Was he involved? 
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A: Ah, no; he was there. No, we weren’t talkin’ to him. 
Q: So how was it decided that the brother was going to be threatened? 
A: Um, it wasn’t really decided; it was just kinda understood. It was like, 
“Hey, tell us!” and he was like, oh, trying to be all tough, and we’re like, 
“Okay…we’re going to shoot your brother now” and then he tried to say 
something else and we shot his brother, and he was like, ‘Oh my God, these 
people really will kill me if I don’t tell them… (laughing)  what they want to 
know.’ 
Q: And after…were you guys satisfied that he had given up everything? 
A: Oh yeah, absolutely, because we took him with us. We’re like, “Drive us 
to this house right now,” and he was with us. So I mean, he knew we were very 
serious. . . . 
Q: Okay.  So when the brother was shot, did that surprise you? 
A: Ahhhh, no. 
Q: What was it about—the situation or the shooter that made it seem 
likely? 
A: Oh, I mean, these people are killers, literally professional killers, like lit-
er-al-ly, like trained to shoot guns very, very, very well and have the mentality 
to—to exercise these abilities and it’s just a given. I mean… 
Q: So you expected it was going to happen? 
A: Oh yeah, especially when that guy was like acting, you know, indignant 
and, you know. It’s like, “No, we are in charge, like you cannot act like that...” 
but he, you know, “Don’t act like that, tell us, you know. Quit acting that way. 
You’re not in charge of this situation.”  And I mean…  
Q: After the brother was shot, did he immediately give it up or was there a 
threat to anybody else in the room? 
A: No, he immediately gave it up. He ah…it took him a second to gather 
his senses, I mean like 20 seconds or so, he just kinda like paced back and forth 
and then like, “Oh my God,” just couldn’t you believe it. But then we got his 
attention and he’s like, “Okay…”  We walked right outside, like literally, right 
then walked outside, got in the trucks and left. 
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While Frank indicated that he had no interest in watching Ted torture anyone, 
he was quite willing to kill a detainee’s family member to get the information that was 
desired.  Here again, it was more than the mission-specific requirements that 
prompted the killing.  It was the defiance and indignation from the target that made 
the brother’s death seem acceptable and inevitable to Frank’s team. 
It was a unique and wonderful feeling  
Acting under obvious command authority, Chris and his squad captured, 
tortured, and killed an Iraqi elder.  Chris found the power in the situation fascinating, 
but the outcome dissatisfying. 
Chris’ initiation as a torturer took place in the context of a specific intelligence-
gathering assignment that his squad received directly from the battalion’s senior 
leadership, in the presence of the battalion commander.  The mission was to capture 
suspected insurgent sympathizers and question them in the field.  In the briefing a 
very senior NCO gave the men directions that spoke to the initiative they were 
expected to exercise: 
Q: And what instructions did they give you about what to do? 
A: Just gather as much information as possible.  They kinda left a “gray” 
area as to how we…what would be done afterwards. 
Q: How did they do that? 
A: Just said, “Get us the information by any means necessary.” 
Q: Those words were used? 
A: Yes. 
Q: What was the rank of the individual who used those words? 
A: He was a…[deleted]. 
Q: In the Intelligence section or? 
A: No, as far as I know he was um…Headquarters. 
Q: At the battalion level? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And how large a group was he saying this to? 
A: Uh, both platoons. 
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Q: And were the officers present when he had said this? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And did any of them contradict him? 
A: No. 
Q: Did any of them endorse what he said? 
A: No they didn’t say anything; they were talking amongst themselves. 
Q: So when you heard that, um…did you and your squad discuss anything? 
A: No.  
Q: Had you gotten that sort of instruction before? 
A: Um, on a couple of occasions. 
Chris explained that on other missions the same instruction had been 
previously issued by a senior NCO or his platoon leader within his company.  The 
earlier missions had not resulted in captures.  Before leaving for the present mission 
his squad and another squad being dispatched to the same location met. 
Q: And ah…was there discussion about what necessary means might be 
required? 
A: Hmm…um…no.  For us it was, ‘whatever we can do.’   
Q: Was this before or after the…rescue of the other…? 
A: It’s afterwards. 
Q: About how long after? 
A: Um, a week or so. 
Chris’ squad, having recently killed and mutilated detainees after the rescue 
mission, casually regarded the prospect of questioning prisoners. 
Q: So when you and your squad mates were discussing going into the 
town, again, what did “necessary means” or “means necessary” mean to you? 
A: It meant, it was up to our own judgment as to what we could or could 
not do. 
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Q: And ah…did you and any of your squad mates discuss any plans for…? 
A: No.  No we…were going to… ah let it go the way it went. 
Chris’ team eventually located one of their targets and engaged in a fierce fire-
fight with the man’s household before battering their way into the family compound.  
Three of the seven defenders survived to be captured, including the man who was the 
primary target of the raid.  Chris described him as an elder, “he was somebody that 
they would look up to in their culture, being old and wise and all that.” 
The man was bound to a chair and interrogated.  During the course of the 
interrogation the team beat him, shocked him at various places on his body with the 
electrical cord torn from a lamp.  That technique was suggested by a squad member 
who claimed to have seen it used in a movie. 
Chris described his own participation and the source of his knowledge of the 
method he employed: 
Q: Okay, so then…describe what happened from beginning to end here. 
A: Um, we’d each take turns you know in doing something and ask him 
questions and if he wouldn’t answer we would beat him, punch him, shocking 
him.  Um…I, myself, um lopped off a couple fingers, starting from each joint 
working my way down… 
Q: Starting with the small finger? 
A: Starting with the small finger and cutting it at each knuckle down to the 
hand. 
Q: What did you use? 
A: Um…I used a pair of um side cutters or dikes…that I carried on me. 
Q: These are normally used for cutting wire? 
A: Correct. 
Q: Now, why did you choose that particular method? 
A: Um…it was something that I read in one of my dad’s little journals and 
that stuck with me. 
Q: How old were you when you read that passage? 
A: About eight or nine. 
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Chris described the scene and revealed what the sense of supremacy felt like 
while he systematically removed three fingers: 
Q: And what were you hearing at the time? 
A: Screaming, “No, no, don’t please, no…” 
Q: And what were you hearing from the others? 
A: “Do it.” 
Q: And…what were you hearing from yourself? 
A: “Just answer the God damn question…” 
Q: What were you feeling at that point? 
A: Empowered…ah his fate pretty much rested in our hands.   At any 
moment…it was ours for the choosing.  (Long pause) It was a unique and 
wonderful feeling. (softly) 
Years after the events, Chris was able to recall the darkly wondrous sense that 
wielding the power of pain, life, and death over a helpless person brought forth within 
him. 
The mayhem continued.  The victim began to suffer from the effects of blood 
loss.  The team’s medic cauterized the wounded fingers with a piece of metal 
superheated on a fire.  When the victim passed out they also administered an 
injection of adrenalin directly into his heart, which had the effect of reviving him.  The 
team continued the beatings, shocks, and humiliation.  At times the gathering of 
intelligence was forgotten: 
Q: What was said at the time it [the injection] was happening? 
A: We’re not getting anywhere with him; might as well just kill ‘im and be 
gone. 
Q: At that point were you still hoping to get information from him? 
A: I think at that point we really were turning it into a game.  We were just 
ah, having fun with it. 
 
Eventually the victim offered up the demanded information: 
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Q: What happened just before he began to speak? 
A: Somebody started talking about maybe we should go and find his 
family.  Maybe, ‘cause he’s not talking, maybe if there’s people that he cares 
about, he might. 
Q: And he heard that? 
A: Yes. 
Q: What did he say? 
A: He just started talking, just started telling us about buildings, answering 
some questions. 
Q: And was he forthcoming from that point forward? 
A: Pretty much, yeah. 
Q: How long after he was bound to the chair…was it before he began 
providing information? 
A: It was about an hour and a half. 
Q: And…how long was he providing information? 
A: Twenty minutes. 
Chris shot the man and the other two men captured during the assault on the 
house.  He explained: 
Q: Did somebody say, “Shoot him”? 
A: No. 
Q: So then how did he end up shot? 
A: I shot him.  In my mind it seemed logical. 
Q: What was the benefit of shooting him, logically? 
A: Um…they weren’t gonna talk about what happened…what we did to 
them.  It’s one thing seeing, it’s another thing having the person talk about it.  
Kinda helps rally people to their cause.  
Q: At some point was there a thought that…they should be brought back 
for further questioning? 
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A: No, no it wasn’t part of our orders. 
Q: Your orders were to question in the field and obtain the information 
yourself? 
A: It’s what they said was, “Go and question ‘em…”  They didn’t give us 
any guidelines after that. 
Chris was again applying a logic of brutal efficiency by killing the prisoners in 
order to limit the outrage that living victim/witnesses would have sparked, especially 
since one of the victims was a respected elder.  In the immediate aftermath, this same 
desire for efficiency was evident in the conversation he had with squad mates: 
Q: What um conversation did you have with anyone in your squad 
immediately after you left the house?  
A: “Um, I shoulda used that ah threat on him from the beginning…” 
Q: And who were you saying that to? 
A: My other guys. 
Q: Who were inside the house? 
A: Yeah. 
Q: Part of the questioning team? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And what was their response? 
A: “Yeah, should’ve…” 
In less than two months, Chris had moved from the young “new guy” shocked 
by seeing a beating, to an atrocity leader in his squad.  He felt free to introduce novel 
torture techniques to the squad, killed prisoners on his own initiative, and delivered a 
terse “lessons learned” summary endorsed by the other torturers.  Childhood 
rummaging, pre-deployment grooming to accept abusive violence, command 
authority and dreadful combat experiences had all combined within this young man to 
enable him to deliver the worst kind of abusive violence that day.   
Although having ostensibly achieved the mission objectives, Chris’ reflections 
on the events were mixed: 
Q: On the ride back, did you think about what had happened? 
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A: Um…I replayed it in my head a few times. 
Q: What were you feeling? 
A: Just feeling…a sense of unaccomplishment; just didn’t feel like we 
accomplished anything. 
Q: Why? 
A: We were there for a long time and just did not seem like we really got 
anywhere.  You know, we got the—most of the information that we wanted 
but…it really didn’t feel like we did anything. 
Q: What else did you feel about it? 
A: (Pause) Still had that power—that—the feeling of empowerment about 
me. 
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Casual Fun  
Chris described learning torture techniques through casual contact with other 
troops.  He also describes his squad torturing to satisfy curiosity, for fun, and simply 
because they had the power to do so.  Whether or not battlefield intelligence was 
sought, torture was habitually used. 
Chris disclosed that the methods of torture used against detainees by his 
squad were learned from a variety of sources.  They learned over meals at the dining 
hall that the battalion intelligence staff was using a range of torture techniques 
including waterboarding, Tasers, cattle prods, Military Police dogs and the “electric 
chair” stress position.  Chris also learned of a refined method of waterboarding from a 
soldier from another unit, again in the dining hall.  Curious about how the technique 
worked, Chris and his squad mates tried it out: 
Q: Tell me about that. 
A: Uh-huh. We were staying in a, in a town overnight and smoking and 
joking and…I do not remember how it—it got to that topic, I…I just said it, and 
like yeah, some guy from you know that Special Ops group told me about 
water boarding and was telling me how to do it.  A bunch of us went, “We 
should try that…” and so we said, “Let’s do it on the next person we see…” and 
it just happened to be…a guy about our age.  He was walking out on the street 
and we stopped him and we gagged him and we flexi-cuffed him and dragged 
him into one of the buildings.  We found a plastic bag that we used. 
Q: In the building? 
A: Yeah.  (Pause) Then we proceeded to water board him, and after we 
had our fun, we let him go. 
The young man had the misfortune to be in the decidedly wrong place at the 
wrong time, but he was lucky that the reasons he was taken were only for amusement 
and edification.  Chris related that the squad used the technique on three insurgents 
captured after firefights.  This was not during an attempt to secure information.  They 
killed the first by mistake.  The other two were deliberately slain.   
During the interview Chris referred to the squad torturing other detainees.   
Q: Were there other occasions in which you, you’d used the term 
“torture” to um--that you tortured detainees? 
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A: Um… well, everything that we did was torture to them.  Whether we 
were questioning them or not, um…we would cause physical or mental harm, 
just because. 
Q:  And was it “just because”…? 
A: Just because we could.  There’s nothing that they could do about it. 
Q: And these occasions occurred in the context of being out in the field? 
A: Uh-huh.  What command doesn’t know won’t hurt ‘em.  It’s not like 
that they’d really are going to talk about it once we get ‘em back to base; 
because he was already scared shitless.  (Pause) It’s not like we have a 
Complaint Department. 
Chris describes preying on the helpless passerby and detained fighters almost 
as the prerogative of the ruthlessly powerful.  He also alludes to two other features of 
their use of abusive violence.  “What command doesn’t know won’t hurt ‘em” shows 
both an acknowledgment of the fact that his command should do something about 
their conduct if it becomes informed and a cynical view that the lower ranks have the 
right to keep inconvenient and unpleasant information from senior ranks.  “It’s not 
like we have a Complaint Department,” seems also to point to the reality that 
detainees have no one to tell their stories to.  Both quotes taken together indicate 
that the organization does not care to know. 
This chapter has contained narratives by both Chris and Frank that 
communicate what the lived experiences of abusive violence were like at the time and 
why they chose the methods that they employed.  Chris’ story has included an 
extended series of events, with each event chosen because they milestone the 
progression of his involvement in abusive violence.  Frank’s account has fewer 
incidents detailed because his own abuse was generally non-escalating.  This is 
probably because of his personal sensibilities and the overall operating methods of his 
unit.  The next chapter provides their continuing stories, but concentrates on how the 
abuse as a phenomenon affected them as individuals, how they situate it in their life-
stories and their current sense-making of war and abusive violence in particular.
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Chapter 6. Chris and Frank: Themes 
and Reflections 
The last chapter detailed some of the specific abusive violence that Frank or 
Chris were part of.  This chapter explores their post-deployment thoughts. They each 
had strong senses of what the experiences meant to them, and what enabled the 
abuse.  The end of this chapter lays out the superordinate themes that I interpreted 
from their stories. 
Bureaucrats and Battalion Commanders  
Chris had a sense that the leadership in his unit was inconsistent regarding 
prohibiting, ignoring, or allowing detainee abuse.  He attributed approval for some of 
the abuse to the battalion’s commanding officer, although other lower-ranked 
persons sought to prevent abuse. Chris’ squad took matters into their own hands to 
evade attempts to prevent abuse.  They also heard through channels, and from the 
top, that tales of abuse were not to be told back home.   
Chris was asked about the differences in attitudes about abusive violence 
among the battalion’s NCOs:  
Q: Now, last time you spoke…you said a couple of things about the 
mission where. . . . you said that at the briefing um…a staff NCO used the term 
“all necessary means” to get the information out in the field and to bring it 
back. 
A: Uh-huh. 
Q: And then you also mentioned that they never told you what you could 
or couldn’t do. 
A: Our senior staff NCO were kinda divided down the middle, some were 
cool, some weren’t, the older staff NCO’s, the ones that have been in for a long 
time… “Old School” guys, you know, they—they were in when hazing each 
other was just a normal everyday thing and beating the crap out of a POW was 
a way to pass the time. So they didn’t really care; the younger staff NCO’s, the 
ones that were more bureaucratic or the ones that we didn’t like, which we 
had more of them than we did of the “Old School”. 
Chris and his squad made sure that they had the freedom to operate as they 
saw fit and were hidden from scrutiny: 
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Q: And um…in the field, at least, if…your squad was employing abusive 
violence against detainees, would there ever be people from outside of the 
squad present? 
A: Um…we had a strict policy against that.  We never allowed media to 
come with us, we never allowed even officers to come with us. 
Q: Why was that? 
A: (Sigh) Um…one incident, our squad leader—oh no, I should say my 
platoon leader, not my squad leader, our platoon leader came out with us on a 
patrol and he got us lost and we ended up two hours inside [deleted 
neighboring country name] so after that it was no officers, no senior staff 
NCOs.  You know we did things our way and if they didn’t like it, tough shit. 
While the squad’s “policy” might have excluded officers, some senior NCOs did 
manage to accompany it into the field.  Creative distraction allowed abuse to go on 
unhindered: 
A: Usually when they accompany us, we would go in [to suspect areas], 
we’d check and clear areas and then we’d allow them to move up with us once 
that’s done. 
Q: And did any interrogations occur with them? 
A: Um…not with them present. 
Q: Okay. 
A: We’d kinda each take turns distracting them, taking them to other 
areas; that’s going as far as planting stuff to make them feel like they’re doing 
something. 
Q: And was that something that you and your squad talked about doing? 
A: Yeah. 
Q: And what was the purpose of that? 
A: Um…they always would get in the way and either…not allowing us to 
do what we needed to do…um; they were more bureaucrats than they were 
military. 
Q: So when you say not allowing you to do what you needed to do, what 
sort of-can you think of a particular incident where that happened? 
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A: Um, we had one [deleted] who thought he was God’s gift to us and 
would always boast that he would not have to lay a hand on somebody in 
order to get them to talk and felt that we should be the same way.   And when 
he would accompany us out into the field…um…it was really him, it’s because 
of him why we would distract them and be like… “Oh, we found some 
weapons…” or “You wanna, you want [to] help us collect ‘em…” um, while 
another set of us would have the person we’re after or somebody that we 
think has valuable Intel…some, in another location.  Um…but ah, one specific 
occasion, we had found a person and he would not let us touch ‘im, and he 
deemed the person not to know anything and that was that.  And um…it 
turned out later that the guy was smuggling weapons in the trunk of his 
vehicle. We would have found that out sooner if we were allowed to do what 
we needed to do.   
Keeping abusive violence secret was not simply the squad’s “policy;” the 
battalion made clear what was expected: 
Q: So…what-what sort of post-deployment um briefings or debriefings 
were um laid on for you guys when you got home? 
A: Um…that…certain topics should not be discussed with the general 
public. 
Q: And who-who were-what level of command was giving these? 
A: Well command passed um, it-it came down from battalion down the 
pipeline, from our squad leaders that were holding private little briefings with 
their respective squads. 
Q: And so what sorts of things were forbidden to speak about to the 
public? 
A: Um, number one topic was the handling and treatment of the EPW’s 
[Enemy Prisoners of War] or detainees. 
Q: And was that just, and why was that such a sensitive topic? 
A: Um…the military was already kinda casted in a bad light due to what 
happened at Abu Ghraib and other things that have happened since then. So 
they were just kinda…getting all their ducks in a row, trying to make sure that 
nothing gets out to the media that it’s still going on. 
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Chris had no doubt that both the secrecy and the acts themselves were 
approved by the highest authority in the unit: 
Q: On your way to your deployment, which your squad leader made a 
specific, had a specific discussion about photography in—in the light of Abu 
Ghraib, on your way out of Iraq, was there any kind of conversation? 
A: Um…our battalion commander, as we were getting ready to board the 
plane from Kuwait to Ireland and then back to the United States, um…he told 
us that we were going home, though a lot of us…truly weren’t going home.  
“But the things that happened…try not to think about em and don’t speak 
about em…” 
Q: This was your battalion commander saying that? 
A: Yeah.  Um…he…he okayed some of the things that we did. 
Q: How was that communicated to you? 
A: Um…he was on a platform and…just got our attention, the usual way he 
would, “Smoke ‘em if you got em. . . .” 
Q: When you say he okayed some of the things you did, what-what things 
you’re referring to? 
A: Um…our treatment towards the indigenous population. 
Q: And what sort of things did he say to you? 
A: Um…he commonly referred to the old Vietnam quote, “Let me win your 
hearts and minds, [or] I’ll burn your damn huts down…” 
Q: Did he explain where the priorities were… as far as he was concerned? 
A: (Sigh) “Peace by any means necessary.” 
Q: (Pause) And…by “peace” what kind of condition do you think that 
meant? 
A: (Pause) If there was anything threatening peace in our area, we had to 
deal with it. 
Chris plainly believed that the abusive violence that forwarded missions was 
expected and approved by the battalion command, as was the silence surrounding 
that abuse.  Even still, the ethical “bureaucratic” NCOs possessed the authority to 
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force adherence to (in their presence, at least) proper treatment of people captured 
by the squad.  Given the overall command impetus for results “by any means 
necessary,” the mixed messages from senior NCOs, and the squad’s own predilections, 
there is little wonder that Chris and his squad invented ways to abuse detainees out of 
sight. 
Being mean for mean’s sake   
To Chris, expressions condoning abusive violence gave full license to the worst 
acts he could imagine in service to mission objectives.  There seemed no self-
regulation of the abuse, and as we have seen, Chris’ squad quickly employed abusive 
violence for mundane and sadistic purposes.  Frank fully embraced effective 
instrumental abusive violence; but this is only one side of the coin.  The other is his 
personal rejection of unnecessary cruelty.  The former deserves no regrets, the latter 
is not nice.   
Once, after a major firefight resulted in several members of Frank’s unit being 
killed or wounded, two detainees were murdered.  In that same situation, Frank 
committed an act that differs in character from the abusive violence he otherwise 
perpetrated.  He stepped on the head of a bound detainee while passing by; that was 
the extent of his action.  He brought it up when asked about the single instance 
indicated on his questionnaire involving his personal participation in abusive violence: 
Q: Can  you tell me about that one time? 
A: Um…well, and this [referring to the study interviews] made me think of 
it a few more times. Like, see, I didn’t really think it was abusive whenever I, 
you know, grabbed that guy and smacked his head into the wall and made him 
open up that lock for me, and there was a few other times where I did stuff like 
that.  Ah, I personally don’t consider that abusive; I just don’t. In this specific 
example, there was a guy laying on the ground, and when I walked past him, I 
stepped on his head and—I just stepped on his head when I walked past him, 
like, like—I was walking and—and he was laying on the ground sideways and I 
stepped on his head like it was a stepping stool, ah…I—I..I guess I consider that 
abusive. 
Q: Okay. Why is that different from other things in your mind? 
A: Um…because I wanted that door opened, and that dude knew how to 
open it, and he needed to open that door. I personally needed him to open 
that door, and I knew no amount of talking to him was going to get him to do 
it, I mean that’s how they respond. I mean, I just don’t… 
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Q: No, I’m sorry, go ahead… 
A: It’s just not—I don’t know… 
Q: The guy—the guy… 
A: And me stepping on that dude on the ground, that’s just…being an 
asshole for no, just being mean for mean’s sake, to just like, the end-state was 
to be mean, you know, and that’s why I consider that abusive. 
Q: Okay. 
A: Just mean for meanness sake. If no other reason, then… 
For Frank, violence used to complete a mission is not abusive; to be mean 
simply to be cruel is wrong.  Throughout the interviews with Frank I was struck by his 
use of the terms “mean” and “not nice” to describe people and situations of appalling 
violence.  Those terms have specific import to Frank. 
Stop you’re going to hurt yourself   
Frank knew that the abusive violence used by the Americans would cost them 
dearly.  He tried to prevent this harm, and his fears have been borne out.  He also 
views this as impossible to prevent. 
Even as Frank’s unit was obtaining impressive results in destroying insurgent 
infrastructure networks, he had real concerns about the effects the abusive violence 
was having on his comrades.  We talked about what that was like: 
Q: Now…in one of the conversations we’ve had, you mentioned that at 
the time, you observed other people doing things that were, and this isn’t the 
term used, but I—it’s what I got out of it, that was more extreme or brutal, 
that you said that you were thinking that you could have—thinking about your 
colleagues that “you’re going to have a hard time with that later.” 
A: Yeah. 
Q: Did you ever express that to them? 
A: Oh yeah. 
Q: In what ways? 
A: I was kind of like a spiritual leader in our platoon and I kind of like held 
people accountable to things too.  
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Q: So? 
A: I would say it just like that. I’d be like, “Man, like you might, you know, 
be careful…” and I really wouldn’t say it in the fact of like… “stop, you’re going 
to hurt that guy…” it was more of like a “stop, you’re going to hurt yourself…” 
type of thing and it was  usually back in the tent, you know, and we’re going 
over stuff and I’m like, “Man, I know you get pissed off and frustrated, but 
dude…” you know. And they’d be like, “I know, I know…” you know, ah, yeah, I 
would—I mentioned it a few times…not too many though, because I’m not one 
to harp on people. 
Frank went home and eventually left the military.  He found that his 
predictions for his friends who were more abusive were borne out: 
Q: Did any of the guys who engaged in the behavior that you were 
concerned with was going to be ultimately hurtful to them--did any of them 
have problems with it later? 
A: Oh yeah, absolutely…to a tee. 
Q: How did you know that? 
A: They tell me, they talk to me. They call me at two in the morning about 
their soul not being in order. They get divorces, they go to jail, they do 
drugs…they have a bad life, they’re very guilty, they have post-traumatic stress 
disorder and are disabled by it. 
I asked Frank whether the abusive violence, and its associated problems for his 
friends, were avoidable.  He answered by describing the men he served with: 
A: They will act like that, and that to me is already a problem; there’s 
already a problem there, so no, it’s not avoidable. If they are placed in that 
situation, it is not avoidable, because they would have issues with other 
instances as well, I believe. I just think that that guilt makes it a lot worse, 
because you have no one else to blame it on, you know; you could deal with 
your friend dying better than you could deal with self, you know, persecution. 
“Oooooh, I really wasn’t very nice…” “I shouldn’t have done that…” And I don’t 
know if that’s a fair answer, and all you have to do is provide one exception to 
refute the entire generalized statement, but that’s how I feel about those 
specific instances. 
Q: Well, and that’s what I’m asking. 
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A: Yeah. 
Q: I’m trying to get… 
A: Yeah. 
Q: …what…how you frame what not only you did or didn’t do, but the 
effect that it had on you and others, your friends.  Is there…and again, if you, 
do you have any thoughts about any ways that the organization can protect 
their people from exposing themselves to that kind of situation? 
A: Um…no, like I said, you would just have to do such an incredible 
amount of like…analysis on their psychology or psychosis to isolate the 
individuals that’d be prone to that sort of behavior, and that is the only way 
that it can be done, I think, and because making them stop, like you [referring 
to interviewer] making them stop, like you could not have walked up to this 
man and made him stop what he was doing. He’s a big guy and he’s really 
pissed, and if you try to tell him to stop, he’ll probably get pissed at you. I 
mean, it’s not, you’re not going to stop it, and not only are you not going to 
stop it, it’s not that bad. Like you should see what happens to us, it really isn’t 
that bad. Ah… 
Q: But it’s bothering them now. 
A: Yeah, absolutely…absolutely, no, you can’t stop it, and that’s --but you 
can stop it, but it…we don’t have the time and resources to, or the individual 
talent to only have people there that are going to, you know, act like, exactly 
like we’d want ‘em to, and some people that are really good at the things that 
we were good at, are just pre-disposed to that sort of behavior. 
Q: Uh-huh. 
A: It’s just kind of how it is. For whatever reason they wanted to travel 
halfway across the world for the possibility of shooting someone, I mean…that 
kind of person might like to be mean to people every now and then. That’s 
just—you can’t control it or stop it. 
So for Frank, the need to have special operations soldiers willing to undertake 
extremely hazardous missions naturally creates a force that includes persons pre-
disposed to extreme violence.  Such men, trained to a razor’s edge of combat lethality, 
simply cannot be restrained if they lose control of themselves.  Frank’s view accepts 
the fact of, and costs of, abusive violence, to both the abuser and the abused, as 
inseparable realities of war.   
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Just don’t say anything   
Chris described the reasons why the unity of the squad would have been 
threatened by any member objecting to the abuse.  His comments dovetail with what 
Frank had to say about the attitude of abusers who might be challenged in the midst 
of abuse. 
Chris was asked about those within the unit who did not participate in abusive 
violence.  He shared his thoughts about them and what his reaction would have been 
if they had intervened: 
A: There’s, yeah, there’s a few that never took part. They watched 
and…from my point of view, that’s taking just as much part as the people that 
are actually doing it. 
Q: Did anybody say, “This is crazy shit, we shouldn’t be doing this, guys?” 
A: No, they just kept their mouth shut. ‘Cause usually your anger transfers 
from one object to the next. 
Q: Hmm… 
A: Just ‘cause you’re on my side and you’re telling me not to do somethin’, 
doesn’t mean I won’t kick your ass later. 
Q: Hmm… 
A: In order for us to stay, you know, “good,” and being able to operate as 
a team, I need to be able to trust that you got my back, and if you’re gonna 
start questioning what I do, then well that’s telling me you don’t got my back.  
So it kinda just, either you can stay and watch, join in or walk away, just don’t 
say anything. 
Chris’ entire mission focus has devolved to the survival of his comrades.  His 
thinking is saturated with a sense of inter-personal loyalty that knows no bounds of 
effort or decency.  His comments here suggest that anyone who is “telling me you 
don’t got my back,” is in danger of becoming part of the out-group that is dispensable, 
or worse.  For soldiers who will kill for convenience, it takes little imagination as a non-
participatory observer to know what “your anger transfers from one object to the 
next,” might mean. 
Bottling it up and holding it in  
Chris and Frank: Themes and Reflections  203 
 
 
 
Chris’ comments describe problems that abusive violence participation 
brought forth which also fit well with Frank’s description of his comrades woes.  His 
account encompasses two generations of soldiers being devastated by their 
experiences and finding the help they needed to be saved from the worst. 
Chris went home with his battalion.  During the deployment his attitude 
toward his command had soured and he became a rebellious malcontent.  Back in 
garrison he and his friends found themselves with little to do but drink very heavily.  
Chris became an angry discipline problem for the unit and he separated from the 
military a few months after leaving Iraq. 
Chris visited his father and in their time together they found the ability to 
confide in one another, something each needed.  Chris described the first time they 
discussed abusive violence: 
Q: And how did it come out? 
A: Um…he started telling me about the things that he did when he was in 
Viet Nam. 
Q: Was that the first time he ever spoke to you about Viet Nam? 
A: He—he’s told me that he’s done bad things.  But that was the first time 
he actually opened up and. . . .  
Q: Uh-huh, so when he opened up to you, where were you? 
A: Um…we were in the car; we were just driving.  I can’t remember to 
where, I just remember we were driving. 
Q: And what sorts of things did he tell you about? 
A: Treatment of the indigenous population of Viet Nam…in Cambodia and 
uh, other areas along the Ho Chi Minh trail. 
Q: And um…how did you feel when he started talking about that? 
A: That…no matter what I said to my dad that he would understand. 
Q: And how did that make you feel? 
A: Alright… (pause)…I mean…—it felt good to have somebody outside of 
my unit, but inside my family that I could talk to.  I—there was really nobody 
else that I could. 
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Q: So your dad talked about the things that he had done.  What did you 
say? 
A: I told him about the things that I did. 
Q: And how did he respond to that? 
A: “You did what you had to do…nothing more, nothing less.”  He would 
say, “Your will to survive was stronger than theirs.” 
Q: And how did you feel when he said that? 
A: That that was some form of justification for the things that I did. 
Q: And you accepted that? 
A: Yeah. 
Chris’ conversations with his father continued.  Chris found them helpful as he 
was evidencing emotional problems: 
Q: And what would those conversations be like? 
A: Um… (pause)…lifting; it’s the only word I could think of. 
Q: Lifting what? 
A: It felt like it being lifted off my shoulders ah...I wouldn’t, didn’t, hafta 
carry it around all the time.  
Q: (Pause) If you didn’t have…when you—when you talk about carrying it 
around, what was that like? 
A: It was hard, um…after I got out [of the military] I was—I became very 
closed off; I didn’t really talk to a lot of people. Um, I was described as being 
extremely rough around the edges because I was direct and to the point, and 
I—I didn’t act like everybody else…even had…random outbursts of anger and 
violence. 
Q: When you had these outbursts, did you know where they were coming 
from? 
A: From in me.  It was just me holding it inside and it’s just boiling. 
Q: When you say “holding it inside” what—what things were you…? 
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A: I was, was a very angry person, in myself, at the world, at the military at 
the time.  Um, they threw me away, they didn’t offer to get me help.  Um…I 
was just very angry and I didn’t care where it went. 
While Chris found the conversations beneficial for him, he thought they were 
problematic for his father: 
Q: When you and your dad would talk, did—did he…tell you what to 
expect based on his own experience of coming back? 
A: It wasn’t really until I came back that my dad started to go get help.  
When I…was talking to him about my problems, it—it kinda—he had been 
bottling it up and holding it in for so long without anybody to talk to that when 
it started coming out, it kinda…I don’t know how to put it, it kinda made things 
worse for him and I sort of feel that it’s my fault. 
Chris’ father seriously contemplated suicide to the extent of making 
preparations to complete the act.  Chris learned of this and persuaded his father to 
abandon the attempt.  Chris’ father eventually admitted himself into a hospital and 
received help for previously undiagnosed PTSD stemming from his Viet Nam service. 
Keep me in and the world out   
Chris’ own moment of crisis nearly overwhelmed him.  Anger, contemplated 
violence, and alcohol abuse accompanied his spiral.  He made himself a prisoner to 
avoid acting on his urges: 
Q: When he did that, when he went and got help, um…did you compare 
that in any way to your situation? 
A: Um…no, I didn’t really give it much thought until um…I had a…my own 
incident where I suddenly just stopped caring and I had the extreme urge of 
going out and just…hurting people for no reason.  I just had a complete mental 
break.  Um… 
Q: So what did you do? 
A: I had managed to barricade myself in my own room. 
Q: And what were you trying to keep in or keep out? 
A: I was trying to keep me in and the world out. 
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Chris eventually confided his feelings to someone.  His family learned of his 
condition and intervened, moving him back home.  A condition of his being able to 
return was that he would seek professional medical help, something he knew was 
necessary: 
I mean, yeah, I knew I had issues ‘cause I would pass out drunk in a chair with a 
loaded .45 in one hand and a bottle of liquor in the other and that scared my 
friends that would be around me.  I lived with two friends…and they—they 
were constantly scared that they were gonna find me in the morning with a 
bullet hole in the back of my head. 
Chris has found that going to frequent sessions at the Vet Center is very 
helpful.  Other than the other vets there, his father, and me, Chris has not been able 
to confide in his wife or other family about his abusive violence experiences because 
he fears lowering their opinion of him. 
Compassion and humanity   
Frank’s views of humanity, both in terms of the species and “being humane,” 
strongly influence his sense-making of the war and abusive violence.  Humans can be 
brutal, but for Frank humanity is a quality that recognizes and respects the dignity in 
others.   
Frank mentioned that the “humanity” in the platoon changed during the 
deployment.  He told two stories to illustrate.  In the first incident, from early in the 
deployment, he entered a room to find a man moving toward a gun.  Frank described 
how his time in Iraq affected his judgment of the event: 
And I ran over there and kicked him in the side rather than shooting and killing 
him, and toward the end of our deployment, that level of compassion and 
humanity had  significantly decreased, ah you know, I would not have ever 
taken that extra effort to not kill him. 
 
In contrast, Frank offered another example from late in the deployment: 
Q: You mentioned that there was a third instance in which people who 
were detained ended up dead with your unit, in this case, shot. What can you 
tell me about that? 
A: Well ah, that was really quick too; it went down really quick. Ah, this 
guy actually came out of his room, ah…and he had a rifle, but, you know, his 
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hands were like up over his head like this... and I don’t know what your 
definition of a detainee is, but to me, at that point, he’s detained. You know, I 
mean I don’t have absolute 100% control over him, ah… 
Q: Was it your opinion he had, he was submitting at that point? 
A: Oh, absolutely and ah-then he got shot and killed.  Right then. 
Q: And did the shooter say why? 
A: Because he could. 
Q: Is that what he said? 
A: Well no, but that’s why he did it. This guy had a gun and, you know, 
he’s going to die and there’s going to be a gun right next to ‘im, I mean, and 
that speaks to the deterioration of compassion that I referenced earlier. 
Interestingly, Frank saw the rising lethality of the unit as some measure of 
diminishing humanity within the Americans.  He did not attribute the change to a view 
of the Iraqis becoming lesser-than humans.  This contrasts strongly with the thinking 
of Chris and several of the other soldiers whose abusiveness increased as they started 
to see Iraqis as animals.  This is not to say that Frank necessarily views all humans at 
an elevated level; rather, he sees all humans at being at an animal level.  Some are 
privileged to avoid the full reality of that situation.  Here he discussed whether he 
expected the brutal tactics that Ted was reputed to use: 
A: Hmmm, yeah, I did, because I—you know, I was lucky enough to deploy 
later on in my military career. Well, I had already traveled enough to 
understand that not everybody thinks like I do, and people in other parts of the 
world are forced to be more real, and not that I consider those tactics to be ah, 
not that I agree with them or anything like that, but there are more of primal 
nature and human beings are animals and we’re afforded the opportunity to 
not have to act that way. We’re afforded the opportunity to use only our 
higher level thinking whereas most of the entire planet lives in a world where 
they have to act like animals to survive. So no, it didn’t surprise me, because I 
really know how people act and people resort to the most heinous things you 
could ever imagine. I was a little taken back, I wasn’t really surprised. 
Frank’s sense-making of the sometimes brutish nature of human existence 
does not eclipse his essentially respectful view of humanity.  Perhaps that is a clue to 
why he criticizes himself for being “mean” in a relatively minor act.  His sense for the 
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dignity of his enemies, and for himself, came out when he spoke about close friends 
who wanted to know about combat: 
Q: And were you open or hesitant? 
A: Ah…I’d say hesitant. 
Q: With those folks, why were you hesitant? 
A: Because a lot of it is just, you know, it’s just not good and, you know, as 
far as people wanting to know about killing people, you know, I—I…I had a lot 
of respect for the fact that they’re humans, and I think it’s very disrespectful to 
tell a story about killing someone; it’s just not…right, I mean, they were—you 
know, it’s just, the incident’s over, and you should give them respect, not 
them, and you should respect yourself enough to not have that be one of the 
things that you involve yourself in, is talking about doing very, very mean 
things to people and killing someone is the very meanest thing you can do to 
somebody, so I guess that’s why—it’s just, it’s just not something I want to be 
involved in. 
Everything is a contradiction   
Chris’ present views on the abusive violence he and his squad perpetrated are 
a tangle of confusion born of feelings of justification, personal disconnectedness, and 
guilt. 
I asked Chris what he wanted to be understood about the abusive violence: 
(Pause) It’s not necessary…but at the same time, when you’re there and when 
it’s happening, you feel that it is. That you aren’t completely yourself when 
you’re doing it.  It’s kind of…happening and you don’t have any real control 
about it.  
I asked Chris whether he was speaking directly about the abuse that he and his 
unit had actually committed, when he said “it’s not necessary:” 
Yeah, when we were taking them back to base, we didn’t have to degrade ‘em 
the way we did. We didn’t have to beat them, we didn’t have to put our 
cigarettes out on ‘em, we didn’t have to cut ‘em with knives.  We didn’t have 
to kill some of ‘em just because we didn’t want to deal with paper work.  I 
mean it…that’s not necessary, but, you know, when you’re there and you’re 
actually doing it and you’re angry and…you don’t care, you feel that it is, and I 
know it’s a complete contradiction and statement, but that’s how it really is.  
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Everything you do is a contradiction; you’re taught your entire life that killing 
another person’s bad.  But yet, you join up, you go over there and you kill 
people. It’s a contradiction and that’s really what life is, it’s just…a bunch of 
contradictions.  You’re told not to do this, but then you’re told to.  It’s…it’s just 
situations that we’re in and how we act in those situations. 
While Chris describes a confused feeling that the gratuitous abuse was 
unnecessary, other answers indicate that the instrumental abuse, what the command 
countenanced, is another matter: 
Q: How do you view some of the things that you did in Iraq now? 
A: Just doing what I was paid to do, following orders. 
And: 
Q: When you look at the abusive violence that you participated in, what 
did that do to you? 
A: (Heavy sigh) It…it wasn’t what I signed up for, but it was part of my job. 
Or at least that’s how I viewed it.  That’s the only thing that came from it; it’s 
just another day at work. 
This is not to indicate that Chris merely shrugs off his behavior.  He does think 
about the de-humanization and degradation: 
 Q: When you look back on your experiences in Iraq, what do you consider 
the worst experiences to have been? 
A: My worst experience?…losing my friends. 
Q: (Pause) And what other things were really bad, when you think about 
Iraq? 
A: Then a close second is how I treated the people…how I thought of them 
as being more of animals than actual human beings. 
The hallowed crucible  
Frank’s sense of the war, and his own experiences and insights gained from 
being in it, are strongly bound up with a view that he was granted the priceless 
opportunity to see humanity with a clarity not often otherwise occasioned.   
I asked Frank what he had learned about human nature: 
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Ah, war is insane, because it makes people literally resort to their true nature, I 
mean, you walk around here, people are fake, these are not real human 
beings, I mean, yeah, they are, I’m not trying to get too philosophical or 
anything crazy like that, but real life, keeping it real, I mean…like honest to 
God, like that’s how human beings really act right there placed under primal 
conditions, you know, you really just get to see, you know, how people are, 
how they really, really, really are, what they truly deem to be important and 
what they are willing to do to keep themselves alive, and you know, what they 
may not be willing to do to keep themselves alive or…or help someone else or 
not help someone else or…just things like that. There’s just a lot of questions 
that cannot, otherwise be answered unless you’re in a true crucible that 
presents the opportunities to, you know, you’re in an atmosphere, an 
environment that can, you know, produce these questions, and they give you 
an opportunity to—to—to respond to this stimulus, and by you, I mean 
humans. 
When Frank went home there were things about his experiences that he felt 
could not, or should not, be shared.  The elevated human experience that other study 
participants had hoped for was certainly prominent for Frank, but was not overlaid 
with the same regret or shame mentioned by some: 
Q: When you got home and, and you…left active duty, um…were you able 
to share many of your experiences with non-veterans? 
A: No. 
Q: Why? 
A: Um, they’re just very personal experiences and in a lot of ways, I just 
kind of feel like, if you want to know what it’s like, then go do it.  Like I had to 
go through a lot to get those experiences, and I know that people want to 
know things and I guess I should have more of a sense of empathy in providing, 
you know, some sort of insight into those situations, but at the same time I 
look at them as almost like, like a hallowed revered, I mean it’s like I’ve done 
something that not many people get to do and, and if you really want to know 
what it’s like then go do it. That’s—that’s kind of, I guess that’s one reason, 
two, and I just don’t think they’ll relate, ah, three, I ah, I just don’t know that I 
could articulate it in a manner that would provide the explanation that I want 
them to have and not, you know, have them develop their own idea based on 
what I say, ah… 
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Not conducive to building your soul   
As valuable as war and its experiences are to Frank, he took from them all he 
needed.  He sought other things for himself, and saw that remaining a soldier would 
no longer serve. 
I asked Frank about his peacetime aspirations: 
Q: You also said that you got out to be the kind of person that you wanted 
to be. 
A: Yeah. 
Q: What was that? 
A: I just want to be a wholesome all-around good person; I want to be an 
active person, I want to be a husband, a loving husband, I want to married for 
a long time, I want to have a good job, I want to be a—I have this strong sense 
of civic responsibility; I’ve served my community in one form or fashion in my 
entire adult life. Even with my job now and all my previous jobs, um…I want 
my kids to think I’m a good dad; I want to, you know, I just want to be a good 
well-rounded person who’s at one, not at one, but at peace with myself. 
Q: You said that that lifestyle, the military lifestyle, I don’t know whether 
you meant that in general or the special operation lifestyle? 
A: I suppose I meant my job in particular.  
Q: Was not conducive to building your soul? 
A: No, not at all. 
Q: What—what… 
A: Well, it’s just not nice to do that, and I mean, yeah, it is awesome, and 
to me it is like the ultimate test of what it is to, you know, to be…and to live, 
and to stay alive, ah…but you know, you just can’t devote yourself to killing 
other people and still foster other parts of your nature that are more pleasant 
and by doing that job that, literally was my job, was to kill other people, and 
that is, that’s just not nice. I mean…it just isn’t. 
Q: You mention that several times yesterday that you saw the decline in 
the humanity of your [unit]… 
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A: Yeah, I really did, and I paid close attention to things like that. I was an 
observer as much as a participant. 
Q: Did you feel that corrosive influence on yourself too? 
A: Absolutely. 
Q: How did you feel about that? 
A: Oh I knew it wasn’t good, and I knew I couldn’t continue to do it, if I 
wanted to become the person that I wanted to be. 
Frank’s ability to be observer and participant produced both a restraint that 
prevented him from engaging in the most sadistic abuse and a detachment which 
allowed him to value the lessons he had enlisted to learn.  Chief among those lessons 
was the need to leave the ultimate experience of war behind in order to explore the 
life experiences of love, marriage, fatherhood, civic involvement and peace. 
It’s what I did   
Chris’ post-deployment reflections on himself as the perpetrator of abusive 
violence once required a denial of responsibility.  His present sense is different. 
Chris shared his thoughts about the abusive violence from when he was freshly 
returned home from the war zone: 
Q: Now…when you got back during that month or so before you were able 
to take significant leave, did—did you reflect on the abusive violence that you 
observed and participated in? 
A: I ah…I kept telling myself it was somebody else, it wasn’t me.  And for a 
while it worked…I just kept believing that it was somebody else that did it. 
Q: What did you think of that other person? 
A: (Pause) I…thought that they were a monster.  (Pause) That that person 
had no place back in the States.  I had no place back in the States. 
Here, Chris views the abusive self as the non-human, undeserving of the way 
of life in America, the same America whose prior generations’ war sacrifices had 
fascinated and perplexed Chris before he enlisted.  As hopeless as that assessment 
sounds, one should remember that Chris was describing his self-view of several years 
earlier, before his “mental break” and counseling with other veterans.  His current 
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sense may best be revealed when I asked him at the end of our first session about his 
Personal Calm Score: 
Q: How—how are you feeling right now on a scale of one to 10, between 
entirely calm and entirely uneasy? 
A: Hmm…about a seven or an eight.  It’s not something that I’m proud of; 
but it’s what I did and I have to live with it. 
While this was one of the highest scores reported by any of the participants, 
and thereby indicates the distress that his war recollections can still trigger, Chris has 
put his experiences within a perspective that indicates that he no longer distances 
himself from responsibility for the abuse and he accepts that it is a burden he will 
have to bear.  Implicit in such a sentiment is the orientation of a present self that 
recognizes a prospective future, not trapped by the past, but nonetheless marked by 
it.  As with Frank, Chris’ becoming a husband and father offers an identity other than 
the one he imprinted upon himself while a child sitting in his father’s uniform. 
Shared Themes 
During the interviews with Chris and Frank, several themes appeared to be 
salient in each of their sense-making of the events experienced in Iraq.   
Good violence versus bad violence   
Both Frank and Chris find justification for instrumental abusive violence in 
terms of their requirement to obtain information.  When Frank discusses slamming a 
detainee’s head into a door he emphasizes that “I personally needed him to open that 
door, and I knew no amount of talking to him was going to get him to do it.”  Chris 
similarly felt that although he had not enlisted expecting to abuse people, “it was part 
of my job.”  This justification allows them to separate violence that was necessary up 
to the point that it served valid military objectives from what is “mean” or 
“unnecessary” violence.  
It is interesting to note that neither soldier’s units were primarily intelligence 
gathering forces; they were nevertheless commissioned to seek out information and 
were freed to devise their own methods.  This factor underscores a possible sub-
theme of “command authority” for the abuse.  To Chris, this is a salient consideration 
as he recalls the abusive violence.  The term “by any means necessary” and the 
repeated instructions to keep silent about abuse, cast some of the abuse as an 
unpleasant but accepted reality of war.  Frank did not discuss explicit command 
authorization; however, he only once mentioned the need to hide information about 
abuse.  That was in the context of an inquiry relating to the deaths of detainees killed 
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in the aftermath of an ambush in which the unit suffered injuries and death.  
Otherwise, his description of being in the field with officers did not include any 
mention of having to hide the abuse from them.  Indeed, command authority is 
implicit in his unit’s practice of studied absence from the sessions where it was 
expected that Ted would torture prisoners. 
Objecting as Hazardous   
Both men shared the view that all unit members were expected to be complicit 
in the abusive violence through their silence.  To do otherwise would have hazarded 
angry backlash from those unit members willing to be most abusive.  Frank found a 
path into raising the question of reducing the level of angry abuse by not criticizing the 
actions on ethical grounds but instead by voicing concern for his comrade’s well-
being. 
Abusive Violence Hurts the Abuser   
These two accounts certainly convey the sense held by both Chris and Frank 
that abuse injures the soldiers who enact it.  Frank’s comrades with disordered souls, 
Chris’ father’s near suicide almost thirty years after the abuse, and Chris’ own slide in 
the direction of self-terrifying violence certainly illustrate the importance of this sense 
of damage.  Additionally, Frank’s awareness that continuing to be associated with the 
special operations’ violent milieu would strangle his hopes for fulfillment offers 
poignant proof that this theme is important to him. 
Frank’s Themes 
Human Dignity, Humanity, and the Human Animal   
Frank reveals a complex view of humans and the relationship between cruelty, 
fear, survival instinct, and dignity vis a vis abusive violence.  The “real” existence of the 
mass of humanity sits at the animal levels of primal survival, aggression, submission 
and survival.  The few are privileged to exist in a world governed by higher-order 
sensibilities and an excursion into the world of those who “keep it real” is a signal 
experience for the worthies willing to make the trip.  In the end, self-respect demands 
that one treat the experience with reverence and accord the enemy one kills with the 
dignity they deserve as human beings. 
Abuse Properly Applied Works   
Frank was adamant that a full understanding of human nature, and the will to 
survive, exposes the simple truth that putting a prisoner in genuine fear for his life will 
result in truthful information.  “Always.  Every time.”   He disdains the clinical 
approaches of the normal military interrogator and, ever mission-oriented, advocates 
immediate abuse before detainees are officially processed.   
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Chris’ Theme 
The glamour of absolute supremacy   
Chris’s expression of the “unique and wonderful feeling,” of holding the fate of 
a human being in his hands, is a powerful sense of the experience for him.  After the 
extended torture and killing of the older man, Chris’ unit carried on with torturing by 
waterboarding other captured insurgents and watching the life leave them, without 
any desire to obtain intelligence.  Such fascination with ultimate control was present 
in the crazed scene of prisoner mutilation in the wake of the rescue mission combat.  
It is also there when Chris, referring to the unit’s habituation to torture, utters, “Just 
because we could. There’s nothing that they could do about it.” 
These two chapters contain many of the most frank, and frankly most difficult 
to consider, accounts of abusive violence received in this study.  The two men whose 
sense-making I have tried to make sense of appear to have entered their combat lives 
willing to be a part of abusive violence.  While they were there, they took part in, and 
did not change their outlook on, the routine practice.  Afterward, Chris came to a 
differing sense about some of the worst abuse, while Frank’s views remained largely 
unchanged throughout and afterward. 
In the next chapter I will present the account of a soldier whose experiences 
moved him along a journey that began with hatred, traveled through routine and 
murderous abuse, and by three transformative experiences, delivered him to mental 
and authoritative positions which compelled him to be the savior of Iraqis and the 
men he led.  The journey’s end is not yet in view as the former soldier’s present life is 
overshadowed by anger, debilitating flashbacks, and a pervading sense forlorn of 
hope. 
Richard Miller  216 
Chapter 7. Richard Miller 
In this chapter, the experiences of one soldier, Richard Miller, will be 
considered.  His sense-making of those experiences, both at the time they occurred 
and later, allows us to approach an understanding of the way he saw his personal 
motivations for enlisting in the military, and all of the events that occurred as a result 
of that decision.   His story shares many features in common with the soldiers 
described in the last three chapters in terms of theme and events; however, the 
manner in which some of those experiences are now framed is of course the product 
of his individual journey.   
Miller’s experiences demonstrate the fullest transformation from hateful 
abuser to staunch abuse objector among the fourteen participants.  Miller began his 
journey into uniform full of hate for Muslims, and zeal to protect America and punish 
her enemies.  He, like Chris Alexander, was assigned to an infantry squad that was 
headed by a veteran soldier whose prior combat deployments had engendered 
callousness toward abusive violence.  In Miller’s case, the squad leader’s attitude 
toward the Iraqi populace was one of hate, vengefulness, and brutal domination.  The 
squad operated in a platoon whose leadership countenanced and encouraged the 
harshest levels of abuse.  Whereas Chris Alexander’s squad-level acceptance of abuse, 
coupled with a generally permissive battalion policy toward violence, was still 
moderated by mid-level NCO attempts to enforce professional norms of behavior, 
Richard Miller existed in a situation where his immediate chain of command 
presented no deterrents to the soldiers putting extreme abusive measures into action.  
Chris’ squad may have casually abused captured insurgents and used atrocious 
measures to extract intelligence, but Richard Miller’s account describes his squad 
openly terrorizing the population through street beatings, murders in the field, 
creation of a torture dungeon, and a COIN policy that relied on terrorizing the 
population rather than trying to win support. 
Miller’s account can be viewed as an example of abusive violence allowed to 
flourish in as permissive or encouraging an environment as likely to be seen for 
military forces of a liberal democracy.  Under authoritarian or totalitarian regimes that 
created official torture and extermination organizations there may have been 
circumstances that would have allowed soldiers even greater freedom to maim and 
murder; however, for early twenty-first century western democracies, I cannot 
envision wider latitude of action than available to Miller’s squad.  Even within the 
confines of the American prisons of Guantanamo or Abu Ghraib there did not seem to 
be the limitless opportunities for abuse.  
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As a case, therefor, Miller would seem to represent a chance to see the zenith 
of American abusive violence in CT and COIN; and yet, we observe a man primed by 
his 9/11-inspired hatred against Muslims, groomed by a murderous squad leader to 
enact brutality, torture, and murder to the point of near insanity, coming to command 
the same squad of willing abusers, who deliberately elects to forswear abuse and to 
lead his men away from the dangers that atrocity represents for them and their 
victims.  Even as Miller’s abuse is monstrously greater than others in the study, his 
despair in its aftermath is more profound as well.  It is for these reasons, the 
similarities and singularities, that Miller’s experiences are accorded the treatment of a 
separate chapter. 
Pre-deployment 
Miller came from a family that included military veterans.  His father, brothers 
and uncles served in the military, some seeing combat in Viet Nam.  As noted in 
Chapter 2, Miller’s decision to enlist was motivated by the 9/11 attacks.  He described 
his choice: 
A: I came from a mostly military family, so…a decision like that wasn’t 
frowned upon, it was very much deemed as, as a good deed, something that 
you should do anyways, not just because of September 11. I had a good job 
and, and…I had a family and everything and so I never even really considered 
joining the military until September 11. 
Q: How soon after September 11 did you decide that you were going to 
enlist? 
A: Almost immediately; unfortunately, I had an injury that I had to wait 
until I was better before I could go into the military, so…I think I enlisted first 
part of 2002. 
Miller’s reactions to the attacks went beyond a sense of patriotic obligation; it 
extended to hatred and harassment. 
Q: So you were a civilian on September 11? 
A: Right. 
Q: What were your feelings then? 
A: I was angry; I…I thought how can anybody do this to us, we’re 
Americans, and…somebody definitely had a death wish to do this to us, 
ah…and I immediately, almost immediately the stories came out it was from 
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Muslim terrorists, and you know, I hated Muslims; I started walking around 
Wal Mart and stuff going after Muslims, um… 
Q: In what way? 
A: I would follow them to see what they were doing, and I would call them 
names, ah basically call ‘em out in public, and families, Muslim families 
walking, you know, in Wal Mart or at a grocery store, just anywhere. I would 
ah, kind of hunt them down thinking that they were all out to get us.  Ah…it 
was, because everything that was on mainstream media was coming out that it 
was, you know, Muslims are out to attack us. 
Q: Were your views, at that time, supported by people around you? 
A: Absolutely. I think…almost everybody in the nation was pretty much 
terrified of, of these Muslim terrorist and “what’s next,” you know? I think, 
well for myself, and many people I knew, you know, if we didn’t protect our 
families, then nobody would, and these Muslims were going to somehow 
miraculously appear in our living room and kill our families and so my whole 
thought process was getting to them before they could get to me. 
Miller enlisted with a desire to undergo special operations training and 
assignment to an elite unit.  He served an initial enlistment in a non-combat role, 
followed by a transfer to the kind of training and unit he had always wanted. 
Miller’s view of all Muslims as “terrorists” wishing to “kill our families,” did not 
rely on military indoctrination to create a dehumanized view of the people of Iraq.  
The military training only served to reinforce his existing opinion.  Miller described the 
racism included in his initial military training: 
A: I was already somewhat racist towards Muslims, but the way that 
everything was, “Kill, kill, kill the Muslims…” and “I went to the market where 
all the Hajis shop and pulled out a machine gun, or pull out a machete, and I 
begin to chop,” stuff like that, stuff we chanted and marched to was pretty 
horrific. Talked about crunching babies, Muslim babies under our boots and. 
Q: Did they use the term Muslim, what was the term? 
A: Haji, the-the term was Haji, and Haji was used in the same way that, I 
guess, you would have used Gook in Viet Nam, and even though the word Haj, 
to Muslim men is-is a compliment. Call him a Haji he’s been, made the voyage 
the Haj, they’ve taken the Haj to Mecca and…but ah, the, you know, stuff like, 
“What do you, Haji babies and dreams have in common?  We both crush both 
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of them under our boots,” stuff like that.  You know, and, and a big part of me 
was like, “Okay, this is just [deleted] training; this is just, you know, they’re 
trying to get you to,to…” I was quite a bit older than most of the recruits, so, 
and…I was putting it in my head, “Okay, they’re just trying to get these kids to 
understand the seriousness of-of the ah-of what’s going on overseas with 
Muslims” and stuff like that. 
The seriousness of an active war-zone, and the strategy to be used to survive 
there, were brought home to Miller when he was assigned to his special operations 
unit.  As with Chris Alexander, Miller was a combat virgin coming under the control of 
a squad leader with experiences of heavy combat that formed the agenda for the first 
half of the deployment: 
Q: In your squad, had any of the soldiers. . . .  been deployed to combat 
before? 
A: Just my squad leader. 
Q: And what did his experiences consist of? 
A: He’d been wounded three times. 
Q: Where? 
[ ] 
A: Iraq; each time he had been wounded he-he received three purple 
hearts on three different deployments to Iraq, and ah…he hated, hated, hated, 
hated the Iraqis, knew that we were going to be going back to Iraq, so…um, 
gave him, I guess, you could say, an opportunity to exact some revenge. 
In describing his expectations about detainees,  Richard brought up a skewed 
phrase also distorted by Chris Alexander’s unit.  It clearly showed Richard and his 
unit’s orientation toward combat captures: 
Q: What sort of expectations did you have before you went, about any 
interactions you might have had with any future detainees? 
A: Um…I didn’t rely have any thoughts of detainees, and I didn’t even 
really think of us taking anybody prisoner to begin with, you know? We’re in a 
fire fight, we shoot to kill, and…screw enemy, you know, screw taking 
prisoners, and… 
Q: Were there any, was there any training on prisoner control? 
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A: No none. I mean, it—it was stuff like, how to clear bodies when walking 
up on a body and to make sure they’re not…they’re alive or dead. You put two 
in, you know, two in the heart and one in the mind. That was—every time we 
were told, “the hearts and minds” and that’s the first thing that came to your 
head, was two in the heart, one in the mind or fire two rounds in the heart, 
one in the brain. Whenever we were told, “We’re going to go over and win the 
hearts and minds…” that’s kind of what was implanted into our head. 
The battalion’s vision of its deployment was shaped by the battalion 
commander’s assurances to the men that they would not be put on route security or 
policing duties.  According to Miller, “our battalion commander kept stating, ‘Don’t 
worry, don’t worry; I’m going to give you every chance you got to shoot mother 
fuckers in the face.’”  For Miller, this was a welcome message. 
Richard described his thoughts once he knew that his battalion was going to be 
deployed to Iraq: 
Q: How did you feel about that? 
A: Was excited. I wanted to do it; I was ready, this [is] what I’d been 
training for. This is what I wanted to do and a lot of people asked me, “Weren’t 
you afraid of dying?”  “No, I’m not afraid of dying, you know...I’ve got God on 
my shoulders… and we’re doing the right thing; we’re doing great things for 
God and country…” and I believed all the propaganda all the way up until that 
point. I knew that…you know, Saddam Hussein and the people of Iraq had 
everything to do with the attack on 9/11, as --everybody in Afghanistan and 
everybody in Libya and Iran and Saudi Arabia, they had a hand in it, so.  
Richard was poised to enter Iraq some years into the occupation; the warm 
and welcoming emotions toward Americans had long soured.  His hatred of Muslims, 
sense of just retribution for 9/11, and the messaging of American culture and media in 
general coupled with that of the military training and his squad leader’s personal 
virulent outlook combined to make Miller a fearful instrument of abusive violence 
directed at the Iraqi people. 
Abusive Violence in Iraq 
The entire population was terrorists 
In Iraq, as reported by other study participants, Richard and his comrades saw 
all the people of Iraq as threats.  He explained how this viewpoint arose after being 
asked about his unit, contrary to expectations, having prisoners to handle: 
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A: Yeah, almost immediately we started dealing with detainees. 
Q: And…in your mind what kinds of people were going to be—becoming 
detainees? 
A: In my mind it was terrorists; we were dealing with terrorists altogether 
and we were told that the entire population was terrorists, and there were no 
innocent people there. The minute you thought somebody was innocent, they 
were going to throw a bomb your way or—or shoot you, so. 
Q: Who was providing you with that understanding, who was saying these 
things? 
A: Ah…battalion commander to…our company commander and company 
first sergeant.  All the—the entire line all the way down was all the way down 
to the lowly private. 
Miller described the unit’s general treatment of the community as an attempt 
to “out terrorize the terrorists.”  It became quite common for the unit to beat people 
on the street for little reason beyond the perception that any failure to instantly 
comply with the Americans’ commands signified Iraqi defiance.   
To disrespect their religion and their people 
Miller mentioned that the unit was involved in raids and routine searches of 
Iraqi homes.  Threats and humiliation were commonly used.  Miller described the 
ways in which terror was delivered to the homes of the population, when I asked him 
about using threats to motivate suspects to talk when captured in their homes: 
A: Quite often. I mean we’d threaten to rape their women; we’d make the 
women undress in front of the men and just overall [behave like] animals 
towards them. 
Q: When…you made the women undress, what was your object at that 
point? 
A: To disrespect their religion and their people. To make them see that we 
don’t give a shit about them, them, their religion, their Allah, any of that, we 
don’t give a shit; they mean nothing to us. 
Q: What did you expect would be, when that message was delivered to 
them, what did you think the effect was going to be? 
A: I think, for the most part, we just didn’t care. We didn’t care what they 
were going to do. At that point, we hated them, we wanted to kill em and “Do 
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something. I’ll bet you won’t—bet you’ll, watch you do nothing, watch you do 
nothing like a little punk bitch, watch you do nothing…” 
Q: So the, it wasn’t so much intimidation as humiliation? 
A: Right. 
Miller described the first street violence meted out by his squad and the 
subsequent introduction of physical abuse toward detainees: 
Q: Do you remember the first time there was a move from threat to 
action? 
A: For my squad and it—we used to, and it was [not] even necessarily just 
towards the detainees, it was—we were always threatening people to go back 
inside their homes when they were stepping out to see what was going on 
with us and where we were going to, you know, hurt them and…and it turned 
into instead of threatening them; we’d just walk up and hit em, so… 
Q: So was the first physical violence against a by-stander? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Do you remember when that happened, and how? 
A: Approximately about a month after being there, and we were out on 
patrol and…people were coming out of their homes and opening their gates to 
see what was going on, what was happening out in the streets just to watch us 
and, and…we kept telling them to go back inside, “Get back inside.” This one 
guy, he’s standing there, he’s just smiling at us and…the smile looked…to be 
kind of taunting, and I walked up with my squad leader and we punched him a 
few times and had the interpreter there telling him, “See, you should have 
went inside, you should have went inside.” 
Q: Who punched him first? 
A: I did. 
Q: As you were walking over toward him, what were you saying to the 
squad leader about this guy? 
A: I was saying, “This punk mother fucker, I don’t know why he doesn’t 
listen to us and go inside.  We’re going to show him why he needs to go 
inside…” 
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Q: And what your squad leader say? 
A: Nothing; he’s just laughing. 
Q: Okay, and when you say you punched him a couple times, where did 
you hit him? 
A: In the face. 
Q: And…how did you feel during that? 
A: Um, I—I think I felt satisfied because…nobody’d ever listen to us there, 
they didn’t take us seriously, and…you could point your weapon at a bunch of 
em, and they’d just be like, ‘Yeah, you’re not going to shoot us…’ and…um, 
they didn’t change the way they thought about that until we got non-lethals 
and started firing our non-lethals at em, so… 
[ ] 
Q: Okay.  And um…when you were punching him what did you hear? 
A: Just him…ah…I heard the sound of my gloves hitting him and his…he 
wasn’t screaming, he was just making the noises of any man that get hit, like 
“Uh, uh…” 
Q: And what did you hear yourself doing or saying? 
A: I was cursing him. 
Q: And… 
A: Like, “Piece of shit, mother fucker…” 
Q: About how long do you think it went on? 
A: Just a couple of seconds. 
Q: And what was his condition at the end of that? 
A: Beat up but otherwise okay. 
Q: Bloody? 
A: Ah, more swollen, we were hitting him on the side of the face and my 
squad leader kicked him while he was down on the side of the face and—and 
he tried to climb back over his fence, his little gate there and um, we were 
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punching him when he was doing that, and we broke his gate to where-it like 
was only on one hinge, then he… 
Q: He fell? 
A: Then he fell. 
Q: Did you see, um…did other by-standers observe what was going on? 
A: Yeah. 
Q: What did you see in them? 
A: Fear, then they went back inside their homes. 
Q: And what did you see in your other soldiers? 
A: Ah…laughing, joking. 
Q: What were they saying? 
A: “Funniest shit ever” stuff like that. 
Q: So…when was the first time that one of your detainees was subject to 
striking? 
A: Hmm…pretty much immediately, about that time frame. 
Miller’s sense of this incident was one of satisfying release of frustration, quite 
early during the deployment.  He also observed his peers’ humorous appreciation for 
the spectacle and the neighborhood’s fearful compliance to return to their homes.  
With violence he was able to force a change to the irksome fact that “nobody’d ever 
listen to us there, they didn’t take us seriously.” 
Miller’s first experience with abusive violence toward a detainee took place a 
short time later.  While conducting a search of a residence, Miller found a piece of 
equipment believed to belong to an American service member.  Miller described the 
situation: 
A: We had done a knock and search of the home and underneath the bed 
of this young man, who was probably 17, 18 years old, we found some washer 
timers, um, and we also found a U.S. Forces IBA [Interceptor Body Armor] 
under… 
Q: IBA is? 
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A: The protective gear, body armor. 
Q: Okay.   
A: With no plates [hard armor inserts], but we found the IBA underneath 
his bed which indicated to us that at one time they had a service member. 
They had either taken this off of a dead service member or had detained the 
service member, and so we took this individual back to our COP [Combat 
Outpost], which we had a ah—we called it “the dungeon.” We were in an old 
[building] and underneath the [building] was a basement-type deal and it was 
called “the dungeon” because it was real steep steps and underneath the 
building was a room, that I guess you could say almost resembled a wine cellar, 
and real damp and dark and real creepy, and that’s where we did all of our—all 
of our detainee interrogations. It was my squad; it was in fact my—my team 
that had captured this individual, but we took him downstairs and it was my 
squad leader who began the interrogations of this—this kid. 
Miller related his reaction to finding the equipment: 
Q: How did you feel when you saw it? 
A: I was angry, ah… 
Q: Which part made you angry? 
A: The IBA…the service member IBA, because there’s no way that this 
individual had an ACU [Army Combat Uniform] IBA unless he had taken part 
in—in some sort of killing or detaining of a U.S. service member. That was my 
thought process on that, um…so we had this 17-year-old kid…and we took him 
to the—to “the dungeon” and… 
 
The abuse started before the trip to the COP: 
Q: You see the stuff, you get angry, then what do you do? 
A: I struck the young man with the stock of my weapon, and ah… 
Q: You went out into the living room? 
A: Right, and immediately hit him with the stock of my weapon and placed 
flex cuffs on him, and then I had my member take him, my team member take 
him to the…Humvee while we had—they put the Israeli pressure bandage over 
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his eyes and the mother was screaming and I was yelling at her to “shut the 
fuck up.” 
Miller explained that it was his squad’s common practice to delay reporting the 
capture of any detainees to the company in order to prevent the military police from 
taking custody of the detainee and thereby interfere with the squad’s own 
interrogations.  This case was no exception: 
Q: Okay. So in this case, had—prior to this, had you and the squad leader 
or anyone else in the platoon worked out that you were not going to report up 
to the company? 
A: You didn’t really need to talk about it, it was just kind of a known, kind 
of a given that you know, these—these fuckers didn’t deserve our respect and 
we’re going to do what we wanted to do. 
The young detainee was put into the trunk of the Humvee and kept there for 
several hours as the squad continued its patrolling.  He was taken back to the COP and 
led down into the “dungeon” and left under guard in a stress position until the 
soldiers were ready to deal with him.  Miller described what happened next: 
A: So then after myself and the other team leader and my squad leader 
were done, you know, getting something to eat, we went down there; we had 
an MRE for the detainee…we didn’t take the—the ah…um…the bandage off of 
his eyes, he was still sitting in that position. We went down there, we…had the 
interpreter with us and we started asking him questions about where he 
received the IBA, what were his plans with the timer and the kid was horrified. 
He kept asking if we were going to kill him, and my squad leader kept telling 
the interpreter tell him, “Yes, we are going to kill him, because he’s not giving 
us any information.” And so the kid, you know, the kid’s crying, scared. I 
started realizing that this kid didn’t—I mean if he had anything to do with 
anything, he would have told us. How horrified this kid was. Um…my, the team 
leader who—the other team leader decided to take the Mossberg 12-gauge 
shot gun and racked it and put it up underneath his chin while we were talking 
to him and told him, you know, “We know you’re lying, give us the 
information.” And the kid was crying and he then wet himself. 
Q: When he racked it…was the weapon charged with a live round? 
A: Yes…um, and he had the round under, the weapon underneath his chin 
and at that point, you could see that the detainee wet himself, and everybody 
started laughing, myself included because I’ve never seen anybody wet 
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themselves over being scared, and I was like, “This guy doesn’t know anything; 
he would have told us something…” and they were like, “No, he—he fuckin’ 
knows something…” and this, I was like, “Well, I’m going to go take my guys 
and do some training…” because I kind of had enough of it, you know, at some 
point it just becomes monotonous, it’s the same thing that you do to people 
over and over again. Gets the same results, nobody knows anything… 
Q: By that time, your unit interrogated people down there before? 
A: Yeah, I never had, but that was the first one that I had. You know, I’ve 
only been in the country a month . . . . We actually turned him in to the—to 
the MP’s there along with the evidence. 
Q: In that interrogation, what physical force was used? 
A: Um…me using my stock of my weapon to hit him that one time, 
um…but mainly it was…placing the weapon in parts of his body and 
threatening to shoot him. 
[ ] 
A: There was that one point where…I didn’t witness it, but one of my 
soldiers said that they placed the ah—they pulled the man’s pants down and 
placed the weapon on his genitals, so… 
Q: When you saw the muzzle placed under his chin with a live round in the 
chamber, what did you think was going to happen? 
A: That they were just scaring the kid. 
Q: Okay. Did the people there seem to be in control of themselves? 
A: Um, I wouldn’t say in control; it was a little more of a crazed, 
like…action, but I knew that they wouldn’t shoot this guy up close like that 
with a 12-gauge, for the simple fact that it’d be way too messy. I mean, he had 
the—there’s like, right here like this and it’s too close, nobody’s stupid enough 
to do that to somebody. 
Q: What did you think about that incident afterwards? 
A: Nothing really, I thought it was just an everyday, what we were—what 
we were doing, what we were there for. 
With this account, Miller relates his sense of the commonplace nature of the 
abusive violence used against this detainee.  He also reveals his sense at the time that 
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these actions, although not strictly speaking within the proper protocols for reporting 
detentions, were fully within “what we were there for.”  His later participation in 
abusive violence would be much more involved and destructive. 
By this point Miller’s sensibilities took no account of whether killing the 
detainee might be either morally wrong or unlawful.  Instead, he is convinced that no 
killing would occur using the shotgun because it would have been “way too messy.”   
It would have been “crazy” to be to be splattered with gore, but not so to terrorize 
and perhaps cleanly kill the boy.   
The worst part of me 
The next incident represents the crossing of a major threshold for Richard.  In 
it he describes the results of anger and frustration, abuse gone beyond the pale, and 
the taking of the obvious solution.  He also describes the effect on his men, and 
himself.  One month into his arrival into Iraq Miller has fully acted upon his anger 
toward Muslims, transforming himself into a torturer and murderer who doubts his 
own sanity.   
Q: How did that incident start? 
A: We were out doing knock and searches, and …we were in a barber shop 
and there were a couple of men in there and this one man just kept like 
looking at us, like mean mugging us, and so I sent our interpreter over who 
punched the guy in the face and we grabbed the guy and we brought him, we 
took him into our vehicle and we were beatin’ the hell out of him inside of our 
vehicle and inside our Humvee and then we took him to the COP, to the 
dungeon to interrogate him, and at this point, three members of our, of our 
company had already been killed by roadside bombs, and so…through the 
anger, one of my good friends was already killed, and in anger I started to 
interrogate this, this member myself along with my platoon sergeant, er, my 
squad leader. 
Q: How was he dressed? 
A: He was dressed in a—in the white, ah…”man dress,” they called it, and 
he had a—he was an older gentleman, probably in his 40’s and…gray hair, 
um…a bit of the gray, graybeard going on, like gray stubble, but…ah…so we 
took him to the dungeon. 
Miller’s account demonstrates the continuing force of his reaction to anything 
less than cowed submission by the Iraqi people.  Combined with the added rage over 
comrade’s deaths, this habitual physical abuse of Iraqis became more serious. 
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As Miller had mentioned, the initial beating took place in the squad’s vehicle: 
Q: Was he restrained? 
A: No he wasn’t; this one wasn’t restrained. He was actually…  
Q: From point of capture all the way down there he…? 
A: Right, he just—he was just covered up like this the whole time because 
we were striking him.  
Q: Did he receive any injuries when he was being beaten only? 
A: Couple of his teeth were knocked out…and a lot of blood. 
[ ] 
Q: How many people participated in the beating? 
A: Three. 
Q: What was the interpreter doing during that? 
A: Sitting in the vehicle…laughing. Once you look back, you could see that 
the interpreter was laughing kind of nervously, but laughing, like just trying to 
be a part of it without trying to be a part of it. 
The team returned to the COP: 
Q: Okay, so you’re downstairs? 
A: Right. 
Q: In the dungeon, and who took the lead in the questioning? 
A: Me. 
Q: How did it start? 
A: I was with the interpreter and I started asking him…to… “Tell me where 
the militia is, where’s militia?” and he kept saying, “I don’t know Mister, I don’t 
know…” and I said, “No, you’re a liar; you’re a fuckin’ liar, tell me where the 
militia is.” And then I was like “[militia name], you know, it was [militia name], 
are you [militia name]?” and he was like, “No, I’m not [militia name]…” I was 
like, “No, you’re [militia name] aren’t you?”  At this point, I was just, I was just 
frustrated; I was pissed off. Nobody ever seemed to know anything, and I took 
out my SOG knife and I started cutting his face. 
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Q: Where? 
A: On the cheek right here, started slicing down his cheek, and ah… 
Q: When you did that, what did you hear? 
A: I heard him screaming and ah… 
Q: What else did you hear? 
A: Laughing. 
Q: Who was laughing? 
A: The—my men behind me…and also myself. 
Q: What were you saying? 
A: I don’t recall saying anything; and I don’t recall laughing, but I can hear 
myself laughing. That’s when I started, I guess you could say, ‘peeling off skin 
from his face’…seeing how deep I can go and what’s underneath the skin. 
Q: And what did you find? 
A: More and more blood. 
Richard’s frustration-venting abuse may have been couched in the guise of 
interrogation, but it quickly descended into the same kind of blood-letting that took 
place on the ride in the back of Chris Alexander’s Humvee.  This situation differs from 
Chris’ in that the revenge, frustration and anger in the dungeon was in no way fueled 
by the aftermath a battle in which the soldier’s life and limb were threatened.  Here, 
Richard’s rage had gone too far; consequently, it was not possible for the detainee to 
be turned in to the MPs.  
Miller described the course of action selected: 
Q: And then what happened? 
A: Um…kept questioning him, he was unable to talk anymore, and…think 
through shock, part of his face was just hanging down. You could see inside of 
his mouth, here…because there was no skin there, and…I knew that we would 
get in trouble for doing this if we were to take him to any kind of MP station or 
whatnot, so I instructed my team to…get ready to go out and talked to my 
squad leader and he was like, “Yeah, take him out.” So we took him out… 
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Q: When…you use the term “take him out” what—did that have a single or 
a dual meaning? 
A: It had a dual meaning; it meant for us to take him out of the COP and 
then “take him out” because this guy can go and tell on us, and…so we drove 
him approximately two miles away from our COP, we dismounted, walked up 
next to a, we called it “[deleted]’s Gorge” because it was where somebody had 
fallen into a gorge. It was just a huge [unintelligible] and ah…fired a round into 
the back of his head and he dropped. 
Q: Did you have one of your men shoot him? 
A: No, I shot him myself. 
Q: Did you use your personal weapon for that? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Were you at all concerned about ballistics? 
A: No. 
Q: When you say “he dropped”, what do you mean? 
A: He dropped into the gorge; he was still standing and I walked up behind 
him with my M4. I just fired one shot into the…bottom part of his head. 
Q: Was he still blind folded? 
A: Yep. (sigh) 
Q: At that point, had—were his hands restrained? 
A: No, his hands were not restrained. 
Q: What did you hear after you fired? 
A: Um…all I heard was the ringing from the shot in my ears. 
Q: What was visible in front of you? 
A: It was dark at this point, it was—like you could see lights in homes, and 
that was about it. 
Q: How many of you had taken a ride out there? 
A: Five. It was a full vehicle. 
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Q: What was the conversation on the way out there? 
A: There wasn’t any; we didn’t…it was like the…you just knew what to do, 
you didn’t have to discuss it, you didn’t want to discuss it. 
Q: What was the mood like on the way back? 
A: Jovial, clappin’ and joking; talking about going to get something to eat. 
Q: Did anyone… 
A: Talking about pussy, stuff like that. 
Q: Did any—anyone refer to the shooting? 
A: No. 
Q: When you got back, what’d you guys do? 
A: Went and got something to eat, laid down and watched our own 
personal movies or played video games on our own personal PlayStation 
portables. 
Q: Did you say anything to your…squad leader about…? 
A: I just gave him the OK sign. 
Q: How long were you out? 
A: No longer than 15 minutes. 
In the aftermath of the killing Richard and the other men seemed to have 
snapped back into the banter and attitudes of a macho special operations team; 
however, for Richard, this was not the complete reality: 
Q: Um…did you think about it afterwards at some points? 
A: Yeah, I did. Um…unfortunately, that was my first kill, and I quickly 
learned that you can’t just kill somebody and go on about your day like nothing 
happened. It stays with you; it lives with you. No matter how hard you…try to 
justify or forgive it, forget it, it just—it’s there, it’ll always be there. 
Q: That night when… 
A: I kept seeing it back in my head again. 
Q: Which part? 
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A: The biggest part was the carving the skin off of his face, and listening to 
him scream. 
Q: What were you thinking at the time that you were imagining this or 
recalling it? 
A: (Pause) I kept hearing myself laughing. It’s like…the worst part of me, 
knowing that I wasn’t laughing but I could hear myself laughing and knowing 
that even when it was going on in real life, I wasn’t laughing, but I could hear 
myself laughing inside my head and…that’s when you start to believe that 
maybe you’re a little bit fuckin’ psychotic. 
Q: How long into the deployment were you at that point? 
A: This was one month into my deployment. 
Just a few weeks after leaving home, living in a world of ever-perceived threat, 
Richard Miller and the men with whom he served had become routinely violent 
abusers of the Iraqi population.  He was immediately deeply troubled both by what 
had happened and his warped sense during the grotesque torture that his inner-self 
was gleefully enjoying the experience.  He names the thing he fears he has become: “a 
little bit fuckin’ psychotic.” 
Richard may have been afraid of what he was becoming, but as we further 
discussed the incident, his additional thoughts about both the cutting and the 
aftermath were revealing of more dimensions of his sense-making at the time: 
Q: I’d like to ask you a little bit about…why you, what you were trying to 
do…at the time you drew your knife. What was your object, do you think? 
A: My object at first was to just scare him by cutting him a little bit, just a 
little bit, and what I found when I started cutting him is that I couldn’t stop 
cutting him. I just kept going more and more. It was almost like a…like I say 
now, it’s like a release. It was like a anger release; I was able to release a lot of 
pressure within myself by carving this man’s face off. 
Q: Were you thinking about the casualties at the time or was it not that 
defined, or? 
A: Yeah, it, it wasn’t even really, I—I don’t think I was really “thinking” at 
all. It was just a natural action, like once I started cutting, it was almost as if I 
was skinning an animal, and then it had no more meaning than that. 
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Q: When you said that you wanted to scare him, were you intending that 
that was going to be the only result, or were you trying to get information that 
you thought he actually had? 
A: I was trying to get information that he actually had, that I thought he 
had and because, you know, everybody in Iraq knows something, but nobody 
in Iraq knows anything. They’re always saying that they don’t know anything, 
but they all know something. There’s no way that you can live three houses 
down from a known terrorist suspect and not know a damn fuckin’ thing, it’s 
impossible, but yet, no matter what you did to these people, they never knew 
anything. 
Q: Now…um…when you saw that you had gone further than you should 
have, what did you feel? 
A: I didn’t feel anything at the time. 
Q: Did you feel, um…like, “Oops, I shouldn’t have done that?” 
A: Probably more so a sense of accomplishment than anything. Something 
that I’ve never done before and to actually…kind of a bravado thing, like, “Oh 
shit, this mother fucker peeled somebody’s face off. This son of a bitch is 
crazy.” You know, it’s kind of like a…it’s a bravado thing that your other 
soldiers who saw it are going to be like, “God damn! This dude fuckin’ just 
peeled somebody’s face off!” 
Q: He’s hard-ass? 
A: Pretty bad ass, yeah, “he’s hard, he’s hard core”.  Which is ultimately 
what you want in the military. 
Richard points further to the community as dangerous co-conspirators of 
insurgent violence toward the Americans.  He implicates everyone by baldly stating 
that they all know about the insurgents but always claim ignorance.  His absolutism, 
“all” and “always” offers universal condemnation for universal guilt.  In this mindset 
he can “know” that the man from the barbershop deserves to be tortured because he 
is part of the enemy effort.  Silence, and protestations of innocence, did not convince 
the American with the knife to stop skinning the man like a game animal.   Miller felt 
amazement that no matter what was done to the populace they obstinately persisted 
to claim ignorance; he entirely rejected the notion that any of the persons Miller 
grabbed off the street, or in shops, might actually be ignorant. 
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Miller also described the sense of “accomplishment” that his atrocity 
engendered and the increase in macho prestige he imagined he deserved for the 
heinousness of his act.  In his self-view, Richard has captured what every soldier 
ultimately desires: the awe-struck respect of other men of violence for the extent to 
which he is willing to ignore humanity in order to bring misery and death to the 
enemy.  In this aggrandized view, questions of guilt or innocence are irrelevant in the 
face of such grim glory. 
Finally, Miller also introduced the sense of not being in full control of himself 
when he declares that his initial intent was to frighten and to barely cut, but that 
“what I found when I started cutting him is that I couldn’t stop cutting him.”  This 
bespeaks a self-revelation, a finding, a discovery, about a proclivity that was 
previously hidden.  Also, his account speaks to a sense of non-agency, a helplessness 
to halt the brutality; in this he is like Chris Alexander who felt that someone else was 
torturing the elderly man.  Richard sees that a previously unacknowledged “other” has 
taken control.  He speaks directly to the “release” of pent-up anger.  He has given his 
anger freedom to act in order to discharge “a lot of pressure.” 
The mechanisms of routine atrocity 
Miller described to me that his squad continued along its lethal path, joined by 
other units in his company.  They also began to employ “drop weapons,” a practice 
that other participants mentioned using as well.  I asked him about the gorge: 
Q: Was that…a place that was used often? 
A: Whenever we needed to get rid of somebody, that was the place that 
we used. 
Q: Okay. Are you able to estimate how many times it was used that way? 
A: For my platoon…three or four times…total, but now there’s other 
platoons in my unit who knew of the gorge as well, so…they knew that, you 
know, that was a good way, when you didn’t have a drop weapon, that was a 
good way to get rid of somebody. We started collecting drop weapons, 
probably…a month and a half into our deployment, like collecting them, like 
actively collecting them to where they were sitting in the vehicles; you got 10 
or 15 in each vehicle. 
Q: AK’s or what? 
A: AK’s, um nine millimeters, brass knuckles, you can shoot someone over 
brass knuckles, knives…stuff like that, anything that you wanted to use, that 
you could say, “Okay, this individual here had a weapon, so I fired.”   
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During the following months Miller’s squad continued with its casual beatings 
and murders, sometimes without even resorting to using the Gorge or the niceties of 
drop weapons.  I asked Richard about whether his platoon had eliminated anyone 
before the first use of the Gorge.  He explained some of those circumstances: 
A: We’ve done it, you know, we—we pulled over and picked up men off 
the street and beaten them so badly that we can’t…we take ‘em to another 
side of town and drop ‘em off, knowing that they’re going to die of their 
injuries. We just drop ‘em on the side of the road, knowing that they’re going 
to die. You know, it wasn’t every day that we put a round into somebody, 
but…we would beat them so severely or—or cut them so severely that they, 
they’re going to die. You cut somebody’s femoral artery, they’re going to die; it 
doesn’t matter what—what—how far they can crawl, they’re gonna die. And 
it’s real easy to cut somebody’s femoral artery. 
Q: How many times do you think you were involved or your squad was 
involved in leaving somebody to die? 
A: About six times. 
Q: And this was some time in the first eight weeks of deployment? 
A: Throughout the first six months of deployment. 
Using a practice mentioned by other participants, Miller’s unit engaged in 
indiscriminate firing when they were attacked by an IED.  Miller also said that the 
instruction came from the top: 
A: I knew I got orders at one point while we were in Iraq from the 
battalion commander himself, stating . . . whenever anybody was hit with IED, 
to, “Kill every mother fucker on the street…” and that’s the highest, I mean, as 
far as you’re concerned, your BC [battalion commander] is god. His word’s god; 
it doesn’t matter anybody else’s word, battalion commander, that’s as high as 
it goes, so…he’s obviously getting his orders from way higher than that. 
Q: Uh-huh.  
A: So BC was the, was god, his word was god. 
If the word of god was to kill everyone in the vicinity of an IED explosion, there 
is little wonder that the men in Miller’s squad felt justified in beating and killing others 
who might have information, or sympathize with insurgents.  The violence may have 
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become habitual, but Miller was to discover a line that went beyond even his callous 
limits. 
I never wanted to kill a kid 
Miller described a mission to arrest a suspected insurgent denounced by an 
informant as being responsible for planting a bomb that killed one of Miller’s good 
friends.  The squad entered the home and secured the occupants.  He explained how 
the event unfolded: 
Q: And did you have a good identification on the target? 
A: Yeah, we knew that he was the adult male in that house. 
Q: And…how many males were there? 
A: Three. 
Q: Ages? 
A: One adult male, one teen-aged male and one young male, probably 
around eight or nine years old. 
Q: Okay. So everybody is secured? 
A: Uh-huh, yeah, the women are in one room which, was a mother and 
daughter, approximately 13 or 14 years old. 
Q: Your interpreter’s inside with you? 
A: Uh-huh. 
Q: Your squad leader is where? 
A: Squad leader’s upfront with the interpreter asking questions. 
Q: And then what happens? 
A: Um, the man keeps saying, “No, no…” the person who told on him is a 
liar, ah…he had no part in any IED, he works at a metal shop, that’s all he does, 
he’s just trying to support his family, and…and that’s when my squad leader 
put his hand around the younger boy’s mouth and held him up to him and took 
a throw-away nine-millimeter and put it up against  the boy’s head, and the 
man was crying saying, “No, please don’t…” and he—you know, I’m just 
standing there providing security out the doorway, and I can see everything 
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that’s happening, and ah…that’s when you hear the nine millimeter go off 
and…he shot the boy in the head. 
Q: Were you watching at the time? 
A: No, I was looking out the door when I heard the nine millimeter go off; I 
turned around, and that’s when I saw the boy hit the ground. 
Q: Did it startle you? 
A: I didn’t really have a startle response anymore. 
Q: I see. Were you…expecting that the boy was going to get shot? 
A: Maybe in some small way, but…I knew that it was a scare tactic that we 
used many times. 
Q: Had anybody been shot actually? 
A: No. 
Q: And which boy was this? 
A: Eight-year-old boy. 
Q: What did you hear? 
A: Screaming from the women, ringing of the gunshot and inside myself, I 
just kept saying, ‘Fuck, fuck, fuck!’ 
Q: What did the squad leader say immediately after? 
A: “I told you, that’s what you fuckin’ get.” And then we grabbed the man 
and took him back to our COP. 
Although Miller felt that he no longer had a startle response, he was still 
capable of feeling shock and dismay.   
Q: When the…well, in this situation that you just described, did you think 
he meant to pull the trigger or that he was surprised when it went off? 
A: Everything that I saw was it was intentional. 
Q: What did he say afterwards about it? 
A: We didn’t talk about it afterwards, we never talked about it. 
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Q: But he didn’t talk about… 
A: Whether it was an accident or on purpose, he…you know, you hear, 
“That’s what you fuckin’ get”, and you’re just like, “Oh shit, fuck!” you know, I 
never wanted to kill a kid. Did I have a part in it, yeah…but I never, like that 
wasn’t my intention going there, with killing children. I wanted no part of that. 
Back at the COP Richard refused to participate in the interrogation, even 
though the detainee was suspected in his friend’s death. 
Q: And um, what happened in the dungeon? 
A: I wasn’t a part of that; I went, I didn’t want to be a part of it. I went to 
my cot, and I turned on the TV or the TV, the computer, and started watching 
my “Six Feet Under” episodes. 
Q: Why didn’t you want to be a part of it? 
A: Just tired of it, tired of…us getting nowhere and it being the same 
repetitive thing over and over again, same thing every fuckin’ day, same thing. 
Q: Well, what was it?  
A: Questioning, getting nothing, hurting, getting nothing, checking the 
same fuckin’ houses…the same blocks, the same people, just tormenting ‘em 
every day. I was just getting tired of it, not knowing what the hell I was doing 
there anymore. I didn’t—didn’t want to be a part of it. It was making me sick to 
my stomach; it was making me…hate everybody that I came in contact with. It 
was making me hate my family back home, hate my privates, hate…my 
wife…at the time, I was hating everybody. I just didn’t want to be a part of it 
anymore. 
Richard found no means of acting on his self-hate.  His loathing could not 
overcome the fear that he had about raising objections.  His comments in this regard 
dovetail completely with those of both Frank and Chris: 
Q: So…at some point, you begin to…have these feelings, what did you 
think you could do about it while you were there? 
A: Ignore ‘em, ignore it, I mean…what can you do? You are what you are, 
and…you just have to learn how to accept it, and so I tried joking about it, 
and…just for the most part, ignoring any kind of…conscious desire to not want 
to do it. You start to, well for me, I started to allow the evil to grow in a good-
to-go way, because what do you do? You can’t go, “Hey look, this isn’t right 
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guys…” I mean…you go against people that you’re with and the people that 
you’re with are going to kill you.  You can kill an eight-year-old kid, why the 
fuck wouldn’t he be able to kill me?  
Richard’s response to feeling that he could not object was to suppress the 
desire to object.  He delved deeper into the “evil” as a means of coping with the 
impossible-seeming situation.  In his mind, being “good to go” with continued abuse 
was the only obvious choice.  Richard also reveals that he deems himself to be a 
person who is both capable of abusive violence but relishes it.  He “is” that person, 
not a person who has done some things, but as he put it “what can you do? You are 
what you are…”  The question in that statement indicates a belief that what he is, or 
has become, is unchangeable: “you just have to learn to accept it.” 
It was ineffective and pointless 
During our interviews and informal conversations, Miller described that near 
the mid-point of his time in Iraq three things occurred that allowed him to see his 
situation differently.  He experienced the birth of his child; his squad leader went back 
home, making Miller the one in charge of the squad; and he was present when other 
Iraqi children were shot by Americans.   
Miller also began to doubt the effectiveness of the brutality his battalion was 
using toward the Iraqis.  We discussed this. 
Q: You said a moment ago that all of the abuse the detainees incurred as 
part of seeking information, but that you never got any. 
A: No. 
Q: Did-- 
A: None of that was valid. (Pause) You beat somebody enough, they’re 
always going to say something, what you want to hear but they usually just 
told on a neighbor or something like that. 
Q: Um…during the course of your deployment, did you evaluate the 
effectiveness of those methods, while you were over there? 
A: Yeah, while I was over there, I started to see that everything that we 
were doing over there was bullshit, that it was ineffective and pointless and 
causing more enemies for the United States than we were helping, so… 
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His doubts tempered his willingness to engage in all-direction punitive fire 
after IED strikes occurred.  He explained his reaction to the battalion commander’s 
order: 
Q: At the time it didn’t make sense? 
A: No, it—it never really made sense to me, I mean, I’d always figured that 
we were going to be…making more enemies than anything, by-by killing 
people’s husbands, wives and children. 
Q: At the time you were doing it though…um…? 
A: It was my job.  My job was not to question and that’s why my job was 
to do and die. 
Q: And… 
A: That’s the way I looked at it. 
Q: Uh-huh.  At…some point, did your compliance with that SOP change? 
A: Yeah, almost immediately um, when that order was given, even though 
we had been doing it already.  Um…for the most part, I usually fired my 
weapon up into the rooftops of buildings, um… 
Q: Before that? 
A: Yeah.  I—I never really saw much reason for—for killing a kid on the 
street because of an IED.  I’d fire my weapons into rooftops or empty fields as 
well, as a couple of other soldiers of mine. 
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American or Iraqi, it’s still a human life 
The incident involving other Americans shooting Iraqi children along with 
adults was the event that changed everything for Miller.  The misgivings that had been 
growing about the ineffectiveness of wholesale brutality as well as the line-crossing 
children shooting combined to prompt a change: 
Q: After that, when your squad detained people, did your attitude change 
translate into changes in how your…how detainees were being treated? 
A: Yeah, I would never, I would never take part in—in any of the detainee 
abuse, um and I told my soldiers that if I caught them abusing detainees, 
um…that they were going to have to deal with me, and give an Article 15, and 
see if I can get them court-martialed, and pretty much most of my soldiers, at 
this point, were on my page. So, um…they viewed things the same way I did 
and ah…um…by this time I was in charge of an entire squad, so…to be a squad 
leader and have, and had had half of my guys who agreed with me and half of 
them who were still gung ho going to go out and shoot people and stuff so…it 
was hard to maintain both sides of people. 
Q: So once you—did you declare that to everybody in the squad? 
A: Yeah. 
[ ] 
Q: So when you made that declaration, what kind of feedback did you get 
from the soldiers? 
A: Um…grumbles from some of em. 
Q: What’d they say? 
A: “Are you serious, this is what we’re here for.” 
Q: And did you…reply to that at all? 
A: Um…yeah, I mean, whenever a soldier talked back I’d just smoke ‘em 
[punish], until they stop talking back. 
Being the squad leader gave Richard the authority to order his men to cease 
their abuse.  Although Miller was assured that some of his men agreed with his 
position, he nonetheless understood the resistance that this change would create with 
some of the troops.  His account does not reflect a simple heart to heart moment with 
the squad; rather, he delivered the word to his men from his position of authority and 
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threatened formal military justice for abusers.  Having given himself over to a new set 
of objectives, he is willing to abuse his own men who are unwilling to comply. 
Miller described in further detail his motives for making the change. 
Q: We were talking about the more humane treatment that you decided 
that you and your squad would use with detainees. Once you started that 
policy, did you feel better about what your involvement was? 
A: I—I felt better personally and I think that I had a problem with 
making—my conscience, and having one more, one more innocent person’s 
death on my conscience, and that if I could, if I could just save one person at 
the hands of my squad, then I was doing better than what I was, so…um… 
I asked Miller about the number of Iraqis his squad had killed before this 
directive who had not deserve to be killed.  He estimated that nearly all of the killings 
were unjustified.  We talked about the aggression of the squad before the new order 
was issued and the effects it had: 
Q: And…for the second half of your deployment, did that number go down 
to or near zero? 
A: Um…nobody in my squad that I’m aware of pulled the trigger on 
anybody. 
Q: Now…up until the point you made a decision to change how your squad 
was going to operate, did you see that the aggression of the squad was higher 
than when you first got there, the same or growing? 
A: Up until the moment that I changed my squad, the aggression had 
grown and was continuing to grow. 
Q: So… 
A: …And we—we very much had a god-like complex. 
Q: Would it be fair to say then that…the situations of the second half of 
deployment being similar to the first, that your squad would have killed more 
people in the second half of the deployment than the first if you hadn’t 
changed? 
A: Without a doubt. 
Q: So…your actions, would it be fair to say then, that your actions did, in 
fact, save a lot of Iraqis? 
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A: I’d like to think so. 
Miller did not come by his epiphany on his own.  He attributed much of his 
change in thinking to a young soldier in his squad who was a steadfast opponent of 
the abusive violence and the war in Iraq: 
Q: Did his presence and his—how he acted, um…did it have any influence 
on anybody else? 
A: On me, I think it had a big influence on me.  Um…we would sit on guard 
duty together and he would talk to me and I’d listen to him and ah…even 
though I didn’t agree in the beginning, I started to agree with a lot of his views 
towards the end because it just made so much more sense than what we were 
doing, and ah, I guess I can attribute this young kid with changing, you know, 
the way a lot of my, my thoughts were. 
I asked Richard about his current view of the logic that applied during his 
deployment: to dominate the AO by out-terrorizing the terrorists: 
A: No, logic is the first thing to escape your—your mentality in war; there 
is no logic, it’s all based on feelings and emotions. Logic is—is a foreign thing in 
your brain when you’re in, in war. 
Q: The concept of…dominating the area and… 
A: Yeah, that’s completely illogical. 
Q: Then did it fit with your feelings and emotions at the time to do those 
things? 
A: Well I think that, when—when we were told that the only way to 
maintain our AO was to kill these people. Did it make sense at the time? Yeah, 
it did because you’re not thinking logically.  You’re thinking about preserving 
your own life or the life of your buddy to the right or left.  You’re not thinking, 
“Okay, if I kill this person, his son’s going to grow up and want to kill me…” 
You’re not thinking that, that logically.  So…while I—living in the moment, 
everything seemed like you were doing it for the right reasons.  Ah, but then, 
you know, hindsight’s 20/20; you take a look back and you’re like… “oh, shit I 
created more enemies for the United States than if I was to never have done 
these things.” 
With these answers, Miller mentions some of the same thinking employed by 
other participants.  Chris Alexander’s declaration that killing detainees always seemed 
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“logical at the time,” but not when considered after returning home, echoes here.  
The preservation of self and comrades as the over-riding consideration was also 
spoken of by others.  Also, the late realization that American troops’ abusiveness 
would fuel an enmity measured in generations, was inherent in the shame felt by 
some participants for their participation in, or failure to stop, that abuse. 
I explored with Miller the choices he made while in Iraq, and whether he might 
have had no truly good options.  His answers describe the evolution of his thinking 
and perhaps the virtues of his later conduct: 
A: And one way or another somebody was going to lose a life. It was 
deciding whether or not…at least for the first half of my deployment that the 
American lives were more important than the lives of the people of Iraq, and 
then the later part of my deployment was realizing that every life lost is a life 
lost and it didn’t matter if they were American or Iraqi, it’s still a human life. 
Q: What you’ve described to me is an assessment also that…the decisions 
you made in the second half of your deployment to restrain the men’s 
behavior did not result in greater losses of life? 
A: No. 
Q: Either American or Iraqi? 
A: Right. 
Q: And, in fact, reduced Iraqi casualties and didn’t create as many enemies 
as if the prior conduct had continued. Would you say that it’s a fair assessment 
that by not creating those enemies, less attacks occurred on Americans? 
A: I would like to hope that that is what happened. It seemed like we were 
getting attacked just as much but…um…I don’t know. I’d like to think that…me 
not shooting the guy for thinking he had something could have…at least for a 
night saved one life, I mean, the next day someone in a different squad could 
have shot that man’s son and he become an enemy of us anyways, but…I had 
no hand in it. When I got—when I got blown up in Iraq, I wasn’t angry, I wasn’t 
upset at the Iraqis, because I would, I started to view them as the same as you 
and I. I would have done the same exact thing. If I kicked in your front door 
and shot your kid in the head, are you going to thank me for it and say, “Hey, 
I—I know you’re looking out for me. This is our freedom and democracy…?” or 
would you pick up a weapon and try to kill me, kill every single person who 
looked like me?  I’d do the latter, and I would do it until the day that I died. 
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So…even, even for one day, I saved that person from wanting to kill us. I don’t 
know, it’s just the way I look at it. 
Miller’s ability to think of the Iraqi’s as human, to equate them to himself, was 
one result of the abuse his former de-humanized view of Muslims had enabled.  Being 
able to see the natural response to the violence in terms of his imagined own 
reactions had the tables been turned, offered Richard the vision to see that saving one 
Iraqi life, “even for one day,” might have spared the Iraqis from hatred and the 
Americans from deadly retaliation. 
We were all monsters  
The effect on troops engaged in abusive violence was a theme that Frank 
Wright had talked about when he described the “disordered souls” and post-
deployment outcomes of his friends.  Miller attempted suicide after returning home 
and found little help from civilian psychiatric care.  He was unable to relate to the 
relationship problems that the other patients were troubled by.  He described why he 
was not able to be open with them during group therapy sessions: 
A: Here I am thinking their problems are jokes and whenever they’d come 
to me, I didn’t want to talk about what, in a group session, I didn’t want to talk 
about what I was feeling for fear of being labeled a monster by somebody. 
Q: How did you label yourself? 
A: As a monster.  As an evil person. 
Q: Now, the things you did were the same things done by your squad 
mates. How did you label them? 
A: We were all monsters. 
Q: Um… 
A: But I think, I think I’d label the—the younger ones as just misguided 
kids who, if it wasn’t for my commands of doing this, then they would have 
never done it. I ah…I was the one who encouraged it most of the time. 
Richard gives name to his assessment of what he and others became in Iraq.  It 
is the same “monster” title that Chris Alexander believes is unworthy of a life in 
America.  Miller also shoulders the responsibility for corrupting the younger soldiers in 
his squad with his examples, encouragement, and commands. 
  I asked Miller about PTSD among his comrades: 
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Q: The diagnosis of PTSD, was that something that other members of your 
squad received? 
A: Yeah. 
Q: How many folks that you’re aware of? 
A: Every single one of them…even the most hard core, “I’d never get 
PTSD” soldier, um is now taking anti-psychotics and anti-depressants just to—
and has been deemed, he was supposed to go to Afghanistan this summer and 
he was deemed unfit for duty because of his Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. 
At some point Richard spoke to some groups about the war.  He found forums 
to be constraining, again concerned about how others would view him.  He did speak 
to individuals, both as a way to unburden himself, but also in some way to share out 
the pain and horror he lived with.  He explained: 
There’s a lot more that I wouldn’t say in public for fear of the way people are 
going to look at me, than, say on one-on-one basis where it’s just me and one 
other person and no matter what they look at, how they look at me, they 
actually have to live with what I tell them.  It’s them that has to go to sleep 
with the images that I had in my head.  And I started to look at it as “fair is 
fair,” you’ve asked to do this, why can’t—why can’t these people look at these 
images and see these images that are in my head. So they can see that life’s 
not all rainbows and lollipops, and there’s a reason that soldiers are killing 
themselves with a higher rate now than ever before. It’s not because we’re 
doing great things for God and country. 
There’s a special place in Hell reserved 
Richard’s troubled memories are not the worst legacy of his abusive service in 
Iraq.  The need for release that was fulfilled by the cutting of his victim in the dungeon 
has not entirely left him.  When I asked him about his rising sense of hatred and 
futility in Iraq, he described what he found within himself in Iraq that has followed him 
home: 
Q: How did you feel about yourself? 
A: I think that’s the one thing I hated worse than anything or anybody was 
myself for what I…was turning into over there and how much I enjoyed it. I 
mean I enjoyed hurting people. To this day, I still have a problem not hurting 
people, because I want to, I want to hurt people. I want them to feel the pain 
that I feel inside, but I want theirs to be physical. I don’t know, it’s hard to 
explain (quiet laugh). Like I just want to hurt people, and it makes me feel evil; 
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psychotic and…my wife doesn’t understand that when I get angry, I just want 
to hurt people. I go out and I pick fights, I go out and I bait people into fights 
with me just so I can hurt em, and she just doesn’t understand why, and I don’t 
know how to explain it to her. I like to break people’s bones in a fight; I mean I 
was trained in the Army and, you know, Brazilian Jiu-jitsu and…I don’t go toe-
to-toe with people, I take ‘em to the ground and I break something; I just want 
to break some—I want to hear it snap, I want to hear them scream…it makes 
me feel better, it’s like me releasing the scream myself. 
Richard’s indescribable pain, his own “disordered soul,” the need to hurt that 
makes him feel “evil” and “psychotic,” is the most pronounced expression of the 
troubling aftermath of involvement in abusive violence among the fourteen 
participants in this study.  Miller gives fullest voice to the thing that bewildered Chris 
Alexander when he barricaded himself in his room, trying to keep himself in and the 
world out.  The life that Richard occupies can be described: hurt.  He is, and he does. 
At the end of the interview process it was my habit to ask participant’s 
whether they could suggest ways in which I could improve the study experience for 
participants.  As I drove Richard back to his hotel he gave an answer that brought into 
high relief the daily reality of his life.  Richard suggested I place a small radio playing 
background music in the small quiet office that we had used.  I asked him why.  He 
replied that during the silences he could hear the screaming, in his head. 
Richard does not blame others, nor does he absolve himself.  His sense of his 
experiences is stark, unrelenting, and hopeless: 
Q: Um…what is your view of now…of what you and your squad mates did 
to the detainees especially? 
A: My view is that we did horrible things and there’s no amount of 
redemption that can change it. There’s no amount of apologies or forgiveness 
that can take away what we have done, and…and as I mentioned before 
there’s a, there’s a special place in hell reserved for people like us. There’s not 
much you can do except accept the consequences for your actions. 
 
Richard’s Themes 
Richard Miller’s experiences reveal the following themes in his sense-making of 
his experiences with abusive violence.  Most of the following are interpretations of the 
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sensibilities he employed at the time of the events, adopting interpretive language 
that represents Richard’s thinking. 
Facilitating Abusive Violence 
Word of God: Command Authority.  The battalion commander and Miller’s 
squad leader are two key figures who embodied the command authority’s full 
support, encouragement, and alignment with abusive violence.   
Communal Guilt.  Miller’s fury and vindictiveness resulting from the 9/11 
attacks placed responsibility squarely on all Muslims in America and every Muslim 
country.  The Iraqi population was simply the group of people placed within Miller’s 
reach.  Communal Guilt also attached to the perceived community support for 
insurgents and militias attacking the Americans. 
Community Terror.  If Communal Guilt was the crime, Community Terror was 
the punishment.  To be brutalized by the Americans was the deserved pay-back for 
the crime of being inconveniently Iraqi during an occupation by troops who saw 
themselves surrounded by threatening animals. 
Frustration and Fists/Obey or Pay.  Everyone knew something, but everyone 
denied it, everyone frustrates us, so everyone gets beat.  Some decide they aren’t 
going to be happy about having American saviors occupy the streets and foolishly fail 
the submissiveness-test.  They get beat, tortured, and killed. 
Laughing, Joking, and Battering. Abuse, if you’re not the one being abused, 
gets a laugh.  Sometimes the laughter is simply submissive, nervous, going-along 
laughter so you’re viewed as a good egg, and not the next one to be broken. 
Drop Guns and Other Niceties.  Rules can, and should, be got around.  Drop 
Guns, beating in Humvees, dropping dying victims far from home, dungeons and 
gorges: all good ideas for abusers.  Simple.  Obvious. 
Inhibiting Abusive Violence 
Ineffective, Pointless, and Worse.  The beatings, torture, intimidation, and 
indiscriminate killing don’t make us safer.  Can’t blame them for resisting; if they did 
this stuff to us, we’d want to kill them too.   
Wanted No Part of This: Discovering the Limit.  Killing kids is going just too far; 
not what I signed up for. 
It’s Still a Human Life: Global Shift.  Their kids are like my kids.  Their reactions 
to oppressive occupiers I can understand.  They’re human too.  If they die, or we die, 
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it’s still a human life.  I need to save human lives: theirs from our abusive violence, 
ours from their retaliation.  We are the true threat. 
Monsters and Misguided Kids. Some of us were Monsters, relishing the release 
of rage on the bodies of our victims.  Monsters led the younger soldiers laughing and 
cheering into the abyss.  They were just kids, led astray by us. 
Have to Deal with Me: From Scourge to Shield.  Nobody will abuse Iraqis, or 
else.  No new Iraqis died, no new soldiers were turned into monsters.  At least we 
stopped making things worse for everyone. 
Aftermath of Abusive Violence 
Hurting: Releasing the Scream.  I enjoy hurting others.  My pain is released by 
their screams.  It makes me feel better.  On the other hand, it makes me feel evil, 
psychotic.  There can be no forgiveness. 
In my time spent with Richard and his wife before the interviews, I learned of 
the flashbacks that place Richard back in Iraq.  They are so strong that his wife is 
unable to summon him from them and takes their children into the basement so that 
they will not see their father pacing in the house, his mind years and continents away.  
Richard told me that the only peace he has found has been due to the patience and 
love of his wife.  He has still not shared with her everything he told me, but her 
calming influence does not require her to know all he has done or seen in order to 
help.  He says that next to her is the only place he can fall asleep.   
In this chapter I have presented the words of one soldier whose experiences 
with abusive violence and his sense-making of them offer a number of themes that 
are in common with others.  Richard Miller’s experiences include heinous examples of 
abuse, but they also encompass efforts to become more humane as the commonality 
of sensibility with the Iraqis toward children and oppression were recognized.  Miller 
took steps to save his men from the hell they would otherwise come to deserve and to 
save the Iraqis from the beating, torture, and murder that he and his men 
represented.   
Miller’s sense of guilt over what he did before he took command of the squad 
is great, and, in light of his actions, not undeserved.  He and others see themselves as 
having become monsters.  It is difficult not to be horrified by their stories, but it is also 
difficult to not hope that they can find peace.  As others have said, to understand does 
not mean to excuse.  The participants made choices and, as Miller says, must live with 
them.  For some the choice to object was not apparent, while for others the choice 
not to object was similarly invisible.  Doubts plague some of each group.  Although 
being troubled at not being forceful enough while addressing abuse by other troops is 
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a background issue for some participants, having been a gross abuser creates 
problems that occupy the foreground of the present.  
In the next chapter, I will discuss the superordinate themes evident within the 
groups of participants and those which, perhaps only expressed by one person, still 
offer insight into the experiences of abusive violence committed in the service of 
Counter-terrorism and Counter-insurgency that may not have been otherwise evident. 
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Chapter 8. Findings, Implications, 
and Conclusion 
This study has been an attempt to understand abusive violence as it has been 
used by individual Americans since September 11, 2001 during the United States’ 
world-wide war on terrorism.  The study focused on the individuals and their sense-
making of abusive violence rather than the state-level priorities that justify the use of 
abusive violence as a tool to apply in the CT and COIN contexts. 
Much has been written about the decisions that led to American policies of 
extraordinary rendition, indefinite detention, and interrogations of suspected 
terrorists as Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, and other secret intelligence centers around 
the world.  Guantanamo, as a place of continued detention, and the purported 
spawning ground of interrogation approaches many considered abusive, continues to 
be a problem for the United States.  In 2013, as this thesis is being written, President 
Obama frames Guantanamo thus: “It hurts us in terms of our international standing. It 
lessens cooperation with our allies on counterterrorism efforts. It is a recruitment tool 
for extremists   (Washington Post 2013).”  How the men and women who carry out 
national CT and COIN policies decided to use or eschew abuse, what the experiences 
of making those choices and executing them were like, and the latter-day sense-
making of those experiences are the questions that required an individual level 
research focus, rather than a policy or state level focus. 
If one applies President Obama’s comments on the place that is Guantanamo 
to the perceived activities of torture and other abusive violence attributed to that 
place, then it becomes difficult to understand why harsh interrogation techniques do 
not deserve the same termination from use that the president is seeking for the 
facility.  In other words, if torture aids the extremists’ cause and harms American 
efforts, then one should prevent abusive violence in its various forms, and especially 
torture as its worst iteration.  Given that the practice of enhanced interrogation 
techniques has the ability to escape the bounds set for it, both in terms of degree of 
harshness and narrowly prescribed authorized-use situations, then understanding 
how individuals actually decide to use the “approved” and “feral” methods is an 
important factor in choosing how to stem the introduction and spread of abusive 
violence and its toxic consequences. 
This study has added to the store of knowledge relating to those decisions to 
use such abusive violence.  In particular, it has carefully sought the recent experiences 
in American abusive violence that accompanied CT and COIN efforts since the 9/11 
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attacks.  While the results of the study were never intended to be projected to any 
larger group of Americans, they do reveal the personal emotions and modes of 
thinking that some American military and security personnel used when undertaking 
abuse that included what was, at the time, considered commonplace. Since the same 
techniques had been endured during training by the soldiers, they were deemed 
acceptable for use on detainees.  As also learned during the study, the use of much 
harsher abusive violence was practiced by some Americans up to and including 
excruciating torture perpetrated for purposes of information extraction, enjoyment, 
emotional release and infliction of agony on despised enemies.  The perpetrators of 
such grave abusive violence who participated in this study give only partially lucid 
explanations for their conduct.  They recall the events from a remove, as if someone 
else was carving the victims with knives or someone else was responsible for the 
delighted laughter in the charnel house. 
Findings in Relation to Prior Research 
The findings in this study sometimes seem to confirm earlier research and 
elsewhere to contradict prior findings.  Inasmuch as prior research has ranged from 
short-term psychological experiments, to studies of broad swathes of torture history 
and archival study of individual military units, to studies of totalitarian regime 
professional torture establishments, it is natural that the study of abusive violence 
undertaken by soldiers representing a liberal democracy would have features of 
varying similarity to earlier attempts to understand the nuances of individual 
willingness to commit abuse. 
Obedience to Authority 
The findings of this research tend to support the Milgram findings on 
Obedience to Authority.  Specifically, the relationship between obedience to authority 
is obviously evident in this study’s Macro Command Authority finding, and is even 
more salient in the Micro Command Authority finding.  Where the organization or 
senior commanders praise, promote or prompt abusive violence, the lower echelons 
find license to improvise abuse.  The extent to which the situation-definitions 
supporting or inhibiting gross abusive violence is refined and modulated by the Micro 
Command Authority appears to delineate the actual extent of movement from so-
called “torture lite” to less-than-clean techniques of physical torture such as beatings, 
cutting, burning, bone-breaking, and coercion-killing of third-parties, and direct killings 
of inconvenient abuse victims.  There is little doubt that the abusers fell into the 
agentic state theorized by Milgram. 
Milgram (1974) also described strain experienced while following orders to 
abuse (153-157).  He described means by which such strain is relieved.  He cited 
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avoidance, denial, and subterfuge.  In the current study these same mechanisms are 
present. Study participant Roy Howard described the distancing he used to avoid 
some exposure to the pain caused by the guards forcing detainees to maintain stress 
positions that he had mandated.  Likewise, Antonio Hayes described allowing an 
injured detainee to be relieved from maintaining a stress position whenever a senior 
soldier was not present; he would help the prisoner to his feet when he heard the 
other soldier approaching the cell.  Hayes’ subterfuge allowed him to both relieve the 
strain of being involved in abuse and maintained good relations with the other soldier.  
Hayes also pretended to have other superseding assignments as a means of avoiding 
interrogations.  Numerous participants described an inability at the time to recognize 
detainee suffering for what it was, especially with respect to forced exercise and other 
hazing they observed or directed. 
In explaining the processes that allow disobedience, Milgram (1974) describes 
a progression that runs from inner doubt to externalization of doubt, to dissent, to 
threat, and finally disobedience.  The progression as Milgram charted it was based on 
the actions of his experimental participants who were operating in short duration 
relationships to authority figures from whom explicit directives to continue inflicting 
pain were received.  The experiences of some of the current study’s participants seem 
to have followed the progression Milgram laid out, especially among those who 
directly objected to abuse.   
De-humanization and deindividuation 
The effects of de-humanization and deindividuation reported by Bandura and 
Zimbardo, with respect to increased intensity pain delivery, are certainly borne out by 
the experiences reported by the participants.  The change from human to non-human 
labeling was provided by military training references, military senior commanders’ use 
of epithets, and junior leader explicit identification of Iraqis as animals.  In one 
reported instance, the near-death experience of Chris’ hand-to-hand grappling knife-
fight, the change of the Iraqis into animals expendable on the altar of group-survival 
was abrupt and profound.  The sublimation of the individuals to the deindividuated 
squad, detachment, vehicle crew, or special operations unit sharing a common 
identity, wearing common uniforms, and operating in darkness, at distance, and 
beyond the view of blind-folded victims, was not only obvious, but in some cases 
desired as a public that feared the unit perforce feared its members. 
Hyper-masculinzed environment 
The kind of environment reported among the Brazilian violence workers by 
Huggins, Haritos-Fatorous and Zimbardo was also evident in some of the more 
egregious abusers’ accounts.  Chris Alexander’s squad banter after incidents, Richard 
Miller’s embracing the badass perception of those who witnessed his torture, 
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mutilation, and murdering, and even Frank Wright’s self-described elite and ultra-
lethal platoon members, all fit within the violence inspiring milieu of the Brazilian hit-
squads and torturers.  Also, the hazing reported as foundational to creating abuse-
ready soldiers and police in Greece and Brazil was also present with several of the 
participants. 
Social and political conditions 
Crelinsten and Schmid (1994) cited two sets of conditions under which one 
might expect torture to arise.  One of those sets was labeled “social and political 
conditions,” and inter alia included the following: 
 a national emergency or other perceived threat to security; 
 the need to process large numbers of suspects; 
 the dehumanization of an outgroup (national, religious or ethnic); 
 a high level of authorization to violate normal moral principles; 
 the presence of a "sacred mission" which justifies anything. (9) 
Given the nature and limitations of the present study, it would not be 
appropriate to say that the findings of the study “support” the condition list provided 
by Crelinsten and Schmid.  What can be said, however, is that the list surely seems 
reminiscent of the experiences of several of the participants.  The first four conditions 
were certainly present within the themes salient to some or others of the participants.  
I did not hear participants speaking in terms of “sacred mission” justifying atrocity in 
the way that security state torturers may have cited a duty to protect a culture or way 
of life from being polluted by communist or other “godless” insurgents.  From a view 
point of an over-riding priority becoming a “sacred dogma” that would justify torture 
or other immoral methods, the “Survival of Us” theme was used as a self-evident 
justification by several of the participants.   
Progression 
Crelinsten wrote about the progression of experiences that torturers received 
that transform their sensibilities and allow them to torture: 
Here we see many of the progressive features of training, the gradual 
movement from one world view (human, civilian, empathic, caring) to another 
(inhuman, torturer, cruel, detached). The subject (the 
conscript/recruit/torturer-to-be) is progressively desensitized while the object 
(the subversive/Communist/terrorist/victim-to-be) is progressively 
dehumanized, objectivized, stripped of any identity except the demonizing 
labels of the dangerous enemy. (1994, 48) 
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While Crelinsten wrote about torturers from various countries who were 
trained to execute tortures of the most heinous kinds in specific support of 
authoritarian regimes, and whose training was often as explicit and formalized as one 
might expect in any other professional military school, the experiences of the current 
study’s participants include many of these same transformative aspects in the shift 
from civilian to soldier to abuser.   
Crelinsten’s work showed that the world’s thousands of institutional torturers 
virtually never escaped from their duties.  Gripped by fear of being turned on by their 
fellows, those who wish to change feel compelled to carry on with their daily work of 
inflicting indescribable pain.  Some very exceptional few make the extraordinary break 
by refusing to continue and accepting the punishment of the institution, or defect 
from the atrocity industry and speak out. 
US military studies in Iraq 
In addition to psychologists and social scientists’ research, there is a small body 
of research that benefitted from a unique level of access to the general environment 
in which the majority of my study participants acquired their relevant experiences.  
The US military conducted annual studies of various aspects of troop mental health in 
Iraq and Afghanistan.  In the studies conducted in 2006 and 2007, researchers added 
battlefield ethics to their areas of review.  Their research provides an additional 
dimension to the literature which is of relevance to my study.  Although the 
interviewees in the present study served in CT and COIN forces that operated in 
various cases before, during, and after the military studies, those studies derived 
findings similar in character to those found here.  
In 2006, the American military conducted an annual Mental Health Advisory 
Team study (MHAT IV) of troops in Iraq.  As part of its study it conducted focus groups 
among soldiers who had been deployed for varying periods.  One group had only been 
in Iraq for one month, the other had had its deployment extended several times, 
being in Iraq for fourteen months at the time of the sessions.  The differences in the 
two groups assessment of their missions is reminiscent of the progression described 
by some of this study’s participants.  As cited by the MHAT IV report: 
The first group thought that they were doing a job that was important in 
fighting terrorism in Iraq instead of letting the terrorists fight in the United 
States. [ ] The second group did not see a purpose for being in Iraq.  They 
thought that either we should leave and let the Iraqi’s fight a civil war, or let 
Soldiers go after insurgents no matter the risk of collateral damage.  They 
thought that Iraqis would learn to cooperate with coalition forces in fear of 
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their cities being destroyed (Office of the Surgeon General United States Army 
Medical Command 2006, 3). 
The differences in attitudes about the primary mission track quite closely with 
the progression that several of this study’s participants reported.  Early on in their 
deployments the study soldiers felt that they were in Iraq to assist in its recovery and 
to protect America from terrorists.  Later several adopted the view that personal and 
comrade survival was of primary importance.  Some of the participants arrived in 
country with units that embraced the view that the intimidation of the populace, the 
so-called “out-terrorize the terrorists” focus, made sense.  These units included troops 
who had served earlier Iraq combat deployments and the kinds of attitudes expressed 
by the MHAT IV veteran troops may well have similarly persisted.   
The MHAT IV report summarized some of its key findings regarding battlefield 
ethics: 
Less than half of Soldiers and Marines believed that non-combatants should be 
treated with dignity and respect and well over a third believed that torture 
should be allowed to save the life of a fellow team member.  About 10% of 
Soldiers and Marines reported mistreating an Iraqi non-combatant when it 
wasn’t necessary, either by destroying their private property or by hitting or 
kicking them.  Less than Half of Soldiers or Marines would report a team 
member for unethical behavior, instead preferring to handle it themselves at 
the team level (Office of the Surgeon General United States Army Medical 
Command 2006, 42). 
The following year’s report (MHAT V) noted that “attitudes regarding the 
treatment of insurgents and non-combatants [ ] may be influenced by training and 
may also be a pre-cursor to behavior (2008, 31).” The participants in the current study 
certainly made mention of de-humanizing attitudes espoused in training and tied the 
general outlook of the Iraqis as less than human to abusive violence that they and 
others around them committed.  The report’s authors chose not to continue to survey 
for attitudes, citing literature that indicates a weak link between attitudes and 
behaviors.  For that reason, they elected to concentrate on reported behaviors. 
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Both the MHAT IV and MHAT V studies used surveys of soldiers which in part 
examined unethical behavior.  Five questions were asked of soldiers in both years, 
three about abusive behavior, and two about units “modifying” or “ignoring” rules of 
engagement.  The results were reported in the MHAT V report: 
Adjusted Percents for Male, E1-E4 Soldiers in Theater 9 
Months 
  
 Percent Reporting  
 One Time or 
More 
 
 MHATI
V 
MHATV  
Unethical Behavior Variable 2006 2007 p-value 
1. Insulted and/or cursed non-combatants in 
their presence 
34.60% 33.00% 0.403 
2. Damaged and/or destroyed private property 
when it was not necessary. 
10.90% 13.60% 0.054 
3. Physically hit/kicked a non-combatant when 
it was not necessary. 
5.30% 6.10% 0.377 
4.  Members of my unit "modify" the Rules of 
Engagement in Order to accomplish the 
mission. 
10.90% 7.40% 0.024 
5.  Members of my unit "ignore" the Rules of 
Engagement in Order to accomplish the 
mission. 
5.70% 4.30% 0.107 
 
(Office of the Surgeon General United States Army Medical Command 2008, 32) 
The only significant difference between the two years’ results was a drop in 
the second year of units modifying Rules of Engagement to accomplish the mission.  
Subsequent years’ MHAT studies did not ask about attitudes or reported behaviors 
relating to battlefield ethics. 
The present study has obvious differences from the MHAT reports cited above 
due to methods employed and study focus.  In this study a limited number of persons 
were studied using the processes of IPA, primarily semi-structured interviews followed 
by interpretive analysis.  The MHAT study asked about only three specific types of 
abusive conduct, of which only one dealt directly with physical abuse directed at 
people.  Also, the reports, as one would expect based on the study designs, did not 
report on what the abusers believed were the reasons for the abuse.  MHAT IV did 
report on relationships between non-combatant mistreatment and such factors as 
level of anger, unit casualties, mental health issues, and handling of human remains. 
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In general, the levels of mistreatment appeared higher with personnel for whom the 
dependent factors were present.   
The MHAT IV findings were of interest while designing the current study, but 
since this study was never intended to seek generalizable results, they could only 
provide peripheral background information. The current study directly sought to learn 
the participants’ explanations for the abusive conduct and therefore resulted in the 
subjective sense-making of individuals. In general, the reported experiences of the 
participants tend to be consonant with some MHAT IV findings.  Participants cited 
anger in general and anger over comrade casualties as reasons for some of the abuse 
they engaged in.  Participants did not generally link mental health issues per se and 
handling of human remains to abuse they observed or committed. 
Rejali on American Post-9/11 Method Transmission  
 Torture historian Darius Rejali (2007) has examined the ways in which methods 
of torture have been taught to Americans during both the Cold War era and since 
9/11.  His work reviewed instances of supposed formal torture training and found that 
there is very little evidence of training programs that taught torture methods to 
Americans in ways similar to the Greek or Brazilian case previously discussed.  Instead, 
he determined that the available evidence shows democracies generally tend not to 
disperse knowledge of torture methods through formal training programs and 
manuals.  He contends that in an era of enhanced human rights monitoring less 
programmed informal “craft apprenticeships” allow for torture to be adopted without 
the existence of documentary evidence likely to implicate government leaders.  As 
such, informal structures allow for methods to “spread though backroom 
apprenticeships, networks of whispers, knowing glances, and the enabling power of 
averted eyes” (2007, 526). 
 Rejali compared manuals produced by the US CIA and US Army for training of 
allied personnel during the Cold War.  Although the manuals did provide some limited 
information about methods such as stress positions, environmental and sleep 
manipulation, sensory deprivation, forced standing or sitting, etc., the evidence from 
the actual practices of other countries which may have received the training materials 
shows little reliance by those countries on the American advice.  He also examined the 
instruction outlines for the training programs delivered by Americans and found no 
support for the view that torture was being taught.  Rejali wrote, “In short, 
interrogation programs, even those that allow for torture, do not appear to be the 
main channels by which torturers learn their craft. . . . Even in American 
counterintelligence, where one would expect to find this training most clearly, the 
time spent on teaching interrogation of any sort is so short that it could not have been 
a program priority” (emphasis original) (2007, 431). 
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 According to Rejali, the transfer of torture methods occurs via low-level 
personnel sharing information instead of formal programs approved by high-level 
leadership.  A notable exception may be the transformation of American Survival, 
Escape, Resistance, Escape (SERE) training, which Rejali described as forcing students 
to be “hooded, deprived of sleep, starved, stripped of clothes, exposed to extreme 
temperatures and painful noise, choked with water. . ., and subjected to harsh 
interrogation including humiliation, sexual embarrassment, and desecration of 
religious symbols and books” (2007, 432).  SERE training specialists provided advice to 
American interrogators at Guantanamo.  Guantanamo interrogators took techniques 
learned from the SERE program and developed a request for Department of Defense 
approval that included a number of SERE techniques for authorized use at 
Guantanamo, including assault, stress positions and sleep deprivation (Rejali, 2007).  
In only one specific example he could find, did Rejali report on formal classroom 
training by Americans in which specific techniques were taught to would-be American 
torturers: “In 2003, the CIA selected fourteen agents for the interrogation of a dozen 
top al-Qaeda suspects and trained them in six authorized torture techniques, including 
the Dutch method of choking with water” (Ibid., 430). 
 In the main, according to Rejali, Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan developed 
torture methods by drawing from their own experiences (some acquired while they 
were SERE students, or from other painful personal history), the media, and 
observations made of other units’ methods.  Rejali wrote that his research “found very 
limited evidence in favor of the thesis that torture training is transmitted through 
official manuals or centralized interrogation programs. . . .  Perhaps others will 
uncover more programs and manuals eventually, but as far as the published evidence 
goes, the craft apprenticeship hypothesis remains the most plausible explanation of 
how most torture techniques get transmitted.  Interrogators appear to pass on 
techniques largely through low-level transmission between ordinary soldiers and 
policemen or by means of simple imitation on the job” (2007, 434).  The experiences 
shared by participants in this study certainly support Rejali’s findings.  No evidence of 
formal training directed at the creation of torturers was described by the soldiers.  
Their “learning” of abusive violence techniques took place in the low level 
transmission methods described by Rejali from soldier to soldier, victim to soldier, and 
in two cases from fathers to sons.  Their own difficult experiences during training and 
disciplinary hazing provided further examples of techniques from which they could 
select. 
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Original Research Questions 
As noted previously, IPA studies do not attempt to extrapolate beyond the 
data provided by participants to conclusions relative any other persons or groups.  The 
use of IPA does, however, provide insight into how some individuals in similar 
situations make sense of the experiences they lived through.  The significant life 
events recounted by this study’s participants included their entry into environments 
that included potential American abusive violence in CT and COIN campaigns.  That 
entry was followed by exposure to abusive violence enacted by others and sometimes 
engaged in by them.  Lethal force against bystanders and detainees was used by some 
of the participants or their comrades.  Turning to the original questions the study was 
designed to address, here are the views prevalent across accounts or strongly-held by 
fewer participants. 
Why did using AV makes sense at the time to participants?   
The wording of the question presupposed a considered and rational “sensible 
choice” criterion being employed by those who engaged in abusive violence.  The 
reality of the lived experiences as related by both abusers and observers of abusive 
violence describe something far different going on.  With the exception of the 
interrogators who were following pre-set guidelines or instructions involving 
environmental manipulation, stress positions, or “monstering”17methods, or the 
deliberate and largely controlled instrumental violence employed by Frank Wright and 
his special operations comrades, the kinds of abusive violence generally described 
were highly emotionally charged.  Much of it was in the form of angry lashing out 
against individuals captured after attempting to kill the Americans, against 
neighborhoods immediately surrounding IED strike sites, or as part of campaigns of 
intimidation and domination seen as necessary to ensure survival. 
For those who explained their own feelings, or sought to explain the motives 
of others who abused, the venting of frustration and anger or the reclamation of a 
sense of control were common reasons offered.  This applied in numerous situations 
including the mocking-treatment and hazing of detainees; the beatings of Iraqis who 
failed to show sufficient submissiveness in the face of American’s demands for 
obedience in streets, shops, and homes; and even the “long drive-by” shootings in 
which frustrated convoys and patrols fired on cars, homes, fields, and people as they 
drove through IED attacks. 
                                                     
17
 “Monstering” as used herein refers to boisterous violent scene-setting of the type engaged in by 
Antonio Hayes and his team-mates.  Soldiers used the crashing of cell doors, shouting, banging of chairs 
against walls, manhandling and jostling of detainees, finger-twisting, and a general reliance on shock 
and surprise to frighten and confuse hooded detainees. 
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In some cases, the violence was an enraged response to surviving harrowing 
combat or the deaths of friends.  Both Chris Alexander and Richard Miller described 
the appalling carving and killings of detainees in the wake of such events.  Frank 
Wright also reported the brutal deaths of two detainees in the immediate aftermath 
of violent combat in which comrades were killed or grievously wounded. 
In other cases, the use of violence against the local Iraqi population as a whole 
was a deliberate tactic to advance the strategy of mass intimidation and domination.  
To “out terrorize the terrorists” was a sentiment that spoke to the adoption of a COIN 
outlook that sought to create within the civilian population a cowed submission to, 
not a willing support of, the American forces.  Brandon Peterson firmly believed that it 
was the only thing that prevented the population of the first city his unit occupied 
from rising up and killing the outnumbered Americans.   
Sometimes abusive violence was contemplated or completed because of 
curiosity or simple amusement.  Chris Alexander and Stephen Scott reported being 
curious about waterboarding.  Stephen might have tried it on a detainee if the 
conditions had permitted him to do it with impunity.  Chris and his squad mates did 
experiment on a passerby for a bit of fun.  Later they used the same tactic to terrorize 
and kill three detainees.  Stephen Scott and Sam Bailey both mentioned seeing others 
in their units menacing unsuspecting Iraqis with weapons simply for their own or 
others’ amusement. 
Abusive violence was also carried out because it was easier than doing 
something else.  Chris Alexander’s squad debated the relative merits of summarily 
shooting a captured roadside bomber versus turning him in for detention and 
probable torture.  They shot the victim to avoid paperwork.  In another case, Brandon 
Peterson described persuading his team not to take a stand against delivering a 
detainee to be tortured by the Iraqi police simply because he was tired and wanted to 
finish his day without unnecessary drama. 
Abusive violence was also committed because abusers found the activity fun or 
otherwise alluring. Several participants reported laughter from themselves or others 
present during episodes of abusive violence including street beatings; secluded 
location scarring torture; and simple detainee harassment and hazing.  Participants’ 
responses, such as Chris Alexander’s recollection that the power to torture or kill a 
prisoner imparted a “unique and wonderful” feeling, gave voice to the sense of dark 
enjoyment that abusing with impunity sometimes produced.  Others recognized the 
temptation that such power offered but restrained themselves from acting out their 
desires. 
Findings, Implications and Conclusions  263 
 
 
 
According to this group of participants, they and their comrades enacted 
abusive violence most often as a result of feeling frustration, anger, and pressure.  
They were frustrated at fighting an invisible enemy who could not be found to punish.  
They were angry because they lost friends to attacks and blamed the populace for 
supporting those carrying out the attacks.  They were pressured to produce 
intelligence or to survive their deployments.  Some abusive violence of the clean types 
reported by Rejali was used by the interrogator participants, but generally excluded 
methods that involving striking, electrocuting, or suffocating. 
How did AV abusers choose the method of abuse employed?  How did they learn of 
possible methods from which to choose? 
Again, the participants report experiences largely divorced from a considered 
choosing from among alternatives.  When moved by immediate irritation or anger, 
participants reported physical striking such as punching, kicking, and butt-stroking 
with rifles.  These were methods taught during combat training.  Participants also 
reported using finger twisting, compliance blows, and forced kneeling which were 
tactics learned during civil disturbance training.  Certain stress positions and forced 
exercises that were used against detainees were first endured by soldiers as physical 
exercises during military training or as punishment hazing in training schools and 
serving units. 
The enhanced interrogation techniques used by interrogators were learned 
from observing the practices of other interrogators.  In other cases interrogators 
learned from detainees how they had been treated by other units.  Some methods 
were more easily chosen because they did not resemble what soldiers recognized as 
torture.  For instance, making someone assume the “electric chair” stress position or 
remain kneeling on concrete surfaces for hours outdoors in the winter seemed to lack 
the raw insult and obvious excruciating pain that other methods exuded.  Also, these 
softening-up methods offered the interrogators an advantage of distancing them from 
the abuse since they could be enacted at the interrogators’ behest by guards out of 
the presence of the interrogators. 
Sometimes there was the informal transfer of techniques during casual 
conversations between line soldiers and special operations and intelligence soldiers 
who described a range of abusive methods they employed.  Waterboarding, extremely 
loud music, bright strobe lighting, the use of military police dogs, and temperature 
manipulation were transferred via these methods. 
Intelligence training courses were also inadvertent ways that abusive 
techniques were transmitted.  The two trained military interrogator participants both 
recounted instructors mentioning the use of electric shock generated by field 
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telephones as a method that had been used in Viet Nam.  Also, Wayne Watson 
described a range of interrogation tactics formally taught to him during interrogation 
resistance training he received as a new agent.  He had been offered what he 
considered to be pseudo-psychological explanations for why those methods would be 
effective.  None of these three participants used the methods they had learned of in 
training. 
Two participants reported learning torture techniques from their fathers.  
Stephen Scott reported being curious about waterboarding because his father had 
told him personal stories as he grew up about its effectiveness in Viet Nam.  Chris 
Alexander learned the use of wire cutters for finger-lopping as a child reading his 
father’s Viet Nam war journals. 
Chris Alexander had also learned of abusive methods employed by the 
members of his squad during their earlier combat deployment.  One member of Chris’ 
squad used a technique, delivering electric shocks via a re-purposed lamp cord, that 
he had seen used in a movie. 
As mentioned earlier, the overall impression received from the accounts of the 
participants was that, especially with respect to finding methods supportive of 
interrogation, approaches had to be improvised.  Some, such as Frank Wright’s 
bashing a prisoners head against a locked door he wanted the prisoner to open, were 
direct, immediate, and capable of gaining the desired result in short order.  Others 
were less effective even though they might have been less or more violently injurious.  
An ad hoc searching for the magic key to get prisoners to divulge their secrets seems 
to have pervaded the interrogators’ experiences.  With respect to non-interrogational 
abuse, participants relied on their personal experiences and simple ready violence of 
the fist, boot, and rifle butt. 
How do veterans now view the abusive violence they observed or perpetrated?   
Participants reflected on the abuse they committed or observed with a range 
of perspectives.  The most common comments reflect regret and guilt over abuse 
committed and abuse not prevented.  This is most pronounced in connection to 
actions the former abusers judged were done “unnecessarily.”  Acts that were done 
either to obtain information or to ensure survival appear to be assessed as 
“necessary” if they were controlled, effective, and devoid of emotions of anger or 
sadistic enjoyment.  As an example, Chris Alexander’s regret over the beating, cutting, 
and electrocution of the Iraqi elder is expressed by his feeling of “unaccomplishment,” 
which refers to the fact that the most effective method (e.g., threatening to find and 
torture the prisoner’s loved one) could have been used earlier.  To Chris, the regret 
was about wasted effort.  This is not the same as guilt, however.  I suspect that if one 
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of the physical tortures had netted information, then Chris would have considered it 
“necessary” and not regrettable. In contrast, Chris referred to other instrumental 
violence in a manner that reflected a belief that they were necessary duties that, 
while distasteful, did not induce feelings of guilt. 
In some cases, expressions of regret for failing to prevent abusive violence 
were made by participants whose conduct, viewed from a third party perspective, 
appeared blameless.  Charles Wilson expressed shame for not preventing the death of 
a detainee who died because the Americans holding him did not have a translator 
with them who could tell them that vitally needed medicine was in the prisoner’s 
truck.  Wilson, who at the time was very likely one of the lowest ranking soldiers in a 
forty-man platoon, had no duties directly related to the prisoners.  After they were 
captured, he returned to his vehicle and played with his Gameboy while the senior 
NCOs and officers in the unit decided what would happen.  Wilson, at the time a mere 
vehicle driver, considers his failure to speak up about the pleas from the prisoners as 
among his worst conduct while deployed.  Although it seems unlikely that anything he 
could have said or done would have changed the outcome, it was the failure to 
recognize at the time that something should have been done, coupled with the failure 
to try to do something, that haunt him. 
As mentioned before, Sam Bailey is similarly concerned that she should have 
been more explicit in her warnings to her battalion commander that unit members 
were being heavy-handed with the population that had welcomed the Americans with 
open arms.  Her doubts continue, although there is probably not enough information 
available to determine whether the reasons for subsequent attacks on the battalion 
had anything to do with their treatment of the locals. 
Chris Alexander’s sense of guilt over things he and his squad did was tied to 
wanton cruelty un-related to their missions.  He expressed feeling badly about 
degrading detainees, killing to avoid paperwork, cutting and scarring prisoners, and 
burning them with cigarettes.  He is only partially able to explain how those episodes 
happen.  He blurted out his confused framing of the acts: “I mean it…that’s not 
necessary, but, you know, when you’re there and you’re actually doing it and you’re 
angry and…you don’t care, you feel that it is [necessary], and I know it’s a complete 
contradiction and statement, but that’s how it really is.”  He is unable to reconcile the 
conflicting demands of civilized conduct and what feels necessary in war.  He settles 
on a view that life is “a bunch of contradictions.”   
Frank Wright feels little remorse for his personal conduct, again because the 
violence he used was necessary to the mission.  His strongest feelings about abusive 
violence are much the same now as they were during the deployment: humans in 
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genuine fear for their lives can be induced to divulge secrets and the use of extreme 
violence to create that fear will cause serious harm to the abusers in later years.  He is 
also of the opinion that effective special operations units must recruit and use men 
willing to become professional killers and that some such men will enjoy hurting and 
killing people.  For practical reasons, Frank considers the negative aspects of abusive 
violence to be unavoidable if special operations forces must be deployed. 
Roy Howard went to war seeking the elevated human experience.  He came 
away from his Iraq experiences having seen himself as an actor on the wrong side of 
the protector/abuser dichotomy.  Knowing that he used painful and injurious 
interrogations techniques including extended stress positioning, solitary confinement, 
and sleep manipulation, he is bewildered that at the time he did not immediately 
recognize the immoral and abusive nature of the methods.  He also is coping with the 
realization that part of his willingness to use those techniques was a desire to have the 
experience of observing their effectiveness.  He admits that he acted out of frustration 
and anger and was tempted to cross the line into scarring and worse physical torture.  
This recognition is both troubling and reassuring to him; he is concerned that he 
contemplated the worst, but is relieved that there were limits to the depths to which 
he could sink. 
Richard Miller’s present sense-making of the abuse experiences of his squad 
are dominated by the brutal treatment to which Iraqis were subjected by him and 
others.  His fear of being psychotic, of harboring a pain that can only be relieved by 
inflicting bone-breaking pain on others, and of being beyond any peace or forgiveness 
darken his vision of the past and the future.  He blames no one else for his plight, 
believing that like Jacob Marley he has forged the chains he now carries link by link in 
his prior life.  He is afflicted by PTSD and sometimes suffers debilitating flashbacks.  He 
has trouble recognizing that it was his decisive act to halt the murderous conduct of 
his squad which made the difference to the Iraqis and the soldiers spared the effects 
of the unit’s violent spree.  He acknowledges the peace-instilling influence of his wife 
and love of his children.  He does know too, that his children gave him the lens by 
which he saw Iraqi children as human, and thereby reacquired the vision to realize 
that any life, Iraqi or American, was worth saving. 
Superordinate Themes 
The superordinate themes identified in this study are representative of the 
thoughts of most participants or are especially salient with relation to a smaller 
number of the participants.  In one or two instances, the superordinate themes may 
have been of great importance to only one participant but are reported as 
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superordinate as they indicate a unique insight or perspective which seems 
descriptive of an important aspect of experiencing abusive violence. 
Survival of Us justifies any aggressive measures thought useful for survival  
Participants’ frequently offered that they were willing to do anything necessary 
to ensure the survival of their comrades.  Interestingly, this declaration was often 
made without reference to personal survival, although frequently an inclusive “we” 
was used.  The commitment to one’s fellows, especially expressed by the combat arms 
soldiers, left little doubt that participants had experienced a deep attachment to 
comrades.  Although often couched in language such as “we will do anything we need 
to do to survive,” it was clear that this was not true.  I heard no willingness to desert, 
refuse to carry out duties, or sabotage mission capabilities. The mission shift to 
“Survival of Us” was offered as a self-evident over-riding justification for aggression.   
Dehumanized Other allows abusive violence against detainees and general 
population. 
 Numerous participants spoke of the sub-human view of Iraqis that abusers held.  This 
came from abusers themselves and others who observed abuse.  Several mentioned 
the training they received at induction or in serving units as being specifically racist 
and made killing and abuse of Muslims a habituated concept. 
360o Threat Environment means EVERY Other represents danger/deserves 
punishment 
During deployments several participants developed the view that every Iraqi, 
including women and children, represented grave threats to soldiers.  In some cases, 
the failure to meekly submit to American superiority was taken as resistant hostility.  
In a similar vein, the ability of insurgents to plant and trigger IEDs was interpreted as 
possible only with the active support of the community.  The belief that every Iraqi 
always was aware of who the insurgents were and what they planned to do was a 
justification to terrify any Iraqi taken off the streets in the pursuit of information.  
Continuing attacks therefore were proof that the community had to be intimidated 
into withholding support for insurgents or deserved to be collectively punished for 
attacks against the Americans. 
Frustration/Anger/Revenge/Rage/Domination create pressure that AV relieves   
The inability to obtain actionable intelligence through properly restrained 
methods; the constant threat of IED strikes or ambushes when in the field; rocket, 
mortar and truck bomb attacks while at bases; and the general misery of being away 
from home in a climate of oven-like temperatures, created a sense of powerlessness 
and frustration.  When casualties from attacks were added to the mix, the level of 
frustration, anger, and desire for revenge grew.  Some participants cited the need to 
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relieve that pressure as a reason why they or others engaged in levels of abusive 
violence that ranged from detainee hazing and street beatings of bystanders to 
scarring tortures and murders. 
Re-humanized Other prompts reduction/cessation of AV   
Several of the soldiers who engaged in abusive violence described a 
moderating effect that came after they began to view the Iraqis as humans.  This came 
about through a mix of influences.  One such influence was coming to the realization 
that detainees were, contrary to expectations, not terrorists or insurgents; they were, 
instead, the “catch” from neighborhood sweeps for military-aged males.  Another 
influence was acquiring a point of view empathetic to the detainees or the general 
community.  Several participants stated an understanding that they would have taken 
up arms against an occupying force that treated Americans the way they treated the 
Iraqis.  Another re-humanizing influence was the guilt that abusers began to feel for 
the way they treated detainees.  Their own assessment of the meaning of their 
emotions relating to their conduct helped to bring about a realization that the Iraqis 
were humans and as detainees were the responsibility of their captors to care for 
properly.  These and other factors allowed several of the participants to reduce or 
completely curtail their abusive conduct. 
Self-reproach persists  
Participants report current feelings of shame, guilt, and self-loathing for 
abusing others or failing to prevent others from abusing.  Re-framing some acts as 
“doing what we had to do” appears to relieve some participants from feeling 
responsible for the abuse; however, where the abuse is regarded as lacking the moral 
cover of necessity, long-lasting negative emotions were reported.  Choosing to turn 
away from abuse, even to the extent of preventing others from perpetrating abuse, 
does not seem to protect participants from ongoing self-reproach.  More than one 
participant reported that supporting anti-war efforts was a personal necessity 
stemming from their feelings of culpability. 
Findings derived/implied by superordinate themes 
The accounts of personal experiences shared by study participants offer their 
own idiosyncratic histories and efforts at making sense of various events.  While this 
cannot be a basis to claim universal findings related to American abusive violence in 
CT and COIN operations since September 2001, the experiences so related allow one 
to consider possible implications.  Although in individual cases below, the language 
used may seem to be positive claims, they are not.  They are simply inferences 
reasonably drawn both from the body of interviews themselves, and the analytical 
interpretations derived therefrom, but may be useful in forming concepts for future 
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inquiry.  Having made this general statement of qualification for the following, I have 
chosen to avoid the odious clutter that would accompany repeating similar provisos at 
each instance. 
 Macro-level Command Authority: High-level authority to commit Abusive 
Violence in the form of EITs or Community-Domination/Community-
Punishment postures provide ample license for the so-inclined to abuse 
detainees or whole communities. 
 Micro-level Command Authority: The lowest level authority figure, including at 
times moral-authority figure, has the most influence on either unleashing or 
retarding AV.  The squad or section leader can commit and thereby foster 
routine beatings, occasional torture, and killings of detainees or loved ones of 
field interrogation targets. 
  “Survival of Us” mission-shift facilitates more brutal levels of abuse including 
intimidation of populace through street beatings, indiscriminate shooting in 
retaliation for IED attacks, psychological and physical torture, and killings. 
 Frustration, fear, and anger combine to fuel affective abusive violence, both in 
contemplation and action.  Beatings, scarring tortures, and cover-up killings 
can result. 
 Hazing experienced by troops in induction training and while with serving units 
reduces the perceived “wrongness” of hazing detainees.  The logic of “if we do 
it to our own, why wouldn’t we do it to them?” can pervade. 
 The widespread and frequent nature of hazing made its use against detainees 
virtually disappear into the background, even for those who would have halted 
more obvious violence. 
 Some military systems/training act to inhibit/retard wanton abusive violence.  
Training in Geneva Conventions emphasis in interrogation training was cited as 
a source of hesitation to employ enhanced and abusive interrogation 
techniques.  Training that persuades interrogators that punishment will follow 
illegal means can inhibit choices made in the field. 
 Determined abusers will evade systems that inhibit/retard/restrict abusive 
violence.  Abusive interrogation methods, including physical tortures and 
scarring tortures, may be employed in field locations before detention center 
accountability procedures take effect.  Abuse in those circumstances can lead 
to un-planned over-kill violence.  In worst cases, cover-up killings may ensue. 
 Convenience can result in going-along with AV tasking or can be the tie-
breaker to abuse.  In the case of troops who have already engaged in serious 
physical abusive violence, killing prisoners instead of removing them to 
detention can occur if they harbor strong belief that prisoner is responsible for 
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American casualties, and an argument for conveniently avoiding detention 
procedures by summary killing is advanced. 
 Abuse can amuse.  Laughing about abuse can signal nervous acquiescence or 
full support for abuse. 
 Objectors can influence abusers to alter behavior.  Sometimes alterations are 
simply cosmetic, sometimes temporary, and sometimes profound. 
 A single significant event can be, or at least seem to be, the salient tipping-
point incident that demarcates abuse/non-abuse: 
o Chris surviving hallway knife fight led to Iraqi’s as animals/Survival-of-
Us priority. 
o Antonio interrogated wounded father led to “I understand why they 
mortar us/I deserve to die” perspective. 
o Kids shot by Americans, following other events, is the reason Richard 
Miller halted all AV against Iraqis. 
The accounts offered by the study participants demonstrate that egregious 
abusive violence can arise within the armed forces of a democracy without the explicit 
and overt orders, atrocity institutions, and death camps of twentieth-century 
totalitarian states.  The testimony clearly shows that it is possible for murder, torture 
and the terrorizing of a civilian populace can come from ordinary soldiers being 
allowed to give vent to frustration, fear, and anger.  
More can lead to less: A proposed progression model of 
AV inception, escalation, and reduction 
The individual accounts from observers, abusers, and objectors give a 
fragmentary view of abusive violence from a multitude of angles.  Compositing those 
fragments into a view of how AV begins, grows and recedes, is admittedly fraught with 
the risk of mis-describing the “true” course of the phenomenon.  Indeed, I would not 
subscribe to a view that there is a single “true” progression; however, by attempting 
to fit the provided pieces into an approximate “mosaic,” we can use future research to 
refine, clarify, or completely re-draw this early image.  If the image proves durable, 
then perhaps it can be used to affect the conduct of future CT and COIN campaigns. 
Having made choices to wholeheartedly participate in heinous abusive 
violence does not mean abusers cannot self-reform.  Prolonged exposure or use of 
indiscriminate AV can lead to conditions conducive to lessened abusiveness.  
Repeating AV seems to affect abuser self-image (“turning in to” unwanted identities) 
and the perceived image of the “other.”  The lack of confirmation that the violence is 
being directed at “terrorists,” acts to open a point of view of the detainees or public as 
victims of oppression.  The adoption of that viewpoint leads to, or can be a result of, 
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an assessment of them/us equivalency: the “if an occupier did this to me and mine” 
logic. Understanding why the insurgents are trying to kill the occupying army (“us”), 
opens a “Re-humanizing” that robs the abuser of the moral license and the 
instrumental/usefulness rationale to continue abuse. 
I believe that a progression model that describes entry into abuse and exit 
from it, based on the combined accounts of participants, can be proposed. By 
proposing this model, I do not claim that it models the only pathway, or even the 
pathway that any single participant traveled.  It reflects the thinking directly reported, 
or implied, by many of the provided accounts, and therefore is a composite model.  It 
is proposed as a single interpretation of how abusive violence may come about and 
may desist.  The ordered list represents the way in which later perspectives are 
derived from some or all of the earlier-stated views. The model begins with pre-
service reasoning and develops based on indoctrination, training, leader influence, 
experience influences, and outsider and peer input. 
The proposed progression model 
1. We are Humans, possessing dignity and morals (Including mercy). 
2. The Other is NOT Human. 
3. Therefore, The Other CAN be abused. 
4. A Survival-of-Us mission-shift REQUIRES us to “Do Everything 
Necessary.” 
5. Therefore, the Other MUST be abused. 
6. Abuse on whim amuses and relieves feelings of frustration, anger, 
rage. 
7. In an absence of more effective CT and COIN tactics, abuse is good, 
and, more must be better. 
8. The most atrocious abuse returns power to abusers, bestowing a 
unique and wonderful feeling. 
9. Excessive, unnecessary abuse promotes self-doubt, self-loathing, 
shame and guilt. 
10. Unnecessary abuse, coupled with recognition of victims’ innocence, 
promotes identification with oppressed point of view. 
11. Identification with oppressed point of view fosters “Re-
humanization” of the Other: Other = Human. 
12. Re-humanization, coupled with assessment that abuse is an 
ineffective and counter-productive COIN approach, promotes 
reduced or terminated abuse. 
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13. Reduction in abuse does not relieve abusers of guilt, shame, or self-
loathing; although, a change to other activities can offer a 
temporary shift in focus/framing of deployment. 
14. Self-perceived “unnecessary abuse” preserves guilt/shame self-
assessment post-deployment. 
15. Self-perceived “unavoidable abuse” has less or no guilt/shame self-
assessment post-deployment. 
16. Self-labeled “unnecessary abusers” who are unable to reconcile 
atrocious abuse/guilt/shame with obligations of “humanity,” 
classify themselves as inhuman “Monsters.” 
17. “Monsters” are trapped by altered identity.  They either re-
humanize selves as persons who made mistakes (“it is what I did”) 
and try to get along with each day or they cannot conceive of any 
forgiveness, including self-forgiveness, and await entry into that 
“special place in hell.” 
Suggested Further Research 
The Jongman and Schmid research desiderata mentioned in Chapter 1, while 
not the core points of inquiry of this study, certainly share the prevailing sensibility 
that serves as the foundation of the Detainee Interaction Study.  When we examine 
the illicit and tortuous methods of CT interrogation, or the export of suspects for 
abusive proxy interrogation, or contemplate the effectiveness of “out-terrorizing the 
terrorists,” we implicitly acknowledge that those approaches and practices lie outside 
civilized norms.  They warrant special study because their use by states deserves 
attention in the same way that disease is studied for definition and cure-seeking.  It is 
my view that those methods must be rejected unless they deliver extraordinary 
benefits to the opponents of terrorists without harmful side-effects.  The experiences 
shared by the participants of this study offer us no such assurances and instead bear 
testimony to the toxicity that abusive violence delivers to victims, objectors, and 
abusers alike. 
This study has contributed to the study of terrorism and counter-terrorism by 
examining the lived experiences of a small number of actors who were placed into CT 
and COIN operations in the wake of 9/11.  The particular group of participants was 
recruited to study how abusive violence was experienced by some Americans who 
observed, objected to, or committed abusive violence.  The study’s findings include 
partial answers to the original study questions, sense-making themes interpreted from 
the participants’ accounts, and inferences derived from those accounts relating to 
possible ways of conceptualizing abusive violence in the recent American case.  
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Inasmuch as the use of abusive violence is arguably detrimental to strategic interests 
of liberal democracies engaged in CT and COIN campaigns, injurious to many 
individuals directly victimized by the abuse, and appears to have lasting and negative 
consequences on perpetrators of the abusive violence, further study of the 
phenomenon is clearly justified. 
The present study, while providing new data, is only able to support claims 
about the ways in which fourteen individuals experienced abusive violence.  There are 
additional areas of study that may lead to fuller understanding of the effects of 
allowing or employing abusive violence in CT and COIN.  Further, if a fuller 
understanding of the mechanisms that promote and inhibit the use of abusive 
violence by individuals is derived, such understanding may identify means of 
decreasing the use of abusive violence and its negative consequences for states, 
institutions, and individuals. 
Some areas of future study include: 
1. Similar IPA study of CT and COIN operatives from other liberal democracies 
that sent personnel to Iraq or Afghanistan. 
2. Broader-based studies using IPA or other research methods such as survey of 
American veterans.  Capitalizing on the reach of military services, government 
and non-profit veterans’ service agencies, or veteran membership groups 
could be helpful in collecting data useful in confirming or refining the theme 
and inferential findings of this study.   
3. Given the effects of Macro and Micro Command authority indicated in this 
study, research into the attitudes, training, and experiences of junior and 
senior unit commanders may identify weaknesses or gaps that fail to prevent, 
or indeed promote, abusive violence by the lower ranks. 
4. Researching the battlefield ethics training delivered at various career points for 
soldiers.  Also, researching the battlefield ethics training delivered pre-
deployment and at various points during deployment to soldiers. 
5. Repeated survey of soldiers during deployment to measure changes over time 
in attitudes relating to anger, frustration, fear, dehumanization, and mission-
identification/articulation.  Designing methods of measuring abusive violence 
behavior frequency and severity over time may also provide useful information 
regarding precursor, coincident, and post-incident attitudes and other factors 
related to abusive violence. 
6. Identifying ways in which the “moral bubble” of the small group can be 
deliberately pierced with messages that counter the groups’ thoughts that 
abusive violence is necessary or useful.  Such messaging could also include the 
acceptable ways in which soldiers, or groups of soldiers, can object to orders 
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that violate laws of war, human rights, or place them in jeopardy of 
punishment.   
7. Study the ways in which those who disapprove of abusive violence can safely 
influence fellow soldiers from continuing to abuse.  Consider making speaking 
out against abusive violence a positive attribute of moral courage celebrated 
by military history and tradition. 
8. Investigate means by which small unit operations can be removed from the 
unobserved, secret, and unsupervised environments in which much of the 
abuse can occur.  Helmet cams, dash-cams, weapons cams, and cell-block cams 
are used in other environments such as combat aircraft and police operations 
to allow for after-action and after-mishap investigations.  Their ubiquity may 
serve to deter misconduct, or may alternatively become so commonplace as to 
become invisible, and allow for documentation of acts during low-level abuse 
development.   
9. Consideration should be given to studying whether regular email and other 
private messaging to soldiers that promote or solicit reporting of abusive 
violence within units can be used to deter and reduce abusive violence.  In the 
alternative, such reporting may allow for effective investigation leading to 
removal of leaders who facilitate or otherwise fail to control abusive violence. 
Conclusion
The most significant finding of this study is that the reduction and full cessation of 
abusive violence by single or small groups of soldiers does not require intervention by 
outsiders.  This appears to be contrary to what might have been understood as a 
result of the Milgram studies on obedience, the Zimbardo’s analysis of his own SPE 
and the Abu Ghraib abuses, and Mestrovic’s study of Operation Iron Triangle.  The 
experiences reported by this study’s participants demonstrate that what Ervin Staub 
called the Continuum of Destruction can be accurately termed the Continuum Beyond 
Destruction.  The forces of Differentiation and Devaluation that result in 
Dehumanization, which in turn opens the pathway to Moral Exclusion, when coupled 
with the Defense of Self and need to reclaim power have been amply shown in this 
study to create the urge in participants to commit abusive violence.  Those combined 
forces have also enabled some to carry out hazing, beatings, coercive and painful 
interrogations, scarring tortures and summary executions.  The influence of command 
authority permission or demands for coercive measures or abusive violence seems 
associated with the more extreme behaviors. 
What the literature and laboratory experiments have not previously 
demonstrated is the strong counter-influence of extended participation in abusive 
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violence.  What Dave Grossman described as the “still, small voice of humanity,” is 
evident in the accounts of study participants who, while remaining under the 
influence of the systems and situations theorized to create abusers, found their ability 
to recognize the innocence and mirrored humanity in the Iraqis upon whom they had 
visited such hatred and abuse.  In some cases that voice did not become audible until 
after the deployments ended, but remarkably, multiple participants described 
reversing their attitudes and abuse during their deployments.  Sometimes those 
reversals were private and unannounced changes resulting in individual moderation or 
avoidance of abusive situations.  In the remarkable case of Richard Miller, the change 
was not only publicly made, but forcefully mandated to his subordinates. 
Both Zimbardo and Mestrovic describe the power of the reference group to 
create the conditions for abuse.  They also both find from the cases they studied a 
need for intervention to come from outsiders belonging to a different reference 
group.  This study raises the question of whether the reference group that supports 
abuse can evolve beyond abuse via a history of violence that fails to deliver the 
security and domination the group seeks and which history also creates self-loathing 
within the soldiers.  Can one squad of soldiers become its own “different” reference 
group and provide the perspective to allow for an “auto-intervention?” 
The laboratory studies of obedience to authority, willingness to do harm, and 
role-adoption were time-limited and failed to discover the effects of longer-term 
harm-infliction behavior.  The ethical restrictions on human subject studies would 
probably preclude such experimentation.  Case studies of abuse, such as Abu Ghraib 
and Operation Iron Triangle, are hindered in their ability to provide similar insight 
because they are selected from cases where the abuse was found out by outsiders, 
presumably before self-moderation occurred.  It is also possible that self-moderation 
was not reported because it was not looked for during the gathering and presentation 
of evidence in prosecutions for war crimes known to have been committed in very 
specific locales and timeframes. 
The hidden nature of the self-moderation phenomenon is most obviously 
explained by the natural desire of reformed abusers to avoid the punishment served 
out by courts martial.  The study participants also made clear that the prospect of 
losing the esteem, affection, and support of loved ones is a powerful deterrent to 
disclosure of the passage through a period of being an abuser.  The rapport-building 
efforts, promises of anonymity, and the commitment to non-judgmental long-form 
interviews combined to deliver the data about the post-9/11 era that other 
experimental and empirical methods have missed.   
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A second finding of this study is a confirmation of what the Abu Ghraib scandal 
revealed: Americans too commit abusive violence.  This study has provided more 
details of the range of abusive violence committed by Americans, but it is clear that 
even in the absence of formal institutionalized torturer creation programs, American 
soldiers operating under the pressures of CT and COIN, can develop a desire to abuse, 
and in some cases will commit, in the small scale available to lower echelon units, acts 
of abuse that go well beyond what has been previously reported.  Routine scarring 
torture, aggravated assaults, waterboarding and murders happen out of a need to 
reclaim a sense of power and control, out of rage, to obtain information, and in some 
cases, for simple amusement.  The abuse can become so “normal” for some squads of 
soldiers, that killing can occur to avoid paperwork or as the “obvious” method of 
concealing unplanned abuse. 
When democracies respond to terrorist attacks they have a choice of whether 
that response will follow a law-enforcement model, a war model, or some hybrid 
form.  In the case of the American response to the 9/11 attacks, a War on Terror was 
declared.  The US dispatched hundreds of thousands of men and women to the far 
corners of the world to carry America’s fight to the enemy.  Those men and women 
went for a variety of reasons, both personal and geopolitical.  Some significant 
number were persuaded to believe that insurgents resisting American invasions, co-
religionists of the 9/11 conspirators, and whole civilian populations did not deserve to 
be treated with human dignity and respect. 
The significant life experiences shared by the study participants provide insight 
into the forces that can shape the attitudes and actions of some soldiers and 
intelligence operatives who find themselves with the power to enact abusive violence 
upon the “Other” found in the persons of detained individuals or captive populations.  
What they tell us is that some Americans in those circumstances, exposed to 
indoctrination that rendered the people under their power as inhuman, vicious 
enemies, and led by superiors who countenanced or encouraged abusive behavior, 
succumbed to pressures of frustration, fear and anger.  What they also tell us is that 
some, subject to identical pressures, did not so succumb, but instead found the 
courage to directly object to the abusers, to divert their comrades from participation, 
and to extricate themselves from the occasions of abuse. 
The accounts provide personal evidence of the range of petty cruelties and 
gross atrocities that did occur when participants and their comrades were not 
properly curbed from lashing out.  They also tell the stories of abusers who turned 
away from the worst abusive behavior.  The adage that absolute power corrupts 
absolutely bears re-considering, for as some participants demonstrated, even when 
power remains absolute, the capacity of “monsters” to recognize the small clear voice 
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of their own humanity remains intact.  A way back can be found if circumstances 
permit.  Some “monsters” do not find the way out in time to prevent soul-crushing 
disorders.  Even those who do not descend to such depths are scarred by abusive 
violence. 
The participants tell stories of young adults gone to war for many reasons, 
some noble and others not.  Nearly all of the professional interrogators and combat 
arms soldiers speak of being ill-prepared for, and inept at, questioning the persons 
they were sent to seize or who were thrust upon them.  The fact that virtually no one 
knew how to effectively interrogate, and the immense pressure they felt to 
accomplish a mission thought to require “breaking” people, meant that the 
temptation to employ force, pain and threats was difficult to resist. 
Few of the participants who spoke of committing abuse now view their abuse 
as justified.  They may have believed at the time that they had little choice but to 
terrorize those within their power, but in only one instance does that view persist. 
As a citizen of a democracy that claims to honor the sanctity of rights 
inalienable, I believe that that country owes a responsibility to it sons and daughters 
sent across the globe, and to those upon whom our global power projects, to ensure 
that our soldiers always know that there are choices other than abusive violence, and 
that they are neither called upon, nor permitted to abuse in America’s name.  It was 
for those reasons that I undertook this study.  The images from Abu Ghraib persuaded 
me that groups of Americans had come to the conclusion that debased behavior 
directed at helpless detainees made sense.  I have been privileged to hear voices that 
add to the tortured logic that can lead to abuse. 
Having been privileged to interview the fourteen participants, I am now no less 
offended by the conduct exposed during and after the Abu Ghraib revelations than 
when I first learned of them.  Some of the acts recounted within this study are far 
worse than what happened there.  The time spent with the participants has created a 
sense of understanding the path traveled by some who became “monsters” and the 
suffering they endure.  I wish to make plain that to understand is not to excuse, and 
that none of the participants seek such excuse.  Each abuser bears the weight of every 
act he chose to carry out.  Their victims’ suffering dwarfs any guilt that they may 
experience, but it would be a mistake to think that abusive violence leaves anyone 
unscathed. Participant Louis Sanders’ words perhaps encapsulate much of what was 
learned in this study: 
What causes, I think, a lot of the problems, especially, you know, all the 
problems which also affects the detainee situation, that we are separate from 
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the other, you know, that there is some kind of super disconnect. That what 
we do to other people really doesn’t affect us, which allows us to do these 
things to other people. But whether we like it or not or want to accept it or 
not, what we do to others we—you know, we do to ourselves, and there’s no 
way that you can go to war and or you know objectify somebody, detain them, 
torture them, mistreat them and think you’re going to walk away clean…it’s 
not going to happen. 
The citizens whose nations engage in Counter-Terrorism and Counter-
Insurgency struggles probably suffer from the same belief in that “super disconnect.”  
Neither they, nor their governments may “walk away clean” if they fail to address the 
forces that foster abusive violence undertaken with the power they bestow upon their 
military and intelligence forces.
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Appendix 1: Participant Harm 
Mitigation, Confidentiality 
Protections and Lone Worker Risk 
Mitigation Protocols 
Participant harm mitigation   
To minimize emotional harm to study participants I consulted with a number of 
American psychologists and counselors with extensive experience  working with 
patients who had endured combat or other traumas resulting in diagnoses of Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).  I received information regarding how to assist 
participants who might experience flash-back episodes during interviews as well as 
the kinds of mental health services available to military veterans, and the ways in 
which the consultants suggested that topics under study could be best approached.  
The overarching message was that I should not avoid discussing in a direct way the 
experiences of interest because of fear that raising such topics would cause distress to 
the study participants.  As was pointed out to me by one counselor in a Vet Center in 
North Carolina, it is not as if the troubled veterans are not already daily thinking about 
their difficult experiences.  Several of the counselors observed that participation in the 
study might offer some of the veterans opportunities to discuss troubling experiences 
for the first time with someone whose judgment they did not fear, which they 
predicted might prove to be a positive experience for the participants.  Part of the 
study plan included me providing each participant with printed information regarding 
the US Veterans Administration Suicide Prevention hotlines and other programs as 
well as the address and telephone numbers of Vet Centers offering counseling to 
veterans both in the city where interviews were conducted and locations nearest to 
participant residences.   
Among the potential harms to study participants is the public association of their 
identities with violent heinous acts.  The dismay and disapproval of family and friends 
who may have constructed a vision of the participant’s war service as solely honorable 
and heroic, and whose ongoing emotional support may be key to participants’ well-
being, could certainly lead to participant harm.  Also, since at the outset it was hoped 
that the study would be able to locate persons who had participated in conduct 
similar to that which had already resulted in courts martial and imprisonment, I 
considered it imperative that collecting data to aid in understanding the phenomena 
accompanying decisions to commit abusive violence should not harm participants in 
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judicial as well as personal and psychological terms.  As such, I deemed confidentiality 
provisions during data collection and reporting as critically important. 
Confidentiality protections  
A number of safeguards were put into place in order to assure participant 
confidentiality.  Participants were told that they could participate entirely 
anonymously, without revealing their names to me.  I also dispensed with a signed 
consent form for the same reason, instead documenting consent through the 
recordings and transcripts of the interviews.  Prospective participants were given 
contact methods for me that included certain enhanced security features.  
Participants were assigned aliases at the time of interview, which aliases were the 
only labels used for study materials associated with the participants.  Demographic 
information regarding participant education, ages at the time of joining government 
service and periods of contact with detainees, and other items were collected without 
reference to any identifiers, including aliases.  The University authorized me to 
withhold from my supervisors the identities of the participants, if known.  My 
supervisors did enjoy complete access to anonymized transcripts of the interviews for 
oversight purposes.18 
Transcripts were prepared by a commercial service contracted under a Non-Disclosure 
Agreement, which service used transcription computer equipment provided by me.  
The provided computer was stored by the transcription service under secure protocols 
including passwords, encryption, and physical security measures intended to prevent 
determined software attack and moderate physical attempts at removal or 
unauthorized inspection.  File transfers were generally accomplished in personal 
meetings with the service, although on a small number of occasions files were 
electronically exchanged via encrypted format.  After the last interview transcript was 
completed by the transcription service, the previously provided equipment was 
retrieved, the audio and transcript files were erased, and the relevant hard-drive 
spaces were over-written multiple times using a security tool from a well-regarded 
commercially available data encryption service.  I personally reviewed the transcripts 
and scrubbed them of information that could be easily used to investigate the 
identities of participants.  In some cases unit names or numbers were removed, 
location names in the US and overseas were deleted and other individual information 
was expunged. 
                                                     
18
 As another protection for participant identities, I investigated whether the US National Institutes of 
Health would be willing to issue a Certificate of Confidentiality covering the study.  Such a certificate 
offers a statutory immunity from subpoena for protected research materials, although that stated 
immunity has not been honored by US courts in all cases.  For a number of reasons, largely relating to 
the unprecedented application from a non-US institution, and the lack of an institutional storage facility 
for the research products, I decided to forgo applying for a Certificate of Confidentiality. 
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As a final safeguard to participant confidentiality, I requested and received University 
permission to tell participants that I would refuse to provide their identities to 
anyone, including as might be sought via legal process.  That promise was extended to 
all potential and actual participants and I am fully committed to fulfilling that promise 
in the unlikely event that attempts are made to identify participants.   
This is a representation that I did not offer lightly, and nor do I think other researchers 
should do so either.  However, I do believe that there are a number of reasons why a 
serious inquiry seeking recollections of deeply personal experiences in matters that 
affect individual people and states, and the relations between states, merits such 
strong confidentiality protections.  Foremost among those reasons is the 
consideration that in striving to understand how individuals come to commit heinous 
behavior, one must first understand that they have committed such behavior, a point 
not easily reached without their frank admissions.  Such candor cannot be expected if 
making revelations of the acts, the thinking that led to them, and their aftermaths, 
would be tantamount to creating information likely to result in the participants’ public 
opprobrium or evidence leading to punishment in criminal and civil courts.   
In addition to the instrumental advantage to be gained by offering unconditional 
confidentiality, it is my opinion that although the study participants may be admitting 
to committing acts of assault, torture and murder, it would be detrimental to the 
study of such wartime phenomena if social scientists were transformed into gatherers 
of evidence for subsequent tribunals.  I do not in any way argue that individuals who 
commit such horrible acts should be immunized from the legal consequences of their 
involvement; however, it is the separate duty of civil and military authorities to 
investigate and bring to justice such offenders.  If there is a rational basis for punishing 
those acts, then there is a similar, if not greater, rational basis for preventing them in 
the first place.  With sufficient study, it may be possible to develop theories that 
describe the pathways and mechanisms that result in abusive violence, and which may 
in turn point the way toward methods of blocking those pathways and interrupting 
those mechanisms.  Understanding how these acts occur in real terms, rather than in 
abstract academic or legal debate, is an argument that strongly favors the collection of 
as accurate a set of empirical data as possible.  One such method of collection surely 
must be to ask the involved parties themselves to relate in their own words their own 
experiences and thoughts that resulted in and from their brutal behavior.  During 
planning for this study it was my view that offering to ensure confidentiality, even 
against possible legally empowered investigation, would enhance the likelihood of 
candor, and was worth potential eventualities.   
Any researcher who chooses to undertake similar research will be well served to 
deliberate at length the strength, and limits, of their commitment to the research and 
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the research participants.  It is one thing to blithely offer promises of confidentiality, 
but the researchers in at least one study involving terrorist killings during the Irish 
Troubles are in danger of having their participants’ taped interviews and identities 
collected as evidence in a murder inquiry by the Police Service of Northern Ireland. In 
my view the informed consent obtained from study participants who extend their 
trust at the risk of grave personal jeopardy must include an honest statement by the 
researchers involved of the limits to which they will protect that information.  That 
statement can only occur if the researchers themselves have settled the “what if” 
question for themselves.19 
Risk Assessment and Mitigation 
The University required that a Risk Assessment be prepared and presented for review 
by the School’s Risk Assessment Officer.  Possibilities addressed included concerns 
relating to normal crime activity, large scale weather events, vehicle traffic hazards, 
terrorist attacks, and lone worker risks.  All but the last were to be addressed by 
simple straightforward measures employed in everyday American urban life.  The 
situations involving potential lone worker risks were judged by me to be worth 
establishing certain additional protocols.  
  
Lone Worker Risk Mitigation Protocols 
Normal risks associated with solo researchers visiting unfamiliar communities and 
locales within those communities were further complicated by virtue of the fact that 
participant identities had to be kept confidential, and some of the participants might 
be operating with impaired self-control.  It was also taken as a given that the 
participants would be trained combat veterans with access to firearms and that some 
participants would have had experiences including inflicting torture and fatal injury to 
detainees. Relying upon personal professional experience as a security consultant and 
high-stakes threat assessment professional, and the counsel of a highly experienced 
forensic psychologist with whom I had co-managed a number of situations involving 
moderate to high risk of targeted violent attacks, I developed the following protocols. 
1. I would carry a personal alarm device secreted on my person that would 
transmit a distress signal via cell phone to a service staffed around the clock by 
operators capable of ascertaining my location within 25 meters via global 
positioning satellite technology. 
                                                     
19
 For a full discussion of the BC Belfast College situation from the standpoint of one of the researchers, 
see the text of a paper presented at the Oral History Network of Ireland (OHNI) Second Annual in 
September 2012 by Anthony McIntyre: 
http://bostoncollegesubpoena.wordpress.com/2012/10/07/the-belfast-project-and-the-boston-
college-subpoena-case/ 
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2. I would try to schedule the participant meetings in venues of my choosing, 
preferably in conferences rooms of hotels or offices where there were other 
persons nearby.  If this was not possible, then a hotel room or public location 
such as a restaurant or lobby would be used.  Next in preference would be a 
semi-private location under my control, such as a vehicle.  Least desirable 
would be the participant’s private residence or vehicle.  A participant’s 
residence presented certain potential suitability concerns beyond individual 
safety, primary among them being the potential inhibition to participant 
candor due to being overheard or interrupted by household members or 
visitors during interviews. 
3. As a check to possible misjudgments due to becoming over-invested in any one 
interview opportunity, I agreed to call the forensic psychologist and discuss 
any situations where I was asked by participants to vary from my established 
interview plan before proceeding with a change. 
4. Prior to each interview I alerted a third party that I was about to enter an 
interview and that I would be texting a pre-arranged all-clear signal by a 
certain time.  In the event that I failed to send the signal, the third party was 
given a contact protocol to initiate with me by mobile phone to ascertain my 
status.  The protocol included a duress/non-duress response sequence.  On 
three or four occasions this protocol was used when either interviews 
exceeded the expected ending times or I forgot to send the required signal. 
5. Also before each interview I left in a secure digital format the actual location of 
the interview and the name and contact information of the participant.  The 
means of obtaining the data were safeguarded in the safe of a law firm that 
had agreed to release the sealed envelope to my representative if I had failed 
to communicate the all-clear within established time frames.  I had an 
established safety response team and operational protocols for the team to 
use in following up in case of probable problems. After each interview I erased 
the digital meeting information. 
The lone worker safety methods proved to be flexible enough to accommodate 
interviews held in person either in Honolulu or in the two other cities where I travelled 
to meet with participants.  The GPS based tracking duress alarm was easily concealed 
and remained undetected by all participants.  The robust plans for response in the 
case of problems allowed me to assure my family, supervisor, and School risk officer 
that my safety was reasonably assured while in the field.  I was also satisfied that the 
confidentiality of the participants would not be compromised except in the worst 
case, and then only the last participant’s information would be exposed.
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Appendix 2. DIS Webpage from 
School of International Relations 
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Appendix 3. unspokentruths.org 
webpage 
Webpage established as part of participant recruiting efforts. 
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Appendix 4. Participant Information 
Sheet Text 
Participant Information Sheet 
Project Title:  Detainee Interaction Study 
Email: distudy@neomailbox.net 
 
What this research study is about 
You are invited to participate in a research study.   
 
I am John Tsukayama, a PhD student at the School of International Relations at the University of St. 
Andrews, Scotland.  This work is part of my research, which is supervised by Dr. Jeffrey Murer.  The 
study will look at the individual experiences of American military and intelligence personnel who 
interacted with detainees during Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Insurgency operations.  The aims of the 
study are to: 
 Describe the kinds of interactions between Americans and detainees 
 Describe the practices employed during those interactions 
 Understand the way those practices were developed, learned  and chosen by American 
military and intelligence personnel 
 Report the post-deployment thoughts of the Americans involved in detainee 
interactions 
 
Why you have been invited to participate 
You are someone who may have had interactions with detainees while you served in a military or 
intelligence arm of the US Government.  As such, I believe that your personal experiences are important 
sources of information and understanding that are vital to my research.   
 
What you can expect if you agree to participate 
You are invited to participate in an interview with me that should last for an hour or more depending 
upon the things you have to share and the amount of time you have available.   
 
I am willing to travel to meet with you for the interview.   
 
If you consent to being interviewed, I will audio record the interview and I will always advise you when 
the recording is starting and stopping.  In addition, there may be shorter follow-up conversations in 
which I seek clarification from you or when you may contact me with other information you want to 
provide.  Those conversations will similarly be recorded. 
 
I will not ask you to sign a consent form.  I will however ask you in the recorded interview whether you 
understand the nature of the research and that you are agreeing to participate in the research. 
 
You may suspend the interview at any point, and you may contact me later should you choose to 
continue.  Likewise, you may decline to discuss any subjects, but remain free to let me know later if you 
change your mind.   You may of course refuse to answer any questions you wish.  At the close of your 
participation I will again ask you to confirm that you understood the purposes of the research and 
voluntarily consented to participating in the research.  Of course, you may withdraw from participation at 
any time. 
 
What will be done to protect your privacy? 
Your identity will be strictly confidential.  Period. 
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I will take a number of steps to protect your privacy.  First and foremost, at no time will you be required 
to give me your true name.  Second, while I will collect some background information from you, that 
information will be kept separate from any audio files or transcripts that contain information about your 
observations or recollections.  That background information will contain no references to the date, time 
or place of your interview and it will not have any information regarding what you say in the recorded 
interview. The background information will be kept only by me in a secure storage site.  
 
When we meet I will provide you a list of fake names from which you will be asked to choose one.  That 
name will be used thereafter in the transcript of the interview and anything written about the interview.  
The digital recording file will be password protected and only I and the transcriber will have access to 
the password.  The transcriber will sign a contract known as a Non-Disclosure Agreement which will 
require that the original audio file and all copies of the transcript held by the transcriber will be destroyed 
or returned to me.  In addition, after the recording is transcribed, I will review it for accuracy and change 
anything in it that would obviously identify you.  Once I am satisfied that the transcript has been 
accurately prepared and edited I will effect the destruction of the digital audio recording file of the 
interview. 
 
I will not give your identity to the transcriber.  I will not give your identity to my supervisors.  I will not 
give your identity to the examiners reviewing my PhD thesis. They do not need to know it and will not 
ask for it. 
 
The transcript of your interview will be held by me in secure storage and I will personally destroy it 
when it is no longer needed. My supervisor, Dr. Jeffrey Murer, will have access to the transcripts in order 
to provide me with guidance and feedback.  Dr. Murer will be reading the transcripts and will not have 
access to your true identity.  He is also committed to protecting your privacy. 
 
I will refuse any requests made to reveal your identity or to provide information likely to lead to 
discovery of your identity, even if you have made your identity known, unless you personally release me 
to provide that information. I consider your privacy to be so vital that I will refuse directions from 
any sources to invade it.  The University knows that I have made this commitment to you and expects 
that I abide by that commitment in my use of your information during my research and any thesis, 
reports, or publications that I may later produce.   
 
Given the precautions outlined above, it is very unlikely that your identity will become known. Even 
still, there may be ways in which your participation in the study could become known.  For instance, the 
information you provide may be so specific that anyone who knew you at the time and was present 
during the events could know who you are.  Of course anyone who arranged for you to contact me to 
participate in the study or anyone you told about your participation would know that we had spoken. 
 
I am not required to report anything you tell me which could be considered violations of government 
policy, procedure, or law.  I would, however, need to make appropriate notifications if you give me 
information indicating that you or others are at risk of harm.  Should this happen, I will tell you and you 
can decide whether to continue your participation. 
 
How the information you provide will be used 
The information provided by you will be analyzed with that of other participants and will be used in my 
PhD thesis. The information may also be used in future research I conduct.  My findings may also be 
shared publicly in presentations or publications to persons interested in the topics I am researching.  Of 
course, as noted above, I will always be mindful of the need to protect your privacy. 
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How this research is funded 
This research is completely independent.  Other than very limited assistance from the University of St. 
Andrews, no UK, US or other government funding is being provided to support me or this research 
study.  I am an independent researcher obligated only to conduct an honest and rigorous study and 
prepare a thesis for examination by the University and its examiners. 
Contacts for Further Information 
 
 
 
Dr. Jeffrey Stevenson Murer 
Lecturer on Collective Violence 
School of International Relations 
University of St. Andrews 
Tel:+44(0)1334/46.19.24 
Fax:+44(0)1334/46.xxxx 
Email: Jeffrey.Murer@st-andrews.ac.uk 
 
John K. Tsukayama 
PhD Student 
School of International Relations 
University of St. Andrews 
UK Tel:+44(0)1331 208 xxxx 
US Tel: +1 (202) 657-5707 
Email: distudy@neomailbox.net 
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Appendix 5: Rapport Building Efforts 
I told participants that the interview process could be accomplished with as 
few as two full days and nights in Honolulu, but that I recommended a more workable 
plan should be built around four nights as this would allow for recovery from jet lag 
and additional time for contingencies, including a possible third interview.  I proposed 
the following schedule to participants who travelled to Hawaii: 
Day 1: Arrival in Honolulu and initial meeting with researcher over dinner to 
allow an informal opportunity to become acquainted and to answer questions 
participant or supporter might have.  If the travel expenses had not been advanced to 
the participant, I provided the cash at the beginning of the first meeting.  Also at the 
first meeting I provided the participant with hard-copies of the Participant Information 
Sheet, a map to the interview site, a listing of Veterans Administration Vet Center 
locations and telephone numbers in Honolulu and in the areas nearest the 
participant’s home, and printed information directed at veterans and their families 
regarding Veteran’s Administration advice and support resources for veteran PTSD 
and suicide prevention.  I also provided some information regarding inexpensive 
sightseeing and dining options for visitors to Honolulu.  Also during the first meeting I 
took the opportunity to thank the participant and supporter for traveling to Honolulu 
and repeated the assertion that the participant was free to withdraw consent to be 
interviewed at any time before or during the interviews and that the reimbursement 
for travel expenses was not intended to purchase the participant’s cooperation or 
information.   
Day 2: The Participant, the participant’s supporter and I spend a few hours in 
further informal interaction.  This was generally a two or three hour island orientation 
tour given by me followed by lunch.  Included in the tour was showing the participant 
and supporter the location of the interview site and providing directions for easiest 
transport to same.  During opportune moments when the participant supporter and I 
were left alone, I made sure to ask whether the supporter had any concerns which 
they wished to raise to me.  In only one case was a concern related.  It concerned 
frequent flashback episodes suffered by the participant.  In all cases the supporters 
expressed appreciation for the inquiry as well as their being comfortable with me and 
the processes that had been evident to that point to ensure participant well-being and 
confidentiality. 
Day 3: First interview day, consisting of three or four hours spent together in 
interview and breaks.  Several hours before the scheduled interview time I spoke by 
telephone with each participant to remind them that they were not obligated to 
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proceed and could terminate the interview at any time.  All elected to start the 
interview.  Most of the interviews concluded at the point in the participant account 
where the combat deployment ended.  The overnight pause was intended to allow me 
to reflect upon the information received in the first interview and to formulate follow 
up questions.  The break was also intended to give the participants a half-day and 
evening spent with the supporters in order to either work through any difficulties 
raised by the first interview or to disengage completely from the study topics and re-
focus on the sight-seeing, and relaxation opportunities afforded by the interview 
locale. 
Day 4: Second interview day, again scheduling approximately three hours of 
interview and another one or two hours of breaks in order to ensure enough time to 
conduct a complete concluding interview.  As with the prior day, before meeting in 
person I spoke by telephone to confirm with participants that they could stop at that 
point; again all elected to proceed. 
Day 5: No scheduled interview, allowing final sight-seeing and start of 
homeward travel via night flight.  This timing also allowed for some flexibility to 
conduct an interview if the prior day proved unsuitable for interview by the 
participant or in the unlikely event that the second interview had to be continued.  In 
one or two cases participants scheduled their travel immediately after the Day 4 
interviews. 
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Appendix 6. Instruction and 
Background  
Instruction and Background Form  
 Please place a mark next to each instruction below to indicate that you have read and 
understand the information.  
Instructions:  
___1. DO NOT list your true name or other individual identifying information on this form.  
___2. DO NOT list the true name of any other person on this form.  
___3. You may choose to not answer any question on this form; if you do, please write 
“declined” anywhere in the answer area to indicate that you did not simply overlook the 
question.  
___4. If you do not understand a question, please ask the researcher for explanation.  
___5. This form will collect certain background information about you and will be kept 
separate from your interview transcript and personal experience disclosure form.  
___6. An alias (fake name) will be assigned to you and your information during the study. All 
materials directly connected to the information you provide at this time and the resulting 
transcript will be referenced only by that alias.  
___7. During the interview an audio-only recorder will be used. You will be told at all times 
when the recorder is about to be turned on and off.  
___8. During the interview and while the recorder is running, please do not use the true 
name of anyone you personally served with or who was present during events you describe.  
___9. If at any time you would like to take a break, please let the researcher know and the 
interview will be paused.  
___10. During the course of the interview you may be asked to consider your Personal Calm 
Score. You determine your own Personal Calm Score by thinking about how you are feeling 
at the time. This is not a precise measure and there is no “right” number—simply how you 
think you feel at the time. On the scale of 1 to 10 below, please circle the number that best 
represents how you are feeling right now.  
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  
Entirely Calm Mostly Calm Neutral Mostly Uneasy Entirely Uneasy  
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Circle highest grade of education completed:  
8th grade  13 College Freshman  
9th grade  14 Sophomore  
10th grade  15 Junior  
11th grade  16 Senior (College Graduate)  
12th grade  17 Post Graduate (Specify no. years and 
degree)______________________________  
Circle highest grade of education completed at time of detainee interaction:  
8th grade  13 College Freshman  
9th grade  14 Sophomore  
10th grade  15 Junior  
11th grade  16 Senior (College Graduate)  
12th grade  17 Post Graduate (Specify no. years and 
degree)______________________________  
During period of experience with detainees, which describe(s) your status: (check all that 
apply)  
___Uniformed Member of US Armed Forces ___Civilian US DoD Employee  
___Member of civilian US Intelligence Agency ___Employee of private contractor to US Govt.  
___Employee of private contractor to foreign govt. ___Employee of private contractor to non-
gov.  
___ American Law Enforcement Officer  
If serving in US Armed Forces at time of detainee experiences, which service(s) were you in 
at the time:  
___US Army ___US Navy ___USMC ___US Air Force ___US Coast Guard  
If member of US Intelligence Agency or American Law Enforcement, please name agency 
you were with at the time of detainee interaction. If you were a state or local law 
enforcement officer assigned to a federal operation, in order to assure anonymity, please do 
not give your home agency name. Instead, name federal organization you were assigned to 
(e.g., JTTF, etc.)  
Agency Name:_____________________________________________________   
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Age at time of military/intelligence/law enforcement recruitment:  
___17-19 ___20-21 ___22-23 ___24-25 ___26-27 ___28-29  
___30-31 ___32-33 ___34-35 ___36-37 ___38-39  
___40 and over ___n/a  
Age(s) at time of interactions with detainees:  
___18-19 ___20-21 ___22-23 ___24-25 ___26-27 ___28-29  
___30-31 ___32-33 ___34-35 ___36-37 ___38-39  
___40 and over ___n/a  
Rank at time of interactions with detainees:  
Enlisted/NCO: E-___ Warrant: W-___ Commissioned: O-___ Civilian Gov.: GS-___  
Other (specify):________________________  
Locations where detainee interactions took place:  
___CONUS ___Guantanamo ___Afghanistan ___Iraq  
Other: (list 
countries)_________________________________________________________________  
Are you still employed by the organization you were with when you had detainee 
interaction?  
___yes ___no  
How long were you with, or have you been with, that organization?  
___ years and ___ months  
Please mark the following tasks that were part of your interaction with detainees: (mark all 
that apply)  
___capture ___transport from point of capture ___guard in field  
___question in field ___guard in holding facility ___question in holding facility  
___in-process in holding facility ___provide medical services ___language translation  
___out-process from holding facility  
___other 
(describe)___________________________________________________________________
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disclosure Sheet 
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Appendix 8. Interview Schedule 
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